Courville v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NICHOLAS COURVILLE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS 24-327-SDD-EWD

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS

ET AL.

RULING

This matter is before the Court on three motions. Defendants Major Dale Blackard,

Nurse Karla Bringedahl, and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

(collectively, the “DPSC Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”).1 Defendant Sergeant

Pharoah Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), which

also includes a request for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e).2 Finally,

Defendant Major Andrew Cupil filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).3

Plaintiff Nicholas Courville (“Plaintiff”) filed Oppositions to each Motion.4 The DPSC

Defendants filed a Reply.5 For the reasons that follow, the Motions will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed suit in state court in connection with injuries he allegedly

sustained while he was an inmate at Dixon Correctional Institute (“DCI”).6 The case was

1 Rec. Doc. 25.

2 Rec. Doc. 27.

3 Rec. Doc. 46.

4 Rec. Docs. 30, 29, and 47, respectively.

5 Rec. Doc. 31.

6 Rec. Doc. 1-2, p. 11.

removed to this Court.7 In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges this Court has federal

question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental

jurisdiction over state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.8

A. Factual Allegations

The operative Complaint9 outlines the following alleged facts:

At the relevant time, Plaintiff was an inmate at DCI and was “disabled, wheelchair

bound, had end-stage renal disease, cardiolmyopathy [sic], severe scoliosis and had

been on dialysis since 2007 with congestive heart failure.”10 At DCI, inmates on dialysis

are permitted to eat lunch earlier than other inmates to allow them time to receive their

treatment.11 On April 30, 2023, Plaintiff was denied his early lunch because the DCI

employee serving food that day did not believe Plaintiff was on the list of inmates who

were entitled to receive lunch early.12 Plaintiff, being pushed in his wheelchair by a fellow

inmate, then proceeded to another location to speak with a supervisor about the lunch

issue.13 The supervisor made a phone call and directed Plaintiff to return to the kitchen.14

When Plaintiff returned to the kitchen, the same DCI employee again refused to serve

him lunch.15 Plaintiff then returned to the same supervisor to report that he was still being

refused his meal.16 The supervisor told Plaintiff to wait “inside the Sally Port 5” and went

to the kitchen to speak to the food service employee.17

7 Rec. Doc. 1.

8 Rec. Doc. 22, ¶ 1.

9 Rec. Doc. 22.

10 Id. at ¶ 7.

11 Id. at ¶¶ 9–11.

12 Id. at ¶ 14–21.

13 Id. at ¶¶ 22–23.

14 Id. at ¶ 23.

15 Id. at ¶¶ 24–27.

16 Id. at ¶¶ 31–32.

17 Id. at ¶ 33.

At this point, Plaintiff alleges he was “standing behind his wheelchair holding onto

[it] supporting himself.”18 Shortly thereafter, Defendant “M. Sergeant” Pharoah Johnson

(“Sergeant Johnson”) entered Sally Port 5, walked over to Plaintiff, and said, “Let’s go.”19

Plaintiff told Sergeant Johnson he was waiting for the supervisor to return.20 Then, Plaintiff

alleges Sergeant Johnson “grabbed [Plaintiff] by the back of his shirt and jerked him

backwards causing [Plaintiff] to let go of the wheelchair handles and spin to the walk

fence, where he grabbed the fence to prevent his fall.”21 Plaintiff asked Sergeant Johnson

to stop being aggressive and to call the supervisor.22 In response, Plaintiff alleges

Sergeant Johnson

placed his hands under [Plaintiff’s] arms with his hands

interlocked behind [Plaintiff’s] head, pressing downward on

his neck and then jerked [Plaintiff] backwards [away] from the

fence and spun him as hard as he could to the left, at that

point, M.Sgt. Pharoah Johnson put all of his weight on

[Plaintiff] and broke his left knee leaving only [Plaintiff’s] right

leg to support both of their weight. The M.Sgts. continued

force caused the tendons and ligaments in [Plaintiff’s] right leg

to tear and rupture. Both legs were broken at that point.23

After Sergeant Johnson “continued to jerk and pull on [Plaintiff], who was

screaming for mercy and help,” other officers came to the scene.24 After Plaintiff stated

his legs were broken, an officer called for assistance.25 A “response team” including three

nurses, Sergeant Johnson, and Defendant Major Dale Blackard (“Major Blackard”) arrived

on the scene, but none of them “checked [Plaintiff’s] condition despite being familiar with

18 Id. at ¶ 34.

19 Id. at ¶ 37.

20 Id.

21 Id. at ¶ 38.

22 Id. at ¶ 39.

23 Id. at ¶ 42.

24 Id. at ¶ 44.

25 Id. at ¶ 45.

his disability and infirmity.”26 Major Blackard ordered Plaintiff to stand up, and Plaintiff

replied that he could not because his legs were broken.27 Major Blackard then ordered

other officers to grab Plaintiff and lift him up, which caused Plaintiff “extreme pain.”28 The

officers, at the direction of Major Blackard, then placed Plaintiff in his wheelchair “without

securing the foot supports,” which caused his feet to “roll[ ] under the chair as he was

being pushed[,] again causing extreme pain.”29

Plaintiff was brought to the DCI Emergency Exam Room with both hands and feet

cuffed to a stretcher, which caused more pain in his legs.30 When a nurse (whose identity

Plaintiff does not specify) looked at Plaintiff’s knees, she immediately declared that

Plaintiff must go to the hospital.31 Plaintiff alleges he then “heard [Defendant Nurse Karla

Bringedahl (“Nurse Bringedahl”)] say she was not sending him out in an ambulance.”32

After remaining “on the stretcher for two hours ignored, unattended and suffering in the

infirmary,”33 three nurses came in, looked at his legs again, and left the room.34

After approximately another hour passed, Sergeant Johnson entered the infirmary

and saw Plaintiff still cuffed to the stretcher.35 Sergeant Johnson said he thought Plaintiff

would have gone to the hospital by then, and after looking at Plaintiff’s legs said, “Man,

I’m so sorry.”36

26 Id. at ¶ 46.

27 Id. at ¶ 47.

28 Id. at ¶ 50.

29 Id. at ¶ 51.

30 Id. at ¶ 52.

31 Id. at ¶ 53.

32 Id. at ¶ 54.

33 Id.

34 Id. at ¶¶ 55–58.

35 Id. at ¶ 60.

36 Id. at ¶ 61.

Another hour later, “[t]ransport officers arrived and took [Plaintiff] to [the hospital]

without his legs being so much as braced or stabilized to stop them from moving. [Plaintiff]

was placed in a wheelchair with his knees bent despite all of the swelling. He arrived at

[the hospital] between 4:45 and 6:45 p.m.”37

At some point, Plaintiff alleges Nurse Bringedahl “called the hospital and told the

nursing staff to administer to [Plaintiff] a double dose of his blood pressure medication.”38

As a result of the excessive dosage, Plaintiff alleges “[h]is blood pressure dropped so low,

he could not receive dialysis.”39

A doctor arrived and reported Plaintiff needed emergency surgery based on his x-

ray results.40 Further (presumably after Plaintiff’s surgery), a “kidney doctor opined that

[Plaintiff’s] blood was not right and he should not be discharged until his blood work was

straightened out.”41 However, Plaintiff alleges Nurse Bringedahl “came into the room and

told [Plaintiff] you are getting the hell out of here and going ba[c]k to prison.”42 Plaintiff

alleges “[h]e was released on Tuesday evening never getting ba[c]k to the prison until

Wednesday afternoon. He had not eaten since Saturday, because his legs were broken

on Sunday.”43

On the day of his discharge from the hospital, Plaintiff alleges he had been ordered

by doctors not to bend his legs, which were in braces.44 DCI transport allegedly arrived at

the hospital “to retrieve [Plaintiff] with no way to properly transport him without violating

37 Id. at ¶ 62.

38 Id. at ¶ 63.

39 Id. at ¶ 64.

40 Id. at ¶ 65.

41 Id. at ¶ 66.

42 Id.

43 Id.

44 Id. at ¶ 67.

[the] doctor’s order not to bend the legs.”45 The DCI transport officer was told over the

telephone by his supervisor, Defendant Major Andrew Cupil (“Major Cupil”), to “do

whatever it takes to get [Plaintiff] back here.”46 Plaintiff alleges the “[d]octor’s orders were

disregarded.”47

Upon returning to DCI, Plaintiff alleges he was placed in an “isolation lock down

cell,” where “[h]e laid on his bed helpless unable to move and unable to get to a urinal[;]

he was forced to urinate and defecate on himself.”48

On May 6, 2023, Plaintiff “went for dialysis, but his blood work was so off (low

hemoglobin, etc.), he had to be sent back to the hospital as an emergency. Again, an

ambulance would not be provided.”49 Plaintiff alleges “[h]e had been bleeding internally

and had been complaining of severe stomach pains and blood in his stool.”50 He was

given four pints of blood at the hospital.51

After the second hospital trip, Plaintiff alleges

[h]e was sent back to the prison subjected to the same

neglect. His dialysis was cut short and not provided at the

appropriate times. He was wearing a yellow arm bracelet that

indicated he was a fall risk. Both legs were in straight leg

braces and he had 20 staples in both knees along with

incisions, yet, he was not being served food or water in his

cell. He was expected to get up and get his food from the food

tray in the door of the cell. … He was being forced out of his

bed with a hydraulic lift and walker unassisted to walk to the

cell door to retrieve food and medi[c]ation.52

45 Id.

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 Id. at ¶ 68.

49 Id. at ¶ 70.

50 Id. at ¶ 71.

51 Id. at ¶ 72.

52 Id. at ¶¶ 73–74.

Plaintiff further states he was “in the back of the infirmary in a disciplinary cell w[h]ere he

stayed for a month. He had no shower for 17 days and often did not receive food as he

was unable to get up. He did not receive wound care.”53

Plaintiff alleges Nurse Bringedahl discontinued his pain medication.54 The

withholding of his medication allegedly continued even after Plaintiff’s kidney doctor

contacted the DCI infirmary to stress the importance of timely and consistent treatment.55

Plaintiff was later sent to the hospital again due to internal bleeding, and another

surgical procedure took place.56 Plaintiff alleges, “[o]nce again, while still under orders not

to bend his legs, DCI made no arraignment [sic] for adequate transportation. He was lifted

into a van with his legs inside and body outside in the rain.”57 In the process of placing

Plaintiff into the DCI van to be transported back to the facility, a straight board was placed

under Plaintiff’s legs and he “was hand cuffed and shackled to a waist chain and unable

to hold onto anything for support.”58 Major Cupil, who was in charge of transporting

Plaintiff on this occasion, could not get the van door closed, so he summoned a second

van.59 As Plaintiff was being pulled out of the first van to be placed into the second van,

he alleges “the board on which he was seated began coming out from under [him].”60

Plaintiff told Major Cupil he was slipping, and Major Cupil told Plaintiff to “be quiet.”61 As

he was being moved by Major Cupil and another unidentified individual, the support board

and wheelchair fell, causing Plaintiff to fall backwards while cuffed to the waist belt and in

53 Id. at ¶ 77.

54 Id. at ¶ 78.

55 Id. at ¶ 79.

56 Id. at ¶ 83.

57 Id. at ¶ 84.

58 Id.

59 Id. at ¶ 85.

60 Id. at ¶ 86.

61 Id.

locked leg braces.62 Plaintiff “fell down onto the lift landing on his back a[n]d butt and it

felt as though his legs re-broke. His back, neck[,] tail bone[,] and left elbow were injured.”63

Major Cupil ordered some unidentified guards to “lift [Plaintiff] and place him on the floor

of the van through the rear door where he was laid under the rear seat.”64 Plaintiff alleges

a hospital security supervisor, after seeing Plaintiff on the floor of the van drenched with

rain and crying in pain, filed a written report of abuse and notified Plaintiff’s doctors.65

Plaintiff alleges Nurse Bringedahl subsequently refused to fill another pain

medication order prescribed by Plaintiff’s doctor.66 Plaintiff further alleges Nurse

Bringedahl supervised the medical staff, including another nurse who would leave

Plaintiff’s medicine and food outside Plaintiff’s cell so that Plaintiff had to get out of bed

and retrieve it.67 At one point approximately one month after the initial injury, Plaintiff fell

and injured his shoulder while attempting to make his way to a water fountain about fifteen

feet from his bed.68 Additionally, in June of 2023, Plaintiff alleges Nurse Bringedahl failed

to refer Plaintiff to physical therapy despite knowing he may never walk again without that

treatment.69

B. Causes of Action

Based on the foregoing facts and resulting injuries, Plaintiff lodges claims under

both federal and state law. The Court notes the lack of clarity of several aspects of the

operative Complaint, specifically regarding the identification of the specific Defendants

62 Id. at ¶ 87.

63 Id. at ¶ 88.

64 Id. at ¶ 90.

65 Id. at ¶¶ 91–93.

66 Id. at ¶ 94.

67 Id. at ¶¶ 96–97.

68 Id. at ¶ 98.

69 Id. at ¶ 99.

against whom each claim is made.70 Nonetheless, the Court’s review of the pleadings

and Plaintiff’s subsequent clarification of the causes of action reveals the following claims:

 As to Defendant Sergeant Pharoah Johnson: 1) negligence;71 2) battery;72 and

3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under

the Eighth Amendment.73

 As to Defendants Major Dale Blackard and Nurse Karla Bringedahl:

negligence.74

 As to Defendant Major Andrew Cupil: negligence.75

 As to Defendant Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections:

vicarious liability “for the tortious acts committed against third parties by its

employees during the course and scope of employment and while under its

control, direction and supervision.”76

70 For example, the operative Complaint contains several vague references such as “the Defendant health

care provider” (presumably a reference to Nurse Bringedahl) and “the Defendant Major” (which could be a

reference to either Major Blackard or Major Cupil). Rec. Doc. 22, ¶¶ 118, 124. Also, referencing no

Defendant in particular, Plaintiff at one point alleges: “Violating numerous inmates rights and failure to follow

rules and regulations implemented for the protection of inmates constitutes deliberate indifference.” Rec.

Doc. 22, ¶ 107. Plaintiff ultimately provided some clarification in his Opposition briefs with respect to these

ambiguities.

71 Id. at ¶¶ 117, 119–121.

72 Id. at ¶ 117.

73 Id. at ¶¶ 131–140.

74 Id. at ¶¶ 118, 124–126. The Court notes that in the Amended Complaint (¶ 118), Plaintiff states that the

conduct of “the Defendant Major” (presumably Major Blackard based on the explanation of the conduct) “is

a battery under state law.” However, in opposing the DPSC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff states:

“[Major] Blackard has failed to point to any allegations in the Amended Complaint that accuse him of a

battery.” Rec. Doc. 30, p. 4. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not pled a battery claim against

Major Blackard.

75 Id. at ¶ 127.

76 Id. at ¶ 130.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motions to Dismiss

1. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to challenge

the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. The party asserting that

the court has jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that the court may adjudicate the

case.77

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is analyzed under the same standard as

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).78 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, a complaint is subject to dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” However, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the

court is permitted to look at evidence in the record beyond simply those facts alleged in

the complaint and its proper attachments.”79 In reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), a

court may consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by

undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by

undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.”80 “Ultimately, a motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain

that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

plaintiff to relief.”81

77 Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

78 Benton v. U.S., 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992).

79 Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ginter ex rel. Ballard v. Belcher,

Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439, 449 (5th Cir.2008)).

80 Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981).

81 Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison

Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)).

2. Discussion

i. Preliminary Note on Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court pauses at the outset to examine its jurisdiction over this matter.82 As

noted, it is alleged this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal

question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).83

Plaintiff’s only federal claim is a § 1983 claim against Sergeant Johnson. For

reasons explained below, Sergeant Johnson’s arguments for dismissal of this claim will

be rejected. Therefore, the § 1983 claim presents a federal question, and the Court has

jurisdiction.

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are brought under state law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a), federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if they “form

part of the same case or controversy” with a claim over which the court has original

jurisdiction. If a court finds that it has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),

it may nonetheless decline to exercise that jurisdiction under the circumstances listed in

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

None of the parties address whether the state and federal claims form part of the

same case or controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Nonetheless, the Court does so

here because “[a] court must satisfy itself that a claim falls within the category laid out in

§ 1367(a), for otherwise there is no federal jurisdiction.”84

82 “[F]ederal courts are duty-bound to examine the basis of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.” Union

Planters Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2004).

83 Rec. Doc. 22, ¶ 1.

84 Kiser v. Moyal, No. CV 23-464-SDD-SDJ, 2024 WL 4229936, at *14 (M.D. La. Sept. 18, 2024) (quoting

Myers v. Cnty. of Lake, Ind., 30 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1994)).

It is generally agreed that the § 1367(a) “same case or controversy” requirement

codified the holding of the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in United Mine Workers of

America v. Gibbs.85 In Gibbs, the Court held that for supplemental jurisdiction to exist,

“[t]he state and federal claims must arise from a common nucleus of operative fact” such

that the plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.”86

The limits of the “same case or controversy” standard are not clearly defined by the

jurisprudence. Some courts within the Fifth Circuit note that the standard “is expansive,

extending supplemental jurisdiction to its constitutional limit,”87 and “[a] loose factual

connection between the claims is generally sufficient.”88 On the other hand, it has also

been recognized that it is unclear “how to proceed when there is some overlap, but not a

perfect factual overlap, between the federal and state claims in question, and the Fifth

Circuit does not appear to have addressed this issue head on.”89

Here, the Court finds sufficient factual overlap exists between the federal and

state-law claims to support supplemental jurisdiction. All the claims in this case involve

the alleged mistreatment of Plaintiff by DCI personnel, beginning with the initial injury by

Sergeant Johnson and continuing with subsequent mistreatment by the other Defendants,

resulting in related additional harm or exacerbation of the same initial injury. The

allegations against all the Defendants are interconnected such that, taken together, “the

85 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Though there is some debate on whether § 1367(a) codified the Gibbs holding, §

1367(a) “clearly embraces at least the Gibbs standard. The only debate is whether the Constitution goes

beyond Gibbs.” 13D Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3567.1 (3d ed.) (emphasis in original).

86 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.

87 Lucarino v. Con-Dive, LLC, No. H-09-2548, 2010 WL 786546, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2010).

88 CheckPoint Fluidic Sys. Int'l, Ltd. v. Guccione, No. 10-4505, 2012 WL 195533, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 23,

2012).

89 Banik v. Tamez, No. 7:16-cv-00462, 2016 WL 6122729, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2016) (emphasis in

original).

entire action before the [C]ourt comprises but one constitutional ‘case.’”90 Therefore, the

Court finds that supplemental jurisdiction exists over the state-law claims pursuant to §

1367(a).91

Turning now to the parties’ arguments, both the DPSC Defendants and Sergeant

Johnson request dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). The Court will analyze the arguments of

these parties in turn.

ii. DPSC Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion

DPSC Defendants argue that the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and

Corrections (the “Department”) is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.92 Accordingly,

DPSC Defendants seek dismissal of any § 1983 claims for monetary damages against

the Department itself as well as those made against Major Blackard and Nurse Bringedahl

in their official capacities.93

DPSC Defendants are correct in noting that, according to the Supreme Court, “a

State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”94 Furthermore, it is clear that this rule

applies to “arms of the state,” and to a state's “officials acting in their official capacities.”95

And the Department “is indisputably an ‘arm of the state.’”96 However, the Court notes

that according to the operative Complaint, Major Blackard and Nurse Bringedahl were

90 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.

91 The Court acknowledges that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides four discretionary grounds for declining

supplemental jurisdiction. The Court will not decline supplemental jurisdiction in this case because 1) the

claims do not “raise[ ] a novel or complex issue of State law,” 2) the state-law claims do not “substantially

predominate[ ]” over the § 1983 claim against Sergeant Johnson; 3) the Court has not “dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction,” and 4) the Court finds no “other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1–4).

92 Rec. Doc. 25-1, p. 4.

93 Id.

94 Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).

95 Med RX/Sys., P.L.L.C. v. Texas Dep't of State Health Servs., 633 F. App'x 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing

Will, 491 U.S. at 71).

96 Traweek v. Gusman, 414 F. Supp. 3d 847, 858 (E.D. La. 2019) (citing Champagne v. Jefferson Parish

Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999)).

“sued individually.”97 On this point, Plaintiff makes clear in his Opposition that no official-

capacity claims are brought against these two Defendants.98 Plaintiff also clarifies that he

is only making state-law claims for negligence and vicarious liability against the DPSC

Defendants.99 Therefore, DPSC Defendants’ argument regarding Plaintiff’s inability to

assert § 1983 claims is inapposite because no such claims are brought against them.

The DPSC Defendants do not expressly raise by name the issue of sovereign

immunity or the Eleventh Amendment.100 However, Plaintiff does so in his Opposition,

arguing DPSC Defendants cannot raise Eleventh Amendment immunity.101 The Fifth

Circuit has noted that courts may consider the issue of sovereign immunity sua sponte

“because it bears on [a] court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”102 Because the DPSC

Defendants challenged this Court’s jurisdiction based on the related premise that the

Department is not a suable “person” under § 1983, the Court will address the issue of

Eleventh Amendment immunity.

97 Rec. Doc. 22, ¶ 4.

98 Rec. Doc. 30, p. 3.

99 Id. at pp. 2–3, 14.

100 The Court notes the following clarification by the Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–

13 (1999) regarding the concept of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment:

The Eleventh Amendment makes explicit reference to the States' immunity from suits

“commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,

or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const., Amdt. 11. We have, as a

result, sometimes referred to the States' immunity from suit as “Eleventh Amendment

immunity.” The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the

sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the

Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution's structure, its history, and the

authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a

fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of

the Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission

into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of

the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.

101 Id. at p. 14.

102 Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Burge v. Parish of St.

Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 465–66 (5th Cir.1999)).

Most straightforwardly pertinent to the Eleventh Amendment issue is Plaintiff’s

claim against the Department itself for vicarious liability under Louisiana tort law. As the

Supreme Court explains, “in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its

agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh

Amendment.”103 As a general proposition, Eleventh Amendment immunity extends with

equal force to pendent state-law claims, such as the negligence claims against Nurse

Bringedahl and Major Blackard and the vicarious liability theory against the

Department.104 However, Plaintiff argues the Department’s removal of the action to this

Court constitutes a waiver of any claim to Eleventh Amendment immunity.105 On this point,

the Supreme Court held in Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia that

“removal is a form of voluntary invocation of a federal court's jurisdiction sufficient to waive

the State's otherwise valid objection to litigation of a matter (here of state law) in a federal

forum.”106 In so holding, the Court reasoned: “It would seem anomalous or inconsistent

for a State both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the ‘Judicial

power of the United States’ extends to the case at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh

Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the ‘Judicial power of the United States’

extends to the case at hand.”107 In line with Lapides, the Court finds that the Department

has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by removing this action to federal

court.108

103 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (citations omitted).

104 See Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 117–121.

105 Rec. Doc. 30, pp. 15–17.

106 Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002).

107 Id. at 618.

108 Rec. Doc. 1.

Nurse Bringedahl and Major Blackard are sued in their individual capacities. As a

general rule, “the Eleventh Amendment does not ordinarily immunize a public official from

an action against him in his individual capacity.”109 However, the Supreme Court has

acknowledged an exception to this general rule: “[W]hen the action is in essence one for

the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest

and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials

are nominal defendants.”110 In other words, “relief sought nominally against an officer is

in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter,” and the state

could invoke its immunity in such a situation.111 Based on this principle, the Fifth Circuit

held in Hughes v. Savell that an inmate’s state-law claim against an individual prison

officer was barred by the Eleventh Amendment because, despite the plaintiff’s argument

that he was suing the officer in his individual capacity, “Louisiana tort law places the duty

to safeguard [the plaintiff] on the State of Louisiana and designates [the officer] as

Louisiana's agent. In order for [the plaintiff] to plead a cause of action for [the officer’s]

negligence, [the plaintiff] must sue [the officer] as an agent of the state.”112 That is, Hughes

found that the plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claim against the officer was actually a suit

against the state because, as a matter of Louisiana law, the state is liable for the

negligence of its employees in failing to protect an inmate.113

109 Henley v. Simpson, 527 F. App'x 303, 306 (5th Cir. 2013). See also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).

110 Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), overruled on other

grounds by Lapides, 535 U.S. 613).

111 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)).

112 Hughes, 902 F.2d at 379.

113 In Copsey v. Swearingen, 762 F. Supp. 1250, 1255 n.2 (M.D. La. 1991), another section of this Court

questioned the Hughes court’s reasoning follows: “The liability of the state for negligent acts of correctional

officers arises under Article 2320 of the Louisiana Civil Code which makes ‘the master’ liable in solido with

the ‘servant’ for ‘damages occasioned by the servant.’ Thus, to the extent that the case might be construed

to imply that only the state incurs liability for acts of its employees, Hughes is clearly in error as to Louisiana

Here, however, the Court finds it unnecessary to employ the Hughes analysis. As

explained above, the Department itself has waived its immunity from suit in federal court

by removing this case. Therefore, regardless of whether the Department is considered

the “real, substantial party in interest” in connection with the individual capacity tort claims

against Nurse Bringedahl and Major Blackard, the Department cannot avail itself of

Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.114

For the reasons stated above, DPSC Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion is denied.

iii. Sergeant Johnson’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion

Sergeant Johnson seeks “dismissal of any official capacity claims under § 1983”

because officials sued in their official capacities are not suable “persons” under § 1983.115

Plaintiff has asserted a § 1983 claim against Sergeant Johnson.116 However, Sergeant

Johnson was only sued in his individual capacity.117 According to the Supreme Court,

“officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals. A government official

law. See e.g. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So.2d 789 (La. 1980), specifically holding that employee and

employer are both liable in solido.’” (emphasis added). See also Deal v. Dep't of Corr., No. CV 15-00534-

BAJ-EWD, 2017 WL 6566198, at *3–4 (M.D. La. Dec. 22, 2017) (reading Hughes as requiring dismissal of

negligence claims against individual prison officers based on “failure to protect Plaintiff from an attack by

another inmate,” but not requiring dismissal of “other state law negligence claims.”).

114 In Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 252–53 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit explained

that “a sovereign enjoys two kinds of immunity that it may choose to waive or retain separately—immunity

from suit and immunity from liability.” The court explained that a state can waive its immunity from suit in

federal court by removing a case to federal court, but “[w]hether [the state] has retained a separate immunity

from liability is an issue that must be decided according to that state's law.” Id. (emphasis added). In other

words, the state’s waiver of immunity from suit by removal “does not affect or limit the State's ability to

assert whatever rights, immunities or defenses are provided for by its own sovereign immunity law to defeat

the claims against the State finally and on their merits in the federal courts.” Meyers ex rel. Benzing v.

Texas, 454 F.3d 503, 504 (5th Cir. 2006), aff'g on reh'g, 410 F.3d 236. Given the jurisdictional context of

the Eleventh Amendment analysis in this case, the Court leaves the issue of DPSC Defendants’ immunity

from liability under Louisiana law for another day. See JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Com. & Indus., No. CV 17-75-

JWD-JCW, 2017 WL 6000349, at *11 (M.D. La. Dec. 4, 2017).

115 Rec. Doc. 27-1, p. 6.

116 Rec. Doc. 22, ¶¶ 131–140.

117 Id. at ¶ 5. As the Supreme Court clarified in Hafer v. Melo, “the phrase ‘acting in their official capacities'

is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which

the officer inflicts the alleged injury.” 502 U.S. at 26.

in the role of personal-capacity defendant thus fits comfortably within the statutory term

‘person’” under § 1983.118 Therefore, dismissal of the § 1983 claim on this basis is denied.

Sergeant Johnson also raises Eleventh Amendment immunity.119 As with Major

Blackard and Nurse Bringedahl, the Court finds that 1) the Department’s removal of the

case to federal court waived any claim to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit;120 and

2) “a suit against a state officer in his or her individual capacity for money damages is not

a suit against the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity,” such that the

Amendment is generally no bar to such a suit (unless the state is the real, substantial

party in interest).121 Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Johnson under both §

1983 and Louisiana tort law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

For these reasons, Sergeant Johnson’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion is denied.

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss

1. Legal Standard

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-

pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”122 The

Court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into

118 Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27.

119 Rec. Doc. 27-1, p. 6.

120 As another section of this Court has explained, “[a]lthough Lapides was limited to state-law claims, the

Fifth Circuit in Meyers ex rel. Benzing extended the waiver of sovereign immunity by removal of private

suits by the state on federal law claims constitutes a valid waiver of the state's sovereign immunity. Further,

the Fifth Circuit has applied this removal principal to § 1983 claims.” Williams v. Louisiana, No. CV 17-453-

JWD-EWD, 2019 WL 1003645, at *4 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2019) (citing Meyers ex rel. Benzing, 410 F.3d at

248; Skinner v. Gragg, 650 F. App'x 214, 218 (5th Cir. 2016); Spooner v. Jackson, 251 F. App'x 919, 924

(5th Cir. 2007)).

121 New Orleans Towing Ass'n v. Foster, 248 F.3d 1143, at *3 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilson v. UT Health

Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263, 1271 (5th Cir.1992); Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412, 428 n.17 (5th Cir. 1985); Hafer,

502 U.S. at 30-31). See also Henley, 527 F. App'x at 306; Hughes, 902 F.2d at 377–79. For the same

reason as explained in connection with the DPSC Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion, the Court will not consider

whether the state is the real, substantial party in interest at this time.

122 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr.

Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).

the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”123 “To

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”124

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the

basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed

factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action will not do.”125 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”126 However, “[a] claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”127 In order

to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility

that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”128 “Furthermore, while the court must accept

well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’”129

On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.”130

123 Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).

124 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007)).

125 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (internal citations and brackets omitted).

126 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

127 Id.

128 Id.

129 Taha v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 2012 WL 1576099, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2012) (quoting Southland

Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).

130 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

2. Discussion

All three sets of Defendants request dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court

will consider each Motion in turn.

i. DPSC Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

a. Qualified Immunity

First, DPSC Defendants argue Nurse Bringedahl and Major Blackard are entitled

to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.131 However, as noted above,

Plaintiff brings only state-law negligence claims against these two Defendants. According

to the Fifth Circuit, “[f]ederal qualified immunity does not apply to state-law claims.”132

Instead, “[i]n evaluating a motion to dismiss a state claim on the grounds of qualified

immunity, federal courts must apply the state's substantive law of qualified immunity.”133

And most significantly for purposes of DPSC Defendants’ Motion, “qualified immunity

does not apply to Louisiana tort claims.”134 Accordingly, the Court finds DPSC Defendants’

qualified immunity argument to be misplaced.

b. Discretionary Immunity

Next, DPSC Defendants argue Louisiana’s discretionary immunity statute, La. R.S.

9:2798.1, bars Plaintiff’s tort claims against Nurse Bringedahl and Major Blackard.135 The

statute provides, in pertinent part:

131 Rec. Doc. 25-1, p. 6.

132 Tuttle v. Sepolio, 68 F.4th 969, 976 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 238–39 (5th

Cir. 2008)).

133 Brown, 519 F.3d at 239 (citing Sorey v. Kellett, 849 F.2d 960, 961–63 (5th Cir.1988)).

134 Williams v. E. Baton Rouge City/Par., No. CV 23-01581-BAJ-EWD, 2024 WL 4241627, at *10 (M.D. La.

Sept. 19, 2024) (quoting Beroid v. LaFleur, No. 21-cv-516, 2022 WL 2826228, at *7 (W.D. La. June 2,

2022)). See also Cloud v. Stone, No. CV 18-1070, 2018 WL 7050844, at *5 (W.D. La. Dec. 19, 2018), report

and recommendation adopted, No. CV 18-1070, 2019 WL 238066 (W.D. La. Jan. 16, 2019) (“although

Louisiana applies qualified immunity principles to state constitutional law claims, that immunity does not

extend to tort claims.”) (citations omitted).

135 Rec. Doc. 25-1, pp. 19–22.

B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or

employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to

exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts

are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.

C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not applicable:

(1) To acts or omissions which are not reasonably related to the

legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or

discretionary power exists; or

(2) To acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent,

malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant

misconduct.136

Relying on Louisiana jurisprudence, this Court has found that discretionary

immunity is unavailable as an affirmative defense at the motion-to-dismiss stage because

of the fact-intensive nature of the required analysis.137 For this reason, DPSC Defendants’

discretionary immunity argument is rejected at this time.138

c. Sufficiency of Allegations

DPSC Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state plausible negligence

claims against Nurse Bringedahl and Major Blackard, likewise resulting in the failure of

the vicarious liability theory against the Department.139

A plaintiff must allege five elements to state a claim for negligence under Louisiana

law:

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a

specific standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant's

conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the

breach element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct

was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact

136 La. R.S. 9:2798.1.

137 Williams v. Sanders, 723 F. Supp. 3d 467, 474 (M.D. La. 2024) (citing Bouchereau v. Gautreaux, 2015

WL 5321285, at *15 (M.D. La. Sept. 11, 2015); Lee v. Ard, 2017 WL 5349493, at *12 (M.D. La. Nov. 13,

2017)). See also Lambert v. Riverboat Gaming Enf't. Div., 96–1856 (La.App. 1 Cir 12/29/97), 706 So.2d

172, 177–78.

138 DPSC Defendants also cited La. R.S. 2800.10 and 2800.19, but provided no analysis regarding their

application. Rec. Doc. 25-1, pp. 19–20. The Court finds the statutes irrelevant to the issues raised by DPSC

Defendants’ Motion.

139 Rec. Doc. 25-1, pp. 15–19.

element); (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a

legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability or

scope of protection element); and (5) the actual damages (the

damages element).140

“A negative answer to any of the inquiries of the duty-risk analysis results in a

determination of no liability.”141

Nurse Bringedahl

The Court first considers the negligence claim asserted against Nurse Bringedahl.

In short, Plaintiff alleges Nurse Bringedahl was negligent by: delaying or interfering with

Plaintiff’s initial trip to the hospital;142 telling the hospital’s nursing staff to administer

Plaintiff a double dose of his blood pressure medication;143 insisting Plaintiff be

discharged from the hospital sooner than recommended by the doctors;144 discontinuing

Plaintiff’s pain medication;145 and failing to make a physical therapy referral for Plaintiff.146

Plaintiff also alleges mistreatment by other DCI nurses “over which [Nurse Bringedahl]

provided supervision.”147

Regarding the first negligence element, “prison authorities owe a duty to inmates

to provide reasonable medical care.”148 DPSC Defendants acknowledge Nurse

Bringedahl “had a duty to provide Plaintiff with reasonable medical care as a nurse

practitioner at DCI.”149 Thus, the first element is satisfied.

140 Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 249 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris,

923 So.2d 627, 633 (La. 2006)).

141 Id. (citing Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So.2d 318, 321 (La. 1994)).

142 Rec. Doc. 22, ¶ 54.

143 Id. at ¶ 63.

144 Id. at ¶ 66.

145 Id. at ¶ 78.

146 Id. at ¶ 99.

147 Id. at ¶ 97.

148 Savoy v. St. Landry Par. Council, No. CIV.A. 08-0232, 2009 WL 3815762, at *9 (W.D. La. Nov. 13, 2009)

(citing Corley v. Prator, 290 Fed.Appx. 749, 753 (5th Cir.2008)) (citing, in turn, Harper v. Goodwin, 41,053

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/06), 930 So. 2d 1160, 1163)).

149 Rec. Doc. 25-1, p. 15.

The second element is breach of the duty, which is “the failure to exercise

reasonable care under the circumstances.”150 DPSC Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed

to allege Nurse Bringedahl breached her duty because “Plaintiff states throughout his

complaint that [Nurse] Bringedahl did in fact provide Plaintiff with medical care,” and

“[m]ost of the care alleged to have been received by Plaintiff was by other people, not

[Nurse] Bringedahl.”151 Aside from a cursory recitation of the facts, Plaintiff does not

provide meaningful analysis on this element in his Opposition.152

Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that

the second element has been sufficiently pled. According to the operative Complaint,

Nurse Bringedahl unreasonably contributed to a delay in Plaintiff’s initial hospital visit

despite his serious injuries and blocked Plaintiff from receiving his doctor-ordered

medication.153 The Fifth Circuit has explained that an inmate can demonstrate an Eighth

Amendment violation (a standard significantly higher than state-law negligence) by

showing that a prison official “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally

treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a

wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.”154 The allegations against Nurse

Bringedahl give rise to a plausible claim for negligence, which only requires

unreasonableness under the circumstances (as opposed to “a wanton disregard for any

serious medical needs” for an Eighth Amendment claim).

150 D.C. v. St. Landry Par. Sch. Bd., 2000-01304 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/7/01), 802 So. 2d 19, 22 (citing Frank L.

Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law § 6–1, at 139 (1996)).

151 Rec. Doc. 25-1, p. 15.

152 Rec. Doc. 30, pp. 7–8.

153 Rec. Doc. 22, ¶¶ 54, 78, 94.

154 Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 239

F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)).

Turning to the third element, Plaintiff must allege that Nurse Bringedahl’s conduct

was a cause-in-fact (or a “but-for” cause) of his injuries. In cases such as this where

multiple causes of harm are alleged, cause-in-fact may be found to exist “when the

defendant's conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about [the] plaintiff's harm.”155

DPSC Defendants argue this element fails because “Plaintiff has alleged that his injuries

were caused primarily by another defendant,” and “despite Plaintiff saying that [Nurse]

Bringedahl’s actions exacerbated his injuries, this alone does not prove that [Nurse]

Bringedahl was the cause of the injuries or the actual exacerbation of the injuries,

especially considering the nature of the injuries.”156 This argument lacks merit. First, even

if Plaintiff’s injuries were “primarily” caused by another defendant, there can be multiple

causes-in-fact of a plaintiff’s injuries under Louisiana tort law. Further, at this stage,

Plaintiff does not need to “prove” anything. Rule 12(b)(6) only tests the sufficiency of the

allegations, and Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Nurse Bringedahl’s conduct caused him

harm or exacerbated his injuries.157 Therefore, Plaintiff survives the Motion to Dismiss as

to this element.

The fourth element is legal cause, which asks “whether the particular risk falls

within the scope of the duty.”158 On this element, DPSC Defendants argue: “[Nurse]

Bringedahl is alleged to have provided Plaintiff with treatment. Just because Plaintiff was

not happy with the treatment does not mean that the treatment was negligent.”159 This

argument fails to address Plaintiff’s principal allegations against Nurse Bringedahl

155 Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1042 (La. 1991), on reh'g (May 28, 1992).

156 Rec. Doc. 25-1, p. 16.

157 Rec. Doc. 22, ¶ 115.

158 Domingue v. TA Operating, LLC, No. CV 21-606-SDD-RLB, 2023 WL 174967, at *6 (M.D. La. Jan. 12,

2023) (quoting Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 2008-1163 (La. 2009), 16 So.3d 1065, 1088).

159 Rec. Doc. 25-1, p. 16.

(namely, delaying the trip to the hospital and withholding Plaintiff’s medication), and the

Court struggles to see how it even connects to the scope-of-duty question. In the Court’s

view, Nurse Bringedahl’s duty to provide reasonable medical care plainly encompasses

the risk that Plaintiff would sustain additional injuries or that his condition would worsen.

Therefore, this element is sufficiently pled.

Finally, Plaintiff adequately alleges actual damages due to his substandard

treatment by Nurse Bringedahl.160

Because Plaintiff adequately pled all five elements, DPSC Defendants have failed

to demonstrate entitlement to dismissal of the negligence claim against Nurse Bringedahl

under Rule 12(b)(6).

Major Blackard

Plaintiff alleges Major Blackard ordered Plaintiff to stand up shortly after his legs

were broken and then ordered other officers to lift Plaintiff off the ground and put him in

his wheelchair without securing the foot supports.161 The operative Complaint sets forth

the negligence claim as follows:

[Major Blackard] knew or should have known that when

[Plaintiff] told him repeatedly his legs were broken and when

there were medical persons on hand, he should have allowed

an examination an[d] he should have allowed an x-ray to

determine the nature of the injury instead of ordering such

person to stand on broken legs and then causing such person

to be thrown in a wheel chair with no foot supports and that

running over his feet would cause exacerbation of injury.162

160 Rec. Doc. 22, ¶ 115.

161 Id. at ¶¶ 47, 50–51.

162 Id. at ¶ 118.

Prison authorities owe a general duty of “reasonable care to protect inmates from

harm.”163 DPSC Defendants concede Major Blackard owed Plaintiff a duty; in their words,

Major Blackard “had a duty to assist in the transport of Plaintiff to the treatment center” at

DCI.164

DPSC Defendants argue no breach of duty has been alleged because, according

to the operative Complaint, Major Blackard ultimately did transport Plaintiff to the DCI

treatment facility.165 This argument ignores Plaintiff’s main allegation that, in the process,

Major Blackard unreasonably subjected Plaintiff to further harm by having him forced onto

his wheelchair without securing his feet and without seeking medical assistance or advice

prior to doing so. Plaintiff adequately alleges that Major Blackard’s conduct was

unreasonable under the circumstances.

As to cause-in-fact, DPSC Defendants repeat verbatim the same argument made

for Nurse Bringedahl, stating: “Plaintiff has alleged that his injuries were caused primarily

by another defendant,” and “despite Plaintiff saying that [Major] Blackard’s actions

exacerbated his injuries, this alone does not prove that [Major] Blackard was the cause

of the injuries or the actual exacerbation of the injuries, especially considering the nature

of the injuries.”166 Again, this argument does not compel dismissal for failure to state a

claim.

Regarding legal cause, DPSC Defendants argue: “[Major] Blackard is alleged to

have transported Plaintiff to the treatment center after he had received serious injuries.

Just because Plaintiff was not happy with [Major] Blackard’s alleged actions while he was

163 Hardy v. Foti, 2001-1257 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/27/02), 812 So. 2d 792, 794.

164 Rec. Doc. 25-1, p. 16.

165 Id. at pp. 16–17.

166 Id. at p. 17.

being transported to the treatment center, this does not mean that [Major] Blackard was

negligent.”167 This argument is rejected for the same reasons as explained above in

connection with Nurse Bringedahl. The proper inquiry is whether Major Blackard’s duty of

reasonable care to protect Plaintiff from harm under these circumstances encompasses

the risk of further injury to Plaintiff or exacerbation of his condition. The Court finds that it

does. Therefore, DPSC Defendants have failed to show entitlement to dismissal on this

element.

Lastly, the Court finds the operative Complaint gives rise to a plausible inference

that Major Blackard’s conduct resulted in additional injury to Plaintiff’s legs, thereby

satisfying the damages element.168

Because Plaintiff adequately pled all five elements, DPSC Defendants have failed

to demonstrate entitlement to dismissal of the negligence claim against Major Blackard

under Rule 12(b)(6).

Vicarious Liability of the Department

Plaintiff also asserts a claim against the Department for vicarious liability based on

the negligence of Nurse Bringedahl and Major Blackard.169 The principle of vicarious

liability in Louisiana law is codified in article 2320 of the Civil Code, which provides, in

pertinent part: “Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by

their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are

employed.”170

167 Id.

168 Rec. Doc. 22, ¶¶ 50–51, 115.

169 Id. at ¶¶ 5, 130.

170 La. Civ. Code art. 2320.

DPSC Defendants’ only argument for dismissal of the vicarious liability claim is that

the underlying negligence claims against Nurse Bringedahl and Major Blackard should

be dismissed.171 Because the underlying negligence claims are not dismissed, the

vicarious liability claim against the Department survives as well.

For the foregoing reasons, DPSC Defendants’ Motion is denied to the extent it

seeks dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of Plaintiff’s state-law claims against the

Department, Nurse Bringedahl, and Major Blackard.

ii. Sergeant Johnson’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

a. Qualified Immunity

One paragraph of Sergeant Johnson’s brief vaguely refers to an “individual

defendant’s immunity defense” and the “protections of official immunity.”172 Plaintiff reads

that language to be an apparent attempt by Sergeant Johnson to raise the defense of

qualified immunity, and his Opposition contains a section arguing against its

application.173

The qualified immunity defense is a familiar one, shielding “federal and state

officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’

at the time of the challenged conduct.”174

The Court finds that Sergeant Johnson did not raise the defense of qualified

immunity in his Motion. Sergeant Johnson does not mention or discuss the qualified

171 Rec. Doc. 25-1, pp. 18–19.

172 Rec. Doc. 27-1, p. 5 (quoting Causey v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 167 F.Supp.2d 898, 903-04 (E.D. La.

2001)).

173 Rec. Doc. 29, pp. 7–12.

174 Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

immunity standard. The Motion’s only discussion of immunity relates to dismissal of any

official-capacity claims pursuant to sovereign immunity.175 Qualified immunity, by contrast,

only applies to individual-capacity claims,176 and Sergeant Johnson never argues that he

is immune from any individual-capacity claims. Therefore, the Court will not consider

whether Sergeant Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

b. Sufficiency of Allegations

Sergeant Johnson makes no argument regarding the application of the legal

elements of Plaintiff’s claims to the facts alleged against him. Instead, he only argues that

“Plaintiff’s status as an inmate makes several of his requests for damages untenable.”177

Specifically, Sergeant Johnson argues Plaintiff cannot recover for medical expenses, lost

wages, loss of employment opportunities, or “inconvenience.”178 Plaintiff does not directly

address this aspect of Sergeant Johnson’s Motion.

The Court finds that Sergeant Johnson’s argument is misguided. On a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and considers

whether a plausible claim to relief has been stated. Rather than attack the sufficiency of

Plaintiff’s factual allegations, Sergeant Johnson only addresses parts of the prayer for

relief outlined in the Amended Complaint. “Whether a claim for relief should be dismissed

under Rule 12(b)(6) turns not on whether all of the relief asked for can be granted, but

whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief.”179 Here, Sergeant Johnson attacks the

175 Rec. Doc. 27-1, pp. 5–8.

176 Walker v. Howard, 517 F. App'x 236, 237 (5th Cir. 2013).

177 Rec. Doc. 27-1, p. 8.

178 Id.

179 Mott's LLP v. Comercializadora Eloro, S.A., 507 F. Supp. 3d 780, 791 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (emphasis in

original) (citing Lada v. Wilkie, 250 F.2d 211, 212–15 (8th Cir. 1957) (reversing the district court's decision

to grant the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion even though the court could not have possibly granted part of the

relief that the plaintiffs requested); Lasslett v. Tetra Tech, Inc., 2015 WL 13805181, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept.

viability of certain remedies outlined in the Amended Complaint, but this has no bearing

on the viability of the underlying causes of action.

Accordingly, Sergeant Johnson’s request for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

is denied.

iii. Major Cupil’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

a. Qualified Immunity and Discretionary Immunity

Major Cupil argues he is entitled to qualified immunity on any § 1983 claims

asserted against him.180 However, no § 1983 claims were asserted against Major Cupil;

he has only been sued for state-law negligence.181 Therefore, as explained previously

with respect to Nurse Bringedahl and Major Blackard, Major Cupil has no argument for

federal qualified immunity.182

Major Cupil also raises the issue of discretionary immunity under La. R.S.

9:2798.1.183 However, as discussed above, the Court will not undertake the fact-intensive

discretionary immunity analysis at the motion-to-dismiss stage.184

30, 2015) (explaining that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the claim under Rule 8(a)(2),

not the prayer for relief under Rule 8(a)(3)); Celebrity Chefs Tour, LLC v. Macy's Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 1159,

1164 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that claims for punitive damages under the Lanham Act are inappropriate

but not grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)); 5B Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 1357 (3d ed.

2004) (“[I]t need not appear that the plaintiff can obtain the particular relief prayed for in the complaint, as

long as the district judge can ascertain from what has been alleged that some relief may be granted by the

court.”)).

180 Rec. Doc. 46-1, pp. 6–8.

181 Rec. Doc. 47, p. 9.

182 Tuttle, 68 F.4th at 976 (citing Brown, 519 F.3d at 238–39) (federal qualified immunity defense does not

apply to state-law claims). See also Williams, 2024 WL 4241627, at *10 (quoting Beroid, 2022 WL 2826228,

at *7) (“qualified immunity does not apply to Louisiana tort claims.”).

183 Rec. Doc. 46-1, p. 8.

184 Williams, 723 F. Supp. 3d at 474 (citing Bouchereau, 2015 WL 5321285, at *15; Lee, 2017 WL 5349493,

at *12). See also Lambert, 706 So.2d at 177–78.

b. Sufficiency of Allegations

Major Cupil only makes a merits-based argument for dismissal in connection with

§ 1983 claims.185 As stated, Plaintiff does not bring a § 1983 claim against Major Cupil.

Because he made no argument as to the merits of Plaintiff’s negligence claim, the Court

will deny Major Cupil’s Motion in this respect.

C. Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement

Sergeant Johnson additionally requests Plaintiff be ordered to provide a more

definite statement.186 Rule 12(e) provides that a motion for more definite statement may

be filed when “a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or

ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive

pleading[.]”187 In evaluating a motion for more definite statement, courts consider whether

the complaint “is so excessively vague and ambiguous as to be unintelligible and as to

prejudice the defendant seriously in attempting to answer it.”188 Such motions are

disfavored and granted sparingly.189 However, in the words of the Supreme Court, “[i]f a

pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice,” then

a Rule 12(e) motion may be appropriate.190 A party may not use a Rule 12(e) motion as

a substitute for discovery;191 however, “[i]f details are necessary in order to make a vague

185 Rec. Doc. 46-1, pp. 3–5.

186 Rec. Doc. 27-1, pp. 9–10.

187 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

188 Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. McGriff, Seibels & Williams, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 632, 633 (E.D. La. 2006) (quoting

Advanced Communications Technologies, Inc. v. Li, No. 05 Civ. 4628, 2005 WL 3215222, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

Nov. 30, 2005)) (citing Bower v. Weisman, 639 F. Supp. 532, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

189 Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959); Conceal City, LLC v. Looper Law

Enforcement, LLC, 917 F.Supp.2d 611, 621 (N.D. Tex. 2013).

190 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).

191 Id.

complaint intelligible, the fact that the details also are subject to the discovery process

should not preclude their production under Rule 12(e).”192

Sergeant Johnson argues he “is unable to properly identify which causes of action

are aimed at him individually” because of the operative Complaint’s inconsistency in its

references to Sergeant Johnson.193 For example, Sergeant Johnson complains that some

parts of the Complaint only reference a “Master Sergeant” without specifically mentioning

Sergeant Johnson by name.194

Although the operative Complaint is not a model of clarity, it is sufficiently clear to

put Sergeant Johnson on notice of the claims brought against him and the grounds

therefor. The operative Complaint’s references to the “Defendant Master Sergeant” are

reasonably interpreted to apply to Sergeant Johnson, as he is the only Defendant to whom

that title pertains. Because the complaint is not “so vague or ambiguous that [Sergeant

Johnson] cannot reasonably prepare a response,”195 the Court denies the Rule 12(e)

Motion.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

The Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants

Major Dale Blackard, Nurse Karla Bringedahl, and the Louisiana Department of Public

Safety and Corrections196 is DENIED.

192 5C Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. and Proc. Civ. § 1376 (3d ed.).

193 Rec. Doc. 27-1, pp. 9–10.

194 Id.

195 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

196 Rec. Doc. 25.

The Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and request for a

more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) filed by Defendant Sergeant Pharoah

Johnson197 are DENIED.

The Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Major Andrew

Cupil is DENIED.198

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this _12_t_h day of ______M_a_rc_h______, 2025.

S

________________________________

SHELLY D. DICK

CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

197 Rec. Doc. 27.

198 Rec. Doc. 46.