Taylor v. Duran

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

KENNADO K. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-01096-JEH

MONICA DURAN,

Defendants.

Order

Plaintiff Kennado Taylor, proceeding pro se and currently detained at the

McLean County Detention Facility, pursues an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

alleged violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). Along with his Complaint,

Plaintiff filed a Petition to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Petition”) (Doc. 2) and a

Motion to Request Counsel (Doc. 3).

I

Prior to conducting a merit review of his Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, the Court must determine if Plaintiff has made the requisite showing that

he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury because he has

accumulated at least three strikes under § 1915(g), which states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment

in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has,

on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that

was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner

is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

§ 1915(g). The Court must make its own determination regarding whether

previous dismissals count as “strikes.” Hill v. Madison Cnty., Ill., 983 F.3d 904, 906

(7th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiff has, on three or more prior occasions, brought an action or appeal

that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Taylor v. Doe, et al., No. 17-cv-2347 (N.D. Ill.

dismissed June 2, 2017); Taylor v. Doe, et al., No. 17-cv-2348 (N.D. Ill. dismissed

June 2, 2017); Taylor v. Doe, et al., No. 17-cv-2349 (N.D. Ill. dismissed June 5, 2017);

Taylor v. Doe, et al., No. 17-cv- 5537 (N.D. Ill. dismissed September 22, 2017); Taylor

v. Doe, et al., No. 17- cv-6001 (N.D. Ill. dismissed September 22, 2017). The Court

finds that each of these dismissals counts as a strike pursuant to § 1915(g).

Plaintiff is also subject to a Seventh Circuit order that instructs district courts

to return unfiled any papers sent by Plaintiff or on his behalf, except in criminal

cases, cases challenging the fact or duration of his confinement, and those alleging

an imminent danger of serious physical harm. Taylor v. Miller, No. 20-2221 (7th

Cir., filed Oct. 9, 2020). (Doc. 5). If the last exception applies, the district court must

resolve the question of whether Plaintiff faces an imminent danger. Id.

The imminent danger inquiry is two-pronged. The first prong is construed

narrowly to include genuine emergencies where “time is pressing” and a “threat

...is real and proximate.” Heimermann v. Litscher, 337 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 2003);

see also Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the harm

must be occurring “at the time the complaint is filed.” Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d

328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003). Allegations of past harm do not suffice. Heimermann, 337

F.3d at 782. The second prong, danger, must be of “serious physical injury.” §

1915(g); Fletcher v. Deathridge, 2008 WL 4724173, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2008).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was prescribed Apixaban for a blood

clot in his left leg while he was at Elgin Mental Health Center (“Elgin”). Plaintiff

alleges he has not received Apixaban at the McLean County Detention Facility and

is in severe pain. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Dr. Monica Duran and nurses Kelly

and Davis are aware of his blood clot and pain, but they allegedly refused to

provide his prescribed medication.

Construing Plaintiff’s allegations liberally due to his pro se status, the Court

finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged he is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury given his allegations regarding his untreated medical issues and

severe pain. Plaintiff’s IFP Petition is GRANTED.

II

The Court must now screen Plaintiff’s Complaint under § 1915A, and

through such process, identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the

entire action if warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 1915A. In

reviewing the Complaint, the Court takes all factual allegations as true, liberally

construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir.

2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts

must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander

v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges he informed Defendant Kelly that his left leg and head hurt

during medication pass on February 25, 2025. Defendant Kelly advised Plaintiff to

submit a sick call request. Defendant Kelly was allegedly aware that Plaintiff had

a blood clot in his left leg when he was sent to Elgin and was prescribed Apixaban.

The next day, Plaintiff alleges he told Defendant Kelly he was having chest

pains and his leg hurt. He informed Defendant Kelly that a doctor told him he

needed to stay on medication indefinitely and it would be fatal if the medication

was discontinued.

When Plaintiff saw Defendant Davis on or about February 27, 2025, he

allegedly informed her that he in severe pain and needed his prescribed

medication for the blood clot in his left leg. Defendant Davis told Plaintiff she

would inform Defendant Dr. Duran about his issue.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dr. Duran is aware of the blood clot in his left leg

because she signed paperwork related to his stay at Elgin, where a doctor

prescribed Apixaban. Plaintiff claims he informed Dr. Duran that he was in pain,

but she told him there was nothing she could do and did not give him his

prescribed medication. Plaintiff also alleges Dr. Duran is denying him medical care

because of an “evil motive.” (Doc. 1 at p. 6).

As a detainee, Plaintiff’s claim for constitutionally inadequate medical care

arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miranda v.

Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353-54 (7th Cir. 2018) (detainees entitled to adequate

medical care). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a detainee must

show: “(1) there was an objectively serious medical need; (2) the defendant

committed a volitional act concerning the [plaintiff’s] medical need; (3) that act

was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances in terms of responding to

the [plaintiff’s] medical need; and (4) the defendant act[ed] purposefully,

knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly with respect to the risk of harm.” Gonzalez

v. McHenry Cnty., Illinois, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a challenged action is

reasonable, the court must consider the “totality of facts and circumstances.” Mays

v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 819 (7th Cir. 2020).

Construing Plaintiff’s allegations liberally, the blood clot in his left leg could

constitute a serious medical need. See Arce v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., 75 F.4th

673, 679 (7th Cir. 2023) (finding leg injury and subsequent blood clot was a serious

medical need). Plaintiff claims that Defendant Dr. Duran was aware of the blood

clot and refused to provide the prescribed medication or medical care. The Court

finds that his allegations are sufficient to proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment

deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Dr. Duran.

Plaintiff’s allegations against nurses Kelly and Davis, however, are too

tenuous to allege a constitutional violation. When Plaintiff encountered Defendant

Kelly during medication pass and complained of pain, she advised him to submit

a sick call request. When Plaintiff encountered Defendant Davis, she informed him

that she would pass on his concerns to Defendant Dr. Duran. Plaintiff’s sparse

allegations against Defendants Kelly and Davis are insufficient to allege a

deliberate indifference claim. See Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063,

1075 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that the defendant nurses did not have authority to

prescribe medication on their own). Defendants Kelly and Davis are dismissed

without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

It is difficult to decipher Plaintiff’s remaining allegations, but it appears that

he named Defendant Dr. Duran and other nurses in prior lawsuits he filed.

Plaintiff alleges he is being denied medical care because Defendant Dr. Duran has

an “evil motive.” (Doc. 1 at p. 6). To establish First Amendment retaliation,

Plaintiff must successfully allege that (1) his speech was constitutionally protected,

(2) he has suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech, and (3) his speech was

at least a motivating factor in the [defendant's] action. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d

711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to proceed on a First

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Dr. Duran. This claim is

dismissed without prejudice.

III

Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Request Counsel. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff has no

constitutional or statutory right to counsel in this case. In considering the

Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel, the Court asks: (1) has the indigent Plaintiff

made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from

doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the Plaintiff appear

competent to litigate it himself? Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff has not shown that he made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel

on his own. A plaintiff usually does this by attaching copies of letters sent to

attorneys seeking representation and copies of any responses received. Because

Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong, the Court does not address the second.

Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff’s motion is denied with

leave to renew.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court's merit review of Plaintiff's Complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this case shall proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim

against Defendant Dr. Monica Duran based on her alleged deliberate indifference

to the blood clot in his left leg and the accompanying pain. Additional claims shall

not be included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion by a

party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) Defendants Kelly and Davis are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and

§ 1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Defendants Kelly and Davis.

3) Plaintiff's Petition to Proceed in forma pauperis [2] is GRANTED. The

Clerk is directed to enter the text order directing jail officials to collect payment

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

4) Plaintiff's Motion to Request Counsel [3] is DENIED with leave to

renew.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff

to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give

Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed

before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of

service. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect

formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will require

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

7) Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk

sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer

should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In

general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on

the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore,

no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendant has not

filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this

Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant

has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

8) If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the

entity for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of Defendant’s forwarding address shall be retained only by the

Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s

counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other

documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed

with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly

to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be

returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance and

the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process

in more detail.

10) Defendant’s counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the

deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change

in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court

of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this

lawsuit, with prejudice.

12) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records

upon request.

13) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to

release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization

to defense counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective

order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

14) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from

the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter

scheduling deadlines.

It is so ordered.

Entered: March 14, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge