MR DOE v. REGIONAL SCHOOL UNIT 21

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

MR. AND MS. DOE, )

both individually and on behalf of )

their minor daughter, JANE DOE, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) No. 2:23-cv-00466-JAW

)

REGIONAL SCHOOL UNIT 21, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ UNOPPOSED MOTION TO SEAL

In line with well-established precedent on the common law presumption of the

right of public access to judicial records, the court dismisses the defendants’

unopposed motion to seal a settlement agreement and orders the agreement

unsealed. For the same reason, the court also orders that the defendants’ motion and

brief in support of sealing the settlement agreement be unsealed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 28, 2023, Mr. and Ms. Doe, each appearing individually and on

behalf of their minor daughter Jane Doe, filed a complaint against Regional School

Unit 21 (RSU 21 or the District); Dr. Terri Cooper, the District’s Superintendent; and

Anita Bernhardt, the District’s Assistant Superintendent (collectively, the

Defendants), Compl. (ECF No. 1), asserting claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 167-82. That same day, Mr. and Ms. Doe filed a

motion for preliminary injunction. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 5). On January 26,

2024, Dr. Cooper and Ms. Bernhardt (jointly, the Individual Defendants) filed a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim (ECF No. 22) (Defs.’ Mot.). On September 6, 2024, the Court dismissed the

Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss and the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary

injunction. Order on Mot. to Dismiss and Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 28).

The parties subsequently entered settlement negotiations. On December 11,

2024, the parties participated in a judicial settlement conference with the United

States Magistrate Judge at which they reached a settlement, and later filed a joint

application for approval of minor settlement. Min. Entry (ECF No. 38); Defs.’

Unopposed Mot. to Seal at 1 (ECF No. 43); Def.’s Unopposed Mot. to Seal, Attach. 1,

Joint Verified Appl. for Approval of Minor Settlement with Inc. Statement Pursuant

to D. Me. Loc. R. 41.2 (Joint Appl. for Settlement Approval). On January 29, 2025,

the Defendants filed an unopposed motion to seal the joint verified application for

approval of minor settlement that the Plaintiffs consented to, in which they further

requested a conference with the Court. Defs.’ Unopposed Mot. to Seal.

At a teleconference of counsel on February 24, 2025, the Court discussed with

the parties the Court’s obligation to follow the law on, among other things, the right

of public access to judicial records, despite the consented-to motion to seal. Min.

Entry (ECF No. 45). At the teleconference, Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that

under the settlement agreement, the Plaintiffs had promised to allow confidentiality

to the extent permitted by law. At the same time, Plaintiffs’ counsel observed that

district court judges had issued decisions not allowing secrecy in minor settlement

cases, and Plaintiffs’ counsel brought this issue to the attention of Defendants’

counsel. Thus, Plaintiffs’ counsel was careful to say that they were not opposing the

Defendants’ effort to seal the settlement, but they also understood that this Court

was going to undertake an independent review and make its own decision.

Upon request, the Court allowed the Defendants to file a memorandum

responding to the Court’s concerns, id., and, in compliance with the Court’s directive,

the Defendants filed a supplemental memorandum in support of their motion to seal

on March 3, 2025. Defs.’ Suppl. Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to Seal (ECF No. 46)

(Defs.’ Suppl. Mem.). The Court allowed the Plaintiffs to file a response, but

Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated by email that they did not intend to do so.

The Court issues this order to address the pending motion requesting an order

sealing the joint application for approval of minor settlement.

II. THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SEAL

A. The Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Seal

The Defendants’ unopposed motion to seal argues “a covenant of confidentiality

to the extent permitted by law” is “an essential element” of the parties’ settlement

agreement and accordingly asks the Court to permit the filing of the joint motion for

approval of minor settlement under seal. Defs.’ Unopposed Mot. to Seal at 1

(discussing Joint Appl. for Settlement Approval).

Turning to their legal arguments, Defendants contend, first, that there is no

clearly established right of public access to documents filed in civil cases under the

First Amendment. Id. at 2 (citing Courthouse News Serv. v. Quinlan, 32 F.4th 15, 20

(1st Cir. 2022)). Acknowledging that federal circuit courts have recognized the

presumptive right of public access to other aspects of a civil case, they allege “[i]n

none of these cases [cited by the First Circuit in Courthouse News] has a court

addressed the question of whether there is a presumptive right of public access to

documents reflecting a settlement.” Id. at 2-3 (collecting cases).

Next, Defendants argue that if there is a right of public access to settlement

documents, it is necessarily a qualified right and must consider factors such as

whether “the settlement implies ‘sensitive information about [a] minor[],’ [including]

the ‘severity and expected duration of [her] emotional and mental injuries.’” Id. at 3

(quoting Willis v. United States, CV 117-015, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221109, at *5

(S.D. Ga. Dec. 26, 2019) (citation amended)).

Defendants proffer that the facts of this case overcome the presumption of

public access and warrant sealing “any documents that would reflect the terms of the

settlement in this case.” Id. (capitalization altered). They assert, first, that although

the Plaintiffs have proceeded under pseudonyms in this case, “the allegations in their

Complaint were previously [] made known to the public in the context of a meeting of

RSU 21’s School Board” and “[t]herefore there is a substantial likelihood that

members of the public viewing the court docket would be able to identify Mr. and Mrs.

Doe, and their minor child.” Id. at 4.

They allege, second, that “because Jane Doe’s condition was described in a

School Board meeting that was open to the public, disclosure of the amount of the

settlement could be interpreted by those viewing the court record as implying

‘sensitive information’ about the minor child’s emotional health.” Id.

Third, Defendants argue that disclosure of the settlement documents would

conflict with the policies reflected in the Federal Education Records Privacy Act

(FERPA) because (1) they “contain information directly related to [Jane Doe]”, and

(2) the settlement documents, when combined with the information previously made

public, “would allow a reasonable person in the school community, who does not have

personal knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to identify the student with

reasonable certainty,” thus making them “personally identifiable.” Id. (quoting

Belanger v. Nashua, N.H., Sch. Dist., 856 F. Supp. 40, 48 (D.N.H. 1994)).

Fourth, they argue “there is a risk that this settlement will be misconstrued

by any member of the community who becomes aware of its terms, and the agreed

confidentiality term will preclude any party . . . from correcting the resulting

misconception.” Id. at 5.

B. The Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum

Responding to the concerns the Court raised about sealing at the February 24,

2025 telephone conference of counsel, Defendants first concede that “there is

substantial support in the case[]law for the proposition that sealing is not justified in

circumstances where the substance of the information that is the subject of a motion

to seal already appears in the part of the court record that is accessible to the public.”

Defs.’ Suppl. Mem. at 2 (citing Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d

Cir. 2004) (a court need not engage in the futile exercise of trying to “make what has

thus become public private again”)). However, Defendants contend “there is a

fundamental difference between what a litigant says in a Declaration and a

settlement agreement made on behalf of a minor.” Id. Elaborating on their position,

Defendants explain that while a litigant’s allegations in a declaration “are assumed

to be self-serving,” a minor settlement agreement “is presumed to reflect

compensation that is at least fair . . . to the child, and it may bear little relation to a

parent-plaintiff’s description of the harm she thinks her child has suffered.” Id. at 2-

3. They contend this characterization is apt in the instant case because Ms. Doe

submitted a declaration in which she “subjective[ly] characterize[ed] . . . her

daughter’s anxiety and its effect on her ability to attend school.” Id. at 3 (citing

Pl[s].’[] Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Attach 1, Decl. of Ms. Doe in Support of Pl.’s Mot. for

Prelim. Inj. ¶¶ 23, 24, 34, 36, 38, 39, 44, 158, 159 (ECF No. 5)).

Referencing FERPA, Defendants continue that Jane Doe’s parents generally

have the right to disclose to the public information about their daughter’s education,

but the Defendants do not have the same right under FERPA and thus “must take

all measures within their power to avoid being seen as sharing with the public any

information about Jane Doe’s mental health and education progress.” Id. at 3-4.

Defendants are concerned that “[m]aking the settlement a public record could . . . be

construed by a member of the public as conveying the Defendants’ view that Jane Doe

has suffered emotional or educational issue,” which “would be problematic under

FERPA.” Id. at 4 (Defendants’ emphasis).

Next, Defendants proffer “[i]f the Court concludes that the public’s interest in

having access to information about the expenditure of government funds is a decisive

factor in whether or not to seal the Application for Approval of Minor Settlement, it

should be aware that only the Plaintiff[s’] attorney[’s] fees are to be paid from the

public coffers,” explaining “[t]he payment for the benefit of Jane Doe will come from

RSU 21’s liability insurance company [and] [t]he public has no heightened interest in

knowing how the insurance company spends its money.” Id. (Defendants’ emphasis).

In conclusion, Defendants ask for the Court’s permission to file the joint

application for approval of minor settlement under seal. Id. at 5.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The First Circuit has explained that there are “two related but distinct

presumptions of public access to judicial proceedings and records: a common-law right

of access to ‘judicial documents,’ and a First Amendment right of access to certain

criminal proceedings and materials submitted therein.” United States v. Kravetz, 706

F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Providence J., 293 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002)).

A. The First Amendment Right of Access

In its description of the First Amendment right of access, the First Circuit was

careful to observe that this right of access relates to “certain criminal proceedings

and materials submitted therein.” Id. (emphasis supplied). In Courthouse News, the

First Circuit wrote: “[n]either this court nor the Supreme Court has recognized any

right under the First Amendment to access documents filed in civil cases.” 32 F.4th

at 20.

At the same time, in Courthouse News, the First Circuit noted that the “parties

agree that there is a qualified First Amendment right in the public to access newly

filed complaints.” Id. Also in Courthouse News, the First Circuit cited Press-

Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1986), as suggesting that there is

such a right and El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 495 (1st Cir. 1992),

as suggesting there is not. The First Circuit then resolved the appeal based on the

parties’ agreement that the First Amendment applied. In El Dia, the First Circuit

wrote that it “seriously question[ed] whether Richmond Newspapers [Inc. v. Virginia,

448 U.S. 555 (1980)] and its progeny carry positive implications favoring rights of

access outside the criminal justice system.” 963 F.2d at 495.

Based on the unsettled state of Supreme Court and First Circuit authority and,

unlike in Courthouse News, an absence of agreement in this case as to the

applicability of the First Amendment to this civil action, the Court follows the

prudential practice of the First Circuit of “forgoing broad constitutional holdings

unless such holdings are unavoidable.” Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 30 (1st

Cir. 2018) (citing Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 497 F.3d 102, 106 (1st Cir. 2007) and

El Dia, 963 F.2d at 494). When faced with whether to rest on the First Amendment

issue in Kravetz, the First Circuit generally declined to reach the constitutional claim

and instead resolved the public access issue using the standards in the common law

right of access. 706 F.3d at 53.

B. The Common Law Right of Public Access

The First Circuit extensively discussed the right of public access in Kravetz

and reiterated that “[c]ourts have long recognized ‘that public monitoring of the

judicial system fosters the important values of quality, honest and respect for our

legal system.’” 706 F.3d at 52 (quoting In re Providence J., 293 F.3d at 9 (in turn

quoting Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1998)). To uphold these

values, once it is determined that the document is a so-called “judicial record,” a

presumption that it is public applies. Id.

The First Circuit explained that a “judicial record” is a document that is

“submitted by parties to aid in the adjudication of” an issue before the court and that

is “meant to impact the court’s disposition of substantive rights.” Id.; accord United

States ex rel. Nargol v. Deputy Orthopaedics, Inc., 69 F.4th 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2023)

(stating judicial records are “those ‘materials on which a court relies in determining

the litigants’ substantive rights’”) (quoting Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 54). Thus, in Kravetz,

a criminal case, the First Circuit decided that there is a right of public access to

sentencing memoranda and support letters intended to influence a sentence. Id. at

56-59. The Kravetz Court rejected the argument that a judicial record need be

disclosed only if it actually influenced a judge’s decision. Id. at 58-59.

At the same time, the Kravetz Court observed that “[t]hough the public’s right

of access is vibrant, it is not unfettered. Important countervailing interests can, in

given instances, overwhelm the usual presumption and defeat access.” Id. at 59

(quoting Siedle, 147 F.3d at 10). In other words, while the presumption is broad,

there are exceptional circumstances that may counter it. However, the First Circuit

cautioned “‘only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial

records’ that come within the scope of the common-law right of access.” Id. (quoting

In re Providence J., 293 F.3d at 10 (in turn quoting FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt.

Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987)).

In balancing the competing interests in cases where the presumption of public

access applies, the district court should consider whether the “personal privacy

interests of third parties” are at stake. Id. at 61. “[P]rivacy rights of participants and

third parties are among those interests which, in appropriate cases, can limit the

presumptive right of access to judicial records.” Id. at 62 (quoting Standard Fin.

Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d at 411) (quotation marks omitted). The First Circuit directed

district courts to “weigh heavily” the privacy interests of third parties in the court’s

balancing analysis.

In addition, the First Circuit directed the district courts to “consider the degree

to which the subject matter is traditionally considered private rather than public.”

Id. (quoting United States v. Connolly (In re Boston Herald, Inc.), 321 F.3d 174, 190

(1st Cir. 2003)). “Financial records of a wholly owned business, family affairs,

illnesses, embarrassing conduct with no public ramifications, and similar matters

will weigh more heavily against access than conduct affecting a substantial portion

of the public.” Id. (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir.

1995)). Addressing sentencing letters in the criminal context, the First Circuit wrote

that “discussion of the ill health of members of the authors’ families, incidents of

domestic violence, and other domestic relations matters” involves “highly personal”

information and “appears to have no direct bearing on the public’s assessment of the

sentences imposed.” Id. at 62.

The Kravetz Court also discussed the right of public access to medical

information. Id. at 63. It began with the premise that “[m]edical information is . . .

‘universally presumed to be private, not public.’” Id. Even so, “[a]cknowledging the

presumptively private nature of medical information does not end the matter”

because “[t]he privacy interest in medical information is ‘neither fundamental nor

absolute.’” Id. (citation omitted). In this context, the Kravetz Court quoted the

Second Circuit in saying that “[c]ourts have long declined to allow public access

simply to cater to a morbid craving for that which is sensational and impure.” Id.

(quoting Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1051).

C. Public Right of Access to Minor Settlement Agreements

The First Circuit has not directly addressed public access to motions for

judicial approval of settlement agreements. However, the Seventh Circuit considered

the issue in depth in Goesel v. Boley International (H.K.) Ltd., 738 F.3d 831 (7th Cir.

2013). After noting that settlement agreements reached without court assistance or

intervention are not treated as “judicial records,” the Seventh Circuit observed that

“settlement terms are of potential public interest only when judicial approval of the

terms is required, or they become an issue in a subsequent lawsuit, or the settlement

is sought to be enforced.” Id. at 834 (collecting cases from the Seventh and Eleventh

Circuits). The Goesel Court wrote that “[i]n all such cases the presumption of a right

of public access to court documents should apply.” Id. In Goesel, the Seventh Circuit

rejected a motion to seal the settlement document, id. at 835, and, “[f]ollowing Goesel,

courts in [the Seventh Circuit] have denied requests to seal judicially-approved

settlement agreements.” Gratton v. Cielo, Inc., No. 23-cv-1647-bhl, 2024 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 135178, at *6 (E.D. Wis. July 31, 2024) (collecting cases).

Goesel has also been followed in courts beyond the Seventh Circuit. See

Carrasquillo v. Bhatia-Gautier, 590 F. Supp. 3d 444, 451 (D.P.R. 2022); Kaufman v.

Jetson Elec. Bikes, LLC, No. 22-cv-3765, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11419, at *6-7 (E.D.

Pa. Jan. 23, 2024); Shannon Brewster as Adm’x of the Est. of Alan E. Brewster v. Larry

Strickland Trucking LLC, 2:24-cv-00096, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150531, at *1-4 (S.D.

W. Va. Aug. 22, 2024); Dilliner v. GM, LLC, Civ. Action No. 2:19-cv-00415, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 31337, at *9 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 19, 2021); Bruning v. Chizek Elevator &

Transp., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-0342-DGK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76409, at *2-3 (W.D.

Mo. May 19, 2017); Willis v. United States, CV 117-015, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

221109, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 26, 2019) (“Once a matter is brought before a court for

resolution, it is no longer solely the parties’ case, but also the public’s case”) (quoting

Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992)).

D. Expenditure of Public Funds

As the settlement in this case involves the expenditure of public funds, “the

presumption of public access is ‘accentuated.’” Carrasquillo, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 450

(citing Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d at 410). In Federal Trade Commission

v. Standard Financial Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987), the First

Circuit wrote:

The appropriateness of making court files accessible is accentuated in

cases where the government is a party: in such circumstances, the

public’s right to know what the executive branch is about coalesces with

the concomitant right of the citizenry to appraise the judicial branch.

Id. at 410.

IV. DISCUSSION

Here, the parties move the Court to seal their minor settlement agreement.

Preliminarily, the Court observes that the Plaintiffs in this case have proceeded

under pseudonyms: Mr. and Ms. Doe on behalf of their minor daughter, Jane Doe.

Compl. ¶ 1. The Defendants have never challenged the Plaintiffs’ right to proceed in

this case under pseudonyms, nor has this Court. See Doe v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 46

F.4th 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2022); Spurwink Servs., Inc. v. Doe, 2:25-cv-00026-JCN, 2025

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36841, at *1-4 (D. Me. Feb. 25, 2025). The First Circuit has

recommended use of redaction, which is similar to pseudonyms, to balance legitimate

privacy interests against the public right of access. Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 63.

Although some inquisitive or local individuals might be able to figure or ferret out

who the Plaintiffs are, there is no reason on this record for the Court to assume that

if they are so interested, they have not already done so based on what is already on

the docket. The cumulative information in the settlement agreement gives no reason

for the Court to conclude that it should be sealed.

Even though the right of public access applies to civil matters, it is “not

unfettered.” Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 59 (quoting Siedle, 147 F.3d at 10) (in turn

quoting FTC, 830 F.2d at 410). The United States Supreme Court in Warner

Communications wrote that the sealing of a settlement agreement, like other sealing

decisions, is “best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be

exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” P.R.

Land & Fruit, S.E. v. Municipio De Culebra, No. 09-2280 (ADC/BJM), 2018 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 221026 (D.P.R. Oct. 24, 2018), aff’d 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20203 (D.P.R. Feb.

5, 2019) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978)). To order

sealed or redacted an otherwise publicly accessible document, such as a settlement

agreement, the trial court is required to make “particularized findings of fact.” Id. at

*18 (quoting Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 59). Moreover, as the magistrate judge in Puerto

Rico Land & Fruit suggested, the parties may not simply file a settlement

agreement and expect it to be sealed without offering a basis for doing so. 2018 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 22106, at *18 (“The docket shows that a formal motion to seal this

agreement was never filed or supported by the parties”). Here, the Defendants have

properly moved for the Court to seal the minor settlement agreement. The question

is whether they have successfully supported their request.

First, Defendants contend the presumption of public access is overcome

because the settlement agreement includes information about Jane Doe, a minor.

Conceding that information about Jane Doe’s education and medical health is already

publicly available on the docket, they insist she could be more readily identified if the

settlement agreement is published unsealed. They argue, further, that the

information in the settlement agreement is different in kind from the subjective

statements Jane Doe’s mother made about her daughter in her declaration.

The Court is not persuaded. Based on the Plaintiffs’ counsel’s responses at the

teleconference, the Court is not at all certain that the Plaintiffs are actively pursuing

a sealing of the motion for court approval of the settlement. As explained by

Plaintiffs’ counsel, they agreed not to oppose the Defendants’ motion, but the Court

interprets Plaintiffs’ counsel’s statement as not independently pressing the Court to

seal the settlement. As such, the Court doubts that to the extent the Defendants are

attempting to have the court records sealed because of the privacy concerns not

pressed by the Plaintiffs themselves, the Defendants have standing to claim privacy

rights on behalf of opposing parties who may not be claiming them themselves.

Second, the complaint in this case, which is already publicly available, is

extremely detailed and provides significant information about Jane Doe’s education

and her medical history. The complaint contains one hundred and eighty-two

paragraphs. Compl. ¶¶ 1-182 (ECF No. 1). These one hundred and eighty-two

paragraphs reveal, among other details, Jane Doe’s age, her current and former

schools, the year she entered the Kennebunk school system, her homeroom teacher,

her Social Studies teacher, and it sets forth in depth the nature of her disability and

her efforts and the efforts of parents, her friends, and the school system to integrate

her into the school. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 22, 43. The extraordinarily detailed

complaint would be sufficient for anyone familiar with Kennebunk, a town of less

than 12,000 residents, to identify Jane Doe. Moreover, the complaint described an

opinion letter written by Jane Doe’s mother that was published in the Portland Press

Herald, described the contents of that letter, and revealed the date it was published.

Id. ¶¶ 15-19. Furthermore, as Defendants acknowledge in their motion to seal, the

complaint was buttressed by a detailed sworn declaration by Ms. Doe consisting of

forty-six pages and one hundred and fifty-nine paragraphs, again containing day-to-

day details about Jane Doe, her medical history, and her interaction with the school

system. See Pl[s.’] Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Attach. 1, Decl. of Ms. Doe in Support of Pls.’

Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 5).

The Court is not convinced that the brief statements in the verified application

for approval of minor settlement should be viewed differently than the allegations in

a complaint or the facts in a sworn declaration. If anything, a settlement application

is more ambiguous than the alleged facts in a complaint or the sworn contents of a

declaration. It implicitly contains evaluations of the prospects of success at trial; the

cost, time, and trouble of a successful prosecution or defense of the case; the provable

damages; and the impact of a trial on the minor, to name a few factors. The notion

that some people may misconstrue the settlement—either deliberately or not—is

pure speculation. Furthermore, the possibility of public misconstruction is part of

the cost of the expenditure of public funds to resolve any litigation subject to court

approval and is, moreover, not grounds for sealing.

Even if the Court were to credit the Defendants’ argument that facts presented

in a different light in a complaint and sworn declaration as opposed to a settlement

agreement somehow warrants the agreement’s sealing, the reality is that what is

already publicly available about this case overwhelms the modicum of information in

the settlement agreement. Indeed, in the joint verified application for approval of

minor settlement contains almost no information about this case. Its “information

concerning Jane’s damages,” for example, consists of only two sentences, contains

almost no personal information about Jane Doe, and by the Court’s reckoning,

includes no information not already made public by the Plaintiffs. See Joint Appl. for

Settlement Approval at 2. By contrast, this entire case has revolved around the

specific facts of this minor’s education, her medical history, and her Individualized

Education Plan.

By the Court’s read, the only information in the settlement agreement not

already publicly available is the settlement amount. See Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 63

(“[T]he interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on

the public record”) (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975)).

The Defendants seek to keep this amount from the public view out of concern that

members of the public may infer something about the parties’ respective liability and

the Defendants’ disregard for their obligations under FERPA.

The Court is again unpersuaded. First, as already noted, it is not convinced

that the settlement amount reveals anything about Jane Doe that has not already

been made public. Second, the settlement amount is precisely the type of information

to which the right of public access most strongly attaches, because it reveals the

expenditure of public funds. See Carrasquillo, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 450; Standard Fin.

Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d at 410. Third, it would be an unusual case where a court

should properly concern itself with what members of the public might do with

information about a settlement. Kravitz, 706 F.3d at 64 (“[A] fear of adverse publicity

. . . is insufficient to defeat public access”). Apart from being highly speculative and

a factor the Defendants could have (and should have) considered before agreeing to

enter into the settlement, members of the public are free to draw their own separate

conclusions about the settlement. Instead, the Court’s concern, pursuant to the First

Circuit’s holding in Kravetz, is whether the presumptive right of public access to a

judicial record is overcome by “[i]mportant countervailing interests.” Id. at 59

(quoting Siedle, 147 F.3d at 10).

In short, the Court firmly rejects the Defendants’ attempts to enlist the Court

in its efforts to hide from the public its expenditure of public funds.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to

Seal (ECF No. 43) and accordingly ORDERS Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Seal,

Attachment 1, Joint Verified Application for Approval of Minor Settlement with

Incorporated Statement Pursuant to D. Me. Loc. R. 41.2 (ECF No. 43-1) be

UNSEALED. As the ground for the automatic sealing of the Defendants’ motion and

brief in support of sealing the settlement agreement is now moot, the Court also

ORDERS Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Seal (ECF No. 43) and Defendants’

Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Seal (ECF No. 46)

UNSEALED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 17th day of March, 2025