Raja Development Co. v. Napa Sanitation District CA1/4

Filed 3/14/25 Raja Development Co. v. Napa Sanitation District CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

RAJA DEVELOPMENT CO.

INC. et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, A170777

v. (Napa County Super. Ct.

NAPA SANITATION No. 19CV000682)

DISTRICT,

Defendant and

Respondent;

COUNTY OF NAPA,

Real Party in Interest.

Plaintiffs Raja Development Co., Inc., Cashel, Inc., and

Carter Randall Callahan (plaintiffs) appeal an order denying

their motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure

section 1021.5.1 We find no error and affirm.

BACKGROUND

In May 2019, plaintiffs filed the present action seeking a

refund of sewer service charges that they, as condominium

owners, paid to the Napa Sanitation District (the District). They

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of

Civil Procedure.

also sought to enjoin further collection of those charges.2 As

amended, their complaint alleged, among other things, that the

sewer service charge included a use fee for general operations,

general revenue purposes, and other non-capacity related

purposes, and that this fee was “an invalid tax because it exceeds

the reasonable cost of providing the service for which it is

charged, the District has not justified the fee with a nexus study,

and the fee has not been approved by two-thirds of voters.” (Raja

Development Co. v. Napa Sanitary Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 85,

91.) Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the use fee was

improperly calculated for townhomes and condominiums at the

same rate that was used to calculate the charges for single family

homes, rather than at the lesser rate charged for apartments,

and that the District had not justified the higher charges with a

rate study showing that the charges were limited to the cost of

providing the associated services as required by law. The

operative complaint omitted the cause of action seeking refunds

of the amounts that plaintiffs alleged had been illegally collected

because the court had previously sustained a demurrer to that

cause of action without leave to amend.

On October 31, 2023, the District moved for judgment on

the pleadings on the ground that plaintiffs’ claim was moot

because the ordinance challenged in the lawsuit was no longer in

effect. The District explained that the sewer service charges

2 The operative complaint names the District (erroneously

referred to as the Napa Sanitary District) as the defendant but

identifies Napa County as the real party in interest.

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challenged in the litigation were imposed under the authority of

Ordinance 87, and that Ordinance 87 was superseded by

Ordinance 112, which was adopted by the District’s Board of

Directors on March 31, 2021 and took effect on July 1, 2021. The

motion further explained: “Ordinance 112 changed the rate

structure for the sewer service charges at issue based on a rate

study conducted in 2020. The District periodically commissions

such rate studies to ensure that sewer service charges properly

align with costs; revisiting the rates at this time was especially

appropriate given the fluctuating water demands due to the

COVID-19 pandemic. The Rate Study analyzed, inter alia, the

cost of providing services to various types of dwellings—including

townhomes and condominiums—and the appropriate nexus

between these costs and the corresponding rates and fees charged

to customers. It determined that the [Equivalent Dwelling Unit]

ratios for townhomes and condominiums, as well as certain other

residential properties, should be adjusted over a five year

period.[3] Ordinance 112 reflects these recommendations, and,

accordingly, the sewer service charges for condominiums and

townhomes are no longer set at [the rates alleged in the

complaint].” Plaintiffs did not dispute that its claims were moot

but argued that a judgment should be entered in their favor since

3 An Equivalent Dwelling Unit is a measure defined under

Section 1.02.010 of the Napa Sanitation District Code as “the

combination of flow and strength of wastestream that is

equivalent to the waste discharged from a single family home.

This is often evaluated on a per day basis.”

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the District had “taken all actions demanded in the []

Complaint.” The trial court disagreed and granted the motion.

On February 29, 2024, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking

approximately $700,000 in attorney fees under section 1021.5.

They claimed that, despite the fact that there was no judgment in

their favor, their lawsuit was “CLEARLY the catalyst for the

actions taken by the District” because the changes demanded by

plaintiffs were “made by the District in the middle of this

litigation.” The District opposed the motion, claiming that its

decision to conduct a rate study and later to change its rate

structure was motivated not by plaintiffs’ lawsuit but by a

separate administrative appeal brought by another entity

in 2016. The District argued further that even if plaintiffs had

established an entitlement to attorney fees, the amount of fees

claimed was not reasonable.

The trial court denied the motion, finding that it was

procedurally and substantively deficient.

DISCUSSION

“The Legislature adopted Code of Civil Procedure

section 1021.5, a codification of the private attorney general

doctrine, as an exception to the general rule that litigants are to

bear their own attorney fees. [Citation.] ‘ “[T]he private attorney

general doctrine ‘rests upon the recognition that privately

initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the

fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or

statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism

authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce

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such important public policies will as a practical matter

frequently be infeasible.’ ” ’ [Citation.] The fundamental purpose

of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public

policies by rewarding attorneys who successfully prosecute such

cases and prevent worthy claimants from being silenced or stifled

by a lack of legal resources.” (Department of Water Resources

Environmental Impact Cases (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 556, 570–571

(Environmental Impact Cases).)

To qualify for fees under section 1021.5, a plaintiff must

show, among other things, that it is a successful party.

(Environmental Impact Cases, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 571.)

“Our Supreme Court has taken a ‘broad, pragmatic’ view of what

constitutes a successful party for purposes of Code of Civil

Procedure section 1021.5. [Citation.] The trial court ‘ “ ‘must

realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a practical

perspective, whether or not the action served to vindicate an

important right so as to justify an attorney fee award’ under

[Code of Civil Procedure] section 1021.5.” ’ [Citation.] [¶] It is not

necessary for a plaintiff to obtain a judgment in its favor to

qualify as a successful party. [Citation.] In Graham

[v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 560–561, 568

(Graham)], our Supreme Court endorsed the ‘catalyst theory’ of

attorney fees, under which plaintiffs may be considered

successful if their lawsuit caused the defendant to voluntarily

provide the relief sought. [Citation.] Under the catalyst theory,

attorney fees may be awarded even when litigation does not

result in a judicial resolution if the defendant voluntarily changes

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its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought

by, the litigation.” (Environmental Impact Cases, supra, at

p. 571.)

A plaintiff moving for attorney fees under the catalyst

theory “must establish that (1) its ‘lawsuit was a catalyst

motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought’;

(2) ‘the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by

threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense’;

and (3) it ‘reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to

filing the lawsuit.’ ” (Environmental Impact Cases, supra,

79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 571–572.) “To satisfy the first (causation)

prong, the plaintiff need not show the litigation was the only

cause of defendant’s acquiescence. [Citation.] The litigation need

only be a ‘ “substantial factor” ’ contributing to the relief

obtained.” (Id. at p. 572.)

We review a trial court’s determination of whether a

litigant is a successful party under the catalyst theory party for

abuse of discretion. (Environmental Impact Cases, supra,

79 Cal.App.5th at p. 573.) “To determine whether the trial court

abused its discretion, we must review the entire record, paying

particular attention to the court’s stated reasons and whether it

applied the proper standards of law in reaching its decision.

[Citation.] ‘ “We accept the trial court’s resolution of credibility

and conflicting substantial evidence, and its choice of possible

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.” ’ ”

(Ibid.)

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Here, the trial court found that: (1) plaintiffs failed to show

that they engaged in any attempts, let alone reasonable

attempts, to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit;

(2) plaintiffs provided only “conclusory argument that

Ordinance 112 achieves the relief that was demanded by

plaintiffs” but presented no evidence, by declaration or request

for judicial notice, “to show what their primary litigation

objective was and what action Defendants allegedly took to

achieve those objectives;” (3) plaintiffs failed to establish that

their lawsuit was the catalyst motivating the defendants to

provide the primary relief sought; and (4) plaintiffs failed to

establish that the lawsuit was meritorious and that they

achieved the catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of

nuisance and threat of expense.

Initially, we agree with the trial court’s characterization of

plaintiffs’ moving papers as procedurally deficient and their

argument as conclusory. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the

trial court raised their failure to address prelitigation settlement

sua sponte, and they argue that the allegations in their complaint

that they met with the staff of the District and detailed the issues

that would later be raised in the complaint were sufficient to

meet this requirement. But it is the burden of the moving party

to ensure that the moving papers support each element required

for relief. (City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.

(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362, 429 [a party moving for an attorney

fees award must establish each element for such an award in

order for their motion to be granted].) This they did not do.

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Similarly, plaintiffs’ conclusory statements that the adoption of

Ordinance 112 necessarily proves the prior charges were illegal

and that the District conceded or admitted as much through or by

their actions is not sufficient to meet their burden as the moving

party. However, we need not rely on these additional grounds to

affirm the trial court’s order because, as discussed below, the

record establishes that the court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not a catalyst for the

District’s decision to conduct the 2020 rate study or enact

Ordinance 112.

On appeal, plaintiffs again rely solely on the chronology of

events to support their argument that the lawsuit was the

catalyst for the actions taken by the District. They argue:

“Plaintiffs’ Action sought 1) to compel the District either [to]

conduct a nexus study for the sewer fees charge or to put the

fee/tax on the ballot for approval, and 2) to adopt a fee for

townhomes and condominiums that is accurate and separate and

apart from the fee charged for single family residences. The

District had refused to take these actions for 44 years before the

Action was filed. Two years after the action was filed, the

District, for the very first time conducted the required nexus

study and establishing a separate fee for townhomes and

condominiums. Following the unprecedented study of rates for

townhomes and condominiums, the District then satisfied the

second demand of Plaintiffs by adopting a separate fee for

townhomes and condominiums which is lower than the fee

charged to single-family residences. The District, through these

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actions, conceded that all of the allegations in the Third Amended

Complaint were true and corrected their illegal actions, for the

first time in almost half a century because of this action.”

This chronology of events was initially sufficient to raise an

inference that plaintiffs’ lawsuit motivated the District’s actions.

As the court explained in Environmental Impact Cases, supra,

79 Cal.App.5th at pages 572–573, “[b]ecause defendants usually

are reluctant to concede that litigation induced them to provide

the relief sought, ‘[c]lues to the provocative effects of the

plaintiffs’ legal efforts are often best gleaned from the chronology

of events . . . .’ [Citations.] ‘When, after litigation is initiated, a

defendant has voluntarily provided the relief a plaintiff is

seeking, the chronology of events may raise an inference that the

litigation was the catalyst for the relief.’ [Citations.] This shifts

to the defendant the burden to produce evidence to rebut that

inference. [Citation.] The ultimate burden of proof, however,

remains on the claimant to establish each element of the statute.”

(See also Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 573 [defendant “knows

better than anyone why it made the decision that granted the

plaintiff the relief sought, and the defendant is in the best

position to either concede that the plaintiff was a catalyst or to

document why the plaintiff was not”]; Californians for

Responsible Toxics Management v. Kizer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d

961, 969 [credible evidence submitted by defendant may “suffice

to rebut the presumption of causation raised solely by the

chronology of events”].)

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Here, the District submitted a declaration by its General

Manager, who explained that he served as the District’s Senior

Civil Engineer / Capital Projects Manager from April 2013 to

August 2016 and as Technical Services Director from

August 2016 to April 2023, and that in those roles he was

responsible for reviewing the District’s annual sewer service

charges. His declaration asserts that the District’s 2020 rate

study and the subsequent changes enacted by Ordinance 112

were motivated by an assessment appeal filed in 2016 by the

management company operating the Oaktree Vineyard Mobile

Home Park (Oaktree Vineyard) and that “neither the 2020 rate

study nor Ordinance 112 were influenced by this lawsuit.” The

declaration sets out in significant detail and with supporting

documentary evidence the following history of the 2016 Oak

Vineyard appeal and how it motivated the District to adjust its

sewer charges: In April 2016, Oaktree Vineyard applied for

review of a determination by the District that the manufactured

homes at Oaktree Vineyard did not qualify as mobile homes

under state statutes and thus, that they should be assessed fees

at the same rate as single family homes and not mobile homes.

The declarant states that he reviewed this application as part of

his job duties and, based on his review of Oaktree Vineyard’s

water usage, “determined that Oaktree Vineyard’s water usage

was more akin to the water usage for mobile homes in the area

than it was to the water usage for single family homes.” In

July 2016, based on the declarant’s report and testimony, the

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District approved the application and reduced Oaktree

Vineyard’s sewer service charges.

The declaration continues: “Because the Oaktree Vineyard

appeal revealed a discrepancy between water usage and

wastewater generation on the one hand, and residential unit

classification and sewer service charges on the other hand, with

respect to the homes at issue in that appeal, I recommended to

[the District’s] management shortly after the appeal that [it]

conduct a further study of water usage and wastewater

generation from different types of residential and commercial

unit types, to assess whether other such discrepancies existed.”

The District’s management agreed with his recommendation and

“determined that [the District] should broaden its next cost of

service analysis to include consideration of a wider range of

residential and commercial unit types, to study the alignment of

water usage and wastewater generation with residential and

commercial unit classification and charges in the most

economical manner.”

According to the declaration, the District conducts rate

studies every five years and the next rate study was scheduled to

take place in 2020. The declarant explained, “we planned to

include wider range of residential and commercial unit types in

the 2020 rate study” but did not “plan for a rate study to be done

outside the regular schedule, in part because conducting a rate

study requires a process to select an appropriate vendor and

requires budgeting time and money to complete the analysis

(including a fair amount of staff time). Because we had recently

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finished a rate study and had another planned to take place in

about three years, and because the expanded analysis we

planned would be complex and would take time to develop, I

believed and [the District’s] management determined in the

course of our discussions in 2016 that it would be more efficient

to add these expanded issues to the 2020 rate study rather than

trying to put together budget and proposal for a study prior to

that time. [¶] When it came time for the Board to commission the

2020 rate study, . . . we recommended that the rate study include

a wider variety of residential and commercial unit types than

those typically included in [the District’s] cost of service analyses.

The Board accepted this recommendation, and on March 4, 2020,

the Board approved a consultant contract for the 2020 rate

study.”

The 2020 rate study “analyzed the cost of providing services

to various types of residential and commercial unit types and the

appropriate nexus between these costs and the corresponding

rates and fees charged to customers” and “concluded that the []

ratios for certain residential properties should be adjusted over a

five-year period.” On March 31, 2021, the District adopted

Ordinance 112, which amended applicable provisions of the

municipal code “to change the rate structure for certain

residential properties as recommended by the 2020 rate study.”

The declarant concludes that “[t]he changes the Board made to

residential sewer service charges would have occurred regardless

of this lawsuit, in my opinion, because through my involvement

in [the District’s] assessment of the [Oaktree Vineyard appeal]

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and in [the District’s] subsequent discussions and determinations

about the scope of the 2020 rate study, and as one of the persons

responsible for that study, I am aware that [the District] had

already put these changes into motion beginning in 2016.”

The trial court reasonably concluded that any inference

that plaintiffs’ litigation was the catalyst for the District’s actions

based on the chronology of events was rebutted by the District’s

evidence submitted in opposition to the motion. Plaintiffs’

arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.

On appeal, plaintiffs repeat, almost verbatim, their

argument in the trial court that the declaration was inadmissible

because “the legislative thought process privilege prohibits staff

statements regarding the intent of the legislative body.” They

cite Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior Court (1990)

20 Cal.4th 509, 540, in which the court held that “[u]nder the

deliberative thought process privilege, senior officials of all three

branches of government enjoy a qualified, limited privilege not to

disclose or be examined concerning not only the mental processes

by which a given decision was reached, but the substance of

conversations, discussions, debates, deliberations and like

material reflecting advice, opinions, and recommendations by

which government policy is processed and formulated.” The trial

court, however, overruled plaintiffs’ objection on the ground that,

because the District is the holder of the deliberative process

privilege, its “decision to include evidence of their motivation

behind adopting Ordinance 112 is better classified as a waiver of

that privilege, rather than a violation of the privilege.”

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Plaintiffs have made no attempt to challenge the trial

court’s conclusion or explain why the general rule that the

“holder of the privilege” is the person entitled to claim or waive it

does not apply. The issue has therefore been forfeited. (Telish v.

State Personnel Bd. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1487, fn. 4.) In

any event, the trial court was correct. (See, e.g., Evid. Code,

§ 912 [“the right of any person to claim a privilege . . . is waived

with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any

holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a

significant part of the communication or has consented to

disclosure made by anyone”]; Citizens for Open Government v.

City of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 306 [“The burden is on

the [one claiming the deliberative process privilege] to establish

the conditions for creation of the privilege”].)

Plaintiffs also argue summarily that the “only purpose of

the [] Declaration is to establish the motives and intent of the

Napa Sanitation District in adopting Ordinance 112” and that

“[n]o one can truly know the intent of those voting except from

statement made from the dais by those voting.” The declaration,

however, provides credible evidence as to the events that led to

the District’s actions as set forth by a direct participant in the

process. Plaintiffs do not suggest that the declaration lacked

credibility. Nor do they argue that the declaration was

insufficient to establish that the specific issue raised by their

lawsuit—whether water usage for condominiums was more

similar to single family homes or apartments—was considered in

the 2020 rate study as a result of the Oaktree Vineyard appeal

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and not their litigation. Rather, they suggest that despite this

evidence individual members of the District’s Board may have

voted in favor of the new ordinance for the undisclosed reason

that they were motivated by plaintiffs’ pending litigation.

Plaintiffs’ argument is entirely speculative and insufficient to

establish that the trial court abused its discretion in relying on

the declaration to conclude that plaintiffs were not a successful

party for purposes of awarding attorney fees.

DISPOSITION

The order denying plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees is

affirmed. The District is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.

GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.

STREETER, J.

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