Hernandez v. Williams

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

Hector Hernandez,

Plaintiff,

Case No.: 23-cv-50267

v.

Judge Iain D. Johnston

Tarry Williams, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

After waiting several years for a set of dentures, Plaintiff Hector Hernandez

claims that employees in IDOC’s medical scheduling office were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The

Medical Schedulers successfully move to dismiss the claims against them under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Hernandez’s Third Amended

Complaint doesn’t plausibly suggest that they personally caused or contributed to

his injuries.

I. Background

Plaintiff Hector Hernandez is one of several IDOC inmates contending

that Defendant Wexford Health Sources maintains a policy, practice, or custom of

denying and delaying inmate dental care. Dkt. 20. The plaintiffs in these cases are

commonly represented by the same attorney using, essentially, a form complaint.

See, e.g., Hernandez v. Williams, No. 23-cv-50267, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171151

(N.D. Ill. Sep. 23, 2024); Smith v. Williams, No. 23-cv-50074, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

195325 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2024). The complaint alleges misconduct by Wexford

employees and, at the tail end, tucks in a sentence alleging that the IDOC

administrative employees responsible for scheduling medical appointments (“the

Medical Schedulers”) “failed to schedule an appointment for [the plaintiff] to be

fitted for upper plate dentures.” E.g., Dkt. 20, ¶ 33. The Medical Schedulers then

move to dismiss the claims against them—as sure as death and taxes—arguing that

a standalone conclusory allegation doesn’t plausibly suggest their personal

involvement in the alleged injuries. See e.g., Dkt. 55. That motion is very effective.

See Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195325.

Shortly after the Court rejected an identical claim made using this template,

Hernandez added new allegations to his Response in this case. Dkt. 59, 1. As

Hernandez claimed in his Response—but not in his thrice amended Complaint—he

asked the Medical Schedulers if they could schedule an offsite appointment for him

“because the individuals responsible for his dental care wouldn’t do it.” Id. at 2. He

also added for the first time that each of the Medical Schedulers personally

observed his injuries. Id. In their Reply, the Medical Schedulers oppose the

introduction of new allegations and maintain that, in any event, Hernandez hasn’t

stated a deliberate indifference claim. Dkt. 60.

II. Legal standard

Under Rule 8, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). A plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations must allow “the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true all the

plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Deerfield Constr., Inc., 933 F.3d 806, 809 (7th

Cir. 2019).

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. “But the proper question to ask is still ‘could these

things have happened, not did they happen.’” Carlson v. CSX Transp. Inc., 758 F.3d

819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05

(7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original)). Importantly, on a motion to dismiss, the

defendant bears of the burden of establishing the insufficiency of the complaint's

allegations. Gunn v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020).

III. Analysis

Claims of constitutionally inadequate medical care by inmates serving prison

sentences are governed by the Eighth Amendment. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768,

776 (7th Cir. 2015). To state a claim of inadequate medical care under the Eighth

Amendment, an inmate must plausibly suggest that (1) he suffered from an

objectively serious medical condition, and (2) the defendant was deliberately

indifferent to that serious condition. Id. Essentially, deliberate indifference occurs

“when a defendant realizes that a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner

exists but then disregards that risk.” Perez, 792 F.3d at 776 (citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)) (cleaned up); Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th

545, 551 (7th Cir. 2022) (deliberate indifference is a “demanding standard”).

It goes without saying—or at least, it’s already been said—that the lone

allegation in Hernandez’s Third Amended Complaint doesn’t state a claim. See

Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195325 (dismissing Smith’s identical claim, based on

the same allegation, because it doesn’t plausibly suggest that the Medical

Schedulers knew of his injuries). Where the same counsel presents the same

allegation in support of the same claim, the outcome is, not surprisingly,

unchanged. That’s the danger of a copy-paste complaint, only exacerbated in this

case by a single conclusory allegation regarding six defendants. Based only on that

allegation, the Court cannot conclude that the Medical Schedulers knowingly

disregarded Hernandez’s medical needs.

What’s more, the Court rejects Hernandez’s attempt to amend his

Complaint—for, essentially, the fourth time—in a responsive pleading. Hernandez

asks the Court to consider the allegations of his Third Amended Complaint

alongside the additions of his Reply, simply by stating:

‘Plaintiffs may add factual allegations in response to a motion to dismiss so

long as those allegations are consistent with facts already alleged in the

complaint.’ Fulson v. Dart, 648 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1027 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2023)

(citing Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012)).

Dkt. 59, 1.1

1 It’s true that a party can add factual allegations in response to a Rule 12 motion. But this

doesn’t mean that it’s best practices. Indeed, it’s poor practice. Just because a party can do

something, doesn’t mean the party should do something. See, e.g., Blazek v. U.S. Cellular

Corp., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (“A zealous defense does not necessarily

But Hernandez makes no effort to square the allegations in his Reply with the

silence of his Third Amended Complaint. Unlike the informal amendments and

clarifications that the Seventh Circuit has previously entertained—where the

parties preview allegations in a complaint and refine them during briefing—

Hernandez rushed to beat the decision in Smith by making new allegations in this

case. See, e.g., Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).

And even then, Hernandez doesn’t state which Medical Schedulers he allegedly

spoke with, what he said, or when. Though these vague allegations would’ve been

entitled to deference if properly pled, they carry no weight with the Court when

thrown into the mix at the bottom of the ninth inning. See United States v.

Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (perfunctory and undeveloped

arguments are waived). As the Court previously warned the Parties, there is no

pinch-hitting in pleading. Hernandez v. Williams, 2024 WL 4265204, n.1 at *3

(warning Hernandez several months ago that “in court, as in baseball, three strikes

and you’re out.”) (citing Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815, 818-19 (7th Cir.

2013); Harrell v. U.S., 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993).

Given the long procedural history in this case, the Court doesn’t believe that

any further amendments are in order. In fact, accepting Hernandez’s proposed

amendments would likely plead him out of Court. If the Medical Schedulers knew

require invocation of every potential procedural bar to an employment discrimination

lawsuit, particularly when an expeditious determination of the merits by a factfinder would

often be a more cost-effective means of disposing of claims.”); Bailey v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 414 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Indeed, just because a district court can

issue an injunction does not mean a fortiori that it is required to do so.”).

that medical providers refused to refer Hernandez for offsite treatment, what could

they have done instead? Nothing in the Constitution requires administrative

employees to override the choices of treating physicians. See, e.g., McCann v. Ogle

Caty., Illinois, 909 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2018). Indeed, that contention stretches the

imagination beyond the breaking point; Seventh Circuit precedent “encourages non-

medical security and administrative personnel’—such as medical schedulers—“to

defer to the professional medical judgments of the physicians and nurses treating

the prisoners in their care without fear of liability for doing so.” Berry v. Peterman,

604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). So, any leave to amend

Hernandez’s claims against the Medical Schedulers would be futile.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Hernandez’s claims against the Medical

Schedulers (Nicole Perez, McKenzie Belan, Kelly Peterson, Eliana Castillo, Jamie

Cater, Madison Rauch, and Unknown Medical Schedulers) are dismissed. Given

the futility of the proposed amendments, as well as Hernandez’s repeated failure to

cure deficiencies in his Complaint, the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss these

claims with prejudice. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008)

(district courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend for both reasons).

S_—

Entered: March 12, 2025 By:

Iain D. Johnston

U.S. District Judge