Tynes v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FT. LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO. 18-62891-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/HUNT

LAWANNA TYNES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

JUVENILE JUSTICE,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before this Court on two related motions: Plaintiff Lawanna Tynes’

Motion for Attorney’s Fees, ECF No. 178, and her Motion for Bill of Costs, ECF No. 179.

The Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas referred these motions to the undersigned for

disposition. ECF No. 180, 181; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); S.D. Fla. L.R., Mag. R. 1.

Upon thorough review of the record and the Motions, Responses, and Replies, the

undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS both Plaintiff’s Motions be GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Following trial in July 2021, a jury found Defendant had discriminated against

Plaintiff based on her sex and race when it discharged her in December 2015. ECF No.

121. The jury awarded damages of $924,600.00. Id. Plaintiff previously filed both a

Motion for Attorney’s Fees and a Motion for Bill of Costs. ECF No. 154, 140. Those

motions were denied without prejudice to be renewed when a stay of judgment was lifted

following the conclusion of Defendant’s appeal of the final judgment. ECF No. 170, 164.

With the appeal concluded in Plaintiff’s favor, she now moves for attorney’s fees and costs

as the prevailing party. ECF No. 178, 179.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this

litigation and is, therefore, entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. This Court uses the lodestar method to

calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees, multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number

of hours reasonably expended. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292,

1299 (11th Cir. 1988). A reasonable hourly rate for attorneys’ fees is determined by

evaluating “the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services

by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (citing Blum

v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)); see also ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 438 (11th

Cir. 1999) (“The significant disparity in their experience should be reflected in the rates

awarded.”); Brown v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., No. 08-61592-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2010

WL 3282584, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2010) (reducing the requested hourly rate).

The movant bears the burden of proving the requested rate is consistent with

prevailing market rates. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. This burden requires the applicant

“supply[] the court with specific and detailed evidence from which the court can determine

the reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 1303. And the focus of that inquiry should be on rates

paid to counsel of similar qualifications and experience in cases litigated in the South

Florida area. See, e.g., Storfer v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co., No. 10-60400-CIV-

COHN, 2011 WL 213461, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2011). In addition to evidence

presented by the movant, “[a] court . . . is itself an expert on the question and may consider

its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form

an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Id. at

1303 (quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Thus, even when the submitted evidence is deficient, a court has the

power to make a fee award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary

hearing.1 Id.

The primary issues here are the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates and the

reasonableness of the number of hours expended, matters over which this Court

possesses sufficient expertise. Plaintiff seeks a combined total award of $192,357.00 in

attorney’s fees and $20,441.17 in costs based upon professional services rendered. ECF

No. 178, 179.

1. Compliance with Local Rule 7.3

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s renewed motion, ECF No. 178, failed to “certify that a

good faith effort to resolve issues by agreement occurred pursuant to Local Rule 7.3(b),

describing what was and was not resolved by agreement and addressing separately the

issues of entitlement to fees and amount.” ECF No. 187; S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.3(a)(8). This,

1 The undersigned concludes that a hearing is not necessary. A hearing on a fee petition

is required only where one is requested, where facts are in dispute, and where the record

is not sufficiently clear to allow the trial court to resolve those disputes. Norman, 836 F.2d

at 1303–04. Moreover, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is unnecessary for issues about which

the district court possesses sufficient expertise: ‘Such matters might include the

reasonableness of the fee, the reasonableness of the hours, and [the] significance of the

outcome.’” Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Norman, 826 F.2d at 1309). The primary issues here are the reasonableness of

counsel’s hourly rate and the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, matters

over which this Court possesses sufficient expertise. Furthermore, the written record here

is of sufficient clarity to permit this Court to resolve any issues of fact that may exist.

Defendant contends, is sufficient reason to deny the motion. Id. Plaintiff maintains that

the parties’ conferral before the filing of the original motion satisfied the requirements

under the local rules because the renewed motion was identical to the original motion,

leaving nothing new for the opposing counsel to discuss.

Local Rule 7.3(a), which functions as “a mechanism to assist parties in resolving

attorney[s’] fee and costs disputes by agreement,” includes several requirements that

must be met before a party files a motion for attorneys’ fees, including the obligation of

counsel to confer prior to filing. S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.3(a)(8). Local Rule 7.3(b) additionally

requires the parties to confer in good faith regarding all disputed aspects of a fee claim.

S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.3(b). Finally, Local Rule 7.3(c) requires the party seeking costs to provide

documentation to support an award of costs. S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.3(c). Generally, the court

relies upon Local Rule 7.3 to deny attorneys’ fees and costs only where the situation

involves “a complete or near-complete failure to confer prior to filing a motion for

attorneys’ fees.” Gutierrez v. El Toro Loco Churrascaria 8st. LLC, 21-22062-CIV-

KING/BECERRA, 2022 WL 3621615, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, 21-22062-CIV, 2022 WL 3594970 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2022).

Here, the undersigned finds Plaintiff sufficiently complied with Local Rule 7.3 and is,

therefore, not precluded from recovering attorney’s fees and costs.

2. Attorneys’ Fees

a. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $450 for 427.46 hours of work. ECF No. 178.

Plaintiff also asks for an enhancement to account for the significant amount of work

required due to the complexity of the case. When “determining what is a ‘reasonable’

hourly rate and what number of compensable hours is ‘reasonable,’” this Court must

consider twelve factors originally outlined in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,

488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). Meyrowitz v. Brendel, No. 16-81793-CIV-MARRA, 2018

WL 4440492, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2018). Those factors are:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal

service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the

attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee;

(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount

involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,

reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability”

of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

The reasonable hourly rate is defined as the prevailing market

rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and

reputation. The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing

the claimed market rate. The Court may use its own

experience in assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s

fees.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Generally, “[a] reasonable hourly rate is one that is adequate to attract competent

counsel in the relevant legal market, but yet does not produce a windfall to that attorney.”

Hermosilla v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 10-21418-CIV-TORRES, 2011 WL 9364952 (S.D. Fla.

July 15, 2011), subsequently aff’d, 492 F. App’x 73 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Blum v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1984)). The record establishes Plaintiff’s counsel

worked on a contingency and has more than thirty-five years of experience. ECF No.

178. Defendant agrees the $450 hourly rate is reasonable and correct. ECF No. 179.

This Court, having considered the twelve factors, as well as the prevailing market rates

in the community, agrees and recommends approving the requested rate.

b. Enhancement

Plaintiff’s counsel requests a two times enhancement for services rendered due to

the complexity of the case, the amount of work involved, the positive result, skill of

counsel, the risks undertaken, and the social benefit of bringing the litigation. ECF No.

178. Defendant objects to the enhancement as it would effectively provide Plaintiff with

a $900 hourly rate. ECF No. 187.

“Sometimes courts apply to the lodestar a multiplier, also known as an

enhancement or an upward adjustment, to reward counsel on top of their hourly rates.”

Davis v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., No. 19-80606-CIV-SMITH/MATTHEWMAN, 2022

WL 2341238, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2022) (quoting In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d

1065, 1076 (11th Cir. 2019)). “Before adjusting for risk assumption, there should be

evidence in the record, and the trial court should so find, that without risk-enhancement

plaintiff would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other

relevant market.” Sun Bank of Ocala v. Ford, 564 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 1990) (quoting

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 731

(1987)).

Courts should consider the following three factors to determine the necessity of a

contingency risk multiplier: “(1) whether the relevant market requires a contingency fee

multiplier to obtain competent counsel; (2) whether the attorney was able to mitigate the

risk of nonpayment in any way; and (3) whether any of the factors set forth in Rowe2 are

applicable, especially the amount involved, the results obtained, and the type of fee

arrangement between the attorney and his client.” Davis, 2022 WL 2341238, at *5.

2 Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150 (Fla. 1985).

To satisfy the first factor, Plaintiff does not suggest that an enhancement was

needed to obtain competent counsel. The second factor—despite the risk Plaintiff’s

counsel took on in pursuing the case through trial—does not alone require the application

of a multiplier. As for the third factor, which reminds the Court to consider the amount

involved and the nature of the recovery, Plaintiff did recover a sizeable award. Still,

Plaintiff’s motion does not indicate Plaintiff’s counsel would not have taken on this case

without an enhancement, and a risk multiplier is often not appropriate if “the lodestar

produces a material and sizable fee given that counsel prevailed in the action, which,” in

this case, “it will.” Davis, 2022 WL 2341238, at *6. Therefore, the undersigned

recommends denying Plaintiff’s request for a two times enhancement.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Upon determination of the hourly rate, a court must determine the reasonable

amount of hours expended in the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983). Inquiry into the reasonable number of hours focuses on an attorney’s exercise of

“billing judgment,” such as the attorney’s exclusion of hours “that would be unreasonable

to bill a client, and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation, or

experience of counsel.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). Fee applicants must exclude

hours that were not “reasonably expended” or that are determined to be “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” from their fee calculations. Hensley, 461 U.S. at

434.

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees for 427.46 hours of work. ECF No. 178. The motion

and supporting affidavits indicate Plaintiff’s counsel limited his hours by not billing for

phone conversations with Plaintiff and with opposing counsel. ECF No. 178. Defendant

objects to many of Plaintiff’s time entries as “block billing, clerical / non-lawyer task,

excessive time, non-compensable, redundant, or vague.” ECF No. 187. In its response,

Defendant lists examples and provides hand-made notations on Plaintiff’s time entries to

indicate which entries it feels should not be compensated. In those notations, Defendant

objects to, generally, half of all of Plaintiff’s counsel’s time entries.

“If the court concludes that the number of claimed hours is excessive, it may

engage in ‘an across-the-board cut,’ so long as it provides adequate explanation for the

decrease.” Galdames v. N & D Inv. Corp., 432 F. App’x 801, 806 (11th Cir. 2001). Courts

need not become “green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011).

The essential goal for the court is to “do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.”

Id.

Despite Defendant’s objections, a review of Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing shows

generally reasonable expenditures of time for a counsel working alone and on the

complex issues presented in this case. Having examined the significant documentation

of billed hours of work performed provided by Plaintiff’s counsel, and considering the

billed hours encompass six years of litigation and include motions for summary judgment

and trial, the undersigned finds an across-the-board cut is not necessary.

3. Lodestar Amount and Adjustment

“[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but that

presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does

not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining

a reasonable fee.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010). The Supreme Court

has specifically identified three circumstances that may justify a deviation from the

lodestar amount: 1) “where the method used in determining the hourly rate employed in

the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value,

as demonstrated in part during the litigation”; 2) “if the attorney’s performance includes

an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted”; and 3)

when there are “extraordinary circumstances in which an attorney’s performance involves

exceptional delay in the payment of fees.” Id. at 554–56.

The undersigned finds no reason to depart from the lodestar calculation in this

case. Therefore, Plaintiff’s counsel should be awarded $450 per hour for 427.46 hours

of work. The undersigned recommends a total amount of attorney’s fees of $192,357.00.

a. Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment Interest

Additionally, Plaintiff includes a cursory request for pre-judgment interest and post-

judgment interest on the award of attorney’s fees. However, Plaintiff provides no statute

or other mechanism under which to award interest. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not

suggest at what rate or from which date interest should be calculated or how much

Plaintiff’s counsel expects to receive in interest. Having no basis by which to calculate

interest or award it, the undersigned recommends denying the request for interest.

4. Plaintiff’s Motion for Costs

“[W]ith the exception of routine office overhead normally absorbed by the practicing

attorney, all reasonable expenses incurred in case preparation, during the course of

litigation, or as an aspect of settlement of the case may be taxed as costs under section

1988.” Hithon v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 566 Fed. App’x 827, 830 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir. 1983)). Plaintiff seeks an

award of $20,441.17 in costs recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, consisting of:

• $400 for the filing fee

• $1,290.00 for service of summons and subpoenas

• $3,287.95 for transcripts

• $714.00 for printing

• $776.98 for six witnesses

• $3,000 for exemplification and copies

• $1,182.50 for mediation

• $9,789.74 of other costs, covering travel for depositions and court appearances,

an expert witness, postage, and supplies.

ECF No. 179. “Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise,

costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 54(d)(1). Rule 54 “creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing

party which [the opposing party] must overcome.” Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo,

929 F.2d 633, 639 (11th Cir. 1991). The burden is initially on Plaintiff to establish and

present evidence as to what costs have accrued and why they should be taxable. But in

challenging whether costs are taxable, “the losing party bears the burden of

demonstrating that a cost is not taxable, unless the knowledge regarding the proposed

cost is within the exclusive knowledge of the prevailing party.” Monelus v. Tocodrian,

Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2009). A court “must have and state a sound

basis” for denying the full amount of costs that the prevailing party incurred because

“denial of costs is in the nature of a penalty for some defection on the prevailing party’s

part in the course of the litigation.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1039 (11th

Cir. 2000) (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

a. Service of Process Costs

Defendant first objects to costs for service higher than the federally mandated $65

and for subpoena costs for witnesses who did not ultimately testify at trial. ECF No. 188.

Defendant points to service costs for six witnesses who did not testify and one duplicate

service for a witness who did testify. Id. Defendant also notes that some of the service

charges were unnecessarily high due to last-minute service. Id. Plaintiff points out that

those witnesses who did not testify were reasonably believed to be necessary and the

related costs were incurred with the expectation that they would be needed at trial. ECF

No. 195. Plaintiff requests that if any service charges are reduced to $65 that any

expended service charges below that maximum amount also be raised to cover the

overall reduction of charges.

“Service of process fees paid to a private process server are compensable as long

as the amount does not exceed the cost of United States Marshal service, which is $65

per hour for each item served.” Santiago v. Peacock’s 17, LLC, No. 22-62272-CIV-

DIMITROULEAS/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH, 2024 WL 582880, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2024),

report and recommendation approved, 2024 WL 580358 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2024) (citing

Guerra v. Ameri-Clean Pumping, Inc., No. 18-22998-CIV-TORRES, 2019 WL 1859243,

at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2019)). The cost of serving a subpoena on a trial witness who

Plaintiff could have reasonably believed was “at least partially necessary to the litigation”

may be taxed against the losing party. Marquez v. Nat’l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 20-

22791-CIV-BLOOM/LOUIS, 2022 WL 2990815, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 20-22791-CIV-BLOOM/LOUIS, 2022 WL 2982120 (S.D.

Fla. July 28, 2022) (quoting George v. GTE Directories Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1299

(M.D. Fla. 2000)); see also Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 5:97CV15-0C-

10C, 2001 WL 862642, *1 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2001) (awarding costs for service of

subpoenas on two trial witnesses who never testified at trial).

Therefore, the undersigned recommends granting costs for the witnesses served

as they were reasonably likely to have been used at trial. But recoverable costs should

be capped at the $65 maximum and those services less than $65 should be compensated

at their original cost and without duplication:

FDJJ $25

Robert Munson $25

Timothy Niermann $50

Frank Gargett $65

Joseph Seeber $65

Gordon Weeks $65

Jorge Guerra $65

Daryl Wolf $65

Yessica Mederos $65

Patrick Morse $65

Roby Cedron $65

Gladys Negron $65

Thus, the total amount of costs in this section is $685.00.

b. Transcript Costs

Defendant challenges transcript and court reporter costs due to Plaintiff’s

insufficient records and missing invoices. ECF No. 188. As Defendant correctly notes,

Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs lists $3,287.95 for transcript and court reporter attendance yet

attaches as exhibits only proof of $2,723.70 in invoices. Id. Plaintiff does attach a check

to “Palm Beach Reporting Services” dated June 6, 2019, for $564.25 but there is no

corresponding invoice indicating for what purpose this court reporter was necessary.

Furthermore, the explanation attached to the check only indicates that it is related to this

case and does not describe what the payment covered. Id. Plaintiff does not respond to

this objection. ECF No. 195. Therefore, the undersigned recommends granting costs for

court reporters only according to the balances due in the provided invoices. Thus, the

total amount of costs in this section is $2,723.70.

c. Printing Costs

Defendant objects to printing costs because Plaintiff’s attachments only show the

payment of $714.20 but no corresponding invoice. ECF No. 188. However, the

explanation attached to the payment of $714.20 indicates that it was used for costs related

to an information request.

Defendant similarly objects to exemplification and copying costs of $3,000

because there is no invoice detailing use of the copies in the case. The Eleventh Circuit

has instructed that “in evaluating copying costs, the court should consider whether the

prevailing party could have reasonably believed that it was necessary to copy the papers

at issue.” Joseph v. Nichell’s Caribbean Cuisine, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259 (S.D.

Fla. 2013) (quoting U.S. E.E.O.C. v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 623 (11th Cir. 2000)).

However, we do not know whether the copying could have been reasonably necessary

because Plaintiff has not provided any documentation related to copying. Other than

Plaintiff’s claim for $3,000 for copying, nothing indicates when, where, or for what purpose

that money was spent. As such, the undersigned recommends compensation only for

printing costs in the amount of $714.20.

d. Mediation and Other Costs

Not all of Plaintiff’s requested costs are contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Mediation is not included in the statute’s enumerated list of reimbursable costs. Id.

Similarly, costs expended for attorney travel, postage, and other basic office supplies

used over the course of Plaintiff’s case, and notebooks, file folders, labels, post-its, and

other basic office supplies are not permitted by § 1920. See Powell v. The Home Depot,

U.S.A., Inc., No. 07-80435-CIV-HURLEY/HOPKINS, 2010 WL 4116488, at *16 (S.D. Fla.

Sept. 14, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 07-80435-CIV-HURLEY, 2010

WL 4102933 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2010). Likewise, travel expenses for an attorney and

miscellaneous expenses such as postage are not contemplated by § 1920. 28 U.S.C. §

1920; Exhibit Icons, LLC v. XP Companies, LLC, No. 07-80824-CIV-MARRA, 2009 WL

3877667, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2009). Therefore, the undersigned does not

recommend reimbursing these costs.

Within the request for Other Costs, Plaintiff asks for reimbursement for fees paid

to a retained expert and his travel expenses. While 28 USC §1821 provides for expert

witness fees including travel expenses, Plaintiff makes her motion pursuant to § 1920,

and that statute provides reimbursement for expert witness fees only for court-appointed

witnesses. As this witness was not court-appointed, the undersigned does not

recommend reimbursing this cost either.

This allows for a total cost reimbursement in the amount of $5,299.68, itemized as

follows:

• $400 for the filing fee

• $685.00 for service of summons and subpoenas

• $2,723.70 for transcripts

• $714.00 for printing

• $776.98 for six witnesses

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Renewed

Motion for Attorney’s Fees, ECF No. 178, be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART,

awarding Plaintiff $192,357.00 in attorney’s fees. The undersigned also recommends

Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Bill of Costs, ECF No. 179, be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART, reimbursing Plaintiff for $5,299.68 in costs.

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above

findings and recommendations as provided by the Local Rules for this district. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely

object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and

Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2018); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

DONE AND SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 13th day of February

2025.

Re mm [lt

PATRICK M. HUNT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas

All Counsel of Record

15