The opinion
Rel: March 14, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________
CL-2024-0651
_________________________
Ricia Nash
v.
Mattie Nash
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-22-902147)
LEWIS, Judge.
Ricia Nash appeals from a summary judgment entered by the
Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") in favor of her mother Mattie
Nash. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for
further proceedings.
CL-2024-0651
Procedural History
On July 21, 2022, Mattie filed a petition against Ricia requesting
that the trial court quiet title to certain property located in Jefferson
County ("the property") and set aside an allegedly fraudulent conveyance
of that property. On July 29, 2022, Mattie filed an amended petition.
Mattie's petition, as amended, asserted that certain recorded deeds
purporting to convey an interest in the property to Ricia were not signed
by Mattie or by Mattie's deceased husband Charles Nash. She asserted
that those deeds were "fraudulent conveyances." Mattie requested that
the trial court "enter a judgment that [she] is the owner of [the property]
in fee simple, free and clear of all claims, interest, liens or
encumbrances."
Both parties filed motions for a summary judgment. Mattie
submitted her own affidavit averring that neither she nor Charles had
signed the deeds purporting to convey an interest in the property to Ricia.
Ricia, on the other hand, submitted, among other evidence, a notarized
quit claim deed dated April 11, 2017, ("the 2017 deed") bearing the
purported signatures of Mattie and Charles conveying a life estate in the
property to themselves with the remainder to Ricia. She also submitted
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CL-2024-0651
a notarized quit claim deed dated October 14, 2019, ("the 2019 deed")
bearing the purported signatures of Mattie and Charles conveying the
property to themselves and Ricia. Ricia also submitted the affidavit of
Robert Jackson, who averred that he had witnessed Mattie and Charles
sign the 2017 deed, and the affidavits of the notaries who witnessed the
signatures on the 2017 deed and the 2019 deed, respectively.
On July 11, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment, stating, in
pertinent part:
"A. That at the hearing … Mattie … was placed under oath
and ore tenus testimony was received by the Court regarding
her mental and physical status. [Mattie] was questioned by
her attorney … as well as the attorney for [Ricia]…. [Mattie]
testified she did not sign a quit claim deed conveying the
property made the basis of this lawsuit to her daughter
Ricia…. Additional testimony and information satisfied this
Court [that] she was more than competent to testify at trial
despite her advanced age and debilitated physical disposition.
"B. Motion for Summary Judgment filed by … Mattie … is
hereby granted.
"C. Mattie … is the rightful owner of the property made the
basis of this lawsuit….
".…
"E. Any quit-claim deed conveyance to Ricia … regarding the
subject property of this lawsuit is held for naught."
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CL-2024-0651
On July 24, 2024, the trial court entered a "Final Judgment" in favor of
Mattie. On August 15, 2024, Ricia filed her notice of appeal to this court.1
Standard of Review
" ' "This Court's review of a summary
judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003). We
apply the same standard of review as the trial
court applied. Specifically, we must determine
whether the movant has made a prima facie
showing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v.
Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala. 2004). In
making such a determination, we must review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d
794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-
12. '[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such
weight and quality that fair minded persons in the
exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably
infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'
1Because the 2017 deed to the property indicates that it was
conveyed pursuant to consideration in the amount of $500, we conclude
that the amount involved appears to be within this court's appellate
jurisdiction. See Coprich v. Jones, [Ms. 2023-0675, June 21, 2024] __ So.
3d __ (Ala. 2024).
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CL-2024-0651
West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So.
2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)." '
"Prince v. Poole, 935 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Dow
v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala.
2004))."
Brown v. W.P. Media, Inc., 17 So. 3d 1167, 1169 (Ala. 2009).
Discussion
On appeal, Ricia argues that Mattie's claim for fraudulent
conveyance was improperly named. She also argues, although somewhat
imprecisely, that the trial court should not have entered a summary
judgment because the deeds were notarized and, thus, they were self-
authenticating evidence of the validity of the conveyance.2 We find the
latter argument dispositive.
Our supreme court has held that
"the execution and acknowledgment and prompt recordation
of a deed is prima facie evidence of its due execution imposing
on one attacking such deed as a forgery to show that the deed
was a forgery by clear and convincing evidence, reaching a
high degree of certainty, leaving upon the mind no fair, just
doubts of the truthfulness of such fact."
2We will consider whether the entry of the summary judgment was
appropriate in light of this argument because "we are able to adequately
discern the issue [the appellant] presents." See Kirksey v. Roberts, 613
So. 2d 352, 353 (Ala. 1993).
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CL-2024-0651
Jordan v. Conservation & Land Co., 273 Ala. 99, 102, 134 So. 2d 777, 780
(1961); see also Briggs v. Glass, 420 So. 2d 46, 48 (Ala. 1982) ("Where a
deed is attacked as a forgery, the Court requires the attacking party to
'show that it was a forgery by clear and convincing evidence, reaching a
high degree of certainty, leaving no doubt of the truthfulness of such
fact.' " (quoting Thompson v. Mitchell, 337 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Ala. 1976))).
In this case, Mattie presented evidence, i.e., her own affidavit, indicating
that she and Charles had not signed the deeds. However, as previously
noted, Ricia presented the signed and notarized deeds, along with
affidavits of the respective notaries to those deeds, in support of her
summary-judgment motion. "[A]ll evidence of record … should be
considered in ruling on [a summary-judgment] motion." Fountain v.
Phillips, 404 So. 2d 614, 618 (Ala. 1981). Moreover, " ' " 'a court may not
determine the credibility of witnesses on a motion for summary
judgment.' " ' " Dixon v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs of the City of
Mobile, 865 So. 2d 1161, 1166 n.2 (Ala. 2003) (citations omitted).
Because the evidence was clearly disputed concerning the validity
of the deeds at issue, a summary judgment was not appropriate in this
case. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in entering a
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CL-2024-0651
summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is reversed,
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
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