Robinson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of Attorney General

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANITA ROBINSON,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-CV-01704

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

THE COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA, OFFICE OF

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

On September 26, 2022, the plaintiff filed a civil action in the

Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas (Doc. 1). The case, removed to

the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,

alleges federal claims for race and color discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2 and state law claims of race, color, and age discrimination under

the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 955(a).1 The

1 We must briefly note that federal courts have generally held that

PHRA claims do not operate as a waiver of Eleventh Amendment

immunity. ,

373 F. Supp. 2d 484, 496 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Nonetheless, the Supreme

Court has held that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity

when it removes a case from a state court to a federal court.

, 535 U.S. 613, 616–

defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on August 9, 2023, for

the dismissal of all the plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 18). The parties briefed

the matter (Doc. 19; Doc. 22; Doc. 23; Doc. 24), and on March 5, 2025, we

heard oral argument from the parties’ counsel. This matter is now ripe

for decision.

I. Background2

On September 7, 1999, the plaintiff, Ms. Anita Robinson, was hired

as a Computer Systems Analyst at the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”). Approximately five years into her

employment at OAG, the plaintiff joined the Human Resources

Department as a Human Resource Analyst III. The plaintiff stayed in

that position until her termination. In her role as a human resource

analyst, the plaintiff’s general duties, among others, included: EEO

officer, resetting employee passwords, SEAP coordinator, coordinating

exit interviews for employees leaving the OAG, and the intake of OAG

complaints. The plaintiff claims she generally performed her assigned

624 (2002). Here, OAG removed the action to the federal court and thus,

waived any asserted immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for the

plaintiff’s PHRA claims.

2 The facts are taken from Doc. 23, the plaintiff’s response to the

defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts.

duties satisfactorily. In December 2020, the defendant began to form a

plan to restructure its human resources department by consolidating the

plaintiff’s position and the position of a fellow employee, Erika Nale, into

a singular Human Resource Analyst III position. The plaintiff and Ms.

Nale were fired on April 13, 2021, because of that restructuring. On July

26, 2021, the defendant hired 35-year-old Vania Tonelotti for the newly

created Human Resource Analyst III position. The plaintiff alleges that

she was not able to apply for the new analyst position.

On September 26, 2022, the plaintiff filed a civil action in the

Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, alleging federal claims for race

and color discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and state law claims

of race, color, and age discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Act, 43 P.S. §955(A). The plaintiff, an African American

woman, was fifty-nine at the time of the termination. The defendant

contends the plaintiff’s position was simply eliminated as part of the

restructuring of human resources rather than under any discriminatory

premise. (Doc. 19, at 8).

II. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates summary

judgment should only be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome

of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” at

248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be

drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the

non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-

movant’s must be taken as true.” , 24 F.3d

508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).

Parties seeking summary judgment bear “the initial responsibility

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and

demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.

, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a

showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported by the

record, demonstrating that “the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to the jury.” , 477 U.S. at

251–52. A court must first determine if the moving party has made

showing that it is entitled to summary judgment when evaluating

such a motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S. at 331. Only

once that showing has been made does the burden shift to the

nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S. at 331.

Parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the record,

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,

affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other

materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or declaration used to

support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out

facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or

declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(4). “Although evidence may be considered in a form which is

inadmissible at trial, the content of the evidence must be capable of

admission at trial.” , 994 F. Supp. 2d 595, 599

(M.D. Pa. 2014); , 192 F.3d

378, 387 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that it is not proper, on summary

judgment, to consider evidence that is not admissible at trial).

III. Discussion

The plaintiff has alleged age and race discrimination claims

concerning two of the defendant’s actions against her in the underlying

action: (1) the plaintiff’s termination of employment; and (2) the

defendant’s refusal to allow the plaintiff to apply for the newly opened

position. Indeed, the plaintiff’s age and race discrimination claims are

considered disparate treatment claims, ones that occur when an

employee “has treated [a] particular person less favorably than others

because of” a protected trait. , 110 F. Supp.

3d 544, 548 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting , 557, 577 (2009)).

These types of claims require the application of the

burden-shifting framework test. ,

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The burden-shifting

framework consists of three steps. First, a plaintiff must show a

case of discrimination. Next, if the plaintiff succeeds, the burden

shifts to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employee’s [action].” Finally, if the defendant satisfies

its burden, the plaintiff must introduce evidence that the legitimate

reasons offered by the defendant were a pretext for discrimination.

A. Age Discrimination Under the PHRA

We turn to the plaintiff’s alleged age discrimination claims under

the PHRA.3 As we stated above, age discrimination claims under the

PHRA require the burden shifting framework under .

To prevail on a claim of intentional discrimination under the PHRA, a

plaintiff must generally show “that his or her age actually motivated or

had a determinative influence on the employer’s decision to fire him or

her.” , 275 F. Supp. 3d 564, 575 (E.D. Pa.

2017) (quoting , 308 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Under step one of the framework, a plaintiff must

show that “(1) the plaintiff is forty years of age or older; (2) that the

defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; (3)

the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question; and (4) the

circumstances of the adverse action give rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination.” , 995 F. Supp. 2d 420, 430

3 The plaintiff has only alleged age discrimination claims under the

PHRA, and not the ADEA. Nonetheless, we note that the state PHRA is

generally interpreted as being consistent with the ADEA.

, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015);

, 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). Therefore, we shall apply

the same standards to the plaintiff’s claim under the PHRA that we

would apply to the ADEA.

(W.D. Pa. 2014). To establish a case at summary judgment,

“the evidence must be sufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder to

find all of the elements of [the] case.”

, 264 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2001). The defendant seeks summary

judgment on the plaintiff’s age discrimination claims on the basis that

the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the discrimination

analysis. Here, the defendant does not argue the first, second, and third

prongs, and thus, we deem the plaintiff has satisfied these elements in

her case as those prongs are not in dispute.

We first analyze whether the record supports evidence that the

circumstances of the defendant’s first adverse action, the plaintiff’s

termination, give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. We note

that our analysis depends on the characterization of the plaintiff’s

termination. The plaintiff characterizes her termination as a

replacement. (Doc. 22, at 8). In age discrimination cases concerning

replacement, a plaintiff must only prove that she was “ultimately

replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger as to support

an inference of a discriminatory motive.” ,

528 F. Supp. 3d 373, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2021). The defendant, however, argues

that the plaintiff’s termination resulted from a reduction-in-force, rather

than being replaced. (Doc. 19, at 9). When an employee is terminated

during a reduction-in-force, the fourth prong of a PHRA analysis becomes

“whether the employer retained employees not within the protected

class.” , No. 05-2834, 2006 WL 1887984,

at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2006). We find ultimately that the plaintiff has

satisfied this prong regardless of the characterization of her termination.

It is undisputed that the defendant hired 35-year-old Vania

Tonelotti for the new Human Resource Analyst III job. (Doc. 23, ¶ 28).

This fact satisfies the fourth prong of under a

replacement analysis as the plaintiff was clearly “replaced by another

employee who was sufficiently younger as to support an inference of a

discriminatory motive.”4 , 528 F. Supp. 3d at 382. Moreover, the

plaintiff can point to evidence that defendant “retained employees not

within the protected class” to satisfy the fourth prong under a reduction-

in-force analysis. No. 3:17-CV-

01329, 2021 WL 1172991, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2021) (citations

4 The plaintiff was 59-years-old at the time of her termination. (Doc.

23, ¶ 32).

omitted). Persons outside the protected class are those employees who

are “similarly situated,” that is, they work in the same area in

approximately the same position. , 297 F.3d

242, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2002)). The plaintiff argues that the additional

human resource analysts on her team are the similarly situated parties

for purposes of her termination.5 Indeed, the record shows that the entire

team consisted of significantly younger individuals than the plaintiff, and

most of those positions were not terminated. (Doc. 23, ¶ 67). The

defendant disagrees with this categorization and argues that Ms. Erika

Nale, an additional human resource analyst, should be considered the

only similarly situated party as she was fired in addition to the plaintiff.

(Doc. 24, at 10). Nonetheless, whether two individuals are similarly

situated is generally a fact for a jury to decide.

, 990 F. Supp. 2d 517, 526 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing

, 371 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, provided

5 The other analysts are Nicole Kreiser (approximate age: 46);

Lauren Beaston (approximate age: 30’s); Mandy Saul (age: early 30’s);

Miranda Shirk (approximate age: late 20’s/early 30’s); Courtney Bailey

(approximate age: mid 20’s); Alixandra Eichelberger (approximate age:

late 20’s/early 30’s); and Erika Nale (approximate age: 39). (Doc. 23,

¶ 67).

that the plaintiff has put forth enough evidence, we find a reasonable jury

could conclude that the human resource analyst team members were

“similarly situated” to the plaintiff in the context of her termination.

Thus, we find that the plaintiff has satisfied the fourth prong of her

claim of age discrimination.

We next analyze whether the record contains evidence that the

circumstances of the defendant’s second adverse action, the refusal to

consider the plaintiff for the new position, give rise to an inference of

unlawful discrimination. We view the defendant’s refusal to consider the

plaintiff for the position in the same context of a failure to hire, where a

plaintiff must prove as the fourth prong that the adverse action “fall[s]

under circumstances that raise an inference of discriminatory action,

such as that the employer continued to seek out individuals with

qualifications similar to plaintiff’s to fill the position or filled the position

with a person not of the plaintiff’s protected class.”

352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing

, 411 U.S. at 802)). Our analysis here is simple as it is

undisputed that the defendant hired 35-year-old Vania Tonelotti for the

new Human Resource Analyst III job, and thus filled the position with a

person not of the plaintiff’s protected class. Therefore, we find that the

plaintiff has established a case of age discrimination for the

defendant’s failure to consider her for the new position.

Nonetheless, the defendant argues that the Court should grant its

motion for summary judgment regardless of whether the plaintiff can

satisfy the first step of because the plaintiff cannot

satisfy the third step of , requiring the employee to

show that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was

pretextual. The Third Circuit has recognized that a plaintiff may

demonstrate pretext by pointing to evidence allowing a factfinder to

disbelieve the employer’s reason for the adverse employment action.

, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir.

2015) (citing generally , 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir.

1994)). The evidence must indicate “such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s

proffered legitimate reasons” to satisfy the factfinder that the employer’s

actions could not have been for nondiscriminatory reasons. at 644–45

(citing , 32 F.3d at 765). In other words, a plaintiff must show

that the employer’s proffered reason was “so plainly wrong that it cannot

have been the employer’s real reason.” , 130

F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997).

The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s position was eliminated

as part of the restructuring of human resources (Doc. 19, at 8), and insists

it had concerns about the plaintiff’s work performance in her then-

current role and fit with the potentially new consolidated role. (Doc.

20-5). Nonetheless, the plaintiff points to numerous annual performance

evaluations where she received satisfactory or better marks throughout

her employment to dispute the defendant’s assertions. (Doc. 23-2;

Doc. 23-3; Doc. 23-4; Doc. 23-5). Moreover, the plaintiff has provided

testimony by her supervisor confirming that she had worked on

constructive feedback while embracing additional roles. (Doc. 23, ¶ 45).

The plaintiff further notes that she was never issued any discipline under

the company’s Employee Disciplinary Policy. ( ¶ 50). Indeed, the

defendant even admits the plaintiff “was qualified for the position

obtained by Tonelotti.” (Doc. 24, at 10). Viewing the evidence in light most

favorable to the plaintiff, we find that the record supports sufficient

evidence for a factfinder to disbelieve the defendant’s reason for

terminating the plaintiff was solely due to a restructuring of human

resources. Moreover, the defendant’s refusal to consider a former

employee for a position that it admits met her qualifications constitutes

a contradiction in the defendant’s rationale for undertaking the

employment actions. Here, we find that the plaintiff has satisfied this

burden concerning both of the defendant’s adverse employment actions

against the plaintiff. Therefore, we will deny the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment concerning the plaintiff’s age discrimination claims.

B. Race Discrimination Under the PHRA/Title VII

We turn to the plaintiff’s race discrimination claims under the

PHRA and Title VII. For purposes of deciding a motion for summary

judgment in race discrimination actions under the PHRA and Title VII,

the claim is subject to the same burden-shifting framework articulated

in . 411 U.S. at 802–805. A plaintiff must establish

she is: (1) a member of a protected class; (2) qualified for the position she

sought to attain or retain; (3) suffered an adverse employment action;

and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could give rise to

an inference of intentional discrimination.

, 982 F. Supp. 2d 462, 479 (E.D. Pa. 2013), , 776 F.3d

181 (3d Cir. 2015). The defendant does not contest the first three

elements; it only challenges the fourth. Therefore, we deem the plaintiff

has satisfied the first three elements in her case of race

discrimination.

Indeed, we need not undertake a significant analysis as our

application concerning the plaintiff’s age discrimination claims

additionally applies to the plaintiff’s race discrimination claims. As we

held above for the defendant’s termination action, while the plaintiff and

the defendant differ on how to classify the plaintiff’s termination, the

plaintiff has provided enough evidence to satisfy either standard. In the

event of a replacement for purposes of race discrimination, a showing

that the “replacement is of a different race than the plaintiff” can be

enough to show an inference of intentional discrimination.

, 624 F. Supp. 3d 530, 539 (D.N.J. 2022) (citing

, 411 U.S. at 800–02). The record clearly

demonstrates the plaintiff was replaced by an individual of a different

race. (Doc. 23, ¶ 28) (providing testimony that Ms. Tonelotti was not

Black, but instead born in Brazil). Moreover, similar to age

discrimination cases, “[i]n order to establish an inference of causation in

a [reduction-in-force] situation, [a plaintiff] must point to a ‘comparator,’

a similarly situated, non-protected class member who was retained as an

employee.” 468 F. Supp. 2d 729, 734 (E.D. Pa. 2007)

(citing , 297 F.3d at 250). As we held in the plaintiff’s age

discrimination claims, we find the plaintiff has provided enough evidence

to convince a factfinder that the remaining human analyst team

members constitute the similarly situated parties. Indeed, the record

shows that every remaining member was Caucasian, and thus, outside of

the plaintiff’s protected class. (Doc. 23, ¶ 67). Therefore, the plaintiff has

satisfied her burden under the first step of

concerning the defendant’s termination of her employment in her race

discrimination claim. Furthermore, in the context of a failure to hire in

race discrimination claims, a plaintiff must prove as the fourth prong

that the adverse action “fall[s] under circumstances that raise an

inference of discriminatory action, such as that the employer continued

to seek out individuals with qualifications similar to plaintiff’s to fill the

position or filled the position with a person not of the plaintiff’s protected

class.” 352 F.3d at 797. The plaintiff has done so here, as the

record indicates that the newly hired employee was an individual of a

different race. Therefore, the plaintiff has additionally satisfied her

burden under the first step of for the defendant’s

failure to consider her for the new position.

The defendant additionally argues that the plaintiff has failed to

provide any evidence of pretext for her race discrimination claims under

the third step of , citing the same basis that it did in

the plaintiff’s age discrimination claims. The plaintiff offers the same

pretext argument for her racial discrimination claims as she did for her

age discrimination claim. (Doc. 22, at 19). Therefore, our analysis and

conclusion remain the same. We have already found that the plaintiff has

provided enough evidence that indicates “weaknesses” or

“inconsistencies” in the defendant’s rationale that it terminated the

plaintiff due to a restructuring of human resources. , 808 F.3d at

644; (Doc. 23-2; Doc. 23-3; Doc. 23-4; Doc. 23-5) (showing satisfactory

annual performance evaluations); (Doc. 23, ¶ 45) (providing evidence that

the plaintiff had never been disciplined). Moreover, we have additionally

found that the defendant’s admission that the plaintiff was qualified for

the new position (Doc. 24, at 10), runs contrary to the defendant’s refusal

to allow the plaintiff to apply for the position. In short, viewing the

evidence in light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find the record shows

sufficient evidence for a factfinder to find pretext for the defendant’s

adverse actions. Thus, we will deny the plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment on these counts.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: March 13, 2025

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge