Edward T. James v. State of Florida & Edward T. James v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC2025-0280

____________

EDWARD T. JAMES,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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No. SC2025-0281

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EDWARD T. JAMES,

Petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

March 13, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Edward T. James, a prisoner under two sentences of death

and an active death warrant, appeals the circuit court’s summary

denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief. He also

petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, moves for a stay of

execution, and requests oral argument. We have jurisdiction. See

art. V, §§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. As we explain below, we affirm the

summary denial of James’s postconviction motion, and we deny his

habeas petition, his motions for stay of execution, and his request

for oral argument.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts were set forth in this Court’s opinion on

direct appeal:

On October 19, 1993, the grand jury in and for

Seminole County, Florida, returned an indictment

charging Edward James with two counts of first-degree

murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, one count

of attempted sexual battery, one count of kidnapping,

one count of grand theft, and one count of grand theft of

an automobile. On April 5, 1995, James appeared before

the Honorable Alan A. Dickey, Circuit Judge, and,

pursuant to a written agreement, entered pleas of guilty

to all counts of the indictment and pleas of no contest to

two counts of capital sexual battery charged by separate

information. The plea did not include an agreement as to

sentence. The State sought the death penalty for each of

the murders that occurred in this case, and on May 30,

1995, James proceeded to a penalty phase trial before a

jury.

The record reflects that on the evening of Sunday,

September 19, 1993, James attended a party at Todd

Van Fossen’s house. James rented a room from one of

the victims in this case, [B.D.], and lived about two

blocks away from the Van Fossens. He arrived at 6 p.m.

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and stayed until approximately 10:30 p.m. Todd’s

girlfriend, Tina, noticed that James seemed intoxicated

by the end of the evening and asked him if he wanted to

spend the night, but James declined. James drank

between six and twenty-four cans of beer during the

party, as well as some “shotguns”—three beers drunk

through a funnel in a very short period of time. Shortly

after leaving the party James ran into Jere Pearson who

lived nearby and was returning from the Handy Way

convenience store. Jere Pearson was interviewed by the

assistant state attorney and the assistant public defender

before trial. An audiotape of the interview was played for

the jury during the trial.

Pearson stated that when the two met, James was

on his way to visit Tim [D.], the victim’s son, and his

girlfriend, Nichole, who also lived nearby. They stopped

and talked for about ten minutes and Pearson watched

James ingest about ten “hits” of LSD on paper. James

told Pearson he had been drinking at Todd Van Fossen’s

party, but he appeared sober to Pearson.

After briefly visiting Tim [D.] and Nichole where he

drank some gin, James returned to his room at [B.D.]’s

house. When he entered the house, James noticed that

[B.D.]’s four grandchildren were asleep in the living room.

One of the children, [W.N.], awoke briefly when James

arrived. She observed that he was laughing and

appeared drunk. James went to the kitchen, made

himself a sandwich and retired to his room. Eventually,

he returned to the living room where he grabbed [B.D.]’s

eight-year-old granddaughter, [T.N.], by the neck and

strangled her, hearing the bones pop in her neck.

Believing [T.N.] was dead, he removed her clothes and

had vaginal and anal intercourse with her in his room.

[T.N.] never screamed or resisted. After raping [T.N.], he

threw her behind his bed.

James then went to [B.D.]’s bedroom where he

intended to have sexual intercourse with her. He hit

[B.D.] in the back of the head with a pewter candlestick.

She woke up and started screaming, “Why, Eddie, why?”

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[B.D.]’s screaming brought [W.N.] to the doorway of her

grandmother’s bedroom where she saw James stabbing

[B.D.] with a small knife. When James saw [W.N.] he

grabbed her, tied her up, and placed her in the

bathroom. Thinking that [B.D.] was not dead, James

went to the kitchen, grabbed a butcher knife and

returned to [B.D.]’s room and stabbed her in the back.

James removed [B.D.]’s pajama bottoms, but did not

sexually batter her.

Covered with blood, James took a shower in the

bathroom where [W.N.] remained tied up and then threw

together some clothes and belongings. He returned to

[B.D.]’s room and took her purse and jewelry bag before

driving away in her car. James drove across the country,

stopping periodically to sell jewelry for money. He finally

was arrested on October 6, 1993, in Bakersfield,

California, and gave two videotaped confessions to police

there. A videotape containing the relevant portions of

James’ statements was played for the jury.

Dr. Shashi Gore, the chief medical examiner for

Seminole County, testified that he performed autopsies

on [B.D.] and [T.N.]. [B.D.] suffered twenty-one stab

wounds to the back with the knife still embedded. The

wounds damaged both lungs, the liver, and the

diaphragm and fractured several ribs. [B.D.] also

suffered major stab wounds to the left side of the neck,

below the left eye, and on the left ear. A knife blade was

also discovered in [B.D.]’s hair. [B.D.] died of massive

bleeding and shock from the multiple stab wounds to her

chest and back. Dr. Gore opined that she died within a

few minutes of her assailant’s attack.

[T.N.] suffered contusions to her lips and

hemorrhaging in her eyes caused by lack of oxygen from

strangulation. Gore opined that the extensive force

necessary to create the contusions on her neck indicated

that a ligature had been used. Dr. Gore also found

contusions around the anal and vaginal orifices. The roof

of the vaginal wall was completely torn. Although the

substantial amount of blood pooled in the pelvic cavity

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indicated that [T.N.] was alive at the time she was

sexually assaulted, Dr. Gore could not state that she was

conscious when she was raped. [T.N.] died of

asphyxiation due to strangulation.

Dr. E. Michael Gutman, a psychiatrist, testified as a

mental health expert witness on James’ behalf. He

conducted neuropsychological tests on James in August

of 1994. Dr. Gutman learned that James’ father and

grandfather had been alcoholics and James used crack

cocaine, LSD, cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, and pills. In

Dr. Gutman’s opinion, James suffers from alcohol

dependence and has an addictive craving for alcohol

which he is unable to break. James has above average

intelligence and his performance IQ is in the superior

range.

James told Dr. Gutman that on the day of the

offense, he had been drinking, had used crack cocaine

and cannabis, and had taken some pills. He could not

remember if he had taken LSD in the hours preceding

the offense. Dr. Gutman determined that James has a

passive aggressive or an addictive personality. In his

opinion, James suffers from poly-substance dependence

and abuse, as well as severe dysthymia, a chronic

depressive disorder. James also has unresolved conflicts

associated with being abandoned by his father.

Dr. Daniel E. Buffington, a clinical pharmacologist

at the University of South Florida, testified for the

defense about the effects of alcohol and drug addictions.

He explained that if a person like James has an

underlying psychological problem, LSD ingestion will

most likely unmask it and allow it to come to the surface.

The acute phase of affectation due to LSD ingestion is

two to twelve hours after ingestion. Possible reactions to

LSD include, among others: a psychotic adverse reaction

which is accompanied by hallucinations; a psycho-

dynamic/psychedelic experience which results in a slow

emergence of the subconscious idea or psychological

condition; and a cognitive psychedelic reaction which

overcomes an individual’s ability to control himself.

-5-

Dr. Buffington opined that if James had drunk

between twenty and thirty cans of beer between the

hours of 6 and 11:30 p.m., he most likely had a blood

alcohol level of more than three times the legal limit. If

James ingested ten “hits” of LSD, about 200 micrograms

at a minimum—which is a heavy dose—when considered

in conjunction with the alcohol use, the peak effect of the

LSD ingestion would have occurred between 12:30 a.m.

and 1 a.m. The description of the crimes is consistent

with the effects that the LSD and alcohol would have had

on James. Dr. Buffington explained that such a large

dose of LSD could have caused a physical or mental

breakdown and a sudden release of aggressive action in

someone like James, who suffers from a passive

aggressive personality.

Dr. Buffington concluded that James was most

probably under the influence of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance due to his psychotic reaction and

psychodynamic/psychedelic reaction to LSD. James

further suffered from a decreased ability to control his

behavioral pattern.

Betty and John Hoffpauir testified that they had

known James for years. Once James made Betty

Hoffpauir’s grandson some golf clubs just out of

kindness. James worked off and on with John Hoffpauir

in his lawn business and would never take any money for

helping him.

Betty Lee, who also testified on James’ behalf, knew

James through her daughter, who had lived next door to

[B.D.]. When Betty Lee would visit her daughter, she

often would see James playing with [T.N.] and [W.N.] out

in the front yard. James was also always willing to help

Betty Lee’s daughter whenever she called on him.

Anthony Mancuso is a volunteer with the Seminole

County Correctional Facility and counsels inmates on

religious matters. He testified that James is well-liked by

the jail personnel as being a non-trouble maker. Once

when Mancuso was ill, James wrote him a letter that

Mancuso believes reflects James’ spiritual growth while

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in custody. Mancuso explained that he has seen an

incredible change in James since he entered the facility.

James also testified on his own behalf at the penalty

phase. He was born in Pennsylvania in 1961. At the age

of ten, he learned that his biological father had left him

when he was just a baby. He eventually went to live with

his biological father in Indianapolis when he was

fourteen. However, James’ father turned out to be a drug

dealer and introduced James to marijuana. James

moved with his father to Massachusetts, but his father

returned to Indianapolis without James two weeks after

the move. James has never heard from his father since

that time. James subsequently moved to Florida with his

mother after she separated from her second husband.

He started experimenting with drugs, including

marijuana and PCP, and eventually dropped out of

school. He did get his GED, however, and entered the

army at age seventeen. He started using more drugs in

the army and received a general discharge under

honorable conditions. James then spent eighteen

months hitchhiking around the country and ultimately

had a son who was born in March of 1983. James went

to San Francisco where he graduated from a computer

learning center. One day, James received a phone call

from his son’s mother who threatened to kill his son

unless James would take him. James returned to

Florida and took custody of his son, Jesse. However,

James soon realized he was not prepared to raise his son,

and his drinking and drug usage increased. His drug

abuse caused his relationship with his girlfriend to break

up and he distanced himself from his son. From James’

birthday on August 4, 1993, until the day of the offense

on September 20, 1993, James was steadily intoxicated.

James feels ashamed for what he did, especially because

he loved [B.D.] and her grandchildren and felt that they

were like his own family. James explained that he does

not believe his drug abuse excuses his conduct, but it

does help to explain it. On the other hand, James also

testified that he had never had an adverse reaction when

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he took LSD and always had good experiences. In

addition, he did not remember taking LSD prior to the

murders.

Following deliberations, the jury returned advisory

penalty recommendations of death for each of the murder

convictions. At the subsequent sentencing hearing held

on August 18, 1995, the trial court confirmed the

previous adjudications of guilt and sentenced James to

life in prison with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five

years before parole eligibility on each of the capital sexual

battery convictions to run concurrent with each other.

Additionally, James was sentenced to life in prison on the

kidnapping charge, fifteen years on each count of the

aggravated child abuse and attempted sexual battery,

and five years on each count of grand theft—all to run

concurrent with each other, but consecutive to the

sentences on the capital sexual batteries.

The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation

and imposed a sentence of death for each of the first-

degree murder convictions and filed a sentencing order in

support of the death penalty. In aggravation, the trial

court found that: (1) each murder was heinous, atrocious

or cruel [(HAC)]; (2) James was contemporaneously

convicted of another violent felony; and (3) each murder

was committed during the course of a felony. The trial

court also considered sixteen [nonstatutory] mitigating

circumstances applicable to this case, [in addition to] the

statutory mitigator that James’ ability to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the

requirements of the law was substantially impaired due

to drug and alcohol abuse; [the court considered as

nonstatutory mitigation] that James was under the

influence of moderate mental or emotional disturbance at

the time of the offense. The trial court gave both of these

mental mitigators “significant weight.” The trial court

attributed “some weight” to James’ past acts of kindness

and helpfulness to friends; and his genuine shame and

remorse for his offenses. The trial court attributed

“substantial weight” to James’ full cooperation with

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authorities in confessing to the crimes and entering pleas

of guilty to the offenses he remembered and “no contest”

to those he “truly [did] not remember.” Additionally, the

trial court attributed “some weight” to James’ good

conduct while incarcerated. In that regard, the trial

court finally noted in mitigation that James is capable of

offering assistance to others while in custody and serving

as an example to others about the negative consequences

of illicit drug use.

James v. State, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1230-33 (Fla. 1997) (last

alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed James’s convictions and

sentences. Id. at 1238. Those convictions and sentences became

final when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari

review on December 1, 1997. See James v. Florida, 522 U.S. 1000

(1997).

James filed his initial motion for postconviction relief in 1998,

and in 2003, he filed a pro se motion to voluntarily dismiss his

postconviction proceedings and counsel. See James v. State, 974

So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 2008). The circuit court held a hearing

pursuant to Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1993), to

determine whether James was competent to proceed and whether

he understood the consequences of dismissal. James, 974 So. 2d

at 366. The circuit court later entered an order dismissing James’s

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motion and discharging collateral counsel. Id. In 2005, James

sought to reinstate his postconviction motion. Id. The circuit court

denied his request, and he appealed the ruling to this Court. Id. at

366-67. This Court concluded that the circuit court “conducted a

comprehensive Durocher inquiry in 2003” and affirmed the circuit

court’s finding that James was competent to waive his

postconviction proceedings. Id. at 367-68.

In August 2018, the Capital Habeas Unit for the Office of the

Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of Florida was

appointed to represent James for the purpose of litigating federal

habeas claims, and it subsequently filed an initial federal habeas

petition. In January 2019, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel

successfully sought reappointment as James’s counsel for the

purpose of exhausting his state-court claims. James’s federal

habeas claims were stayed pending the resolution of his state-court

postconviction litigation.

In November 2019, James filed a successive motion for

postconviction relief. The motion raised five claims, including two

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, one claim that James

was incompetent at the time of his postconviction waiver, one claim

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for relief pursuant to Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), and

one claim of cumulative error. See James v. State, 323 So. 3d 158,

160 (Fla. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1678 (2022). The circuit

court later denied James’s motion, and this Court affirmed. Id.

The federal district court lifted the stay of habeas proceedings

in 2021, and in 2022, James filed an amended petition for writ of

habeas corpus. In September 2024, the district court denied the

habeas petition and a certificate of appealability. See James v.

Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., No. 6:18-cv-00993-WWB-RMN (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 6, 2024). In February 2025, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued an order denying James’s

motion for certificate of appealability. James v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr.,

No. 24-14162 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025) (unpublished).

Governor Ron DeSantis signed James’s death warrant on

February 18, 2025. James filed a successive motion for

postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.851, which the circuit court summarily denied on February 26,

2025.

James timely appealed the denial of postconviction relief and

raises three claims. He also raises one claim in a petition for writ of

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habeas corpus and seeks a stay of execution. We address each of

these issues in turn and explain why James is not entitled to relief.

ANALYSIS

“Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is

appropriate ‘[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case

conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Owen

v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017, 1022 (Fla. 2023) (quoting Bogle v. State,

322 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 2021) (alteration in original)). We review the

circuit court’s decision de novo, “accepting the movant’s factual

allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record,

and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the

movant is entitled to no relief.” Id. at 1022-23 (quoting Walton v.

State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2009)).

1. Totality of the Circumstances

In his first postconviction claim, James argued to the circuit

court that based on the totality of the circumstances, his execution

would violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment. These circumstances include: (1) the nearly

thirty years that have elapsed between the date of James’s

convictions and the signing of his death warrant; (2) his cognitive

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decline over time; (3) his physical and mental decline in the wake of

a near-fatal heart attack in 2023; and (4) other hardships.

Under rule 3.851(d)(1), “[a]ny motion to vacate judgment of

conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant

within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final.” Fla.

R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). There are three exceptions to raising

postconviction claims outside of the one-year timeframe:

(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were

unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and

could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence, or

(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not

established within the period provided for in subdivision

(d)(1) and has been held to apply retroactively, or

(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file

the motion.

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A)-(C).

The circuit court rejected James’s totality of the circumstances

claim as untimely and procedurally barred, as well as on the merits.

He challenges the circuit court’s procedural rulings, contending

that his claim regarding the totality of the circumstances involves

his current condition, and, for that reason, has not been ripe until

now.

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Even if we assume that neither untimeliness nor a procedural

bar precludes consideration of this claim on the merits, James is

not entitled to relief. A significant aspect of James’s claim is that

his nearly thirty-year stay on death row constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment. However, in Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186,

200 (Fla. 2007), this Court observed—and we continue to observe—

that “no federal or state court has accepted the argument that a

prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment.”

Moreover, this claim has been consistently raised in this

Court’s death warrant cases and, as James concedes, has been

repeatedly rejected by this Court. See Owen, 364 So. 3d at 1027

(declining to recognize Owen’s claim that thirty-seven years on

death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Dillbeck v.

State, 357 So. 3d 94, 103 (Fla. 2023) (affirming the denial of

Dillbeck’s claim that executing him after thirty years on death row

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, “consistent with our

longstanding precedent that such claims are ‘facially invalid,’ ” and

concluding that “Dillbeck’s arguments about conditions on death

row do not persuade us that our precedent is ‘clearly erroneous’ ”);

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Gaskin v. State, 361 So. 3d 300, 308 (Fla. 2023) (also rejecting

claim that Gaskin’s more than three decades on death row

constituted cruel and unusual punishment).

Moreover, we agree with the circuit court that even in light of

James’s allegations relating to cognitive and physical issues and

other hardships, James’s death sentence does not constitute cruel

and unusual punishment. Notably, with respect to James’s pattern

of cognitive decline—a matter which the State generally does not

dispute—we agree with the circuit court that James’s cognitive

issues do not shield him from execution:

The Florida Supreme Court has specifically stated, “We

have long held that the categorical bar of Atkins [v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)] that shields the

intellectually disabled from execution does not apply to

individuals with other forms of mental illness or brain

damage.” Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 100 (emphasis added);

see also Gordon v. State, 350 So. 3d 25, 37 (Fla. 2022)

(“[F]or purposes of the Eighth Amendment, the existence

of a traumatic brain injury does not reduce an

individual’s culpability to the extent they become

immune from capital punishment.”). Thus, Defendant

cannot establish that his condition shields him from

execution or that his execution violates the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment.

(Emphasis and footnote omitted.)

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Moreover, also without merit is James’s claim that various

conditions of his confinement render his death sentence in violation

of the Eighth Amendment. See Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054, 1064

(Fla. 2024) (affirming circuit court’s finding that defendant provided

no authority to support that his conditions-of-confinement claim

“serves as a valid basis to vacate a death sentence, nor does he

attempt to explain how his claim would be cognizable under rule

3.851”).

These circumstances taken together, James is not entitled to

relief. See Orme v. State, 361 So. 3d 842, 845 (Fla. 2023) (rejecting

argument that totality of the circumstances of Orme’s sentence,

including thirty years on death row, amounts to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Florida

Constitution).

2. 2023 Brain Scans

Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A) provides an exception to the one-year

requirement where “the facts on which the claim is predicated were

unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not

have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). In that instance, “any claim of newly

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discovered evidence in a death penalty case must be brought within

one year of the date such evidence was discovered or could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Glock v.

Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 2001); see also Jimenez v. State,

997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008).

In James’s postconviction motion, he claimed that the results

of brain scans conducted on him in 2023—following a near-fatal

heart attack in January 2023—render his execution in violation of

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He generally framed this

claim as one of newly discovered evidence, stating that the scans

were not previously available to counsel and asserting that the

results constitute “significant new evidence relevant to ‘the type of

individualized consideration . . . required by the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases.’ ”

However, James’s 3.851 motion did not offer argument in

support of the second of the two prongs required in order to prevail

on a claim of newly discovered evidence:

First, in order to be considered newly discovered, the

evidence “must have been unknown by the trial court, by

the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must

appear that defendant or his counsel could not have

known [of it] by the use of diligence.”

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Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of

such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal

on retrial.

Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (alteration in

original) (citation omitted). To establish the second prong of Jones

for the purpose of obtaining a new penalty phase, James must show

that “the newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less

severe sentence.” Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938, 942 (Fla. 2019)

(quoting Walton v. State, 246 So. 3d 246, 249 (Fla. 2018)).

Now, on appeal, James argues that the brain scans are newly

discovered evidence and that they would likely produce a lesser

sentence at a new penalty phase. We take seriously the State’s

argument of facial insufficiency as to this claim and will only

consider the newly discovered evidence issue in light of the circuit

court’s order addressing the claim as one of newly discovered

evidence.

James’s failure to demonstrate that he would probably receive

a less severe sentence at a new penalty phase is dispositive.

Rejecting James’s claim, the circuit court explained:

Defendant alleges that his execution would violate

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based on the

results of his 2023 brain scans that were not previously

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available to him. He asserts that federal counsel

requested all relevant medical records following his heart

attack. On March 24, 2023, counsel received records

from UF Health Gainesville indicating a CT scan of

Defendant’s brain had been performed, but the results

were not provided. Counsel sent a second request to UF

Health Gainesville but was told no imaging records

existed. She sent a third request, then sought a status

report on the third request nine more times. Counsel

finally received the CT scan results on February 14,

2025. Defendant claims that the results revealed

significant evidence of brain dysfunction that predated

his heart attack (potentially by decades), is progressive in

nature, and was further expedited by an anoxic injury

from the heart attack. He argues that these findings

constitute “significant new evidence.”

....

[T]he Court finds that even if the CT scan results

constituted newly discovered evidence, Defendant cannot

establish that such evidence would likely yield a less

severe sentence at a new penalty phase. . . . [T]he law

that shields the intellectually disabled from execution

does not apply to individuals with brain damage.

Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 100; Gordon, 350 So. 3d at 37.

Defendant is therefore not entitled to relief on Claim 2.

Moreover, James has not established that the alleged newly

discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence at a

new penalty phase in light of the weighty aggravation found as to

each murder. James’s penalty phase jury considered, and the trial

court found, multiple mitigating circumstances, including ones

relating to mental health. Yet, the jury’s recommendation and the

trial court’s determination that death was the appropriate sentence

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for each murder were made in light of three weighty aggravating

factors, including the contemporaneous murders of the victims and

the finding of HAC as to each murder. James’s adult victim, B.D.,

died as a result of massive bleeding from dozens of stab wounds,

and his eight-year-old victim, T.N., died from strangulation.

See Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 102 (concluding that the appellant could

not demonstrate probability of a less severe sentence on retrial in

light of weighty aggravating factors). James is not entitled to relief.

3. Unanimity

James also argued in his postconviction motion that his

execution would violate the Eighth Amendment because one juror

voted to spare his life. In his 2019 successive postconviction

motion after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v.

Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), James argued that his nonunanimous

jury recommendation violated the Sixth Amendment. The circuit

court denied the claim as untimely, and this Court affirmed on that

ground, while also adding that James would not be entitled to relief

in light of State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), and because

his convictions and sentences became final in 1997. See James,

323 So. 3d at 161.

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In Poole, this Court held:

[W]e further erred in Hurst v. State when we held that the

Eighth Amendment requires a unanimous jury

recommendation of death. The Supreme Court rejected

that exact argument in Spaziano [v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447

(1984)]. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465; see also Harris v.

Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995) (“The Constitution

permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital

sentence.”). We are bound by Supreme Court precedents

that construe the United States Constitution.

297 So. 3d at 504.

Having previously challenged his nonunanimous death

sentence on Hurst grounds, James seeks to avoid a procedural bar

by arguing that this claim is not a Hurst claim, but rather an Eighth

Amendment “evolving standards of decency” claim. However, we

have rejected similar claims. In Zack v. State, 371 So. 3d 335 (Fla.

2023), this Court recently stated: “Even if timely and not barred, to

the extent Zack frames this issue as one of ‘evolving standards of

decency’ under the Eighth Amendment, this Court rejected precisely

the same argument in Dillbeck.” Id. at 350. “Because the Supreme

Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent to which we are bound does

not require a unanimous jury recommendation for death during the

penalty phase, the postconviction court properly found this claim to

be meritless.” Id. We also reject James’s argument that unanimity

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rules governing guilt phase proceedings apply in the context of the

penalty phase.

4. Habeas Claim

In his habeas petition, James argues that this Court should

reconsider its prior decision that his postconviction claims were

untimely. In James, 323 So. 3d at 160-61, this Court affirmed the

circuit court’s ruling that two claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a claim that James was not competent to waive his state

postconviction proceedings, and a cumulative error claim were

untimely.1 James argues that as a result of this decision, he has

been precluded from receiving merits review of constitutional

claims, and he maintains that manifest injustice has resulted. He

argues that the ends of due process warrant reconsideration of this

Court’s rulings regarding the timeliness of his ineffective assistance

of counsel and competency claims. We disagree.

At the outset, we observe that while James seeks to revisit

prior competency issues, he does not argue that he is incompetent

1. This Court also concluded that James’s claim pursuant to

Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), was procedurally barred and

untimely.

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to be executed. Moreover, although he has demonstrated a

cognitive decline, James, who has a current full-scale IQ of 115,

does not claim to be intellectually disabled as a bar to his

execution.

We decline to revisit this Court’s decision affirming the

findings that his postconviction claims were untimely, and we reject

James’s argument that a failure to reconsider his timeliness rulings

amounts to manifest injustice. See Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d

267, 274 (Fla. 1975) (stating that a defendant has the burden of

proving manifest injustice and that “[i]n other words, clear prejudice

must be shown”).

First, this Court has not held that amended Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.851—no longer permitting the waiver of

postconviction counsel—applies retroactively. 2 Second, other

inmates’ waiver proceedings are not, without more, a viable basis

for relief. As the State observes, “there are no opinions from this or

any other court to support James’[s] claim that the lower court

2. See In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Crim. Proc. 3.851 and Fla.

Rule of App. Proc. 9.142, 351 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 2022).

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rulings in those cases were proper under the law existing at the

time those events occurred. James has not shown that he is being

treated unfairly.” Third, James’s effort to introduce recent brain

scans to challenge his 2003 postconviction waiver is improper

where that waiver was upheld in 2008 based on a finding that the

waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. At that

time, this Court concluded: “In the present case, the record reflects

that the circuit court conducted a comprehensive Durocher inquiry

in 2003 and found that James was competent to discharge counsel

and dismiss all postconviction proceedings.” James, 974 So. 2d at

367.

5. Motions for Stay of Execution

James has filed motions for a stay of execution to accompany

both his postconviction appeal and his habeas petition. However,

we decline to grant a stay of execution and deny both motions

because James has failed to raise substantial grounds upon which

relief might be granted. See Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941, 951

(Fla. 1998) (denying motion for stay of execution where movant

failed to establish “substantial grounds upon which relief might be

granted” (citing Bowersox v. Williams, 517 U.S. 345 (1996))).

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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the denial of James’s successive

motion for postconviction relief. We also deny his petition for a writ

of habeas corpus and his motions for stay of execution. Having

fully considered the record and the parties’ briefing, we also deny

James’s request for oral argument.

No rehearing will be entertained by this Court, and the

mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,

FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County,

Melanie Freeman Chase, Judge

Case No. 591993CF003237A000XX

And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Dawn B. Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, North

Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant/Petitioner

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Timothy A. Freeland, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, and Michael W. Mervine, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent

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