The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ROBERT D. KORNAGAY,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 2:24-cv-980-SPC-NPM
R. TABIL et al.,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Robert D. Kornagay’s Complaint (Doc. 1).
Kornagay is a prisoner of the Florida Department of Corrections and sues
twelve state prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court must review
the Complaint sua sponte to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages against a party who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 1915A.
To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant
deprived him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2)
the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654
F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865,
872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an
affirmative causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059
(11th Cir. 2001).
The root of this action is Kornagay’s allegation that Defendant Tabil
repeatedly threatened Kornagay for filing prior lawsuits and encouraged other
inmates to attack him. Kornagay was eventually stabbed by another inmate
in an attack allegedly orchestrated by Defendants Coreff and Bias. Kornagay
alleges Defendants Snider, Scarpatty, and Dawson knew of the danger but
were deliberately indifferent to it. And he accuses Noe, Zabala, and Garnet of
deliberate indifference to the injuries he suffered in the attack. These claims
survive sua sponte review. But Kornagay’s claims against Johns and Adams
do not.
Johns and Adams are representatives of the FDOC secretary. Kornagay
asserts they violated his Eighth Amendment rights when handling grievances.
Specifically, he alleges Johns returned an emergency grievance because it did
not qualify as an emergency under the Florida Administrative Code, sent the
grievance to the warden, and advised Kornagay to file an informal grievance.
Kornagay alleges Adams denied a grievance appeal.
The Eighth Amendment’s “prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment requires prison officials to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates.’” Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). To succeed on a failure
to protect claim, a plaintiff must show (1) he was incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the prison official was
deliberately indifferent to the risk, and (3) the constitutional violation caused
his injuries. Id. at 1357-58. Deliberate indifference is akin to subjective
recklessness as used in criminal law. To establish deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff “must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that
his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.”
Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024). A defendant was not
deliberately indifferent if he responded reasonably to the risk. Id.
Kornagay does not plausibly plead that Johns or Adams acted recklessly
to a known risk of serious harm. Johns did not ignore Kornagay’s grievance—
he responded reasonably by sending it to the warden and advising Kornagay
on the proper procedure. Kornagay’s real dispute with Johns is over the
definition of an “emergency grievance.” That claim is not actionable in federal
court because “prisoners have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in
having access to prison grievance procedures.” Allen v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 578 F. App’x 836, 439 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, alleged defects in the
grievance procedure do not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights. Id.
What is more, Kornagay does not state the content of the grievance John
returned or the appeal Adams denied. An official cannot be found liable for
deliberate indifference if he or she acted reasonably. “[T]he reasonableness of
the response is dependent upon the exigencies of the specific circumstances.”
Cox, 15 F.4th at 1860. And a prisoner asserting a failure-to-protect claim must
plead facts that help the court understand where the defendant’s response fell
on the sliding scale between reasonable and reckless. Id. Kornagay failed to
allege what Johns and Adams knew when they made their respective decisions.
As a result, his complaint does not plausibly establish that either defendant
was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
Plaintiff Robert Kornagay’s claims against Defendants Johns and Adams
are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate
Johns and Adams as parties to this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 17, 2025.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record