holding that constitutional harms are sufficient to satisfy the injury prong of standing
How later courts described this case
- holding that constitutional harms are sufficient to satisfy the injury prong of standing
- plaintiff “deserves the opportunity to amend his pleadings if the defects can be cured”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ACCEPTED
15-24-00095-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
3/10/2025 3:36 PM
NO. 15-24-00095-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
FOR THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM
AUSTIN, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
EDWARD RANDOLPH TURNBULL IV,
Appellant,
V.
THE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, ET AL.,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the 201st Judicial District Court of Texas
Cause No. D-1-GN-24-002025
The Honorable Amy Clark Meachum, Presiding
APPELLANT’S REPLY TO APPELLEES’ BRIEFS
GAINES WEST WEST, WEBB, ALLBRITTON & GENTRY, P.C.
State Bar No. 21197500 1515 Emerald Plaza
gaines.west@westwebblaw.com College Station, Texas 77845
JOHN “JAY” RUDINGER, JR. Telephone: (979) 694-7000
State Bar No. 24067852
jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com
JUDD E. STONE II STONE HILTON PLLC
State Bar No. 24076720 600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350
judd@stonehilton.com Austin, Texas 7870
Telephone: (737) 465-3897
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
i
RECORD REFERENCES
For clarity and the Court’s convenience, Mr. Turnbull will reference the
Clerk’s Record and Appellees’ briefs as follows:
Document Reference
Clerk’s Record CR ____
Brief of Appellee Hodgkins Hodgkins Br. ____
Brief of Appellees CFLD, CDC, CFLD Br. ____
Kates, Brannon, Grosz, and Martinez
Brief of State Bar Appellees SBA Br. ____
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Record References .......................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents ........................................................................................... iii
Table of Authorities ......................................................................................... v
Summary of the Facts ..................................................................................... 1
Introduction .................................................................................................... 4
Argument .................................................................................................... 6
I. Mr. Turnbull Has Established Standing .................................... 6
A. Mr. Turnbull’s injuries are neither speculative nor
based on prosecutorial discretion ......................................... 6
B. Mr. Turnbull complains solely of Appellee’s conduct ......... 7
C. Maintaining suit is Mr. Turnbull’s only means of redress…10
D. Appellees misplace reliance on Linda R.S., Martinez
and Lefebure........................................................................ 12
II. Mr. Turnbull’s Claims Are Based in Both Law and Fact ........ 16
A. A reasonable person could believe Mr. Turnbull’s
allegations............................................................................ 16
B. Mr. Turnbull’s claims are not legally foreclosed ................ 18
III. Immunity Does Not Bar Mr. Turnbull’s Claims ...................... 20
A. The Legislature waived immunity in the State Bar Act ...... 21
B. Sovereign immunity does bar injunctive relief from
constitutional harms ............................................................ 22
iii
C. Ministerial acts are not protected by absolute
immunity ............................................................................. 23
D. Appellees are not entitled to immunity under the Texas
Rules of Disciplinary Conduct ............................................ 24
IV. Alternatively, Mr. Turnbull should have the opportunity
to replead .................................................................................. 26
Conclusion & Prayer for Relief .................................................................... 27
Certificate of Service .................................................................................... 30
Certificate of Compliance ............................................................................. 30
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Apollo Enters., Inc. v. ScripNet, Inc.,
301 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) ..................................6, 8
Bacon v. Tex. Historical Comm’n,
411 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) ....................................25
Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc.,
144 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2004) ........................................................................23
City of Elsa v. M.A.L.,
226 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2007) ........................................................................ 11
Crampton v. Farris,
596 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.)………….24
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman,
252 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. 2008) ........................................................................27
Davis v. Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co.,
No. 05-21-00092-CV, 2023 WL 3735115
(Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2023, no pet.) .................................................17
Drake v. Walker,
No. 05-14-00355-CV, 2015 WL 2160565
(Tex. App.—Dallas May 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) ................................17
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59 (1978) ........................................................................................13
Heckman v. Williamson Cnty.,
369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) ...................................................... 6, 8, 9, 10, 11
In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc.,
991 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999) .......................................................................... 4
In re RNDC Tex., LLC,
No. 05-18-00555-CV, 2018 WL 27773262
(Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ..............................18
v
In re Shire PLC,
633 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021,
orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) ..................................................................18
Johnson v. Lynaugh,
796 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) ...................................................16
Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emp. Pension Sys.,
458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015) ............................................................................22
Lefebure v. D’Aquilla,
15 F.4th 650 (5th Cir. 2021) .......................................................12, 14, 15, 16
Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614 (1973) ..............................................................12, 13, 14, 15, 16
Longhorn Creek Ltd. v. Gardens of Connemara Ltd.,
686 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, pet. filed) ...........................16, 18
Martinez v. State Bar of Tex.,
797 Fed. Appx. 167 (5th Cir. 2020) ............................................12, 13, 14, 16
McGregor v. Clawson,
506 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1974, no writ) ............................... 5
Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,
233 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2007) ..................................................................26, 27
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) .......................................................................... 5
Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Holmes,
294 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. denied) .............................22
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ........................................................................20
Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik,
355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011) .........................................................................26
vi
Tex. Nat’l Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy,
74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) ....................................................................21, 22
Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust,
354 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2011) ........................................................................20
Univ. of Houston v. Clark,
38 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000) ..........................................................................23
Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York,
871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994) ........................................................................21
Wooley v. Schaffer,
447 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)……..16
Statutes and Constitutions:
Tex. Const. art. I § 3.................................................................................................19
Tex. Const. art. I § 13...............................................................................................20
Tex. Const. art. I § 19...............................................................................................19
Tex. Const. art. V, § 1 ................................................................................................4
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.017(b) ...................................................................................21
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.072(b)(2) ................................................................. in passim
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.073 .......................................................................................23
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.106........................................................................................21
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.107(a) ..................................................................................21
Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034 .....................................................................................21
Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1 .........................................................................................16, 18
Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 1.06(W) .............................................................................25
Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 2.12 ....................................................................................25
Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 17.09 ............................................................................24, 25
Other Sources:
Chief Justice James Blacklock, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MRsf5Vz4M-c (Feb. 26, 2025)……..12
vii
TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellant Edward Randolph Turnbull IV (“Appellant” or “Mr. Turnbull”)
respectfully submits this reply brief in support of his appeal from the trial court’s
orders dismissing his claims. Appellees’ response briefs fail to refute Mr. Turnbull’s
standing to maintain suit or demonstrate that Appellees are entitled to immunity as
to any of his claims. For the reasons Mr. Turnbull discussed in his opening brief and
those addressed below, the trial court’s orders should be reversed.
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
Mr. Turnbull is a criminal defense attorney from Houston. CR 9. He and his
law firm, Turnbull Legal Group (“TLG”), represent defendants charged with crimes
in courts across Texas. Id. For several years, TLG subscribed to Microsoft
Corporation’s OneDrive cloud service to store important documents and data,
including case-critical attorney work product and discovery received from the State.
Id.
In October 2019, without prior notice or any warning, Microsoft denied TLG
access to all data that had been stored on its OneDrive account and remotely
removed all of TLG’s data from its in-office computer hard drive. CR 9–10. This
devastated Mr. Turnbull’s ability to serve his clients. Id. After almost three weeks
of non-responsive replies from Microsoft, Mr. Turnbull and TLG filed suit and
obtained a temporary restraining order against Microsoft. CR 10.
1
In retaliation for Mr. Turnbull’s pursuit of civil recourse against Microsoft,
for its improper denial and remote seizure of TLG’s data and subsequent refusal to
return the data, Microsoft took a series of actions that affect Mr. Turnbull and TLG’s
staff and attorneys to this day. First, Microsoft’s attorneys threatened Mr. Turnbull
with criminal charges and bar complaints and threatened to file public pleadings
claiming Mr. Turnbull possessed and publicized child pornography. CR 13–14.
Next, Microsoft’s attorneys filed publicly accessible pleadings containing those false
and baseless allegations, claiming that Mr. Turnbull shared or made public images
of child exploitation imagery, and that those images were being preserved for a
criminal investigation and bar complaint. Id. Microsoft’s attorneys did so despite
knowing that those allegations were patently false, that the disputed OneDrive data
was unknowingly received by TLG from state prosecutors in the ordinary course of
discovery as part of a 3000+ page “phone dump”, and the data did not contain any
illegal images. CR 11.
In addition, to date (and more than five years later), Microsoft and their
attorneys have repeatedly refused to communicate and correct erroneous and
knowingly false reports Microsoft made to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (NCMEC) claiming that Mr. Turnbull and TLG’s staff and
attorneys possessed and publicized child pornography. CR 16–17. Consequently,
those false reports remain with the federal and state agencies NCMEC regularly
2
shares information with, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration
and Customs, the Postal Inspection Service, and the Secret Service. Id.
This egregious campaign violated multiple provisions of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”). In February 2021, Mr.
Turnbull turned to the State Bar of Texas (“State Bar”), comprised of the Board of
Directors, the Commission for Lawyer Discipline (“CFLD”), the Board of
Disciplinary Appeals (“BODA”), the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
(“CDC”), and other State Bar staff to report Microsoft’s attorneys’ professional
misconduct. Mr. Turnbull filed grievances with the CDC demonstrating that
Microsoft’s attorneys violated Texas’s disciplinary rules.
There were various administrative failures in how Appellees—including the
CDC, various State Bar officials, and the CFLD—processed his grievances:
1. Mr. Turnbull’s initial grievances were dismissed without a full
explanation as to why they were dismissed, in contravention of Texas
law;
2. The CDC dismissed Mr. Turnbull’s grievances that Microsoft’s
attorneys misrepresented the truth and were dishonest in their pleadings
filed with a court, but, less than one year later, the CDC instituted
disciplinary petitions against Sydney Powell, Attorney General Ken
3
Paxton, and First Assistant Attorney General Brent Webster based on
the exact same category of misconduct;
3. The CDC wrongly treated Mr. Turnbull’s subsequent grievances, which
alleged additional and distinct allegations of misconduct, as one
collective grievance and dismissed them;
4. The CDC thereafter arbitrarily refused to accept Mr. Turnbull’s
amended grievances, in contravention of Texas law; and
5. The Assistant Disciplinary Counsel for the CDC who handled Mr.
Turnbull’s case failed to disclose a conflict of interest when he
dismissed Mr. Turnbull’s grievances (that he was previously employed
by the firm that was representing Microsoft in the related bar
proceedings Mr. Turnbull filed in the state of Washington) and
discriminated against Mr. Turnbull based on his political views.
INTRODUCTION
Under the Texas Constitution, the Supreme Court of Texas has the inherent
authority to regulate the Texas judiciary, including the practice of law. In re Nolo
Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. 1999); TEX. CONST. ART. V, § 1.
Working together with the Supreme Court, the Texas Legislature enacted the State
Bar Act in 1939 and therein created the State Bar of Texas to address the “growing
demand upon the part of the public and the lawyers of this State” for the regulation
4
and governance of the “legal profession and the professional conduct of attorneys.”
Act of Apr. 6, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 1, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 64. As one Texas
appellate court summarized:
[T]he State Bar Act was intended to result in a new and comprehensive
system regulating the practice of law in Texas. The intent and purpose
of the Legislature was to provide for a full and comprehensive set of
laws to cover completely the practice of law, and regulation of and
disciplining of lawyers…The State Bar Act is purely a creature of
statute, prescribing the machinery and procedure by which the State Bar
has been empowered to bring and maintain [disciplinary proceedings].
But for the statute, the State Bar and [its subsidiaries] would have no
existence.
McGregor v. Clawson, 506 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1974, no writ)
(internal citations omitted). The State Bar Act has been amended numerous times in
its 86-year existence, including the addition of rights afforded to complainants. See,
e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.072(b)(2) (entitling complainants to a “full explanation”
upon dismissal of their complaint).
This case concerns Appellees’ failure to protect complainants’ rights. Their
briefing, however, improperly shifts focus away from the actual legal issues before
the Court. By bogging this litigation down in jurisdictional limbo, Appellees seek to
prevent the merits of Mr. Turnbull’s claims from ever being reached. Of course, no
one disputes that subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the power of a court to
decide the case, Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443
(Tex. 1993), but that is no obstacle to the full airing of Mr. Turnbull’s claims. He
5
affirmatively established standing and his claims are not barred by immunity. The
district court erred in finding otherwise.
ARGUMENT
I. Mr. Turnbull Has Established Standing.
Standing is an inherent part of subject matter jurisdiction, and in determining
whether the plaintiff has established standing, the court must “construe the pleadings
in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader’s intent.” Id. at 446 (emphasis
added). In each of their briefs, Appellees ignore this fundamental principle of Texas
jurisprudence and, instead mischaracterize Mr. Turnbull’s claims as failure-to-
prosecute claims rather than the stated basis of his claims: Appellees’ refusal to
follow their statutorily mandated authority and intentional discrimination against
Mr. Turnbull. Both have led Mr. Turnbull to suffer legally cognizable injuries that
can be redressed by the relief that he has sought.
A. Mr. Turnbull’s injuries are neither speculative nor based on
prosecutorial discretion.
To satisfy the first prong of standing, Mr. Turnbull must plead that he suffered
some concrete, particularized, non-hypothetical injury. Heckman v. Williamson
Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154–55 (Tex. 2012) (holding that constitutional harms are
sufficient to satisfy the injury prong of standing). Mr. Turnbull did just that.
Appellees, as entities and actors within a legislatively created agency, are
bound by the statute that created their existence—the State Bar Act. See Apollo
6
Enters., Inc. v. ScripNet, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 848, 859 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no
pet.). Accordingly, Appellees are bound to follow the Legislature’s mandate in the
State Bar Act that Appellees give complainants, like Mr. Turnbull, a “full
explanation” upon the dismissal of their grievance. TEX. GOV’T CODE
§§ 81.072(b)(2). It is from Appellees’ refusal to follow their statutory and
constitutional mandate that Mr. Turnbull suffered harm.
To get around this, Appellees again consistently mischaracterize Mr.
Turnbull’s claims as complaints about “nonprosecution.” Hodgkins Br. 12; SBA Br.
11; CFLD Br. 40. Contrary to Appellees’ assertion, however, Mr. Turnbull’s
Original Petition identified various, specific actions actually taken—or not taken—
by Appellees that Mr. Turnbull alleges injured him. See CR 28 (Appellees “failed to
provide a full and fair explanation”), 29 (Appellees “refused to act in an open and
fair manner” and “acted arbitrarily because they have denied Mr. Turnbull the
recommendation/reasoning for their determination that they would provide to other
similarly situated complainants”), 30 (Appellees did not provide a “transparent
disciplinary proceeding”).
Importantly, nowhere in the above-outlined allegations did Mr. Turnbull
complain of the prosecutorial outcome of his grievances. Rather, because Mr.
Turnbull identified conduct actually taken by Appellees that violated his
constitutional rights, Mr. Turnbull has satisfied the “injury” prong of standing.
7
B. Mr. Turnbull complains solely of Appellees’ conduct.
To satisfy the second prong of standing, Mr. Turnbull must plead facts that
trace his alleged injuries to the Appellees’ conduct, as opposed to those of a third
party. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155. Mr. Turnbull did just that.
Appellees are required to follow the provisions of the State Bar Act and the
Texas Constitution. See Apollo Enters., Inc., 301 S.W.3d at 859. This includes
Appellees’ obligation to fully comply with the Legislature’s mandate that
complainants, like Mr. Turnbull, are given a “full explanation” upon the dismissal
of their grievance. TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 81.072(b)(2) (emphasis added).
To get around this, Appellees construe Mr. Turnbull’s complaints as against
Microsoft’s attorneys rather than Appellees. See, e.g., SBA Br. 15–16. Not so. Mr.
Turnbull has alleged that: (i) Appellee Brannon failed to disclose his conflict of
interest and subsequently told Mr. Turnbull that the CDC placed his grievances on
the summary disposition docket [CR 19]; (ii) Appellee Baldwin informed Mr.
Turnbull that the summary disposition panel dismissed his grievances [CR 20]; (iii)
Appellee Reynolds informed Mr. Turnbull that the CDC denies Mr. Turnbull’s
public information request regarding his grievances and their dismissal [CR 20]; (iv)
Appellee Grosz informed Mr. Turnbull that the CDC dismissed his new grievances
[CR 22]; (v) Appellee Hodgkins informed Mr. Turnbull that BODA affirmed the
dismissal of his grievances, told Mr. Turnbull that BODA’s decision was final and
8
denied Mr. Turnbull his right to amend his grievances, in violation of the Texas
Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (“TRDP”) [CR 22]; (vi) Appellee Martinez returned
Mr. Turnbull’s amended grievances and informed Mr. Turnbull that he would not be
permitted to amend or refile his grievances [CR 23]; and (vii) Appellees CDC and
CFLD, including Appellee Willing, Appellee Brannon, and Appellee Kates, refused
to provide Mr. Turnbull his statutory right to a “full explanation” as to why his
grievances were dismissed and why Mr. Turnbull was denied his statutory right to
amend or appeal his grievances, why he was intentionally treated differently than
other similarly-situated complainants, and why the attorney discipline system was
used to cloud in secrecy its arbitrary, capricious, and political decision making
process [CR 25–27].
To be sure, the misconduct of Microsoft’s attorneys brought Mr. Turnbull to
Appellees in the first place. However, it is the conduct of Appellees—not
Microsoft’s attorneys—from whom Mr. Turnbull seeks relief. That brings this case
squarely within Heckman’s reach. After all, in Heckman, the Supreme Court held
that a breach in legislative duties is traceable to the state actor or agency responsible
for carrying out that legislative duty. 369 S.W.3d at 157. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court noted that the traceability prong of standing does not require the plaintiff to
show exactly what responsibility the defendants bear for his alleged injuries but,
9
instead, only requires the plaintiff to show that his injuries are fairly traceable to the
defendants. Id.
Appellees attempt to distinguish Heckman, claiming that any mandate by the
Legislature in the State Bar Act applies only to the Supreme Court, not Appellees.
See, e.g., CFLD Br. 46. In other words, Appellees inexplicably advocate for Mr.
Turnbull to file suit against the Supreme Court itself. Id. at 45. Nothing in Texas
jurisprudence supports that strange outcome.
As the traceability prong of standing requires, Mr. Turnbull has identified the
proper defendants because Mr. Turnbull has pointed to specific conduct taken by
each Appellee that resulted in Mr. Turnbull’s constitutional harm. As the Supreme
Court stated in Heckman, whether or not Appellees bear ultimate responsibility for
Mr. Turnbull’s harms is irrelevant because Mr. Turnbull need not prevail on the
merits of his claims at this stage of the litigation. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 157.
Rather, Mr. Turnbull need only show that his injuries are fairly traceable to
Appellees’ conduct. Id. By identifying the specific and independent actions taken by
each Appellee that violated their statutorily and constitutionally mandated duties,
Mr. Turnbull has satisfied the traceability prong of standing.
C. Maintaining suit is Mr. Turnbull’s only means of redress.
To satisfy the final prong of standing, Mr. Turnbull need only prove that there
is a “substantial likelihood” that his requested relief will remedy his alleged injury.
10
Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155–56 (holding that “mathematical certainty” is not
required). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that constitutional violations by
the State may be remedied by injunctive relief. Id. at 158; City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226
S.W.3d 390, 391 (Tex. 2007). Mr. Turnbull did just that by requesting injunctive
relief.
In Heckman, the Supreme Court held that because the plaintiff’s requested
injunction would “in some way” redress his alleged injuries, the plaintiff satisfied
the redressability prong of standing. 369 S.W.3d at 159. Like the plaintiff in
Heckman, Mr. Turnbull seeks injunctive relief against the government to prevent the
government from continuing to violate his constitutional rights. See CR 31–33.
Specifically, Mr. Turnbull requested injunctive relief for Appellees to re-open the
grievances, investigate the grievances fairly, and provide Mr. Turnbull with a full,
fair, and complete explanation of the decision—whatever decision—it makes. CR
31. Contrary to Appellees’ insistence, such relief would not compel Appellees to
make any prosecutorial decision. SBA Br. 16. Rather, Appellees would simply be
required to comply with the law as it is already written, which they failed to do.
Without relief from a federal or state court, Mr. Turnbull would be left with
no forum to seek redress for Appellees’ unconstitutional weaponization of the
attorney discipline system—a fact recently acknowledged by Chief Justice
Blacklock:
11
It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the State Bar remain
completely politically neutral in everything it does, both as a matter of
substance and as a matter of the perception that its actions give to
people on both sides of the aisle. The Supreme Court will accept
nothing less from the State Bar, and we expect the Bar to live up to that
high standard.
Chief Justice James Blacklock, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MRsf5Vz4M-c (Feb. 26, 2025) (emphasis
added). Because injunctive relief would remedy the constitutional harms Appellees
caused Mr. Turnbull, Mr. Turnbull has satisfied the redressability prong of standing.
D. Appellees misplace reliance on Linda R.S., Martinez, and Lefebure.
To all this, Appellees largely defer to three federal cases: Linda R.S.,
Martinez, and Lefebure. But the holdings in those cases are based on facts easily
distinguishable from those presented here, and thus, the Court should decline to
follow them.
First, Appellees cherry-pick 52-year-old dicta from Linda R.S. v. Richard D.
to support their arguments. See Hodgkins Br. 13; SBA Br. 11–13; CFLD Br. 41, 43.
At issue was whether a mother had standing to force a district attorney to initiate a
criminal prosecution against her child’s father for failure to pay child support. Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 614 (1973). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
mother lacked standing because she “failed to allege a sufficient nexus between her
injury and the government action which she attacks to justify judicial intervention.”
Id. at 617–18. This was because she “made no showing that her failure to secure
12
support payments”—the injury-in-fact she claimed—“results from the
nonenforcement, as to her child’s father.” Id. at 618. And that was because the statute
created a completed offense with a fixed penalty, so “if appellant were granted the
requested relief, it would result only in the jailing of the child’s father.” Id. After
announcing this holding, the court added in language best understood as elaboration,
if not outright dicta, 1 that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in
the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Id. at 619.
Unlike the plaintiff in Linda R.S., Mr. Turnbull does not seek to compel the
prosecution of Microsoft’s attorneys. Rather, Mr. Turnbull seeks only to require
Appellees to follow the procedures and the law they are required to follow. CR 31–
33. Further, unlike in Linda R.S., Mr. Turnbull’s requested relief would actually
remedy his injuries.
Second, Appellees rely on the Fifth Circuit’s unpublished opinion 2 in
Martinez. See Hodgkins Br. 13; SBA Br. 13–14, 16, 32; CFLD Br. 41, 43, 51, 68. In
Martinez, after the State Bar allowed a convicted criminal’s defense attorney to file
a late response to his grievance, the convicted criminal sued the State Bar, alleging
1
Five years later, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that Linda R.S. was a redressability
decision, noting that “standing was denied not because of the absence of a subject-matter nexus
between the injury asserted and the constitutional claim, but instead because of the unlikelihood
that the relief requested would redress appellant’s claimed injury.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 n.24 (1978).
2
Unpublished Fifth Circuit opinions “are not precedent, except under the doctrine of res
judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case (or similarly to show double jeopardy, notice,
sanctionable conduct, entitlement to attorney’s fees, or the like).” 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
13
that had the State Bar not done so, the attorney would have been found guilty of
professional misconduct and would have resulted in his conviction being overturned.
Martinez v. State Bar of Tex., 797 Fed. Appx. 167, 167–68 (5th Cir. 2020)
(unpublished). The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that the convicted criminal, acting
pro se, lacked standing because he failed to point to any statutory or constitutional
provision preventing the State Bar from allowing and considering a late response.
Id. at 167.
Unlike the plaintiff in Martinez, who made broad and vague assertions of
constitutional harm, Mr. Turnbull has identified specific statutory provisions that
Appellees willfully refused to follow, resulting in constitutional harm to Mr.
Turnbull. Furthermore, unlike the plaintiff in Martinez, who speculatively claimed
his conviction would have been overturned had the State Bar prosecuted his attorney,
Mr. Turnbull does not complain of the prosecutorial outcome but, rather,
Appellees’ willful refusal to follow the requisite procedures and the law.
Finally, Appellees rely on the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Lefebure. See
Hodgkins Br 12; 11–12, 14–16; CFLD Br. 43. There, the plaintiff sued the local
district attorney to compel him to investigate and prosecute the man who sexually
assaulted her for his crimes. Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 651–52 (5th Cir.
2021). The Fifth Circuit, relying on the above-identified dicta in Linda R.S., held
that the plaintiff lacked standing because she did not have “a legally cognizable
14
interest in how others,” such as her rapist, are treated by the government. Id.
(emphasis in original).
That holding was controversial. It resulted in a forceful dissent, which
distinguished failure-to-prosecute claims (for which plaintiffs lack standing) from
claims of failure to protect, an independent equal protection violation. Id. at 664
(Graves, J., dissenting). In the dissent’s view, the plaintiff “articulate[d] a failure-to-
protect injury that we have recognized for at least twenty years—and one that
invokes the original concerns of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 668 (Graves, J.,
dissenting).
Even accepting the rule in Lebefure for purposes of resolving this appeal, its
holding is still distinguishable. Unlike the plaintiff in Lefebure, Mr. Turnbull does
not seek to compel the prosecution of Microsoft’s attorneys. See CR 31–33.
Moreover, while the relief requested by the plaintiff in Lefebure would not have
redressed her injuries , Mr. Turnbull’s relief would redress his injuries because it
is Appellees’ failure to follow the requisite procedures that caused his constitutional
harms.
*****
Because Mr. Turnbull (i) does not seek to compel the prosecution of
Microsoft’s attorneys, (ii) has identified specific statutory and constitution
provisions Appellees violated, and (iii) has pointed to requested relief that would
15
simply require Appellees to follow their already-mandated authority, Linda R.S.,
Martinez, and Lefebure are inapposite and should be distinguished by the Court.
Surely Appellees do not contend that the Texas judiciary cannot compel state actors,
like Appellees, to follow their clearly defined statutory and constitutional
obligations.
II. Mr. Turnbull’s Claims Are Based in Both Law and Fact.
Though Appellees urge this Court to hold otherwise, Mr. Turnbull’s claims
are not baseless. A proceeding is baseless when it lacks an arguable basis in law or
fact. Johnson v. Lynaugh, 796 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam). In
determining whether a claim is baseless, the Court must construe the pleadings
liberally in favor of Mr. Turnbull, look to his intent, and accept as true the factual
allegation in his pleadings to determine if his claims have a basis in law or fact.
Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet.
denied). Because a reasonable person could believe Mr. Turnbull’s allegations and
his claims are not legally foreclosed, the district court erred in finding that Mr.
Turnbull’s suit is frivolous.
A. A reasonable person could believe Mr. Turnbull’s allegations.
Mr. Turnbull’s claims lack a basis in law if “no reasonable person could
believe the facts” that he pleaded. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Longhorn Creek Ltd. v.
Gardens of Connemara Ltd., 686 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, pet.
16
filed). Irrelevant in this determination is whether Mr. Turnbull’s claims are likely or
outlandish. Id. (quoting Drake v. Walker, No. 05-14-00355-CV, 2015 WL 2160565,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)). This threshold is so
low and, therefore, it “seldom rises to a point of contention in the case law.” Id. at
425 (quoting Davis v. Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co., No. 05-21-00092-CV, 2023 WL
3735115, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2023, no pet.)).
Mr. Turnbull has alleged that: (i) Appellee Brannon failed to disclose his
conflict of interest and subsequently told Mr. Turnbull that the CDC placed his
grievances on the summary disposition docket [CR 19]; (ii) Appellee Baldwin
informed Mr. Turnbull that the summary disposition panel dismissed his grievances
[CR 20]; (iii) Appellee Reynolds informed Mr. Turnbull that the CDC denies Mr.
Turnbull’s public information request regarding his grievances and their dismissal
[CR 20]; (iv) Appellee Grosz informed Mr. Turnbull that the CDC dismissed his
new grievances [CR 22]; (v) Appellee Hodgkins informed Mr. Turnbull that BODA
affirmed the dismissal of his grievances, told Mr. Turnbull that BODA’s decision
was final and denied Mr. Turnbull his right to amend his grievances, in violation of
the TRDP [CR 22]; (vi) Appellee Martinez returned Mr. Turnbull’s amended
grievances and informed Mr. Turnbull that he would not be permitted to amend or
refile his grievances [CR 23]; and (vii) Appellees CDC and CFLD, including
Appellee Willing, Appellee Brannon, and Appellee Kates, refused to provide Mr.
17
Turnbull his statutory right to an explanation as to why his grievances were
dismissed, denied Mr. Turnbull his statutory right to amend or appeal his grievances,
intentionally treated Mr. Turnbull differently than other similarly-situated
complainants, and used the attorney discipline system to cloud in secrecy its
arbitrary, capricious, and political decision making process [CR 25–27].
Appellees—and only Appellees—could have taken the actions alleged by Mr.
Turnbull because Appellees are the very entities and actors charged with overseeing
the attorney discipline system. Therefore, a reasonable person could believe Mr.
Turnbull’s allegations. Therefore, contrary to Appellees’ insistence, Mr. Turnbull’s
claims have a basis in fact.
B. Mr. Turnbull’s claims are not legally foreclosed.
Similarly, Mr. Turnbull’s claims lack a basis in law only if his allegations
taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle
him to his requested relief. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. In other words, “the defendant
must establish the plaintiff’s claims are ‘foreclose[d] as a matter of law.” Longhorn
Creek Ltd., 686 S.W.3d at 426 (quoting In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2021, orig. proceeding [mand. denied])). However, if nothing in
the pleadings “trigger a clear legal bar” to the claims, then the claims are not
frivolous. In re RNDC Tex., LLC, No. 05-18-00555-CV, 2018 WL 27773262, at *1
(Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
18
Mr. Turnbull’s due course of law, equal protection, and open courts claims
are not legally foreclosed as they are based on specific provisions of the Texas
Constitution. First, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that Appellees failed to provide him a
full explanation upon the dismissal of his grievances, as required by the State Bar
Act, and did not allow Mr. Turnbull to amend his grievances as required by law. CR
20–27. Because Mr. Turnbull’s allegations are based on article I section 19 of the
Texas Constitution, which forbids Appellees, as an arm of the State, from depriving
Mr. Turnbull of “life, liberty, property, privileges, or immunities” without “due
course of the law of the land,” TEX. CONST. art. I § 19, his due course of law claim
is based in law.
Second, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that Appellees used the attorney discipline
system to treat him differently from similarly situated complainants. CR 26–27.
Because Mr. Turnbull’s allegations are based on article I section 3 of the Texas
Constitution, which forbids Appellees, as an arm of the State, from treating similarly
situated persons differently, TEX. CONST. art. I § 3, Mr. Turnbull’s equal protection
claim is based in law.
Finally, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that Appellees failed to provide Mr.
Turnbull a full explanation upon dismissal of his grievances, prohibited him from
amending his grievances, and failed to ensure that the State Bar and its subsidiaries
and actors followed their statutory and constitutional obligations. CR 20–27.
19
Because Mr. Turnbull’s allegations are based on article I section 13 of the Texas
Constitution, which forbids Appellees, as an arm of the State, from unreasonably
restricting his access to the judicial system, TEX. CONST. art. I § 13, Mr. Turnbull’s
open courts claim is based in law.
Appellees argue that even if the Court were to let Mr. Turnbull to proceed to
the next phase of litigation, he ultimately cannot prevail on his claims against them.
However, at this stage in the litigation, Mr. Turnbull need not conclusively prove
that he is entitled to recover on the merits of his claims. Rather, Mr. Turnbull need
only show that his claims are not baseless or legally foreclosed. Because immunity
does not bar his claims, as discussed infra, and because Mr. Turnbull’s claims are
based on Appellees’ willful abridgement of specifically identified rights provided to
Mr. Turnbull by the Texas Constitution, Mr. Turnbull’s due course of law, equal
protection, and open courts claims are based in law and should have survived
Appellees’ motions to dismiss in the trial court.
III. Immunity Does Not Bar Mr. Turnbull’s Claims.
Sovereign immunity deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t
of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Though
Appellees, as an arm of the State, are generally immune from suit, Tex. Parks &
Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011), sovereign
immunity does not protect Appellees from a lawsuit for injunctive relief or where
20
the Legislature waived immunity. Tex. Nat’l Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74
S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034; Univ. of Tex. Med.
Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994). Furthermore,
absolute immunity does not bar Mr. Turnbull’s claims because such immunity is
inapplicable to the failure to perform ministerial acts within Appellees’ scope of
authority.
A. The Legislature waived immunity in the State Bar Act.
Sovereign immunity may be legislatively waived by “clear and unambiguous
language.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034; Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v.
York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994). The Legislature did so here in the State Bar
Act by intentionally excluding Appellees from its grant of immunity.
Specifically, the Legislature expressly provided immunity to complainants,
witnesses, and persons associated with the unauthorized practice of law committee.
TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 81.072, .106. Notably, this list excludes Appellees.
Additionally, no amount of wordplay by Appellees can skew the fact that the
Legislature limited the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of the State Bar of Texas
to the State Bar itself and not any other entity or state actors “other than the state
bar.” Id. § 81.107(a). Finally, the Legislature limited the liability of the State Bar of
Texas to nonmonetary relief but otherwise allowed for relief in the form of
declaratory and injunctive relief. See id. § 81.017(b).
21
Accordingly, the Legislature waived sovereign immunity as applied to
Appellees and, contrary to Appellees’ insistence otherwise, had the Legislature
believed it necessary to clearly provide immunity to Appellees, the Legislature
would have done so at any point over the last 85 years of the State Bar Act’s reign.
B. Sovereign immunity does bar injunctive relief from constitutional
harms.
Even if the Court holds that the Legislature did not waive sovereign immunity
for Appellees in the State Bar Act, Texas law is crystal clear that Appellees cannot
avail themselves of sovereign immunity against claims for injunctive relief from
constitutional harm. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Holmes, 294 S.W.3d 328,
334 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. denied) (“Sovereign immunity does not shield a
governmental entity from suit for equitable relief for a violation of constitutional
rights”); Tex. Nat’l Conservation Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d at 853.
Contrary to Appellees’ assertions, Mr. Turnbull did plead that Appellees are
not entitled to sovereign immunity in this case because of his constitutional harms.
CR 29. When a plaintiff alleges that a governmental entity or actor committed a
constitutional violation, the proper focus is on whether the plaintiff has pleaded a
facially viable claim, not whether the entity or actor performed a ministerial act.
Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emp. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2015).
To be sure, had Mr. Turnbull sought monetary relief from Appellees’ conduct,
Appellees would have been able to avail themselves of sovereign immunity.
22
However, because Mr. Turnbull seeks injunctive relief and his claims are based in
law and fact, as briefed supra, Appellees cannot avail themselves of sovereign
immunity in this case.
C. Ministerial acts are not protected by absolute immunity.
When a state actor failed to perform a ministerial duty, as Appellees did here,
absolute immunity does not apply. Univ. of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580
(Tex. 2000). A ministerial act is one for which “the law prescribes and defines the
duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the
exercise of discretion or judgment.” Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144
S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. 2004). The State Bar Act requires Appellees to provide
complainants, like Mr. Turnbull, a “full explanation” upon the dismissal of their
grievance. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.072(b). The State Bar Act requires Appellees to
provide complainants, like Mr. Turnbull, the opportunity to amend their grievance.
Id. § 81.073(b).
Importantly, the Legislature provided no discretion to Appellees on whether
or not to provide this full explanation or to allow amendments to a grievance.
Accordingly, Appellees’ obligations to follow these provisions were ministerial and,
therefore, not subject to immunity. Furthermore, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that
Appellees acted outside the scope of their authority by, among other things,
prohibiting Mr. Turnbull from amending his grievances, disallowing Mr. Turnbull
23
to amend his grievances, refusing to provide Mr. Turnbull a full explanation upon
the dismissal of his grievances, and intentionally treating him different that other
similarly situated complainants based on his political affiliation. CR 20–27.
Appellees took these actions deliberately and outside the scope of their legal
authority to do so. Therefore, Appellees cannot avail themselves of absolute
immunity.
D. Appellees are not entitled to immunity under the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Conduct.
Appellees rely heavily on TRDP 17.09 to evade accountability for their
lawlessness. That rule generally provides that Appellees are “immune from suit for
any conduct in the course of their official duties.” TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 17.09.
However, to determine whether such immunity applies in this case, this Court must
look to the “nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor performing
it.” Crampton v. Farris, 596 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019,
no pet.). Furthermore, activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial
phase of prosecution” may entitle a governmental entity or actor to immunity. Id.
Here, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that Appellees sued in their official capacity
refused to provide Mr. Turnbull his statutory right to a “full explanation” of why his
grievances were dismissed, denied Mr. Turnbull his statutory right to amend or
appeal his grievances, intentionally treated Mr. Turnbull differently than other
similarly-situated complainants, and used the attorney discipline to cloud in secrecy
24
its arbitrary, capricious, and political decision making process. CR 27–31.
Importantly, all of these actions were taken during the just cause determination stage
of the attorney disciplinary process, which is non-judicial and non-adversarial. TEX.
R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.06(W), 2.12. Because Mr. Turnbull’s grievances were
dismissed as part of a non-adversarial process, Appellees were not acting as part of
the “judicial phase of prosecution.”
Moreover, only the Legislature may grant absolute and unqualified immunity.
This Court must “defer to the Legislature as the gatekeeper controlling when and
how citizens can sue their state government or its officers for their official acts.”
Bacon v. Tex. Historical Comm’n, 411 S.W.3d 161, 173 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013,
no pet.) (emphasis added). This is because the Legislature is in the best position to
bestow absolute and unqualified immunity, not the judiciary.
Importantly, the apparent immunity provided by TRDP 17.09 was not granted
by the Legislature but, instead, the Supreme Court. Though Mr. Turnbull has argued
that the Supreme Court abridged the separation of powers doctrine by providing such
immunity, Appellees have not—and cannot—point to any provision within the State
Bar Act or any other statute that provides the same absolute and unqualified
immunity to the entire State Bar, including Appellees. Accordingly, Appellees
cannot reasonably hide behind a judicial rule to circumvent accountability for
violating their statutory and constitutional obligations.
25
IV. Alternatively, Mr. Turnbull should have the opportunity to replead.
In her brief, Ms. Hodgkins argues that Mr. Turnbull should not be allowed to
amend his pleadings if the Court were to affirm the trial court’s determination that
Mr. Turnbull’s claims against her are barred by sovereign immunity. However,
because any alleged defect could be cured on remand, Mr. Turnbull should be given
the opportunity to do so.
When courts grant a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity,
courts allow the plaintiff the opportunity to replead if the defect can be cured. Tex.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2011); Tex. A&M Univ. Sys.
v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2007) (plaintiff “deserves the opportunity to
amend his pleadings if the defects can be cured”). Ms. Hodgkins inappropriately
relies on Koseoglu to support her argument that Mr. Turnbull should not be given an
opportunity to replead. Hodgkins Br. 32.
In Koseoglu, a state employee sued a state university system and other state
defendants for breach of contract stemming from an employment dispute. Koseoglu,
233 S.W.3d at 838. The Supreme Court of Texas prevented the plaintiff from
repleading to “cure the jurisdictional defect” based on sovereign immunity because
the plaintiff’s only argument against sovereign immunity—that the state defendants
waived sovereign immunity by accepting benefits under the alleged employment
contract—had been “consistently rejected” by the court. Id. at 840 (citations
26
omitted). Because no additional repleading would be able to overcome sovereign
immunity for the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, remanding the case “would
serve no legitimate purpose.” Id.
By contrast, assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Turnbull’s claims against Ms.
Hodgkins are barred by sovereign and official immunity—which Mr. Turnbull
vehemently denies—Mr. Turnbull’s claims may be repleaded to cure such a pleading
defect. Unlike in Koseoglu, Mr. Turnbull’s claims are not wholly barred and may, if
required, be repleaded. Ms. Hodgkins’ immunity defense is based on her contention
that Mr. Turnbull sued her “in her official capacity for conduct taken in the course
of her official duties.” Hodgkins Br. 29, 32. Even if the Court were to adopt Ms.
Hodgkins’ view, Mr. Turnbull’s alleged failure to plead conduct taken outside Ms.
Hodgkins’ course of official duties is a factual defect, not a legal one (as in
Koseoglu).
Because any defects in his petition may be cured by repleading, Mr. Turnbull
should be afforded that opportunity.
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
Whether Mr. Turnbull will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claims is a
question appropriately reserved for the trial court in the first instance. It is not one
that this Court can or should reach. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d
229 (Tex. 2008) (“A plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he cannot
27
prevail on the merits of his claim; he lacks standing because his claim of injury is
too slight for a court to afford redress”). Rather, the Court need only decide whether
the laws of the State of Texas provide Mr. Turnbull an opportunity to explore his
claims through the discovery process.
Mr. Turnbull respectfully requests that this Court reverse each of the five
orders of the district court, remand the proceedings for discovery and eventual
resolution on the merits, and grant such other and further relief for which he may be
entitled.
28
DATE: March 10, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
WEST, WEBB, ALLBRITTON & GENTRY,
P.C.
1515 Emerald Plaza
College Station, Texas 77845
Telephone: (979) 694-7000
Facsimile: (979) 694-8000
By: /s Gaines West
GAINES WEST
State Bar No. 21197500
gaines.west@westwebblaw.com
JOHN “JAY” RUDINGER, JR.
State Bar No. 24067852
jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com
~ AND ~
JUDD E. STONE II
State Bar No. 24076720
judd@stonehilton.com
STONE HILTON PLLC
600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350
Austin, Texas 7870
Telephone: (737) 465-3897
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
29
CERTIFCATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been served on the
following counsel of record on March 10, 2025.
Daniel J. Olds Via E-File
CLARK HILL PLC
901 Main Street, Suite 6000
Dallas, Texas 75202
dolds@clarkhill.com
Patrick W. Mizell Via E-File
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
845 Texas Avenue, Suite 4700
Houston, Texas 77002
pmizell@velaw.com
Royce LeMoine Via E-File
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
P.O. Box 12487, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
royce.lemoine@texasbar.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
/s Gaines West
GAINES WEST
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, I certify
that the foregoing document complies with the word count limitation of Rule 9.4(i).
It contains 6,534 total words, including any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1). In
making this Certificate of Compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by
Microsoft Word, the software used to prepare this document. This is a computer-
generated document using Times New Roman 14-point font.
/s Gaines West
GAINES WEST
30
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Billy Hart on behalf of Gaines West
Bar No. 21197500
billy.hart@westwebblaw.com
Envelope ID: 98275795
Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: Appellant's Reply to Appellees' Briefs
Status as of 3/10/2025 3:51 PM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Pat Mizell pmizell@velaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Billy SHart billy.hart@westwebblaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Jay Rudinger jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
David Kitner 11541500 dkitner@clarkhill.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Jadd Masso 24041411 jmasso@clarkhill.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Royce Lemoine 24026421 royce.lemoine@texasbar.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Richard Huntpalmer 24097857 Richard.Huntpalmer@texasbar.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Gaines West 21197500 gaines.west@westwebb.law 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
John Rudinger 24067852 jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Judd Stone 24076720 Judd@stonehilton.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Daniel Olds 24088152 dolds@clarkhill.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Brooke Noble bnoble@velaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Michael Graham 24113581 Michael.Graham@TEXASBAR.COM 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Emily Bamesberger ebamesberger@velaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Justin B.Cox jbcox@clarkhill.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT
Gaines West gaines.west@westwebblaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT