Tracy Walenciej v. E. Ohio Corr. Ctr.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 25a0142n.06

No. 24-3571

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED

Mar 12, 2025

KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

TRACY WALENCIEJ, )

)

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE

) UNITED STATES DISTRICT

v. ) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN

) DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN OHIO CORRECTION CENTER, )

) OPINION

Defendant-Appellee. )

)

Before: COLE, WHITE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff-Appellant Tracy Walenciej appeals the grant of summary

judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Eastern Ohio Correction Center

(the EOCC), in this action alleging that the EOCC engaged in sex discrimination when it

terminated Walenciej’s employment. We AFFIRM.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

1. Walenciej’s Tenure as Program Manager and Deputy Director

The EOCC is a community-based correctional facility (CBCF) established under Ohio law.

Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2929.01(D), 2301.51–58. As a CBCF, the EOCC “provides residential

correctional-related services to felony offenders, including but not limited to services such as

prison diversion, substance abuse addiction assistance, education assistance, and programs for

community service.” R. 24-1, PID 84. The EOCC has two locations—one in Wintersville, Ohio,

and one in Lisbon, Ohio—and served six counties at the time of the events underlying this case.

No. 24-3571, Walenciej v. E. Ohio Corr. Ctr.

Two boards administer the EOCC. The Facility Governing Board (FGB) oversees the

EOCC’s general operations. Ohio Rev. Code. § 2301.51(A)(3)(c). And the Judicial Advisory

Board (JAB), comprised of Ohio state-court judges, appoints two-thirds of FGB members and

advises the FGB on community needs, admission criteria, and other “general requirements.” Id.

§§ 2301.51(A)(3)(c), (E). “[T]he board or boards of county commissioners of the member

counties [] appoint the remaining one-third . . . of the members.” Id. § 2301.51(E).

The FGB hires and supervises an Executive Director who “ha[s] general charge of” the

EOCC and runs its daily operations. Id. § 2301.55(A)(1). At all times relevant to this case, the

EOCC’s Executive Director was Eugene Gallo. His most recent term of employment was from

2016 to 2020. Phillip Nunes has since replaced Gallo as Executive Director.

Walenciej has a master’s degree in social work and is a Licensed Independent Social

Worker with Supervisory Status (LISW-S) in the state of Ohio. She worked at the EOCC from

2006 until April 2020. After serving as a program administrator beginning in 2006, Walenciej

became Deputy Director in 2014. As Deputy Director, Walenciej reported to Gallo and assisted

him with general operations, including hiring and disciplinary decisions. She also acted in Gallo’s

stead when he was absent. While she was Deputy Director, Walenciej consistently received

“exceptional” (the highest rating available) and “advanced” (the second-highest rating available)

ratings on her performance evaluations.

As Deputy Director, Walenciej initiated and oversaw the EOCC’s Vivitrol Program, under

which healthcare providers administer intramuscular injections of naloxone, a prescription drug

treatment for opioid addiction. Walenciej recruited Frank Vostatek, a nurse practitioner and

pharmacist, to administer the Vivitrol Program.

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Walenciej testified during discovery that her colleagues treated her differently based on

her sex throughout her time at the EOCC. Gallo made comments about how attractive she was

and bypassed her by delegating decisionmaking authority to her male subordinates. One of

Walenciej’s male subordinates and Joe Shipbaugh, Walenciej’s predecessor as Deputy Director,

referred to her privately by cupping their hands around their chests to mimic breasts. Other

colleagues joked and/or gossiped about her supposedly engaging in sex acts at work. And Gallo,

Shipbaugh, and other senior male staff met regularly in Gallo’s office to gossip, complain about

their wives, and sometimes discuss EOCC administrative matters. On at least one occasion,

someone posted a handwritten sign reading “He-Man Woman-Haters Club”—a name that both

attendees and other EOCC staff regularly used to refer to those meetings—on Gallo’s door while

the men were meeting. R. 24-4, PID 189–93. When Walenciej expressed concerns about these

behaviors to Gallo, he directed Walenciej to speak to one of the employees who spread the joke

about her engaging in sex acts at work but took no other action.

2. Walenciej’s Promotion and Subsequent Complaints

In 2019, Gallo outlined a transition plan that called for him to retire at the end of 2020 and

Walenciej to begin as Executive Director on January 1, 2021. Based in part on Gallo’s

recommendation, the FGB selected Walenciej to be the next Executive Director.

As news spread about Walenciej’s potential promotion to Executive Director, the FGB

received nine written complaints—seven anonymous and two signed—about Walenciej,

apparently from current and former employees. The complaints alleged that Walenciej bullied and

harassed other EOCC employees; regularly used inappropriate language when talking to and about

residents and staff; was generally a bad manager; had a romantic relationship with her subordinate

Matt Grimard and gave him preferential treatment; hired her friends and gave them preferential

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treatment; improperly received a free television from Vostatek; improperly funded the Vivitrol

program while employees’ health-insurance benefits were being cut; and falsified statistics used

to secure grant funding.

After receiving these complaints, the FGB “suspend[ed] contract talk[s]” with Walenciej

and “openly advertise[d]” the Executive Director position. R. 32-11, PID 984. It also engaged

outside counsel Fishel Downey Albrecht & Riepenhoff, LLP (Fishel Downey), to investigate the

complaints. Because several of the complaints were anonymous, Fishel Downey “interview[ed]

all resident supervisors, case managers, and programming staff to ensure a thorough investigation.”

R. 24-5, PID 261. On April 9, 2020, following its investigation, Fishel Downey produced a written

report (the Report).

Based on witness statements and Walenciej’s admitted conduct, the Report found that

Walenciej engaged in harassment, bullying, and unprofessional behavior, in violation of multiple

EOCC policies. Walenciej admitted that “she curse[d] in the workplace every day”; “called

subordinate employees names” like “motherfucker, dickhead, [and] asshole”; told one employee

that she would “punch him in the throat” and another that she would “punch him in the dick”;

referred to an employee using “‘Hispanic’ names”; wrote the phrase “punch her in the cooter” on

her desk calendar1; and kept a “shitlist” of employees’ names displayed in her office. 2 Id. at PID

262–63. Several witnesses (including one with whom Walenciej claimed she had an excellent

relationship) said Walenciej was a bully who yelled and cursed at them, dismissed their importance

by telling them that “monkeys could do their jobs” and they “just push buttons,” and belittled and

1

Walenciej says she wrote down this phrase as someone was describing a viral YouTube video so that she

could find the video later.

2

Walenciej maintained that each of these behaviors was acceptable because it was commonplace among

EOCC staff and/or just workplace banter.

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insulted residents. Id. at PID 262–64. And “[n]early all witnesses who testified that they observed

Ms. Walenciej engage in inappropriate behaviors stated they did not file a complaint or grievance

with [the] EOCC because they were afraid of retaliation from Ms. Walenciej.” Id. at PID 264.

The Report also found that Walenciej violated the EOCC’s hiring and promotional policies

when hiring Kristen LaRoche, who previously worked at the pharmacy that administered the

Vivitrol program; Patty Allen, who had previously worked with Walenciej; Crystal Chipps, who

had previously lived with Walenciej and who Walenciej hired as a Fiscal Manager despite Chipps’

having no accounting degree; and Operations Manager Todd Cottrell, who Walenciej promoted

from Accounts Manager without interviewing another internal candidate who wanted the job.

Walenciej violated the policies by “not post[ing vacant positions] prior to hiring to seek internal

candidates”; not posting positions “for the appropriate time period, if at all”; and not considering

or selecting internal applicants. Id. at PID 266. The allegations of Walenciej giving better pay

rates and insurance benefits to certain favored employees were unsubstantiated, however.

The Report found as well that Walenciej dated Grimard and gave him preferential

treatment, also in violation of multiple EOCC policies,3 and kept the relationship secret until

months after it ended.4 Walenciej did not discipline Grimard when he was frequently tardy;

falsified his time sheets; missed work; arrived at work hungover; failed to timely complete projects

and paperwork; was “verbally aggressive” with Allen, who was his direct supervisor; bypassed

Allen to bring questions and requests for advice directly to Walenciej; lied to Walenciej; yelled at

3

Walenciej maintains that the relationship was not improper because the EOCC has no policies expressly

prohibiting romantic relationships between employees. Appellant’s Br. at 22 (citing R. 24-10, PID 310–814).

4

Walenciej disclosed the relationship, which lasted from July 2018 to June 2019, to Gallo in October 2019.

When they next met to discuss the issue, Gallo directed Walenciej to adopt a Little Sister through Big Brothers, Big

Sisters; take an ethics training course; and discuss the situation with Dr. JerryJo Gilham, a mutual acquaintance who

had previously consulted at the EOCC. But he still ultimately recommended that Walenciej replace him as Executive

Director.

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Walenciej; completed an internship, which Walenciej oversaw while in a romantic relationship

with him, during paid working hours at the EOCC; and used an EOCC van for personal purposes,

without verifying his driver’s license or insurance information, when his personal car needed new

tires.5 Id. at PID 270–73. Allen told the Fishel Downey investigators that she felt she could not

correct Grimard’s behavior herself because of his relationship with Walenciej.

Finally, the Report found that Walenciej administered the Vivitrol program in ways that

violated the EOCC’s policies and Ohio law. “The EOCC ha[d] no written policies and procedures

regarding the administration of its Vivitrol Program,” including no contract for Vostatek’s services

and neither documentation of malpractice insurance nor an indemnification clause. Id. at PID 275–

76. Gallo had “minimal involvement, if any at all,” with the program and deferred to Walenciej.

Id. at PID 275. Vostatek was able to enter the EOCC and receive shipments, despite not being an

employee. Vostatek received assessment fees even when the patient opted not to receive Vivitrol

shots. The EOCC paid Vostatek from the Resident Commissary Account based on invoices it, not

Vostatek, created. And Vostatek provided and billed the EOCC for medical services other than

Vivitrol injections. Additionally, Walenciej, Gallo, Dane Watkins, and LaRoche—the four

employees who worked on the Vivitrol program—all improperly accepted gifts from Vostatek: a

50-inch television (Walenciej), Grey Goose vodka (Gallo, Walenciej, LaRoche, and Watkins), and

incense burners (Walenciej, Watkins, and Gallo).6

5

Walenciej testified that many other EOCC employees, including Gallo, also used EOCC vans for personal

purposes.

6

Walenciej admits she accepted the television, vodka, and incense burner, but testified that she thought

accepting the gifts was allowed because (1) nobody ever told her she could not receive gifts from Vostatek, and (2) she

received the television when Vostatek sold a building he owned and gave away furnishings that he otherwise would

have thrown in the trash.

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In short, the Report found that Walenciej “engaged in harassing and unprofessional

behavior,” “bullied subordinate employees,” “did not follow [the] EOCC’s hiring policies and

procedures,” had a relationship with Grimard and gave him preferential treatment, and improperly

operated the Vivitrol program. Id. at PID 265–85. It therefore recommended terminating her

employment. Because the investigation uncovered misconduct from other employees as well, the

Report also recommended terminating Grimard’s employment; disciplining, but not firing,

Watkins; requiring LaRoche to complete additional training on ethics and other policies; and,

given Gallo’s planned retirement, “hasten[ing] [the EOCC’s] hiring process and begin[ning] the

transition to a new Executive Director as soon as practicable.” Id. at PID 285–87.

The FGB promptly acted on the Report’s recommendation and directed Gallo to terminate

Walenciej’s employment. The resulting termination letter, dated April 10, 2020, stated that the

EOCC was firing Walenciej “following the results of an internal investigation that concluded [she]

engaged in misconduct and inappropriate behavior in violation of numerous EOCC policies.” R.

32-24, PID 1026. Gallo finished out his contractual term and now serves on the FGB.

On April 9, 2020, Walenciej’s counsel wrote to Gallo requesting a public hearing before

the FGB and JAB, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 121.22(G)(1). The EOCC’s counsel

responded, asserting that Walenciej was not entitled to a public hearing under § 121.22(G)(1)

because she was an at-will employee not covered by Ohio Revised Code § 124.34, but that

Walenciej had a right to appeal her termination to the Executive Director. The EOCC therefore

construed Walenciej’s letter as an appeal of the termination. Walenciej’s counsel responded,

saying that limiting Walenciej to a post hoc appeal hearing violated EOCC policy, contending that

Gallo was “uniquely unsuited to preside over” any appeal, declining to participate in the “ad hoc

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appeal process,” and “reiterat[ing] [Walenciej’s] request for a formal hearing” before the FGB and

JAB. R. 24-12, PID 816–17.

B. Procedural History

Based on the events described above, Walenciej filed an administrative charge with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She received a right-to-sue letter on May

24, 2022, and filed this timely7 action on August 19, 2022. The now-operative Amended

Complaint alleges that the EOCC engaged in sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Count 1), and Ohio Revised Code Chapter

4112 (Count 2), and seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

Following the close of discovery, the EOCC moved for summary judgment on both claims.

As relevant on appeal, it first argued that Walenciej had not established a prima facie case of

discrimination because Gallo, whom Walenciej identified as a similarly situated male employee,

was not similarly situated. Second, it contended that Walenciej’s claim would fail even if she had

established a prima facie case because she “was terminated for a host of non-discriminatory

reasons, including her admitted relationship with a subordinate employee, her failures in

administering the Vivitrol program, her ethic[al] and policy violations with respect to receiving

gifts, and her inappropriate language at work.” R. 25, PID 863. And finally, it argued that

Walenciej could not pursue punitive damages because (1) there were no violations to support such

7

As a non-jurisdictional condition precedent to bringing a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must exhaust

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); Williams v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 53 F. App’x 350, 351 (6th Cir. 2002)

(order). To do so, a plaintiff files an administrative charge with the EEOC or another proper state or local agency.

Williams, 53 F. App’x at 352. If the agency declines to pursue the claim and issues a right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff

must sue within ninety days. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). To demonstrate compliance with this scheme, a

complaint should include exhaustion allegations and attach the right-to-sue letter. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Assocs.

Home Equity, 13 F. App’x 323, 324 (6th Cir. 2001). The Amended Complaint alleges that Walenciej filed an

administrative charge with the EEOC and received the attached right-to-sue letter on May 24, 2022. And she sued on

August 19, 2022—within 90 days of receiving her right-to-sue letter.

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damages and (2) “political subdivisions like the EOCC are immune from punitive damages.” Id.

at PID 869.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the EOCC on both claims. It held

that Walenciej had not established a prima facie case of discrimination because she and Gallo were

not similarly situated and, even if she had established a prima facie case, the EOCC offered non-

discriminatory reasons for firing her and no reasonable jury would have found that those reasons

were pretextual.

Walenciej now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment. As relevant on

appeal, Walenciej contends that her termination was “without just cause and based upon pretextual

grounds,” R. 4, PID 29, the true ground being sex discrimination.

II. Standard of Review

“The court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the

same standards as the district court.” Int’l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, 974 F.3d 690, 697 (6th

Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). In making that determination, “the court views the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party,” and draws all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Int’l

Outdoor, 974 F.3d at 697 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the movant

bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine disputes of material fact, she can meet

that standard by showing that the non-moving party lacks evidence to support an essential element

of her case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

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In sum, “[t]he key issue is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of

law.’” Rocheleau v. Elder Living Constr., LLC, 814 F.3d 398, 400 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)). And “[i]n reviewing a summary

judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.” Bennett v.

City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 817 (6th Cir. 2005). That said, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two

different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury

could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion

for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Moreover, “a mere scintilla

of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat summary

judgment; rather, the non-moving party must present evidence upon which a reasonable jury could

find in her favor.” Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Analysis

“Because the elements and legal standards for establishing unlawful sex discrimination are

the same under Ohio Rev[ised] Code § 4112.02 and under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2,” Laderach v. U-

Haul of Nw. Ohio, 207 F.3d 825, 828 (6th Cir. 2000), “we analyze the state and federal claims

together,” McCarthy v. Ameritech Publ’g, Inc., 763 F.3d 469, 482 n.4 (6th Cir. 2014).

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Ohio law similarly makes it unlawful “[f]or any employer, because of

the . . . sex . . . of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to

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discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.” Ohio Rev. Code

§ 4112.02(A).

“Intentional discrimination claims under Title VII can be proven by direct or circumstantial

evidence.” Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 648–49 (6th Cir. 2012). “Direct

evidence consists of facts that, if believed, require the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was

at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840

F.3d 292, 302 (6th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is proof

that does not on its face establish discriminatory animus, but does allow a factfinder to draw a

reasonable inference that discrimination occurred.” Ondricko, 689 F.3d at 649.

When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, as Walenciej does here, she must satisfy

the three-part burden-shifting framework first set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). Under that framework, the plaintiff must first “establish a

prima facie claim of discrimination.” McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 117 F.4th 887, 895 (6th Cir.

2024). To do so, she must show that she: “(1) was a member of a protected class . . . ; (2) suffered

an adverse employment action; (3) was qualified for the position held; and (4) was replaced by

someone outside of the protected class[,] or [that] similarly situated non-protected employees were

treated more favorably.” Id. If the plaintiff makes these showings, “the burden of production

shifts to the employer to identify a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, “[i]f the

employer identifies a legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the

employer’s reason is pretextual.” Id.

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It is a close call whether Walenciej established a prima facie case for her sex-discrimination

claim. We therefore assume without deciding that she met her burden on the first McDonnell

Douglas step and proceed to steps two and three. And because Walenciej failed to create a genuine

dispute of material fact as to pretext, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of the EOCC.

To meet its burden on step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the EOCC needed

to identify a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking an adverse employment action against

Walenciej. See Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 2016).

It met its burden by citing the misconduct identified in the Report, including Walenciej’s

mismanagement of the Vivitrol program, her harassing and bullying behavior, and her

inappropriate relationship with Grimard. See Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 726 F.3d 851,

854–55 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that a violation of company policy can be a legitimate reason for

terminating an employee); Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 886–87 (6th

Cir. 2020) (documented “questionable payments” and “abusive business practices” between a

contractor and the state agency where the plaintiff directly supervised certain programs, along with

the plaintiff’s “toxic relationship with her subordinates,” were legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for the defendant to fire the plaintiff).

At that point, the burden shifted back to Walenciej to show pretext. See Jackson, 814 F.3d

at 779. A plaintiff satisfies this burden at summary judgment by providing enough evidence for a

reasonable factfinder to determine that the employer’s proffered reason does not adequately

explain its conduct. Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 11 F.4th 498, 515 (6th Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs

often prove pretext by showing that the defendant’s proffered reason: “(1) had no basis in fact;

(2) was insufficient motivation for the employment action; or (3) did not actually motivate the

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adverse employment action.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). But these common ways to show

pretext “are not the only ways” a plaintiff can meet her burden. Miles, 946 F.3d at 888. Instead,

“these three categories are simply a convenient way of marshaling evidence and focusing it on the

ultimate inquiry: did the employer [take the adverse employment action against] the employee for

the stated reason or not?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although her pretext argument on appeal is underdeveloped, Walenciej seems to argue that

her misconduct was insufficient motivation for the employment action and did not actually

motivate her termination. Appellant’s Br. at 42–45; Reply Br. at 12–13. Neither argument

persuades.

Walenciej first asserts that her misconduct did not warrant termination because Gallo

engaged in similar conduct without being fired. Appellant’s Br. at 42–45; Reply Br. at 12–13

When determining whether employees engaged in similar misconduct, we look to “the type,

circumstances, and respective severity of the misconduct alleged.” Spratt v. FCA US LLC, 812 F.

App’x 348, 355 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Jackson, 814 F.3d at 780–83, and Johnson v. Ohio Dep’t

of Pub. Safety, 942 F.3d 329, 331–32 (6th Cir. 2019)). Because Walenciej engaged in more serious

misconduct than Gallo, the EOCC had valid reasons for treating Walenciej and Gallo differently.

See Johnson, 942 F.3d at 331 (“The Department disciplined the [plaintiff and the other allegedly

similarly situated employee] differently because their situations were different. Thus, [the

plaintiff] has failed to present a case for discrimination.”).

First, Walenciej ran the Vivitrol program, and its failures were directly attributable to her.

Cf. Corell v. CSX Transp., Inc., 378 F. App’x 496, 502–03 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding conduct not

comparable where the plaintiff had a higher “degree of culpability” than another employee). Gallo,

on the other hand, “should have been more aware/involved” in the program but was not directly

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responsible for its mismanagement. R. 24-5, PID 275, 287. Walenciej also accepted a television

from Frank Vostatek (unlike Gallo) and engaged in a significant and unique amount of documented

bullying and harassing behavior.

More importantly, Walenciej had an inappropriate romantic relationship with a direct

subordinate that caused significant workplace disruptions, while Gallo did not. And substantial

differences in conduct justify different disciplinary actions. See, e.g., Wright v. Murray Guard,

Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that two employees were not similarly situated

where one employee “allegedly sexually harassed at least one of his subordinates, including

coercing one or more into having sexual relations with him,” and the other allegedly allowed an

unauthorized person into the workplace and violated a no-contact order by spreading rumors about

another employee); Simpson v. Vanderbilt Univ., 359 F. App’x 562, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2009)

(finding that two nurses were not similarly situated, and that the plaintiff nurse had not shown

pretext, when one nurse “supposedly failed to chart a patient assigned to her for an entire shift”

and the other failed to chart four patients).

True, Walenciej points to her deposition testimony that Gallo also had a workplace

romance, albeit one that did not make it into the Report. Appellant’s Br. at 39–40 (citing R. 24-4,

PID 166–68). Walenciej testified that (1) Gallo and his alleged romantic partner traveled together

for work; (2) she once saw them “sitting intimately” in a restaurant and they moved apart when

they saw her; and (3) she had heard “regular workplace gossip” that Gallo was having an affair.

R. 24-4, PID 166–68. Accepting that Gallo was having an affair based on Walenciej’s testimony,

Walenciej cites no evidence that Gallo’s alleged affair caused workplace disruptions like those her

relationship with Grimard caused. See Patches v. City of Phoenix, 68 F. App’x 772, 773 (9th Cir.

2003) (“[The plaintiff] offered for comparison three male/female relationships and other

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misconduct of male officers. These comparisons are not similar in all relevant aspects to [the

plaintiff’s] situation . . . [, in part because m]ost of the misconduct [the plaintiff] pointed to did not

involve workplace disruption . . . .” (cleaned up)). Moreover, Walenciej testified that she never

reported Gallo for having an affair, and that she thought nobody else had made such a report. Cf.

Malone v. Eaton Corp., 187 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[The plaintiff] admitted his affair to

three other supervisory employees. One of these employees reported the incident, . . . [and] the

other two employees confirmed [it] . . . . In the case of the female supervisor, [the employer] had

only rumors and anonymous reports that she had violated company policy.”). The record therefore

provides no reason to think that the FGB knew about Gallo’s affair and disregarded that knowledge

to treat Walenciej more harshly. See Cosby v. S.C. Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 93 F.4th 707,

716 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[I]ndependently fatal to her claim, . . . [the plaintiff] offers no evidence that

either [of the people investigating the allegations] was involved in the decision not to investigate

[the allegedly similarly situated employee] based on rumors of a romantic relationship with a

subordinate, or indeed that [the investigating employees] even knew of such rumors.”).

Walenciej’s second pretext argument also fails. She contends that the main difference

between her misconduct and Gallo’s—her inappropriate relationship—was not the real reason for

her termination. Appellant’s Br. at 37–39. She specifically argues that (1) “the EOCC failed to

present any evidence as to what grounds or conclusions that the EOCC’s Facility Governing

Board . . . in fact relied upon in terminating Ms. Walenciej,” id. at 39 n.2, and (2) the EOCC still

planned to promote her to Executive Director even after she disclosed the inappropriate

relationship to Gallo. The first point is unpersuasive given meeting minutes reflecting that the

FGB directed Gallo to act on the Report—i.e., that it terminated Walenciej’s employment because

of the misconduct documented in the Report, in which Walenciej’s relationship with Grimard

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loomed large. Whether the EOCC expressly stated that it discharged Walenciej primarily because

of her relationship with Grimard or said that it discharged her because of misconduct in which her

relationship with Grimard loomed large is, as the district court observed, “a distinction without a

difference.” R. 37, PID 1111. Walenciej’s point about disclosing the relationship to Gallo likewise

misses the mark because Gallo was not the decisionmaker ultimately responsible for firing

Walenciej. Rather, the FGB decided to fire Walenciej based on the Report and directed Gallo to

carry out its instruction. And the FGB, to which Walenciej does not claim to have disclosed her

relationship with Grimard before Fishel Downey completed the Report, took prompt disciplinary

action when it learned all the relevant information.

Next, Walenciej points to the EOCC’s failure to follow its internal discipline policy and to

provide her with a termination hearing. Appellant’s Br. at 43–44. Even assuming the EOCC failed

to follow its policy or provide a required hearing, failure to follow internal policies, without more,

generally does not show pretext for discrimination. See White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth.,

429 F.3d 232, 246 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n employer’s failure to follow self-imposed regulations or

procedures is generally insufficient to support a finding of pretext.”).

Walenciej also identifies inappropriate comments made by other EOCC employees at

various times during her employment at the EOCC.8 Appellant’s Br. at 19. But isolated comments

from non-decisionmakers that are not clearly connected to the termination decision are rarely

enough to show pretext. See White, 429 F.3d at 246 (finding that, in the context of a failure-to-

hire claim, allegations that a member of the hiring committee had previously sexually harassed

8

Although the Amended Complaint alleges “a severe and/or pervasive hostile work environment based on

sex,” R. 4, PID 29, Walenciej abandoned any such claim below by not making any arguments about it in her response

to the EOCC’s summary judgment motion, which argued that “Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged or included a

hostile work environment claim [in the Amended Complaint], but to the extent this Court believes Plaintiff has, the

record is devoid of any viable hostile work environment claim,” R. 25, PID 864; see also R. 37, PID 1100 n.1. She

does not address her hostile-environment claim on appeal.

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female employees at the defendant employer “are entirely unrelated to the instant case and are

qualitatively different from [the plaintiff’s] claim of sex discrimination in hiring,” and that “such

evidence does not support [the plaintiff’s] contention that [the employer’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory] reason [for choosing another candidate] . . . was pretextual”); Diebel v. L & H

Res., LLC, 492 F. App’x 523, 532–33 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that, in an age discrimination case,

questions about the plaintiff’s retirement and “discriminatory comments about wanting to create a

“‘younger company’” did not show pretext where they were “isolated” and there was “little

evidence” that the comments were connected to the adverse employment action); Cecil v.

Louisville Water Co., 301 F. App’x 490, 498 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a “few inappropriate

comments . . . too thin a basis” to rebut the defendant’s proffered reason for the adverse action).

Finally, Walenciej argues that because there was no express policy “prohibiting or

regulating personal relationships among coworkers,” the EOCC’s termination of her employment

based on her relationship with Grimard was discriminatory. Appellant’s Br. at 41. But Walenciej

was Grimard’s superior, not his peer. And companies may have sound reasons for penalizing

supervisors who date subordinates and not penalizing employees who date their peers. Cf. Sarsha

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[An employer] is entitled to enforce

a no-dating policy (if one exists) against supervisors, who by virtue of their managerial positions

are expected to know better, rather than subordinates.”). Moreover, as the district court correctly

noted, the EOCC had a policy in place prohibiting employees from acting in ways in which their

personal interests “‘would impair their objectivity,’” and “a romantic relationship between a

subordinate and a superior is such a common example of impermissibly impaired objectivity that

it is a cultural cliché.” R. 37, PID 1111. Additionally, as discussed above, Walenciej and

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Grimard’s relationship caused many problems at the EOCC. Walenciej’s last argument therefore

also does not defeat summary judgment.

V.

For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM.

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