The opinion
Filed 3/12/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
WILLIAM KUO et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, A169912
v.
(Alameda County
DUBLIN UNIFIED SCHOOL
Super. Ct. No. 22CV007041)
DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
Catherine Kuo was tragically killed while volunteering at an event held
by defendant Dublin Unified School District (DUSD). Plaintiff family
members and her estate sued DUSD, asserting negligence and premises
liability claims. The trial court granted DUSD’s motion for summary
judgment upon concluding that Labor Code section 3364.51—providing that
school volunteers may be deemed employees entitled to workers’
compensation benefits as their sole remedy for any injury sustained while
performing service—defeated the court’s jurisdiction.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred because death is
not “any injury” and DUSD’s school volunteers were not “deemed” employees
for section 3364.5 to apply here. We disagree and affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless
otherwise stated.
1
BACKGROUND
DUSD held a distribution event on March 24, 2021 at one of its middle
schools for the “Farmers to Families Food Box Program,” which provided
fresh food to families negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Kuo
volunteered at this event. While she was loading a food box into the rear of
one vehicle, another vehicle entered the parking lot and pulled up behind. A
DUSD employee approached the second car and instructed the driver to open
the rear hatch of the vehicle so he could load a food box into the rear cargo
area of that vehicle. The driver suddenly drove forward, crushing Kuo
between the two vehicles. Kuo was transported to a medical center and died
later that day.
Kuo’s family members and estate filed a complaint against DUSD
asserting negligence and premises liability causes of action. The complaint
alleged that DUSD was negligent by failing to implement basic safety
protocols at the event, failing to communicate safety protocols to volunteers
and others, and failing to train and/or supervise employees who were
organizing and coordinating the event. It also alleged that DUSD had
created a dangerous condition of public property by failing to implement such
safety protocols.
DUSD moved for summary judgment, arguing that section 3364.5
barred plaintiffs’ claims. Section 3364.5 is part of the Workers’
Compensation Act (§ 3201 et seq.) (WCA). It provides that “a volunteer,
unsalaried person authorized by the governing board of a school district or
the county superintendent of schools to perform volunteer services for the
school district or the county superintendent shall, upon the adoption of a
resolution of the governing board of the school district or the county board of
education so declaring, be deemed an employee of the district or the county
2
superintendent for the purposes of this division and shall be entitled to the
workmen’s compensation benefits provided by this division for any injury
sustained by him while engaged in the performance of any service under the
direction and control of the governing board of the school district or the
county superintendent.” (§ 3364.5.) When section 3364.5 applies, it provides
the sole and exclusive remedy for such injuries. (See §§ 3600 [liability for
compensation provided by WCA “in lieu of any other liability whatsoever”
against employer “without regard to negligence”], 3602 [right to recover
compensation is the “sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her
dependents against the employer” where the conditions of compensation
concur]; see also Gund v. County of Trinity (2020) 10 Cal.5th 503, 507 (Gund)
[workers’ compensation is an “exclusive remedy” for individuals covered by
WCA].) The trial court does not have jurisdiction to grant relief. (Furtado v.
Schriefer (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1608, 1613.)
In support of its motion, DUSD submitted Resolution 2011/12-30
(Resolution) passed and adopted by its board of trustees in 2012. It stated:
“NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that in accordance with Section
3364.5 of the Labor Code, volunteers shall be entitled to Workers’
Compensation benefits for any injury sustained by him/her while in the
performance of any service under direction and control of the District
Superintendent.”
DUSD also submitted the memorandum of coverage from the Protected
Insurance Program for Schools applicable to the time period of the March 24,
2021 incident. The provision titled “VOLUNTEERS” stated: “This
agreement shall apply to loss on account of bodily injury by accident or bodily
injury by disease sustained by volunteer workers performing duties for or on
behalf of the covered party while acting within the scope of their duties on
3
behalf of the covered party providing that the covered party’s Board has
first adopted a resolution as provided in Division 4, Part 1, Chapter 2, Article
2, of the California Labor Code declaring such volunteer workers to be
employees of the covered party for purposes of the workers’ compensation
law.” Plaintiffs filed original and supplemental memoranda in opposition to
the motion, arguing that section 3364.5 applicability was not established here
because the statutory term “injury” does not include death.2
The trial court granted DUSD’s motion for summary judgment. It
determined that death “falls into the category of an injury according to its
plain meaning.” And while finding no ambiguity in the term, the court noted
that the legislative history of the statute—evidencing an intent to provide
school volunteers with the same protection as employees—supported this
reading. The court concluded that section 3364.5 defeated its jurisdiction.
Judgment was entered in favor of DUSD and against plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
This appeal presents two questions of statutory interpretation:
whether the term “any injury” covers fatal injuries like the one Kuo sustained
here, and whether DUSD volunteers were “deemed” employees under section
3364.5. In answering such questions, we exercise our independent judgment
to “ ‘ “determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.” ’ ” (New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Public Utilities Com.
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 784, 795 (New Cingular); MacIsaac v. Waste
Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082
2 Plaintiffs also argued in the trial court that Kuo’s volunteer service
was not under the “ ‘direction and control’ ” of DUSD or the superintendent,
but their opening appellate brief confirms no such argument is raised on
appeal.
4
(MacIsaac).) That process may involve up to three steps. (MacIsaac, at
pp. 1082–1084.)
First, we look to the words of the statute themselves and “ ‘ “the plain,
commonsense meaning of the language used by the Legislature.” ’ ” (Sutter’s
Place, Inc. v. California Gambling Control Commission (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 818, 832 (Sutter’s Place).) “ ‘We do not, however, consider the
statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the entire substance of the
statutes in order to determine their scope and purposes.’ ” (New
Cingular, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 795.) “ ‘That is, we construe the words
in question in context, keeping in mind the statutes’ nature and obvious
purposes.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘We must harmonize the various parts of the
enactments by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as
a whole.’ ” (Ibid.)
“If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our task is at an
end, for there is no need for judicial construction.” (MacIsaac, supra, 134
Cal.App.4th. at p. 1083.) But if the language is ambiguous, we proceed to the
second step and may turn to extrinsic sources like legislative history
materials to assist in our interpretation. (Sutter’s Place, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 832.) If ambiguity remains, we “must cautiously take the
third and final step” and “apply ‘reason, practicality, and common sense to
the language at hand.’ ” (MacIsaac, at p. 1084.) With this framework in
mind, we begin with the term “any injury” under section 3364.5.
I. “Any Injury” Under Section 3364.5
A. Plain Language
Section 3364.5 provides entitlement to workers’ compensation for “any
injury” sustained by a school volunteer while engaged in the performance of
5
service. We conclude that fatal injuries unambiguously fall into the category
of “any injury” according to its plain meaning.
We reached the same conclusion in Mori v. Southern General Ins. Co.
(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 99. In that case, family members of a garbage truck
employee who died from injuries sustained in an accident sought satisfaction
of a judgment from the driver’s insurance policy, which covered damages
“because of injury.” (Id. at p. 101.) We concluded that the employee’s
death—caused by fatal injuries—was an “injury” according to its plain
meaning. (Id. at p. 102.) While plaintiffs here argue that Mori is irrelevant
because it involved contract interpretation, not statutory interpretation, that
distinction does not alter our analysis regarding the “ ‘ “plain, commonsense
meaning” ’ ” of the term. (Sutter’s Place, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 832.)
Nor are we persuaded by plaintiffs’ other plain language arguments.
First, plaintiffs argue that section 3364.5 identifies the conditions under
which a school volunteer may be entitled to workers’ compensation, and that
the term “injury” is one such condition meant to exclude death. But the text
of the statute reflects a broader condition for “any injury sustained by him
while engaged in the performance of any service under the direction and
control of the governing board of the school district or the county
superintendent.” (§ 3364.5) This clause shows an intent to limit entitlement
to workers’ compensation only for injuries sustained during volunteer service
as directed, not injuries outside of such service. (See White v. County of
Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [discussing rule of statutory
construction that qualifying phrases and clauses are to be applied to
immediately preceding words].)
Section 3364.5 thus describes the conditions under which a school
volunteer may be deemed an employee entitled to workers’ compensation.
6
And section 3600, set forth in a subsequent chapter of the WCA, identifies the
conditions of compensation liability “for any injury sustained by his or her
employees arising out of and in the course of the employment and for the
death of any employee if the injury proximately causes death.” (§ 3600,
subd. (a).) Sections 3364.5 and 3600 make clear that a school volunteer may
be deemed an employee entitled to workers’ compensation for any injury,
including fatal injuries.
Second, plaintiffs cite a dictionary definition of “injury” as “ ‘harm or
damage that is done or sustained.’ ” As a preliminary matter, we note that
general dictionaries may be used to ascertain the meaning of language in a
statute, but we “must exercise ‘great caution’ when relying on a dictionary
definition of a common term to determine statutory meaning because a
dictionary ‘ “is a museum of words, an historical catalog rather than a means
to decode the work of legislatures.” ’ ” (A.S. v. Miller (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
284, 293, fn. 4; see also De Vries v. Regents of University of California (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 574, 591.) Exercising such caution, we view the dictionary
definition proffered by plaintiffs to contradict their position here. A fatal
injury clearly does “harm” or “damage” to the injured person under the
commonsense meaning of those terms.
Third, plaintiffs cite the definition of “injury” in section 3208 that
“govern[s] the construction and meaning of the terms and phrases used” in
the WCA unless context otherwise requires. (§ 3204.) Section 3208 defines
“ ‘injury’ ” as “any injury or disease arising out of the employment, including
injuries to artificial members, dentures, hearing aids, eyeglasses and medical
braces of all types; provided, however, that eyeglasses and hearing aids will
not be replaced, repaired, or otherwise compensated for, unless injury to
them is incident to an injury causing disability.” But this definition simply
7
confirms that the term “injury” can mean “any injury.” Nothing in the
provision supports exclusion of fatal injuries from the definition of “any
injury.” And while section 3208 does list examples of injuries that are not
fatal, those examples are not exhaustive. (See Hassan v. Mercy American
River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 717 [noting that the word “including” in
a statute is “ ‘ordinarily a term of enlargement rather than limitation’ ”].)
Moreover, inclusion of the word “any” in “any injury” under both
section 3208 and 3364.5 supports a broad reading of that term. Courts have
used such language to conclude that a statutory provision encompasses the
full spectrum of the term. (See, e.g., Carroll v. County of Los Angeles (1997)
60 Cal.App.4th 606, 609 [“It is therefore logical to interpret [statutory]
reference to ‘any trail’ to mean just that, i.e., any trail, whether paved or
unpaved”].) The same logic applies here: “any injury” includes fatal injuries
under section 3364.5.
Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24
Cal.4th 800 (Vacanti) does not contradict this view. In Vacanti, the
California Supreme Court cited the definition of “injury” from section 3208 in
explaining that an injury is compensable under workers’ compensation when
it arises out of employment and causes “ ‘disability or the need for medical
treatment.’ ” (Vacanti, at p. 814.) As a preliminary matter, we are not
persuaded that a fatal injury does not cause “ ‘disability or the need for
medical treatment’ ” under the commonsense meaning of those terms. (Ibid.)
Indeed, plaintiffs assert that Kuo received medical treatment here. Nor do
we read Vacanti as excluding fatal injuries from the definition of “injury”
under section 3208. After defining a compensable injury covered by workers’
compensation, the California Supreme Court made clear that such coverage
applies in cases of “ ‘injury or death.’ ” (Vacanti, at p. 814.)
8
B. Statutory Framework
Our interpretation of “any injury” is also consistent with the
surrounding statutes and “ ‘statutory framework as a whole.’ ” (New
Cingular, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 795.) The WCA was enacted as a
“comprehensive statutory scheme governing compensation given to California
employees for injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment.”
(Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 810.) “The workers’ compensation system
was created to provide, in the words of our state Constitution, ‘for the
comfort, health and safety and general welfare of any and all workers and
those dependent upon them for support to the extent of relieving from the
consequences of any injury or death incurred or sustained by workers in the
course of their employment.’ ” (Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th
689, 697, quoting Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.) Given this purpose, section 3202
expressly requires that the provisions of the WCA “be liberally construed by
the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of
persons injured in the course of their employment.” (§ 3202; see also Mitchell
v. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1474, 1480 [“In
adjudicating whether a claim falls within the workers’ compensation system,
all doubt should be resolved in favor of finding jurisdiction within the
workers’ compensation system”]; Gund, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 515 [rejecting
“overly narrow interpretation” of term under the WCA as “undermining its
civilian-protective purpose”].) This mandate supports the inclusion of fatal
injuries in the “any injury” term of section 3364.5.
Despite plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary, the statutory provisions
surrounding section 3364.5 do not suggest otherwise.3 There are four
3 Our analysis is focused on statutory provisions in the WCA. We do
not find the definition of “injury” in Government Code section 810.8 relevant
9
categories of language used in these provisions for different types of workers.
(See Larkin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 161
(Larkin) [describing provisions that “extend eligibility for workers’
compensation benefits to certain categories of volunteers who otherwise
would be ineligible under the law’s definition of ‘employee’ ”].)
First, provisions like section 3362.5 state that a person “deputized or
appointed by the proper authority as a reserve or auxiliary sheriff or city
police officer, a deputy sheriff, or a reserve police officer of a regional park
district or a transit district” is an employee for purposes of workers’
compensation. (See also §§ 3361 [members of volunteer fire departments],
3363 [members of reserve fish and game warden program].) Unlike section
3364.5, these workers are employees (i.e., they need not be “deemed”
employees by any entity), and there is no explicit language regarding the
scope of compensation (i.e., for “any injury” while performing service). But
the absence of such language does not suggest that a narrow definition of the
term “any injury” applies to section 3364.5. On the contrary, the legislative
history of section 3362.5 shows it was enacted in 1989 after a reserve sheriff
was injured but not covered by workers’ compensation, on the basis that
“reserve police officers who are assigned specific police functions by a proper
authority should be covered by the workers’ compensation laws when injured
in the course of performing authorized services.” (Assem. Com. on Fin. &
Ins., 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 276 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Apr. 24, 1989, p. 2.)
The second category includes provisions like section 3365,
subdivision (a), stating that a person engaged in suppressing a fire pursuant
here, particularly as DUSD fails to identify any authority relying on this
definition to interpret the term “injury” under section 3364.5 (or any other
provision in the WCA).
10
to law or official request is “deemed” an employee entitled to workers’
compensation. (See also §§ 3366 [persons engaged in law enforcement
service], 3367 [persons rendering certain technical assistance].) These
workers are “deemed” employees by the services they perform (i.e., not by any
entity) and again, there is nothing to suggest that the lack of explicit
language regarding compensation for “any injury” limits the term in section
3364.5.
The third category includes provisions like section 3362, stating that an
active member of a police department “shall, upon the adoption of a
resolution by the governing body of the county, city, town or district so
declaring, be deemed an employee” entitled to workers’ compensation. (See
also §§ 3363.5 [persons performing voluntary services for public agency],
3363.6 [persons performing voluntary services for private nonprofit].) As
explained in County of Kern v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2011) 200
Cal.App.4th 509, the resolution requirement in this third category reflects
types of service “where more direct, local control may be warranted.” (Id. at
p. 522.) The legislative history of section 3362 confirms this intent to provide
local entities with such control over coverage, stating that benefits could be
offered “if the local entity desires” but are “purely optional.” (Senator
Stanford C. Shaw, Letter to Governor Brown, re Sen. Bill No. 1427 (June 23,
1959).)
The fourth category includes provisions like the one at issue here,
which contain not only a resolution requirement but also specify
compensation for “any injury” sustained while engaged in the performance of
service. (See §§ 3361.5 [volunteers for recreation and park districts],
3364.55–3364.7 [juveniles engaged in rehabilitative work].) The legislative
history of these provisions shows no intent to limit or narrow the term “any
11
injury,” but instead to provide the same coverage as the categories above.
Section 3361.5, for example, was enacted because “unpaid volunteers should
be extended the same benefits available to volunteer firemen, reserve police
officers, disaster service workers, etc.” (Sen. Com. on Industrial Relations,
Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1316 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.), p. 2.), italics added.)
We reject plaintiffs’ remaining arguments regarding other statutory
provisions in the WCA. First, plaintiffs cite to the language of section 3600
regarding employer liability “for any injury sustained by his or her employees
arising out of and in the course of the employment and for the death of any
employee if the injury proximately causes death” where the conditions of
compensation concur. (§ 3600, subd. (a).) We view this phrase as simply
confirming the proximate cause requirement for fatal injuries, and consistent
with the condition of compensation that an injury is “proximately caused by
the employment, either with or without negligence.” (Id., subd. (a)(3); see
also South Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 61
Cal.4th 291, 297–298 [discussing proximate cause requirement of section
3600 for injuries and death].) While section 3600 focuses on the scope of
liability, section 3364.5 concerns the scope of employees and presents no need
for the same clarification. We are not persuaded that section 3600 supports
any narrowing of the term “injury” in section 3364.5.
Second, plaintiffs cite to sections 3370 and 3370.1, which provide that
inmates and patients of state facilities are entitled to workers’ compensation
for injuries or injuries causing death arising out of assigned work under
certain conditions. Again, we are not persuaded that this language is
relevant here because these provisions do not deem such persons to be
employees (by resolution or otherwise) and thus fall outside the framework
used in section 3364.5 (and the four categories described above). In any
12
event, we view sections 3600, 3370, and 3370.1 as simply consistent with the
WCA and the California Constitution that workers’ compensation covers
“injury or death.” (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4; Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 810.) So too with section 3364.5.
Finally, we “must apply the general principle of statutory construction
that statutes are to be read in order to harmonize the statutory scheme and
not to produce absurd results.” (In re Catalano (1981) 29 Cal.3d 1, 11.) We
agree with DUSD that excluding fatal injuries from coverage under statutory
provisions like section 3364.5 with the term “any injury” would produce
absurd results. The “primary objective” of the WCA is “to protect individuals
against the special risks of employment with comprehensive coverage for
their injuries.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437,
461 (Minish).) But in return, the WCA also seeks “to insulate the employer
from tort liability for his employees’ injuries.” (Minish, at p. 461; see also
Gund, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 516 [“A complementary concern familiar from
the history and underlying logic of workers’ compensation was also at play in
the legislative drafting process: limiting expansive liability for public
agencies”].) Statutory provisions with the term “any injury” were passed
with these dual purposes in mind. An enrolled bill report on section 3361.5,
for example, stated: “Adoption of the appropriate resolution would probably
save money for the affected local government agency because workmen’s
compensation where it applies is an exclusive remedy, where as potential
liability under common law tort principles as modified by statutes, may be
considerably higher in given instances than would the workmen’s
compensation liability.” (Dept. Industrial Relations, Enrolled Bill Rep. on
Assem. Bill No. 1316 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 7, 1973, p. 1.) Interpreting
provisions like section 3364.5 to exclude fatal injuries, which likely expose
13
entities to more potential liability than non-fatal injuries, contravenes this
purpose.
C. Legislative History
While we conclude that the term “any injury” in section 3364.5
unambiguously includes fatal injuries, its legislative history further supports
our interpretation. Section 3364.5 was added by Senate Bill No. 336 in 1967.
(Stats. 1967, ch. 345, § 2, p. 1544.) The bill authorized school districts “to
provide insurance coverage, including workmen’s compensation, for persons
authorized by the governing board to perform volunteer services for the
district” and prescribed “procedures for classifying such persons as employees
of the district for purposes of workmen’s compensation insurance.” (Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 336 (1967–1968 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig.,
p. 5051.) Bill analysis noted that school districts insured against injury or
death of its employees, but volunteers were “neither compensated nor covered
by insurance.” (Sen. Local Government Com., staff analysis of Sen. Bill No.
336 (1967–1968 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 13, 1967.) It described a
developing problem: “Increasing use is being made of volunteer assistance by
numerous school districts -- such as under the compensatory programs (as
tutors, librarian aides, playground monitors, etc.) and general school
assistance (as aides for handicapped, teacher aides, etc.).” (Ibid.)
The bill was introduced at the request of the San Francisco Unified
School District to allow it to provide insurance for volunteers like the San
Francisco Education Auxiliary, a “300-member group of ladies who do
volunteer teacher-aide work in classrooms.” (Senator Hugh M. Burns, Letter
to Governor Reagan, re Sen. Bill No. 336 (June 13, 1967).)4 Senator Burns
4 The letter is on letterhead of the bill’s author, Senator J. Eugene
McAteer. (See Larkin, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 164, fn. 10 [“While there are
14
explained: “Working alongside teachers, volunteers are subject to the same
physical risks.” (Ibid.) These statements evidence an intent to provide school
volunteers with the same workers’ compensation coverage as school
employees for any injury—including both fatal and non-fatal injuries—
sustained while engaged in the performance of volunteer service.
Plaintiffs point to a different part of the legislative history to contend
otherwise. Senate Bill No. 336 not only added section 3364.5, but also added
former section 1019 to the Education Code,5 providing that “the governing
board of any school district may provide for persons authorized by the
governing board to perform volunteer services for the district insurance
coverage which is the same as or comparable to that provided by the
governing board for its employees, including coverage under the provisions of
Division 4 (commencing with Section 3201) of the Labor Code.” (Italics
added.) Because the bill was amended to add the “or comparable” language
before it was adopted, plaintiffs contend that this reflects “a change
regarding the extent and scope of workers’ compensation coverage for school
district volunteers.” But any such change related to the scope of coverage
often limits to what an interpreter may reasonably infer from an individual
legislator’s letter [citation], we have considered letters expressing the views
of a bill’s sponsor where those views are fully consonant with the statutory
language and the history of the legislation”].)
We grant DUSD’s unopposed request to take judicial notice of this
document and the staff analysis of Senate Bill No. 336, as well as plaintiffs’
request to take judicial notice of a motion to amend the bill. We deny
plaintiffs’ request to take judicial notice of a DUSD website page and State of
California injury report form because, as explained in part I.D., post, neither
is necessary or helpful to our analysis. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252;
Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th
739, 748, fn. 6.)
5 Former Education Code section 1019 was subsequently renumbered
and ultimately repealed. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1010, § 72509, p. 3978; Stats. 1981
ch. 471, § 42, p. 1805.)
15
under former Education Code section 1019, not the statute at issue here.
Indeed, the plain language of former Education Code section 1019 allowed for
insurance coverage “including” workers’ compensation coverage under Labor
Code section 3364.5. (See Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital, supra,
31 Cal.4th at p. 717.) It did not narrow the terms of section 3364.5.
D. Other “Extrinsic Sources”
Plaintiffs contend that other “extrinsic sources” may be used to
interpret section 3364.5, and cite DUSD’s memorandum of coverage from the
Protected Insurance Program for Schools as one such source. As a
preliminary matter, plaintiffs misunderstand the category of “appropriate
extrinsic sources, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public
policy.” (Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board (2024) 15
Cal.5th 1152, 1170.)
Nor do plaintiffs present any authority that such a memorandum
trumps the statutory language of section 3364.5 or DUSD’s Resolution
triggering application of the statute. Minish does not provide such support,
where the appellate court concluded that application of section 3363.6—
providing that private nonprofit volunteers may be deemed employees for
workers’ compensation by resolution—did not require personal identification
or notice and acceptance of each volunteer. (Minish, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 467, 471.) Minish did not analyze the workers’ compensation policy in
place, instead simply noting defendants’ argument that their policy covered
volunteers. (Id. at p. 445.)
In any event, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that the
“injury” terms in the memorandum of coverage preclude section 3364.5
applicability here. The memorandum of coverage states that it applies to
“loss on account of bodily injury by accident or bodily injury by disease
16
sustained by volunteer workers performing duties for or on behalf of the
covered party while acting within the scope of their duties on behalf of the
covered party providing that the covered party’s Board has first adopted
a resolution as provided in Division 4, Part 1, Chapter 2, Article 2, of the
California Labor Code declaring such volunteer workers to be employees of
the covered party for purposes of the workers’ compensation law.” We view
this explicit reference to the resolution requirement in section 3364.5 as
evidence of intent to be consistent with its terms. (Cf. Civ. Code, § 1641 [“The
whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if
reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other”].) And we
interpret the term “bodily injury by accident” to include fatal injuries by
accident like the one sustained by Kuo here under the “ ‘ “plain,
commonsense meaning” ’ ” of the term. (Sutter’s Place, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 832.)
Given our conclusion that the term “any injury” includes fatal injuries,
we turn next to plaintiffs’ arguments regarding whether DUSD volunteers
were “deemed” employees under section 3364.5.
II. Volunteers “Deemed” Employees Under Section 3364.5
Section 3364.5 provides entitlement to workers’ compensation for
volunteers “deemed” employees “upon the adoption of a resolution of the
governing board of the school district or the county board of education so
declaring.” Plaintiffs argue that DUSD volunteers were not “deemed”
employees under section 3364.5 for two reasons: (1) DUSD’s Resolution did
not use the term “deemed,” and (2) DUSD did not treat its volunteers as
employees. Neither is persuasive.6
6
We reject DUSD’s contention that these arguments are forfeited for
failure to raise below. At the hearing on DUSD’s summary judgment motion,
17
A. Use of the Term “Deemed”
Nothing in the statute supports plaintiffs’ position that a resolution
must explicitly use the word “deemed” to trigger section 3364.5. Section
3364.5 requires only that the governing board adopt a resolution “so
declaring.” DUSD did exactly that, adopting a resolution stating, “in
accordance with Section 3364.5 of the Labor Code, volunteers shall be
entitled to Workers’ Compensation benefits for any injury sustained by
him/her while in the performance of any service under the direction and
control of the District Superintendent.” We do not read into the statute any
additional requirement to use magic words, as such an interpretation would
defy section 3202’s command that the WCA be liberally construed. (See
Minish, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 466 [“In short, interpreting section
3363.6 to require personal identification of volunteers in order to provide
them with workers’ compensation conflicts with section 3202 because it could
result in restricting, rather than extending, coverage to injured persons”].)
Plaintiffs note that in Perez v. Galt Joint Union Elementary School
Dist. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 150, the school district had adopted a resolution
that used the word “deemed.” (Id. at p. 158.) But nothing in Perez suggests
such use is mandatory. Instead, the appellate court addressed and rejected
the plaintiff’s argument that section 3364.5 did not apply because the
resolution did not explicitly use the exact name of the district, concluding
such an interpretation would “needlessly narrow” the scope of the statute.
(Perez, at pp. 172, 170.) So too here. Plaintiffs also cite Larkin, suggesting
that it addressed “the importance of the actual language of resolutions.” But
Larkin simply restated the resolution requirement in section 3362 that
plaintiffs argued that the Resolution never used the “deemed” language. And
plaintiffs’ supplemental memorandum in opposition to the motion argued
that DUSD’s conduct was contrary to application of section 3364.5.
18
workers may be deemed employees for workers’ compensation by a resolution
“ ‘so declaring.’ ” (Larkin, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 160.) It did not hold that
any particular language, let alone the term “deemed,” was required to be
used in the resolution.
B. DUSD Conduct
Plaintiffs next contend that DUSD volunteers were not “deemed”
employees because DUSD did not treat its volunteers as employees.
Plaintiffs do not present any authority that such conduct nullifies application
of section 3364.5 after DUSD’s Resolution was adopted.
Plaintiffs instead note that DUSD did not produce any documents in
response to discovery requests for “notices to or communications with
volunteers advising them they had workers’ compensation coverage,” citing
other statutes and regulations that have certain notice provisions. But
section 3364.5 does not contain a notice requirement. And Minish rejected
the imposition of any such requirement in the absence of explicit language or
provision. (Minish, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 468.) “It is a well-settled
rule that courts must not add provisions to a statute under the guise of
statutory interpretation to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the
face of the statute or from its legislative history.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs also note that DUSD did not produce any documents showing
workers’ compensation claims or payments, arguing that this lack of
production proves DUSD has not “deemed” its volunteers as employees. Even
accepting plaintiffs’ characterization of the discovery, they again do not
present any authority supporting their position that such conduct nullifies
application of section 3364.5. On the contrary, the plain language of section
3364.5 provides for its application “upon the adoption of a resolution of the
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governing board of the school district or the county board of education so
declaring.” DUSD satisfied this condition by adopting its Resolution.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting DUSD’s
motion for summary judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. DUSD is entitled to its costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
SIMONDS, J.*
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, Acting P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.
*
Judge of the Superior Court, County of Sonoma, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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Trial Court: Superior Court of California, County of Alameda
Trial Judge: Hon. Tara Desaultels
Counsel: Casper, Meadows, Schwartz & Cook and Nick Casper, for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Leone Alberts & Duus, Katherine A. Alberts, Brian A. Duus and
Seth L. Gordon, for Respondent.
William Kuo et al. v. Dublin Unified School District – A169912