Hanson v. Goodman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

WESLEY HANSON,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL NO. 1:24-CV-31

(KLEEH)

SENIOR TROOPER D.M. GOODMAN,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the

Defendant, Senior Trooper D.M. Goodman. For the reasons discussed

herein, the motion is GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff Wesley Hanson (“Hanson”) filed

this action against Defendant Senior Trooper D.M. Goodman

(“Trooper Goodman”). On May 22, 2024, Trooper Goodman filed a

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion is fully briefed and

ripe for review. On September 10, 2024, the Court convened a

hearing on the motion.

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

The Complaint asserts the following set of facts. Hanson is

a resident of Taylor County, West Virginia. Compl., ECF No. 1, at

¶ 1. Trooper Goodman is a State Trooper employed by the West

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

Virginia State Police. Id. ¶ 2. On June 8, 2023, Hanson was the

subject of a traffic stop conducted by Trooper Goodman. Id. ¶ 8.

Trooper Goodman advised Hanson of the purpose of the stop: lack of

motor vehicle inspection, non-transparent material below the ASI

line of the windshield, and tires beyond the wheel wells, which

constitutes unsafe equipment. Id. ¶ 9. Hanson peacefully

attempted to explain his violations, but Trooper Goodman

interrupted him, spouting profanities and calling him a “f*cking

liar.” Id. ¶ 10. Trooper Goodman returned to his own vehicle

while shouting, “You’re getting a ticket!” Id. ¶ 11. Trooper

Goodman returned to Hanson’s vehicle to present him with citations

for the violations. Id. ¶ 13.

Trooper Goodman explained the citations to Hanson before

handing them to him. Id. ¶ 15. Hanson tore up the citations and

placed them within his vehicle. Id. ¶ 16. Trooper Goodman then

grabbed the door handle of Hanson’s vehicle and demanded that he

step out. Id. ¶ 17. Hanson asked him why he was being asked to

step out. Id. ¶ 18. Trooper Goodman told Hanson that he was under

arrest because he “just ripped the ticket up” and, as a result, he

believed that Hanson was “not going to appear in court.” Id. ¶ 19.

Hanson responded that he intended to appear in court and pay his

ticket. Id. ¶ 20.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

Hanson stepped out of his vehicle, as instructed. Id. ¶ 26.

Trooper Goodman then grabbed Hanson, pulled his arm forcefully to

remove him from the vehicle, and threw Hanson’s cell phone to the

ground before placing him in handcuffs. Id. ¶ 27. Trooper Goodman

said, “You have to appear on your citation. . . . I don’t take

that as you are going to.” Id. ¶ 28. Hanson repeatedly stated

that he intended to appear for the citation and pay his ticket.

Id. ¶ 29.

Trooper Goodman placed Hanson in the back of his police

cruiser and brought him to the police station. Id. ¶ 30, 34.

Trooper Goodman charged with certain traffic offenses, along with

obstruction. Id. ¶ 35. Hanson asserts that he did not interfere

with Trooper Goodman’s performance of any of his legal duties.

Id. ¶¶ 36, 37. He asserts that Trooper Goodman intentionally

mischaracterized his interaction with Hanson in the report that he

drafted. Id. ¶ 39. Based on these facts, Hanson brings the

following claims against Trooper Goodman in both his official and

individual capacities:

(1) Violation of the United States

Constitution, First Amendment (42 U.S.C.

§ 1983);

(2) Violation of the United States

Constitution, Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C.

§ 1983);

(3) Abuse of Process; and

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

(4) Battery.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

the Court to dismiss an action for lack of jurisdiction over the

subject matter. A plaintiff bears “the burden of proving that

subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co.,

166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). In

considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the

court should “regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue,

and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting

the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Id. (citation

omitted). The court should grant the motion “only if the material

jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is

entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id. (citation omitted).

When a defendant asserts multiple defenses, “questions of subject

matter jurisdiction must be decided first, because they concern

the court’s very power to hear the case.” Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.

Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 442 n.4 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

a defendant to move for dismissal upon the ground that a complaint

does not “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In

ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as

true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”

Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). A court is

“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

A court should dismiss a complaint if it does not contain

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A motion to dismiss “does not

resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or

the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v.

Martin, 980 F.2d 942, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). Dismissal is

appropriate only if “it appears to be a certainty that the

plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts

which could be proven in support of its claim.” Johnson v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1969).

IV. DISCUSSION

For the reasons discussed below, Hanson’s claims fail as a

matter of law. First, Trooper Goodman is entitled to sovereign

immunity in his official capacity. As for the individual capacity

claims, dismissal of each claim is appropriate because Trooper

Goodman’s arrest of Hanson was lawful. Finally, even if Trooper

Goodman’s conduct technically violated the Constitution, he is

entitled to qualified immunity because he was not on notice that

his conduct was unconstitutional.

A. As a state employee, Trooper Goodman is entitled to

sovereign immunity to extent that he is sued in his

official capacity.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides, in pertinent part, “The Judicial power of the United

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States

by Citizens of another State[.]” Eleventh Amendment immunity also

“applies to . . . state employees acting in their official

capacity.” Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted). “[A] suit against a state official in his or

her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather

is a suit against the official’s office. . . . As such, it is no

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citations omitted).

There are three exceptions to sovereign immunity. See Lee-

Thomas v. Prince George’s Cnty. Pub. Sch., 666 F.3d 244, 248–49

(4th Cir. 2012). First, the State may waive its right to immunity

and consent to suit. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of

Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002). Second, “Congress may abrogate the

States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally

intends to do so and act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of

constitutional authority.” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.

Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). Third, “the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for

prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in

violation of federal law.” Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S.

431, 437 (2004) (citation omitted).

Here, none of the exceptions apply. While 42 U.S.C. § 1983

provides for a federal cause of action, it does not abrogate the

Eleventh Amendment. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 241 (1979).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Trooper Goodman’s motion to dismiss

with respect to the official capacity claims because he is entitled

to sovereign immunity in his official capacity. The official

capacity claims are DISMISSED.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

B. Trooper Goodman’s arrest of Hanson was lawful because

Hanson refused to accept his citation as his written

promise to appear in court.

State Police officers are authorized to arrest violators of

any traffic offense. See W. Va. Code § 15-2-12. Under Chapter

17C of the West Virginia Code (Traffic Regulations and Laws of the

Road),

(a) Whenever any person is arrested for any

violation of this chapter punishable as a

misdemeanor, the arrested person shall be

immediately taken before a magistrate or court

within the county in which the offense charged

is alleged to have been committed and who has

jurisdiction of the offense and is nearest or

most accessible with reference to the place

where the arrest is made, in any of the

following cases:

. . .

(7) In any other event when the person

arrested refuses to accept the written notice

to appear in court as his or her promise to

appear in court or to comply with the terms of

the written notice to appear in court as

provided in section four of this article[.]

Id. § 17C-19-3. One can avoid a custodial experience by securing

his or her own release in accordance with the next section of the

Code:

The arrested person in order to secure

release, as provided in this section, must

accept a copy of the written notice prepared

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GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

by the arresting officer. The officer shall

deliver a copy of the notice to the person

promising to appear. Thereupon, said officer

shall forthwith release the person arrested

from custody.

Id. § 17C-19-4(d).

Here, it is undisputed that Hanson violated the traffic code

and Trooper Goodman had probable cause to arrest him for the

traffic violations. Hanson argues, however, that the traffic stop

was “over” after the citations were issued, and Trooper Goodman

had no probable cause to arrest him after issuing the citation.

Trooper Goodman argues that an objectively reasonable officer

could have concluded that by ripping up the citation, Hanson

refused to “accept the written notice to appear in court as

his . . . promise to appear in court[.]” See id. § 17C-19-3(a)(7).

In accordance with the law, the next step was that Hanson “shall

be immediately taken before a magistrate or court” by Trooper

Goodman. See id. § 17C-19-3(a).

The Court finds that Hanson’s ripping up the citation

constituted a refusal “to accept the written notice to appear in

court as his . . . promise to appear in court,” which necessitated

Hanson’s transportation to a magistrate. Accordingly, Trooper

Goodman’s arrest of Hanson was lawful.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

C. Because Trooper Goodman’s arrest of Hanson was lawful,

all of Hanson’s claims fail as a matter of law.

All of Plaintiff’s claims require that a constitutional

violation occurred. Because it did not, all claims fail as a

matter of law.

1. First Amendment (Count One)

Hanson asserts that Trooper Goodman arrested him in

retaliation for tearing up the ticket, which Hanson characterizes

as speech. “A First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim fails as

a matter of law if there was ‘probable cause for the arrest.’”

Hulbert v. Pope, 70 F.4th 726, 738 (4th Cir. 2023), cert. denied,

144 S. Ct. 494 (2023). As the Court has already found, Trooper

Goodman had probable cause to arrest Hanson after Hanson violated

the traffic code. When Hanson refused to accept his citation as

his promise to appear in court, Trooper Goodman was required to

take him into custody. Accordingly, there was no First Amendment

violation as a matter of law. Trooper Goodman’s motion to dismiss

is GRANTED in this respect, and Count One is DISMISSED.

2. Fourth Amendment (Count Two)

Hanson asserts that Trooper Goodman unreasonably seized him

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A Fourth Amendment

unreasonable seizure claim, like a First Amendment retaliatory-

arrest claim, also fails as a matter of law if there was probable

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

cause for the arrest. See id. Again, as the Court has already

found, Trooper Goodman had probable cause to arrest Hanson after

Hanson violated the traffic code. When Hanson refused to accept

his citation as his promise to appear in court, Trooper Goodman

was required to take him into custody. Accordingly, there was no

Fourth Amendment violation as a matter of law. Trooper Goodman’s

motion to dismiss is GRANTED in this respect, and Count Two is

DISMISSED.

3. Abuse of Process (Count Three)

Hanson argues that Trooper Goodman is liable for abuse of

process. “Generally, abuse of process consists of the willful or

malicious misuse or misapplication of lawfully issued process to

accomplish some purpose not intended or warranted by that process.”

Williamson v. Harden, 585 S.E.2d 369, 372 (W. Va. 2003) (citations

omitted). The elements of an abuse of process claim include

“first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a willful act in the use

of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the

proceeding.” Preiser v. MacQueen, 352 S.E.2d 22, 28 n.8 (W. Va.

1985) (citation omitted). Notably, “there is no liability where

the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to

its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.” Id.

Again, as the Court has already found, Trooper Goodman had

probable cause to arrest Hanson after Hanson violated the traffic

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

code. When Hanson refused to accept his citation as his promise

to appear in court, Trooper Goodman was required to take him into

custody. Accordingly, there was nothing improper about Trooper

Goodman’s actions and no abuse of process as a matter of law.

Trooper Goodman’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in this respect,

and Count Three is DISMISSED.

4. Battery (Count Four)

Hanson argues that Trooper Goodman committed a battery

against him. “An activity that would otherwise subject a person

to liability in tort for assault and battery . . . does not

constitute tortious conduct if the actor is privileged to engage

in such conduct.” Hutchinson v. W. Va. State Police, 731 F. Supp.

2d 521, 547 (S.D.W. Va. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Hutchinson v.

Lemmon, 436 F. App’x 210 (4th Cir. 2011). Police officers are

privileged to use reasonable force to remove the occupants of a

lawfully stopped vehicle and arrest them. See Weigle v. Pifer,

139 F. Supp. 3d 760, 776–77 (S.D.W. Va. 2015).

Presumably, Hanson’s argument is that the arrest itself was

a constitutional violation, so even a deminimis use of force is

considered a battery. Again, as the Court has already found,

Trooper Goodman had probable cause to arrest Hanson after Hanson

violated the traffic code. When Hanson refused to accept his

citation as his promise to appear in court, Trooper Goodman was

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

required to take him into custody. Accordingly, there was no

battery as a matter of law. Trooper Goodman’s motion to dismiss

is GRANTED in this respect, and Count Four is DISMISSED.

5. Punitive Damages (Count Five)

Hanson asserts a separate count for punitive damages. The

Court finds that punitive damages do not constitute an independent

cause of action. See Coss v. Teters, No. 2:23-CV-00180, 2023 WL

3470899, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. May 12, 2023). Count Five is hereby

DISMISSED to the extent that it asserts a cause of action.

D. Even if Trooper Goodman’s actions technically violated

the Constitution, he is entitled to qualified immunity

in his individual capacity because he was not on notice

that his conduct was unconstitutional.

Qualified immunity “protects government officials from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

It “may be invoked by a government official sued in his personal,

or individual, capacity.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall

Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006). In order to be entitled

to qualified immunity, a defendant must either show (1) that no

constitutional or statutory violation occurred, or (2) that the

right violated was not clearly established at the time it was

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

violated. Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 789 F.3d 389, 396 (4th

Cir. 2015). A court may consider either prong first. Pearson,

555 U.S. at 236. “For a right to be clearly established, existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 246 (4th

Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

As discussed above, the Court finds that Hanson’s ripping of

the citation constituted a refusal to promise to appear, and

Trooper Goodman’s arrest of Hanson was lawful. Even if it were

unlawful for some reason, however, there was nothing putting

Trooper Goodman on notice that the conduct was unlawful. In other

words, Trooper Goodman had no notice that ripping up the citation

did not constitute a refusal to accept and appear. The Court finds

that, at the time of Trooper Goodman’s actions, it was not clearly

established that the actions were in violation of the United States

Constitution. Hanson has not shown that existing precedent has

placed the constitutional question beyond debate. Accordingly,

Trooper Goodman is also entitled to qualified immunity in his

individual capacity, and the individual capacity claims against

him are additionally DISMISSED for this reason.

HANSON V. GOODMAN 1:24-CV-31

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5]

Vv. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the motion to dismiss is

GRANTED [ECF No. 5]. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and

STRICKEN from the Court’s active docket.

It is so ORDERED.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit copies of this Memorandum

Opinion and Order to counsel of record.

DATED: March 19, 2025

Tom 8 Bla

THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

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