HUNT v. CASTRO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

DERRICK MARTIN HUNT,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 5:23cv320/TKW/MAL

WARDEN, FCI MARIANNA,

Respondent.

___________________________/

ORDER, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Dereck Martin Hunt, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 2. Hunt is

currently in federal prison serving a sentence of 210 months for Enticing a Minor to

Engage in Sexually Explicit Conduct. Id. at 8, 24, 30. Through his petition, he seeks

to prevent or delay his extradition to Fulton County, Georgia while he challenges his

federal conviction. Id. at 14-15. He argues that if he is extradited, he will be

transported without the legal papers he needs. Id. at 14. He also argues that Fulton

County, Georgia officials lost the right to prosecute him because they violated his

right to a speedy trial. Id. at 11.

The Warden responded in opposition to the petition, arguing Hunt did not

exhaust his administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prison (BOP). ECF No. 11.

Hunt has filed a Motion for Leave to Amend § 2241 and a Supplement with

Combined Response. ECF No. 15, 16. In his Supplement with Combined Response,

Hunt raises additional arguments and amends his request for relief. ECF Nos. 16.

Even considering these additional matters, for the reasons discussed below, Hunt’s

petition should be dismissed.

I. Background

Hunt was arrested in July of 2012 in the State of Georgia and charged with

numerous offenses relating to sexual conduct with a child under Georgia law. ECF

No. 2 at 7. He was transferred into federal custody where he was charged with

Enticing a Minor to Engage in Sexually Explicit Conduct based on the same

incidents. Id. at 8. After Hunt was released on bail on July 29, 2012, he absconded,

and he was not apprehended until over seven years later, on November 22, 2019. Id.

Hunt was returned to federal custody, and Georgia state authorities were notified of

his apprehension. Id.

After his apprehension, Hunt entered a conditional guilty plea to the federal

charge. Id. His conviction was affirmed on appeal on September 28, 2023. Id. at 8-

9. He is currently in custody at the Federal Correctional Institution in Marianna,

Florida with a projected release date of September 28, 2034. See

https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.

On November 27, 2023, Hunt filed a Motion to Quash all pending charges in

Fulton County, Georgia. ECF No. 2 at 10-11, 24-27. His state court motion was

based in part on the state’s alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. Id. He

claimed the state has waited too long after his re-apprehension to pursue charges. Id.

Hunt states he met with officials at FCI Marianna on December 5, 2023, and he

refused to sign for a transfer of custody to Fulton County, Georgia. Id. at 11. He

asserts that on the same date he began to initiate the administrative remedy process.

Id. Among the attachments to the § 2241 petition are: a December 4, 2023 email to

then-Warden Winfield objecting to the proposed extradition, and a handwritten

version of the same message addressed to a Ms. Mooneyham on the BOP’s “Inmate

Request to Staff” (BP-8) form. Id. at 39-40.

In his petition dated December 14, 2023, Hunt seeks an order suspending

extradition (1) during the pendency of his petition for a writ of certiorari to the

United States Supreme Court,1 (2) while his Motion to Quash remains pending in

Fulton County, and (3) while the instant § 2241 petition is pending. ECF No. 2 at

14-15. Read literally, Hunt objects to his transfer from federal custody until after the

three identified legal matters are resolved. Underlying his claim is his belief that he

1 Hunt’s first request, that extradition be suspended during the pendency of his petition for writ

of certiorari is now moot. On January 23, 2024, Hunt filed a notice with the Court titled

“Petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts Under Federal Rules of Evidence,

Rule 201(b)(2) Et. Seq.” ECF No. 6. He explains therein that his petition for a writ of certiorari

was denied on January 8, 2024, and he has begun “his perfection of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Petition

for Habeas Corpus Relief and cannot be extradited to Georgia.” Id. at 2. Hunt requests a court

order granting “injunctive or declaratory relief barring any transfer of the Petitioner to the State of

Georgia until he has successfully filed his § 2255 petition collaterally attacking his federal

sentence.” ECF No. 16 at 5. This additional request is also moot because the one-year limitation

period under § 2255(f)(1) expired on January 9, 2025.

cannot lawfully be prosecuted on the pending charges in Fulton County, Georgia

because to do so would violate his right to a speedy trial. Id. at 5.

On April 29, 2024, Respondent moved to dismiss Hunt’s § 2241 petition

because Hunt failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.2 Hunt claims in his reply

that he is entitled to a futility exception to the exhaustion requirement. ECF No. 16

at 2. He also acknowledges that granting the requested injunctive relief would

potentially interfere with the pending state proceedings, but he contends his right to

collaterally attack his federal conviction supersedes the State of Georgia’s interest

in prosecution. He argues that the Younger abstention doctrine does not preclude the

requested relief, and this Court should bar his transfer to the State of Georgia “until

he has successfully filed his § 2255 petition collaterally attacking his federal

sentence.” ECF No. 16 at 5.

II. Discussion

A. Exhaustion is required before filing a § 2241 petition.

Prisoners are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing a

§ 2241 petition. Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 471, 474-75 (11th Cir.

2015). The exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but it is a requirement, and

thus it is a defense a respondent may assert, as the Warden has done in this case. Id.

2 Respondent also moved to dismiss all improperly named respondents. ECF No. 11 at 1.

Pursuant to this Court’s Order of December 27, 2023, this was already done, and as of that date,

only the Warden at FCI Marianna remains as a respondent. ECF No. 5.

at 475.

The BOP has an administrative remedy procedure that allows an inmate to

raise issues related to any aspect of imprisonment. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq. The

procedure has multiple tiers. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19. Before seeking formal

review, an inmate should first attempt to resolve the matter informally by presenting

his complaint to staff on a form commonly referred to as a BP-8. 28 C.F.R. §

542.13(a). If informal resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may then initiate the

formal review process.

The full, formal BOP administrative remedy procedure has three steps. First,

the inmate must file a Request for Administrative Remedy, commonly referred to as

a BP-9, with the warden of the facility. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. If the inmate is

dissatisfied with the warden’s response, the inmate may appeal to the Regional

Director by filing a Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal or BP-10. 28 C.F.R. §

542.15(a). Finally, if the inmate is dissatisfied with the Regional Director’s response,

the inmate may appeal to the BOP’s Central Office by filing a Central Office

Administrative Remedy Appeal, or BP-11. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). To fully exhaust,

an inmate must properly complete each step of the BOP administrative remedy

process. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).

B. Hunt has not exhausted his administrative remedies.

Appended to the Warden’s response to the petition is a document titled

“Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval,” dated March 5, 2024. ECF No. 11-

1. The document does not identify Hunt by name, but it contains his Register

Number: 55995-048, which is sufficient to identify him. The search concludes “No

remedy data exists for this inmate.” Id.

In Hunt’s response to the Warden’s assertions about exhaustion, he refers back

to the two attachments to his original petition reflecting his opposition to the

extradition. ECF No. 2 at 39, 40. He erroneously claims that the email and the

substantively identical “Inmate Request to Staff” satisfied the BP-8 and BP-9

requirements. The Inmate Request to Staff is the BP-8, the first informal step in the

grievance process; Hunt never initiated the formal review process. Furthermore, in

his requests, Hunt does not complain about his lack of access to legal papers in the

event he is extradited. Therefore, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

with the Bureau of Prisons.

Hunt now makes the conclusory statement that additional attempts at

exhaustion would have been futile due to the “imminent danger of being transported

back to Georgia without his legal paperwork.” ECF No. 16 at 2. He claims upon

extradition, “all of an inmate’s property is packed into a storage box within the

facility’s R&D Department, and inmates are told they are not allowed to bring any

items (including legal work).” Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). Hunt further claims he

could have been prejudiced, referencing the Supreme Court’s denial of his petition

for certiorari in January of 2024, which triggered his one-year time limitation to file

a motion challenging his federal conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Id. at 2-3.

Hunt’s assertion that further attempts at exhaustion would be futile is not well

taken. His extradition to Georgia has not in fact happened and he has had time to

pursue his administrative remedies. His concerns about losing access to his legal

paperwork upon extradition are matters that are appropriately addressed at the

administrative level. Under these circumstances, Hunt has not shown he would be

entitled to avail himself of a futility exception. See Straughter v. Warden, FCC

Coleman - Low, 699 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1308-09 (M.D. Fla. 2023) (citing to “the need

to channel claims to the most appropriate forum in the first instance” as a factor

against recognizing a common law futility exception to the exhaustion requirement).

C. Challenge to State Court Detainer

Although Hunt does not specifically request the court to grant him more than

temporary relief from the detainer, he argues that the “clear and unambiguous” issue

in the case is that “Fulton County Georgia Officials have lost their Lawful Right to

now Prosecute Petitioner after violating his Rights to a Speedy Trial by their failure

to Timely obtain Custody of Petitioner over the last four years he has been in Federal

Custody.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). To the extent Hunt is contesting the

detainer, his claim must fail because he has failed to exhaust remedies and Younger

abstention applies.

A federal prisoner contesting a state detainer must first pursue administrative

remedies under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) in the court of the state

which has placed the detainer, in this case Georgia. See Grant v. Hogan, 505 F.2d

1220 (3d Cir. 1974) (federal prisoner was required to exhaust all remedies afforded

to him by the IAD before seeking relief in federal court); Slaughter v. Henderson,

470 F.2d 743, 744 (5th Cir.1972) (federal prisoner with Ohio state detainer lodged

against him was required, before seeking federal habeas relief, to attempt to have the

Ohio detainer removed from his prison records through the administrative

procedures of the IAD); Hurst v. Hogan, 435 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ga. 1977)

(recognizing Congress has provided in the IAD an “efficient and effective method

for resolving a prisoner’s claim that he has been denied a speedy trial and is therefore

subject to an illegal detainer” and that requiring resort to these remedies under the

IAD “will remove the necessity of intervention by the federal courts); see also

Norton v. Parke, 892 F. 2d 476 (6th Cir. 1989) (Kentucky state prisoner seeking

relief from Ohio detainer required to pursue remedies provided by the IAD before

seeking federal habeas relief).

As explained by the Supreme Court, Article III of the IAD “establishes a

procedure by which a prisoner incarcerated in one party State . . . may demand the

speedy disposition of ‘any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis

of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner’ [] by another party State.”

Carchman v Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 720 (1985). The warden must

inform the prisoner that a detainer has been lodged against him and that

he may request final disposition of the indictment, information, or

complaint upon which the detainer is based. If the prisoner makes such

a request, the warden must forward it, together with a certificate

providing certain information about the prisoner's terms of

confinement, to the appropriate prosecuting official and court of the

receiving State. The authorities in the receiving State then must bring

the prisoner to trial within 180 days, absent good cause shown, or the

court must dismiss the indictment, information, or complaint with

prejudice, and the detainer will cease to be of any force or effect.

Id. at 721. Hunt has not completed this process. To the contrary, Hunt is resisting

efforts to be brought to Fulton County, Georgia for disposition of his case by raising

speedy trial as an affirmative defense. Because he has not made a request to be

brought to Georgia on the detainer, he has not exhausted his IAD administrative

remedies. See Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985) (remedies not

exhausted where petitioner is raising speedy trial as an affirmative defense); Brown

v. Estelle 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976) (an attempt to force the state to go to

trial is attainable through federal habeas corpus but an attempt to abort a state

proceeding is not).

Furthermore, a challenge to the detainer itself on speedy trial grounds is

barred by the abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

“Younger established that, based on principles of comity and federalism, a federal

court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings where the state

court conviction and/or sentence is not yet final.” Johnson v. Florida, 32 F. 4th 1092,

1099 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45). Here, Hunt’s Georgia state

proceedings are not yet final. His claim that his right to speedy trial has been violated

does not justify making an exception to Younger. Id.

III. Conclusion

Hunt’s petition should be dismissed because Hunt did not exhaust his

available remedies and Younger abstention applies. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED: Hunt’s Motion for Leave to Amend § 2241 (ECF No. 15) is

GRANTED. And it is respectfully

RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF

No. 2), as amended, be DISMISSED.

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close the file.

DONE on February 13, 2024.

s/ Midori A. Lowry

Midori A. Lowry

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The case was referred to a magistrate judge for the issuance of all preliminary

orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters.

See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days of the date of the report and recommendation. Any different

deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only

and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all

other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and

legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.