The opinion
Sanchez v New York City Tr. Auth.
2025 NY Slip Op 30796(U)
March 11, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County
Docket Number: Index No. 155365/2022
Judge: Richard Tsai
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
State and local government sources, including the New
York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.
This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
publication.
INDEX NO. 155365/2022
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 50 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2025
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
PRESENT: HON. RICHARD TSAI PART 21
Justice
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 155365/2022
JUANA ALMONTE SANCHEZ and ROMULO RAMIREZ-
SAMBOY, MOTION DATE 08/22/2024
Plaintiffs, MOTION SEQ. NO. 002
-v-
THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
DECISION + ORDER ON
MANHATTAN AND BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT
OPERATING AUTHORITY, RENE JOLY, and LUIS MOTION
BELTRAN ADAMES,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers (Motion 002) 25-49
were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY .
Upon the foregoing documents, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for partial
summary judgment in their favor as to liability against defendants is GRANTED IN
PART TO THE EXTENT THAT plaintiffs are granted partial summary judgment in their
favor as to liability as against defendants New York City Transit Authority, Manhattan
and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority and Rene Joly, who are jointly and
severally liable; and it is further
ORDERED that the first affirmative defense of plaintiffs’ culpable conduct in
defendants’ answer is stricken, and plaintiffs’ motion is otherwise denied; and it is
further
ORDERED that defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the
complaint as against defendant Luis Beltran Adames is GRANTED, the complaint is
severed and dismissed as against Luis Beltran Adames, with costs and disbursements
as against this defendant as taxed by the Clerk upon submission of an appropriate bill
of costs, and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant Luis Beltran
Adames accordingly; and it is further
ORDERED that the remainder of the action shall continue; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties are directed to appear in person for a status
conference in IAS Part 21, 80 Centre Street Room 280, New York, New York on June
5, 2025 at 3 p.m.
155365/2022 SANCHEZ, JUANA ALMONTE ET AL vs. THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT Page 1 of 4
AUTHORITY ET AL
Motion No. 002
1 of 4
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INDEX NO. 155365/2022
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 50 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2025
In this action, plaintiffs allege that they were passengers on a bus operated by
defendant Luis Beltran Adames, which was rear-ended by another bus operated by
defendant Rene Joly.
Plaintiffs now move for partial summary judgment in their favor as to liability
against defendants, and for a finding that defendants are 100% liable.
Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ motion to the extent that plaintiff seeks summary
judgment in their favor as against defendant Luis Beltran Adames. Defendants cross-
move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against defendant Luis Beltran
Adames. Plaintiffs take no position on the cross-motion.
In their affidavits, plaintiffs Juana Almonte Sanchez and Romulo Ramirez-
Samboy each aver that, on April 2, 2021, they were passengers on a bus bearing
license plate no. AT9025, which was struck in the rear by another bus bearing license
plate no. AU 1032, while the bus was stopped at a bus stop on northbound Broadway,
at its intersection with West 137th Street in Manhattan (see Exhibit A in support of
plaintiffs’ motion, Sanchez aff ¶ 1 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 28]; see Exhibit B in support of
plaintiffs’ motion, Ramirez-Samboy aff ¶ 1 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 29]). Sanchez states
that, as she walked toward the rear of the bus to find a seat, the impact “caused me to
fall hard to the ground on my back” (Sanchez aff ¶ 3). Ramirez-Samboy similarly states
that he was walking with Sanchez to toward the rear to find a seat, and “[t]he impact
caused me to fall hard to the ground” (Ramirez-Samboy ¶ 3).
In his affidavit, defendant Luis Beltran Adames states,
“My bus had been at a complete stop for approximately 2 minutes during
which time passengers were getting on the bus. After the last passenger
had gotten onto the bus, but before I had closed the door and while still
stopped, my bus was struck from behind by another bus” (see Exhibit 3 in
opposition and in support of defendants’ cross-motion, Adames aff ¶ 3
[NYSCEF Doc. No. 42])
In defendants’ answer, they admitted that defendant New York City Transit
Authority (NYCTA) owned the bus bearing license plate number AU1032, and that the
bus was operated by defendant Rene Joly, who was an employee of defendant
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA) (see Exhibit D in
support of plaintiffs’ motion, answer ¶ 4 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 31]). Defendants also
admitted that it owned the bus bearing license plate no. AT9025, which was operated by
defendant Luis Beltran Adams, who was also a MABSOTA employee (id.). Lastly,
defendants admitted that both had operated the buses with the permission of NYCTA
and MABSTOA (id.).
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AUTHORITY ET AL
Motion No. 002
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INDEX NO. 155365/2022
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 50 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2025
According to their bill of particulars, plaintiff Sanchez suffered, among other
injuries, a left knee fracture of the medial patellar facet and a medial meniscus tear, and
a rotator cuff tear of the right shoulder, along with lumbar and cervical spine injuries
(see Exhibit E in support of plaintiffs’ motion, bill of particulars ¶ 12 [NYSCEF Doc. No.
32]).
It has been well established in New York that a rear-end collision “with a stopped
or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver
of the rear vehicle” (Cabrera v Rodriguez, 72 AD3d 553, 553 [1st Dept 2010), while the
driver of the lead vehicle, which was stopped, is presumed not negligent (Giap v Pham,
159 AD3d 484, 485 [1st Dept 2018]; see also Soto-Maroquin v Mellet, 63 AD3d 449,
450 [1st Dept 2009]).
Here, there is no dispute that bus operated by defendant Luis Beltran Adames
was stopped at a bus stop when it was rear-ended by a bus operated by defendant
Rene Joly. Thus, plaintiffs met their prima facie burden of establishing the negligence
of defendant Rene Joly as a matter of law, and that Joly’s negligence was a substantial
factor in causing the collision.
As the NYCTA is the admitted owner of the vehicle operated by defendant Joly,
who operated the bus with its permission, plaintiffs met their prima facie burden that the
NYCTA is vicariously liable for Joly’s negligence under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388
(see Murdza v Zimmerman, 99 NY2d 375, 379 [2003]). As the incident occurred within
the scope of Joly’s employment, plaintiffs also met their prima facie burden that
MABSTOA is vicariously liable for Joly’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat
superior (Riviello v Waldron, 47 NY2d 297, 302 [1979]; Ryga v New York City Tr. Auth.,
17 AD3d 561, 562 [2d Dept 2005]).
In opposition, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
should be denied because they attribute negligence to the defendants collectively,
depositions have not been held, and that the evidence establishes that defendant
Adames is not at fault (see affirmation of defendants’ counsel in opposition and in
support of cross-motion ¶¶ 19-24 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 39]).
As plaintiffs point out, summary judgment is not premature because information
as to why Joly’s bus rear-ended Adames’ bus is within Joly’s own personal knowledge
(see Stephenson v New York City Tr. Auth., 226 AD3d 546 [1st Dept 2024]; Ahmad v
Behal, 221 AD3d 558, 559 [1st Dept 2023]). The mere hope that additional discovery
may lead to sufficient evidence to defeat a summary judgment motion is insufficient to
deny such a motion” (Singh v New York City Hous. Auth., st
- 177 AD3d 475, 476 [1 Dept
2019]).
Therefore, plaintiffs are granted partial summary judgment in their favor as to
liability as against the NYCTA, MABSTOA, and Joly, who are jointly and severally liable.
155365/2022 SANCHEZ, JUANA ALMONTE ET AL vs. THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT Page 3 of 4
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Motion No. 002
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INDEX NO. 155365/2022
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 50 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2025
To be clear, the determination of these defendants’ fault as a matter of law on
this motion does not include the issue of whether plaintiffs suffered a serious injury
within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), “which is a threshold matter separate
from the issue of fault” (Reid v Brown, 308 AD2d 331, 332 [1st Dept 2003]).
The branch of plaintiffs’ motion seeking a determination that defendants are
“100% liable” is granted to the extent that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing the first affirmative defense of plaintiff’s culpable conduct, based on plaintiffs’
affidavits that established they were passengers who played no role in the operation of
the bus operated by defendant Luis Beltran Adames.
However, summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor as to liability against defendant
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) is denied. Plaintiffs did not submit any
evidence either that the MTA owns the bus at issue, or that Joly was an employee of the
MTA.1
Turning to defendants’ cross motion, defendants are granted summary judgment
dismissing the complaint as against defendant Luis Beltran Adames. Adames was the
driver of a stopped vehicle that was rear-ended by the bus operated by defendant Joly.
As discussed above, in rear end collisions, a presumption arises that the driver of the
lead vehicle is not negligent, which plaintiffs did not contest.
3/11/2025
DATE RICHARD TSAI, J.S.C.
CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
MOTION
CROSS MOTION
APPLICATION:
X
GRANTED
GRANTED
SETTLE ORDER
El
DENIED
DENIED
X GRANTED IN PART
GRANTED IN PART
SUBMIT ORDER
B OTHER
OTHER
□
CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE
1
Although not raised by defendants, the court notes that “[i]t is well settled, as a matter of law,
that the functions of the MTA with respect to public transportation are limited to financing and
planning, and do not include the operation, maintenance, and control of any facility” (Delacruz v
Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 45 AD3d 482, 483 [1st Dept 2007]; see also Archer v New York City
Tr. Auth., 187 AD3d 564 [1st Dept 2020]).
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Motion No. 002
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