The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
YVONNE F. BROWN, )
)
)
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-1718
)
)
v. ) District Judge W. Scott Hardy
) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
TRACEY DYER, Manager; JACKIE )
WATKINS, Assistant Manager; and EBONY )
TOLLIVER, Community Assistant, )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
)
YVONNE F. BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 25-63
)
v. ) District Judge W. Scott Hardy
) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
ARBOR MANAGEMENT.COM, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) entered by
Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly in each of the above-captioned matters on February 7, 2025.
(Civ. Action No. 24-1718 (“Brown I”), Docket No. 7; Civ. Action No. 25-63 (“Brown II”), Docket
No. 4). The two R&Rs, which are essentially identical, recommend that the complaints in these
separately filed, but related, matters be dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. (Brown I Docket
No. 7 at 2, 6; Brown II Docket No. 4 at 2, 6). Service of the R&Rs was made on pro se Plaintiff
Yvonne F. Brown (“Plaintiff”) via U.S. Mail, and she was informed that any objections to same
by unregistered CM/ECF users were due by February 24, 2025.1 (Brown I Docket No. 7 at 6-7;
Brown II Docket No. 4 at 6-7; and Docket text entries). Thereafter, Plaintiff did not file any
objections to the R&Rs.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may file specific written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, and a district
judge must conduct a de novo review of any part of the R&R that has been properly objected to.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), (3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Here, however, because Plaintiff did not
file any objections to the R&Rs, which explicitly stated that failure to file timely objections “will
waive the right to appeal” (Brown I Docket No. 7 at 6; Brown II Docket No. 4 at 6), we review the
magistrate judge’s decision for plain error. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)
Advisory Committee’s Note to 1983 Addition (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need
only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.” (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N.D. Cal., 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974))).
Here, in Brown II, upon careful review of the R&R, Plaintiff’s Complaint (Brown II Docket
No. 3), and the entire record, the Court, finding no plain error on the face of the record, will accept
Judge Kelly’s recommendation. As such, in Brown II, the Court will adopt the R&R as the Opinion
of the Court, and will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, as set forth more
1 The Court notes that the Brown I R&R was returned by U.S. mail to the Court as “RTS Unable to Forward.”
The Brown II R&R, however, was not similarly returned to the Court. The R&Rs, which are essentially identical,
recommend dismissal of both cases. Additionally, both R&Rs indicate that written objections were due within
seventeen days for unregistered CM/ECF users, and advise that the failure to file objections would waive the right to
appeal. (Brown I Docket No. 7 at 6; Brown II Docket No. 4 at 6).
fully in the R&R. In Brown I, upon careful review of the R&R, Plaintiff’s Complaint (Brown I
Docket No. 4), and the entire record, the Court will accept Judge Kelly’s recommendation with
one small modification. As such, in Brown I, the Court will adopt the R&R as the Opinion of the
Court, as modified herein, and the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
In so ruling on the Brown I R&R, the Court only disagrees with Judge Kelly’s construal of
Plaintiff’s “Motion to Amend” as an “Amended Complaint.” (Brown I Docket No. 6). Rather,
the Court regards such filing as a motion to amend the Complaint, since Plaintiff entitled the
document “Motion to Amend” and indicated therein that she was requesting to amend the claim to
add a claim of discrimination. (Id.). Because the Court disagrees with the Brown I R&R to the
extent it construes the Motion to Amend as an Amended Complaint, the Court does not adopt that
R&R to the extent it is based on the Motion to Amend constituting a supplement to the Complaint
rather than a request to submit supplementation. Accordingly, the Court considers the Brown I
Complaint (Brown I Docket No. 4) to be the operative complaint in that matter, and the Court
adopts the Brown I R&R to the extent it is based on the Brown I Complaint, without consideration
of the Motion to Amend since it is not a pleading.
Aside from that minor issue, the Court agrees with Judge Kelly’s recommendations as to
the Complaints in both Brown I and Brown II. Specifically, the Court agrees with Judge Kelly
that, although Watkins and Tolliver are named as defendants in Brown I, and although Arbor is
named as a defendant in Brown II, the Complaints in the respective matters fail to allege any facts
related to such defendants, and the Complaints should therefore be dismissed against these parties
for failure to state claims against them on which relief may be granted. (Brown I Docket No. 7 at
4; Brown II Docket No. 4 at 4). The Court also agrees with Judge Kelly that Plaintiff’s claims
against defendant Dyer in Brown I contain a litany of legal conclusions without factual support
sufficient to place Dyer (or the Court) on notice of the basis of the claims asserted against her.
(Brown I Docket No. 7 at 4-5; Brown II Docket No. 4 at 4-5). Thus, the Court agrees with Judge
Kelly that Plaintiff has not stated a claim that crosses the line from conceivable to plausible in
order to proceed because the alleged facts, as they are presently pled, simply do not support claims
under federal law. (Brown I Docket No. 7 at 5-6; Brown II Docket No. 4 at 5-6). Additionally,
the Court agrees with Judge Kelly that Plaintiff may be able to cure the identified deficiencies in
the Brown I and Brown II Complaints, so those Complaints will be dismissed without prejudice
and Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint in each matter. (Brown I Docket
No. 7 at 6; Brown Docket No. 4 at 6).
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the Court enters the following Order:
AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 2025,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Brown I R&R (Brown I Docket No. 7), as MODIFIED
herein, is ADOPTED as the Opinion of the Court in Brown I.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Brown II R&R (Brown II Docket No. 4) is
ADOPTED as the Opinion of the Court in Brown II.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the reasons set forth herein and in the R&Rs, the
claims alleged by Plaintiff in her Complaints in Brown I and Brown II are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, if Plaintiff wishes to file an Amended Complaint in Brown I and/or Brown II
to correct the substantial pleading deficiencies identified in the R&Rs, she shall do so in each case,
in a pleading that fully alleges every claim she wishes to pursue and that stands by itself without
reference to the original Complaint filed in each matter, by April 7, 2025. If Plaintiff does not file
an Amended Complaint in accordance with this Memorandum Order in Brown I or Brown II by
April 7, 2025, then her claims in that case will be dismissed with prejudice.
/s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge
cc/ecf: Yvonne F. Brown (via U.S. Mail)