Antonio Turner v. State of Indiana

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 24S-CR-147

Antonio Turner, FILED

Appellant (Defendant below), Mar 12 2025, 10:27 am

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

–v– Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

State of Indiana,

Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Argued: June 20, 2024 | Decided: March 12, 2025

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court

No. 49D32-2110-F5-31008

The Honorable Andrew Borland, Magistrate Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 23A-CR-1868

Opinion by Justice Molter

Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Slaughter concur.

Justice Goff concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.

Molter, Justice.

This is a case about a good guy with a gun shooting a bad guy with a

gun when the only choices were to shoot or be shot.

Antonio Turner was one of three students studying organic chemistry

at a classmate’s home, tucked away in a quiet neighborhood just outside

of Indianapolis. While they were studying, the classmate’s jealous love

interest, Dequan Briscoe, repeatedly called her. And when he learned

Turner was at her home, Briscoe twice threatened to “pull up” on

Turner—to attack him—which Turner heard over the speakerphone.

Shortly after hearing the threat, Turner walked outside to his car, and

moments later, he sensed that the unfamiliar car screeching towards him

down the sleepy street was an ambush. Since he didn’t have time to reach

the house and had nowhere to hide, he turned while running and fired

four shots into the car, wounding Briscoe. Turner fired based on his

intuition—he didn’t recognize the car, couldn’t see through its darkly

tinted windows, and wouldn’t have recognized Briscoe if he saw him. But

that intuition proved prescient. It turns out Briscoe was aiming a handgun

to shoot Turner just before Turner began firing.

Because Turner shot Briscoe before Briscoe shot Turner, Turner is the

defendant rather than the victim in this case; the State charged Turner

with battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. And

following a bench trial, the magistrate judge convicted him. Yet the judge

agreed with Turner that, in hindsight, it was necessary for Turner to fire at

Briscoe to avoid being shot. But the judge rejected Turner’s self-defense

justification because, without the benefit of hindsight, it was objectively

unreasonable for Turner to fire at a car into which he couldn’t see. Turner

made the best choice, the judge explained, and it was unfortunate that his

only choices were a felony or funeral. But that paradox followed from the

objective reasonableness standard governing Indiana’s self-defense law,

and the law gave the judge no choice but to convict, he believed.

Fortunately for Turner, that isn’t how Indiana’s self-defense law

functions. To be sure, the judge was correct that the self-defense statute

justifies using force when the defendant’s actions are objectively

reasonable in the circumstances. And many cases explain we don’t use

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hindsight to second-guess the reasonableness of the defendant’s decisions

in the heat of the moment.

But this case presents a question of first impression in Indiana: Do we

deprive defendants of the benefit of hindsight when it reveals their

conduct was necessary in self-defense, even though that necessity wasn’t

fully apparent in the moment? The answer is that we do not, and we base

that answer on a sentence in the self-defense statute that our Indiana

appellate courts have never interpreted before, which says: “No person,

employer, or estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal

jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third

person by reasonable means necessary.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2.

Because the trial court concluded that Turner’s conduct was necessary

in self-defense, the statute justified the shooting, and we vacate the

conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

I. Factual Background

The State, Turner, and the trial court all agree that Turner is an

upstanding citizen whose involvement here results from terrible luck

leading him to the wrong place at the wrong time. Before this case, he had

no criminal history, and as the trial court described: “he has led a law-

abiding life,” and he “has shown himself to be a productive, employed,

respected member of the community.” Tr. at 140.

Turner grew up on the east side of Indianapolis and graduated from

Warren Central High School, participating in band throughout his high

school years. Among his bandmates and their parents, he earned a

reputation as honest and peaceful. Then, after graduating from Warren

Central, he attended Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis,

pursuing a double major in biology and medical humanities. Alongside

his collegiate studies, he also worked for Kroger processing e-commerce,

and he worked for a dog training business.

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Through a cruel twist of fate, the tragedy here stems from Turner’s

commendable enrollment in organic chemistry his senior year in college. It

was a difficult course, so he would often study with a classmate, Nyah

Grice. Their last study session together was in preparation for an

upcoming Monday exam, and they met around 5:00 p.m. on a Saturday at

her home in a quiet Lawrence, Indiana, neighborhood just outside

Indianapolis. Another student, Maray Bell, joined them a little while later.

Grice had been in a relationship with Dequan Briscoe, and it is unclear

whether they were still dating at that time. But over the course of the

evening, Briscoe called and texted Grice repeatedly, and Turner heard

several of those phone conversations over Grice’s speakerphone. Grice

told Briscoe not to come to her house because she was studying, which

angered Briscoe, and he began questioning why Turner was in her house.

Eventually, Briscoe repeatedly told Grice that he was going to “pull up”

on Turner, which Turner heard. Id. at 89, 90. Turner interpreted the

statement as common lingo on the east side of Indianapolis meaning

Briscoe was “coming to harm [him] in some way.” Id. at 90.

Now concerned for his safety, Turner went outside to retrieve his

handgun from his car around 8:30 p.m. He was licensed to carry his

firearm, which his mother had given him for protection because they lived

together in a “very dangerous” part of Indianapolis where he had seen

many people shot. Id. at 84.

As he was walking to his car, he noticed another car’s headlights from

“about five houses down.” Id. at 91. But it wasn’t moving, so he thought

nothing of it and continued to the passenger side of his car to retrieve his

handgun. Turner then began walking back toward Grice’s house. While

he was ascending her driveway, the other car’s engine revved, and the car

sped down the street towards him, tires squealing. Turner had never met

Briscoe before, didn’t know what he looked like, and didn’t know what

kind of car Briscoe drove, but he was aware from Grice that Briscoe

regularly carried a gun, and he “just knew” that the car barreling toward

him was Briscoe. Id.

Turner tried to run to the house but couldn’t get there before the car

abruptly stopped in front of the driveway. The car—a Volkswagen Jetta—

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had dark, illegally-tinted windows, so Turner could not see inside. But he

sensed he was about to be attacked, so he turned around and fired four

shots at the car, stopping when it drove off. Two of Turner’s shots hit

Briscoe, one in each arm. And it turns out that Turner’s intuition was

correct: Briscoe was driving the Jetta, armed with a handgun, and aiming

to shoot Turner.

After he was shot, Briscoe fled and pulled his car into a nearby open

garage. Authorities arrived shortly after and treated his wounds. They

also discovered Briscoe’s blood-stained, unholstered gun resting in the

passenger seat of his vehicle. Meanwhile, Turner gathered his things at

Grice’s house and went home. After Turner learned from Grice that his

shots wounded Briscoe, he called the police and told them what

happened.

II. Procedural History

The State charged Turner with Level 5 felony battery by means of a

deadly weapon. He waived his right to a jury trial, so the magistrate judge

conducted a bench trial, at which Turner claimed the shooting was

justified by self-defense.

Briscoe and Turner both testified, and they gave conflicting accounts.

Turner’s account tracks our factual description above. Briscoe, on the

other hand, claimed that while he had told police he was upset that

Turner was at Grice’s home, he really wasn’t, although he was “a little

upset” that Grice told him not to come over. Tr. at 20. He acknowledged

that he stopped his car in the middle of the street in front of Grice’s house,

but he said he didn’t speed up and he didn’t pull out his handgun. He

testified that it may have seemed like he was driving fast, even though he

wasn’t, because he had modified his car so that it would have a “loud

exhaust on it.” Id. at 9, 22. He had also tinted his windows darker than the

legal limit.

He testified that when he stopped in front of the house, he saw

someone in the driveway who he assumed was Turner and who “just

turned around and started shooting.” Id. at 12. And after he was shot in

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both arms, he sped away. As for the blood-stained handgun police found

on his passenger seat pointed towards the passenger window, he gave

conflicting accounts of whether the gun simply fell out of its holster in the

console or whether he unholstered the gun while driving away.

After hearing all the evidence, the judge explained he agreed with

Turner about “what are the facts.” Id. at 125. Briscoe was “upset

apparently because Mr. Turner [was] there with his girlfriend or ex-

girlfriend,” and Briscoe said he was going to “pull up” on Turner. Id. The

judge agreed with Turner that Briscoe’s statements over the phone were

“threats that Mr. Turner heard.” Id. at 126. He also reiterated he

“believe[d]” Turner’s testimony, and Turner was “being truthful” when

he spoke with police and in court, and the judge credited the witnesses

who testified to Turner’s “reputation [] of being a truthful person.” Id. As

for the gun in Briscoe’s car, the judge concluded that “Briscoe lied . . .

about how that gun got out in the seat,” and he was “lying about it falling

out of the holster,” as “holsters are designed so that guns can’t fall out of

them.” Id. Instead, the judge concluded that Briscoe “did likely draw his

gun inside of that car and probably had bad intent” to shoot Turner. Id.

Yet, the judge rejected Turner’s self-defense claim and convicted him.

He agreed with Turner that “this is a good guy in a bad guy scenario.” Id.

at 127. And he empathized that he couldn’t say he “might not have done

the same thing,” id., because “what the heck else [was Turner] supposed

to do?” Id. at 141. But he understood the law as constraining him to

convict because Turner “couldn’t see inside of this car” and “couldn’t see

a gun,” so Turner’s fear that he was about to be shot, while accurate, was

unreasonable as a matter of self-defense law. Id. at 126–27. As the judge

understood the law, Turner could only be justified in shooting if either

“he saw the gun and it was being raised toward him, or [he] knew that

Briscoe was the guy, or that the car was about to run him right over in

order for that combination of the fear created by the threats on the phone

and the circumstances he saw to justify the self-defense.” Id. at 127. The

judge concluded by lamenting the burdens that would come with Turner’s

felon status, but assuring Turner: “honestly, if your choice was between

being a convicted felon and being harmed, you probably made the right

choice.” Id. at 142.

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Turner appealed his conviction, arguing that the “trial court

misinterpreted and misapplied Indiana’s self-defense statute.” Appellant’s

Br. at 12. The court’s mistake, Turner argued, was concluding that “it had

no choice under Indiana law but to convict Turner although the trial court

made it clear that if Turner had not taken the actions that led to his

conviction, Turner’s life would have been in real jeopardy.” Id. The judge

had agreed with Turner about what the evidence showed, so Turner made

clear he was not asking the appellate courts “to reweigh the evidence nor

assess the credibility of the witnesses.” Id.

The State argued in response that “Turner’s argument fails because he

asks [the court] to determine the reasonableness of his actions in hindsight

instead of determining the reasonableness of his actions based on the

circumstances surrounding his conduct when he used force.” Appellee’s

Br. at 6. The Court of Appeals agreed with the State, affirming in a

unanimous nonprecedential memorandum decision. Turner v. State, No.

23A-CR-1868 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2023) (mem.). It based its decision on

Turner’s testimony “that he had never previously met Briscoe or seen his

car, he did not know who was driving the car, he did not see a gun

pointed at him, and Briscoe never shot at him.” Id.

Turner then petitioned for transfer to our Court, which we granted,

thus vacating the Court of Appeals decision. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

Turner challenges his conviction on the basis that the trial court

mistakenly rejected his self-defense justification. As with any statute, we

review the trial court’s interpretation of the self-defense statute de novo.

Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022). And “[w]hen a defendant

challenges the State’s sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-

defense, the standard of review remains the same as for any sufficiency of

the evidence claim.” Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999). “[W]e

do not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility, and only look to the

evidence most favorable to the judgment.” Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662,

667 (Ind. 2021) (quotations omitted). We will affirm the defendant’s

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conviction if there is evidence, including reasonable inferences, that

supports the judgment. Id. And we will reverse the defendant’s conviction

“only if no reasonable person could say that” the defendant’s self-defense

claim “was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson v.

State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002).

Discussion and Decision

At this point in the case, there is no longer any dispute between the

parties about the material facts: Turner avoided being shot by Briscoe only

by shooting Briscoe first, but Turner fired based on intuition, unable to see

through Briscoe’s darkly tinted windows. The magistrate judge reasoned

that while it was necessary for Turner to shoot Briscoe in self-defense, it

was not reasonable, because the necessity was only apparent in hindsight.

The State agrees that was the appropriate analysis, and Turner’s argument

on appeal is that the trial court’s reasoning reflects a legal error—the judge

misinterpreted the self-defense statute.

We agree with Turner. Under Indiana’s self-defense statute,

justification for using force based on a mistaken belief about necessity

depends on the reasonableness of the belief given the circumstances. But

using defensive force based on an accurate belief is justified regardless of

the belief’s reasonableness. In other words, using force for protection

based on a belief that is both unreasonable and turns out to be wrong isn’t

justified, but acting on a belief that is unreasonable, yet right, is justified.

Below, we discuss how Indiana’s self-defense justification bars

conviction for what would otherwise be criminal conduct. Then, we

explain how resort to hindsight differs depending on whether it is used to

second-guess the reasonableness of the defendant’s fear or instead to

confirm the necessity of defensive force. Finally, we note that this analysis

does not reflect a change in Indiana’s self-defense law but rather how the

self-defense statute applies to a sliver of circumstances where the

necessity of self-defense is only fully apparent in hindsight.

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I. Self-defense justifies what would otherwise be

criminal conduct.

Self-defense is a legal justification for what would otherwise be

criminal conduct, Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021), and it

operates as a complete bar to conviction, Hill v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1061,

1064 (Ind. 1986). Once the defendant invokes self-defense, the State has

the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one element of

the justification. Id.

Our legislature recognizes that the “citizens of this state have always

enjoyed” “robust self-defense rights.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a). And we recently

recognized that Article 1, Section 1’s guarantee of an “inalienable” right to

“life” includes the right of self-defense, which “was a firmly established

right long before Indiana became a state.” Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of

Indiana v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Hawai’i, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky,

Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 976 (Ind. 2023); see generally 1 Jens D. Ohlin, Wharton’s

Criminal Law § 14:2 (16th ed. 2024) (explaining the common law origins of

the self-defense justification). Our Indiana Constitution also protects that

right through the means Turner used here: “The people shall have a right

to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.” Ind. Const. art.

1, § 32; see also Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ind. 1990)

(explaining that it is “clear that our constitution provides our citizenry the

right to bear arms for their self-defense” (quotations omitted)).

These rights may be regulated, though, Matthews v. State, 148 N.E.2d

334, 338 (Ind. 1958), and the legislature regulates self-defense through

Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2. See I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a) (explaining that the

purpose of the self-defense statute “is to provide the citizens of this state

with a lawful means of carrying out” the state’s policy “that people have a

right to defend themselves and third parties from physical harm and

crime”). Every state recognizes a self-defense justification, see Shlomit

Wallerstein, Essay, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced

Consequences, 91 Va. L. Rev. 999, 999 (2005) (noting that “the right to self-

defense is recognized in all jurisdictions”), and Indiana’s statute reflects

the common features, see 2 Paul H. Robinson, Crim. L. Def. § 121 (2024)

(describing the features common to all self-defense statutes).

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The statutory trigger is generally “the imminent use of unlawful force.”

I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). A defendant generally may use force only when

necessary for protection. Id.; see also Hileman v. State, 224 N.E.3d 321, 328

(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (explaining that the right to self-defense ends when

the danger passes). And the force must be proportional to the threat. I.C.

§ 35-41-3-2(c) (providing that only “reasonable force” may be used in

defense); Hall v. State, 231 N.E.3d 868, 874–75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“The

amount of force that an individual may use to protect himself must be

proportionate to the urgency of the situation.”), trans. denied.

Of course, we evaluate all of this in hindsight. And when people make

split-second decisions about how to defend themselves in what they

perceive to be a dangerous situation, they sometimes make mistakes that

become apparent only with the benefit of that hindsight. Or, on the other

hand, the necessity of their actions may become fully apparent only

through hindsight. How we use hindsight to determine whether self-

defense justifies force depends on whether hindsight reveals a mistake or

confirms the necessity of using force.

II. A defendant’s use of force based on what turns

out to be a mistaken belief about the necessity is

only justified if the mistake was a reasonable

one.

“Every jurisdiction recognizes some defense for some mistakes as to a

justification,” and most do that “by including the word ‘believes’ in the

definition of a justification.” 2 Paul H. Robinson, Crim. L. Def. § 184 (2024).

Our legislature has taken that approach, building grace for mistakes into

the self-defense statute so long as the person acts reasonably under the

circumstances. Specifically, our self-defense statute says:

A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other

person to protect the person or a third person from what the

person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful

force. However, a person:

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(1) is justified in using deadly force; and

(2) does not have a duty to retreat;

if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to

prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or

the commission of a forcible felony.

I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c) (emphases added).

Our Court has determined that the above language establishes both a

subjective and an objective standard to evaluate the reasonableness of a

defendant’s belief that force was necessary to protect against the imminent

use of unlawful force. Littler v. State, 871 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 2007).

Subjectively, the defendant must actually believe force is necessary, and

objectively, that belief must be one that a reasonable person would form

given the circumstances. Id.

Under this part of the statute, we evaluate the reasonableness of the

defendant’s belief only prospectively. “The law protects persons who feel

compelled to act at such times even though in retrospect it is proved they

have erred.” Heglin v. State, 140 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Ind. 1957); id. (“The law

does not use hindsight as a measure of reasonable conduct under

circumstances such as these.”). “The question of the existence of such

danger, the necessity . . . as well as the amount of force necessary to

employ to resist [an] attack can only be determined from the standpoint of

the defendant at the time and under all the then existing circumstances.”

French v. State, 403 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 1980). That means that “the trier

of fact must consider the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant,

rather than to the victim or anyone else.” Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d

342, 350 (Ind. 2013). Even though the defendant’s testimony is “critically

relevant,” the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief remains a strictly

objective inquiry. Id. at 349.

So, for example, under the self-defense statute, a person is justified in

using force to defend against someone pointing an unloaded gun if the

person in fear reasonably believes the gun is loaded. A cashier confronting

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an armed robber reasonably fears the gun is loaded. An actor filming a

scripted shooting scene doesn’t. Thus, an actor mistakenly shooting in

self-defense wouldn’t be justified, but a cashier shooting in self-defense

would. That is so even though hindsight reveals the robber’s gun was

unloaded, because the cashier’s belief was reasonable under the

circumstances despite being mistaken.

Through this prism, the magistrate judge analyzed Turner’s

circumstances, asking whether—setting aside hindsight—it was

reasonable for Turner to fear a car he didn’t recognize, into which he

couldn’t see. And if that were the only question, we would affirm. Turner

argues, and the concurring opinion agrees, that his conduct was

objectively reasonable even viewed only prospectively because Briscoe

had recently threatened him, Turner knew Briscoe carried a gun in his car,

and a car was speeding aggressively towards Turner in a way consistent

with an ambush.

But the question “is whether the inferences supporting the judgment

were reasonable, not whether there were other more reasonable inferences

that could have been made.” Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind.

2004) (quotations omitted). As the State correctly points out, it was within

the trial court’s discretion to conclude that it is generally unreasonable for

someone in Turner’s position to shoot into a car they can’t see inside and

without knowing who is inside. So, for example, if Turner had been

mistaken, and Briscoe hadn’t been preparing to shoot him, we would have

to affirm because there is evidence to support (even if it does not compel)

the trial court’s conclusion that Turner’s fear that the approaching car

posed an imminent threat was objectively unreasonable.

Another question, though—and this is a matter of first impression in

Indiana—is whether the factfinder should ignore hindsight when it

confirms rather than belies the defendant’s belief. We address that question

next.

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III. A defendant’s use of protective force based on an

accurate belief that force is necessary is justified

even if the necessity is only fully apparent in

hindsight.

A. Statutory Interpretation

Indiana cases have focused on the first two sentences of the self-defense

statutory provision quoted above, which provide that a defendant’s use of

force is justified when they have a reasonable belief that it is necessary to

respond to a threat of unlawful force. I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). But there is a

third sentence—the final sentence in that provision—which no court has

interpreted in a reported decision. That sentence says: “No person,

employer, or estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal

jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third

person by reasonable means necessary.” Id.

When we interpret statutes, we give the words their plain meaning,

considering the statutory structure as a whole and avoiding

interpretations that render any part of the statute meaningless or

superfluous. ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192,

1195, 1199 (Ind. 2016). None of the words in this provision are ambiguous,

and their meaning is so plain that there is no need to walk through their

dictionary definitions. Read together, they simply codify the core self-

defense justification for individuals recognized at common law, and they

extend that protection to those (employers and estates) who face

derivative liability for an individual’s justified use of force. See Page v.

State, 40 N.E. 745, 745 (1895) (“One who is without fault, and in a place

where he has a right to be, and is there unlawfully assailed, may, without

retreating, repel force with force, and go even to the extent of taking the

life of his adversary, if in repelling his assailant he used no more force

than is reasonably necessary in his own self-defense.”). That is, at a

minimum, a person is justified in using force when: (1) they are protecting

themselves or someone else; (2) that protection is from an imminent threat

(imminence is part of what makes the force “necessary”); (3) force rather

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than some other means is “necessary” for that protection; and (4) their

response is proportional (the “reasonable means necessary” for

protection). I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c).

This final sentence in the self-defense statute also reflects both a

subjective and an objective standard. Subjectively, the defendant’s use of

force must be for the appropriate purpose: to “protect[] the person or a

third person.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). Objectively, the force must be a

necessary, proportional response to an imminent threat. But the only

mention of reasonableness in this sentence refers to the means used, not

the defendant’s belief. So for the core self-defense this sentence codifies,

the justification depends on the accuracy of the defendant’s belief, not its

reasonableness.

In other words, the factfinder must determine, in retrospect, whether the

use of force was really necessary. If so, self-defense justifies the conduct,

no matter how reasonable or unreasonable the defendant’s fear. But if not,

the defendant must look elsewhere for justification because this sentence

in the statute provides no refuge for mistaken beliefs.

Reading all three sentences of the relevant statutory provision together

yields an understanding that boils down to what we explained long ago,

which is that self-defense justifies the use of force when “the defendant

acted without fault, was in a place where he had a legal right to be, and

was in real danger of death or great bodily harm or was in such apparent

danger as caused him in good faith to fear death or bodily injury.” Spinks

v. State, 437 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 1982) (emphasis added), disapproved of in

part on other grounds by McCraney v. State, 447 N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ind. 1983)

(clarifying that it is the State’s burden to disprove self-defense). In short,

the core self-defense justification applies when the force was necessary as

discussed above in Section I, and then beyond that, there is statutory grace

for mistakes, but only reasonable ones, as discussed in Section II. We use

hindsight to confirm the necessity of using defensive force, but not to

second-guess the reasonableness of any mistake.

As this analysis reflects, we are interpreting each of the three relevant

sentences and explaining how they operate together, not, as the

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concurring opinion describes, reading one clause “in isolation.” Post, at 2,

3.

B. Subjective Motivation

Our interpretation also does not, as the concurring opinion concludes,

conflict with Trogdon v. State, 32 N.E. 725 (Ind. 1892). In Trogdon, the Court

recognized the same subjective standard we recognize today: the

defendant must be motivated to “protect himself from threatened

danger.” Id. We said there—as we’re saying here—that “[t]he danger may

be actual or only apparent.” Id. And we said there—as we continue to

agree here—a defendant “who does not in fact apprehend any danger”

may not “deliberately and maliciously kill another, and successfully interpose

the defense of self-defense[] because it subsequently appears that there

was actual danger.” Id. (emphasis added).

The commentators the concurring opinion cites, post, at 4, read Trogdon

as we do, which is to confirm that the defendant’s subjective motivation

must be for protection, not some other malicious intent. For example,

Professor Robinson’s treatise describes the takeaway from Trogdon and

cases like it as this:

If A kills his enemy B for revenge, and he later learns to his

happy surprise that by killing B he has saved the lives of C and

D, A has no defense to murder. In other words, he must believe

that his conduct is necessary to avoid the greater harm.

2 Paul H. Robinson, Crim. L. Def. § 122 n.4 (2024) (cited in the concurring

opinion, post, at 4). Similarly, the Restatement of Torts points to Trogdon as

the basis for this illustration:

A points what appears to be a cane at B and addresses a gross

insult to him. B to avenge the insult knocks A down. B is not

privileged to do so, although the supposed cane is a disguised

shotgun and A was attempting to shoot B and would have

done so, had B not knocked him down.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 15 of 24

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 63 cmt. f (Am. L. Inst. 1965). And

Professor Simons—citing Trogdon and tracking our analysis—explains: the

“unwittingly justified actor who does not act for a defensive purpose is

probably not entitled to invoke self-defense,” but “[o]n the other hand, if

the actor does act for a defensive purpose, he might retain the right of self-

defense even if his beliefs that the facts support defensive force are

unreasonable, so long as those beliefs turn out to be correct.” Kenneth W.

Simons, Self-Defense, Necessity, and the Duty to Compensate, in Law and

Morality, 55 San Diego L. Rev. 357, 360 (2018) (emphases added).

As Trogdon and these commentators recognize, the reason a defendant

cannot interpose self-defense for a malicious killing is that a malicious

killing is not for protection. Codifying that limitation, the statutory

provision on which we rely for our holding says self-defense justifies only

force “for protecting the person or a third person.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). That

limitation is finely calibrated, though. While the State certainly has good

reasons for not recognizing a justification for malicious killings, there

would be serious constitutional questions if the law required an

individual to succumb to being shot because their anticipation of being

shot, while accurate, was nevertheless unreasonable. See Members of Med.

Licensing Bd. of Indiana v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Hawai’i, Alaska,

Indiana, Kentucky, Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 976 (Ind. 2023) (recognizing that

Article 1, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees an “inalienable”

right to “life” that includes the right of self-defense, which “was a firmly

established right long before Indiana became a state”). And we generally

prefer statutory interpretations that “avoid constitutional issues.” City of

Vincennes v. Emmons, 841 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ind. 2006).

Having concluded that Indiana’s self-defense statute justifies both (1) a

defendant’s use of proportional force necessary to protect the defendant

or a third party, and (2) the same force based on a reasonable

misapprehension about the need to use force, we turn to applying that

understanding to the facts here.

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C. Turner’s Use of Force

Given the trial court’s factual conclusions, to which we defer, Turner’s

actions were justified here. After considering all the evidence and

weighing the witnesses’ credibility, the trial court concluded that Turner

was telling the truth, and his conduct was necessary to protect himself.

Turner’s choices, in the judge’s view, were either to shoot or be shot,

because Briscoe was lying when he testified, and he had drawn his gun to

shoot Turner just before Turner shot him first.

The judge assured Turner that he navigated the horns of a dilemma as

best Turner could, recognizing: “if your choice was between being a

convicted felon and being harmed, you probably made the right choice.”

Tr. at 142. But as we explained in the previous section, Indiana law does

not force that dilemma. Instead, based on the judge’s factual

determinations, Turner’s shooting was justified under Indiana law

because (1) he was protecting himself from a threat of serious bodily

harm; (2) the threat was imminent; (3) the threat required force for

protection; and (4) the force Turner used was proportional to the threat—

he shot at Briscoe to avoid being shot and then stopped shooting when

Briscoe drove off. Turner’s use of force was justified not because his belief

that he was about to be shot was reasonable but because that belief was

correct, and force really was necessary to protect himself.

The concurring opinion finds two primary faults with this analysis, but

each concern is misplaced.

First, the opinion characterizes our invocation of the self-defense

statute’s last clause as “sua sponte,” post, at 1—which means “[w]ithout

prompting or suggestion,” Sua Sponte, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.

2024)—and the opinion reminds of the dangers of adopting “a theory

without the exchange and vigorous testing of arguments by the parties in

interest,” post, at 5. While we agree those concerns warrant caution before

invoking statutory provisions sua sponte, our reliance on that provision is

not sua sponte.

It was Turner who invoked the statute and asked us to set aside his

conviction based on it. His appellant’s brief block-quoted the self-defense

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 17 of 24

statute and bolded the clause on which we rely: “No person, employer, or

estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind

whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable

means necessary.” Appellant’s Br. at 15 (emphasis omitted) (quoting I.C.

§ 35-41-3-2(c)). He then argued he “had a lawful right to defend himself

from serious bodily injury or death from the likes of Briscoe under the

unique circumstances presented in this appeal.” Id. at 20. And, he

continued, “[i]n error, the trial court felt like it had no choice under

Indiana law but to convict Turner although the trial court made it clear

that if Turner had not taken the actions that led to his conviction, Turner’s

life would have been in real jeopardy.” Id.

Turner persisted with this argument in his transfer petition, in which

his argument section concisely summed up our analysis here: “As

essentially found by the trial court, this was truly a case of ‘shoot or be

shot’. The trial court got the facts correct but applied the law under IC 35-

41-3-2 incorrectly.” Pet. to Trans. at 4. He repeated that argument in his

conclusion. Id. at 11 (“The trial court got the facts correct but applied the

law incorrectly. . . . This was truly a case of ‘shoot or be shot’ as found by

the trial court.”(emphases omitted)). Oral argument in our Court also

included “vigorous testing of arguments by the parties in interest,” post, at

5, as we questioned each side extensively about the analysis this opinion

provides. See Oral Argument at 7:35–9:30, 19:40–21:00, 25:55–33:25.

Second, the concurring opinion says the record doesn’t support a key

premise of our analysis, which is that the magistrate judge concluded it

was necessary for Turner to shoot at Briscoe to avoid being shot. Post, at 7.

But even the State agreed at oral argument with Turner’s characterization

that the judge concluded Turner confronted a “shoot or be shot”

predicament. Pet. to Trans. at 4, 11; Oral Argument at 19:40–20:21 (the

State agreeing that the judge concluded that Briscoe was lying and was in

fact pointing a gun at Turner). After all, the conclusion that Turner had to

shoot Briscoe to avoid being shot is what led the judge to say Turner

“probably made the right choice.” Tr. at 142. Obviously, shooting Briscoe

would not be the right choice if it wasn’t necessary.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 18 of 24

Because the magistrate judge agreed with Turner that his only choices

were to shoot or be shot, we agree with Turner’s argument that the self-

defense statute justified his shooting.

IV. All the limits our case law recognizes for the

self-defense justification remain.

Our decision today is not a revision or expansion of Indiana’s self-

defense law. Rather, it reflects that an unusual fact pattern—the sort

which is usually only the subject of academic hypothesizing—enlivens a

typically dormant statutory provision. See generally 2 Paul H. Robinson,

Crim. L. Def. § 122 (2024) (“But the question of whether the justified actor

who acts without the requisite purpose or knowledge should be

exculpated, is clearly independent of the question of whether the

mistakenly unjustified actor should be.”); id. (describing case law

addressing facts like those here as “rare”). Still, the legislature’s

recognition of a robust self-defense justification remains tempered by

important limits.

A. The legislature recognizes a “robust” self-defense

justification.

The State worries our interpretation of the self-defense statute will

encourage a new Wild West, shoot first and ask questions later mentality.

But of course it is the legislature rather than the courts setting the policy.

And the legislature explained at the beginning of the self-defense statute

that it was leaning into the “robust self-defense rights that citizens of this

state have always enjoyed.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a).

In any event, the State’s own approach results in shooting first and

asking questions later. What differs is who gets shot and what questions

we’re asking. If Turner behaved as the State says he should have, then

Briscoe would have shot him first, and the courts would be analyzing the

legal questions surrounding charges against Briscoe.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 19 of 24

The State’s concern also seems to reflect a misunderstanding of the role

hindsight plays here. Turner’s shooting was justified only because he was

right; he really was about to be shot. But it would not be justified if it

turned out he was wrong.

Suppose for example that the driver turned out to be an innocent food

delivery driver who was in a hurry, a reckless teenager who enjoyed

squealing their tires, or even an unarmed Briscoe who was just trying to

startle Turner. Then the shooting wouldn’t be justified under the statute.

Shooting at the car wouldn’t have been necessary for Turner to protect

himself, so the core self-defense justification wouldn’t apply. And we

would have to defer to the trial court’s evidence-based conclusion that the

mistake wasn’t reasonable, so the statutory grace for reasonable mistakes

discussed in Section II wouldn’t apply to justify the shooting either. See,

e.g., Hall v. State, 231 N.E.3d 868, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (rejecting the

self-defense justification where the defendant claimed he shot the victim

to defend against the victim swinging a knife, “but no knife was found at

the scene,” and the jury concluded the defendant did not reasonably fear a

knife), trans. denied. By foreclosing any grace for even honest yet

unreasonable mistakes, there is no incentive for reckless behavior.

B. There are several important limits on the self-

defense justification.

Our case law recognizes several other important limits on the self-

defense justification that today’s opinion does not change.

First, the self-defense justification still requires that the defendant “was

in a place where he had a right to be” and “acted without fault.” Larkin v.

State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021). “A person who provokes, instigates,

or participates willingly in the violence does not act without fault for the

purposes of self-defense.” Richardson v. State, 79 N.E.3d 958, 964 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2017). For example, we’ve rejected the self-defense justification

where the defendant claimed that he feared violent retribution that was

provoked by his own “initial confrontation and violent epithet.” Henson v.

State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. 2003). Here, Turner had a right to be at

Grice’s house, and he was fleeing rather than confronting Briscoe.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 20 of 24

Second, a self-defense justification cannot be based on a mere verbal

threat because “oftentimes combatants make threats of violence which are

never carried out.” Id. Relatedly, the feared harm must be imminent. Just a

few months ago, we denied transfer in a case where the Court of Appeals

affirmed a murder conviction over a self-defense claim. The victims had

previously, and repeatedly, threatened to kill the defendant—including

showing up to his workplace and pointing a gun at him—and then they

showed up armed to a gas station where the defendant was a customer.

Harris v. State, 239 N.E.3d 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Seconds

after they entered the gas station, the defendant shot and killed them.

Neither the trial court nor appellate court doubted the sincerity of the

defendant’s subjective fear of the victims, but the courts concluded the

defendant did not face an imminent threat, and it wasn’t reasonable for

him to fear violence was imminent. Like this case, appellate review

required deference to the trial court’s decision that the defendant’s fear

was not reasonable. But unlike this case—where the trial court concluded

Briscoe was about to shoot Turner—the trial court in Harris concluded that

shooting the victims was not necessary for the defendant to avoid an

imminent threat of harm because the victims had not yet seen the

defendant. Id.

Third, “[w]hen a defendant arms himself or herself with a weapon

before an imminent threat exists in a premeditated strategy to retaliate for

past violence (rather than to protect against the imminent use of unlawful

force),” self-defense does not justify using force. Henson, 786 N.E.2d at 278.

That is because “[w]hile the criminal code is willing to excuse the use of

force in certain circumstances to protect against certain unlawful activity,

it does not countenance and will not sanction premeditated retaliation for

past violence.” Id. Turner only armed himself because he correctly

believed he was in danger, not in retaliation for any past disagreement.

Fourth, “[w]here a person has used more force than necessary to repel

an attack the right to self-defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result

is that the victim then becomes the perpetrator.” Weedman v. State, 21

N.E.3d 873, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Turner stopped shooting when

Briscoe drove away, using no more force than necessary.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 21 of 24

Our concurring colleague is “skeptical” that these limits remain after

today’s opinion, offering this hypothetical to illustrate why:

Take, for example, a defendant who, while idling at a stop

light, encounters his rival in an adjacent vehicle—a rival known

to frequently carry a gun. If the rival lowers his window to lob

threats of violence but fails to reveal a weapon, what’s to stop

our hypothetical defendant from responding by firing his own

gun into the rival’s car?

Post, at 5.

Ironically, this point is made in an opinion concurring in the judgment

and agreeing that Turner’s shooting was justified when he confronted the

essential facts of the hypothetical. Briscoe is the “rival known to

frequently carry a gun” who decided to “lob threats of violence but

fail[ed] to reveal a weapon.” Id. Turner then “respond[ed] by firing his

own gun into the rival’s car.” Id.

So it is true, as the concurring opinion observes, that “with today’s

decision, the defendant”—both in Turner’s case and in the hypothetical—

“need neither observe an imminent threat of harm nor reasonably believe

in the presence of such threat.” Post, at 5. But that is true under the

concurring opinion too, which also concludes Turner’s shooting was

justified even though our concurring colleague acknowledges Turner

didn’t know what Briscoe looked like, didn’t know what kind of car

Briscoe drove, couldn’t see inside Briscoe’s car, and never saw a gun.

The key difference between the two opinions is that the Court’s opinion

vacates the conviction only because Turner’s fear proved accurate in

hindsight—the magistrate judge concluded Turner had to shoot Briscoe to

avoid being shot. Because the magistrate judge concluded that Turner’s

fear was unreasonable, we would not set aside the conviction if that fear

proved unfounded. In contrast, the concurring opinion concludes that

Turner’s shooting would have been justified even if it was unnecessary;

even if it turned out that Turner mistakenly shot a completely innocent

bystander. That approach, which shows no deference to the trial court’s

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 22 of 24

evaluation of reasonableness, would dramatically expand the self-defense

justification and contract our appellate deference to trial court evidence

weighing.

Still, there is important overlap between this opinion and the

concurring opinion. The concurring opinion says that to “avoid” “creating

uncertainty in the law” and “leading to potentially harmful consequences

for Hoosiers,” we should “adhere to the principle set forth in Trogdon—a

principle endorsed by modern scholars of the criminal law.” Post, at 7.

That is, we must “stress[] that privilege of self-defense does not accrue

until there is the appearance of danger, either real or imaginary,” and

“insist[] that a defendant must actually believe in the necessity for force,”

and “that he has no defense when he intentionally kills his enemy in

complete ignorance of the fact that his enemy, when killed, was about to

launch a deadly attack upon him.” Id. (emphasis in original, quotations

and citations omitted). We agree, and Turner’s shooting was within these

limits.

As both opinions reflect, the legislature’s statutory protection for the

“robust self-defense rights that citizens of this state have always enjoyed”

has important limits. I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a). But none of those limits require

martyrdom in service of reasonableness. So Turner didn’t have to take a

bullet as the most reasonable thing to do; the law permitted him to save

his own life.

Conclusion

For these reasons, we vacate Turner’s conviction and sentence.

Rush, C.J., and Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur.

Goff, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 23 of 24

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Bryan L. Cook

Attorney at Law

Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Alexandria Sons

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 24 of 24

Goff, J., concurring in the judgment.

Should the merits of a self-defense claim depend on the defendant

having acted with knowledge of the justifying circumstances, even if his

conduct is objectively justified in hindsight? Facing this very question well

over a century ago, this Court held that a defendant who acted out of no

apparent necessity to preserve life or limb may not “interpose the defense

of self-defense” simply because it “subsequently appears that there was

actual danger, of which he was at the time ignorant.” Trogdon v. State, 32

N.E. 725, 727 (Ind. 1892).

The Court today reaches the opposite conclusion, holding sua sponte

that, under an obscure and otherwise dormant provision of our self-

defense statute, “Turner’s use of force was justified not because his belief

that he was about to be shot was reasonable but because that belief was

correct, and force really was necessary to protect himself.” Ante, at 17.

Defendants like Turner, the Court opines, enjoy “the benefit of hindsight”

when the evidence “reveals their conduct was necessary in self-defense,

even though that necessity wasn’t fully apparent in the moment.” Id. at 3.

In my view, the statutory provision on which the Court relies is less

than clear. And its novel interpretation, I fear, will create uncertainty in

the law, leading to potentially harmful consequences. What’s more, even

if I were to agree with the Court’s interpretation, its holding rests on a

flawed premise—there’s simply nothing in the record to support the

conclusion that “Turner avoided being shot by Briscoe only by shooting

Briscoe first.” See ante, at 8. For these reasons, and because I believe the

Court’s novel statutory interpretation is entirely unnecessary to give

Turner relief, I concur only in the Court’s judgment.

I. The Court’s decision lacks supporting authority,

creates legal uncertainty, and rests on a false

premise.

Under Indiana’s self-defense statute, a “person is justified in using

reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 1 of 12

person” from what he or she “reasonably believes to be the imminent use

of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). The statute further justifies

the use of “deadly force” and imposes no duty to retreat if the person

“reasonably believes” that such force is “necessary to prevent serious

bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a

forcible felony.” Id. Finally, the statute concludes by stating that “[n]o

person, employer, or estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal

jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third

person by reasonable means necessary.” Id.

The Court’s decision turns on this last sentence of the statute—the

Legal Jeopardy Clause (or just Clause), as I refer to it.

A. Well-settled principles of statutory interpretation

undermine the Court’s novel reading of the Clause.

According to the Court, the Legal Jeopardy Clause simply codifies the

“core self-defense justification” for a person facing prosecution, and it

extends that protection to those facing “derivative liability.” Ante, at 13.

With this much, I agree. But the Court doesn’t stop there. Instead, it goes

on to conclude that, because the only reference to reasonableness relates to

the “means used” for protection, the Clause reflects an “objective

standard,” so justification for self-defense depends only on “the accuracy

of the defendant’s belief, not its reasonableness.” Id. at 14.

I’m left unpersuaded.

To begin with, while the “words” of the Clause themselves may be

unambiguous when read in isolation, see id. at 13, precedent instructs us to

“avoid interpretations that depend on selective reading of individual

words,” especially when such interpretations “lead to irrational and

disharmonizing results.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62

N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016) (citation omitted). Instead, we must consider

“the structure of the statute as a whole.” Id. (citation omitted). Applying

this well-settled principle of statutory interpretation, the Clause’s “core

self-defense justification,” in my view—and as the statute as a whole

contemplates—turns on whether the person “reasonably believes” the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 2 of 12

circumstances call for the use of force. See I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). By focusing

on the absence of this language in a single sentence of the statute, and by

reading the Clause in isolation, the Court undermines the “statute’s

underlying policy and goals.” See Culver Cmty. Tchrs. Ass’n v. Ind. Educ.

Emp. Rels. Bd., 174 N.E.3d 601, 605 (Ind. 2021). Reading the Clause with the

rest of subsection (c), by contrast, shows the statute was intended to

require reasonable belief, even when the justification is proven accurate in

hindsight.

Second, the legislature clearly spelled out when using reasonable force

or deadly force is “justified.” See I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). Critically, there’s no

similar language in the Clause itself—a contiguous provision under the

same statutory subsection. See id. It seems evident, then, that, had the

legislature intended to create an accurate-in-hindsight justification, “it

could have easily done so with slight modification to the wording of the

statute” or it could have structured the Clause as a separate subsection.

See Sullivan Corp. v. Rabco Enters., LLC, 160 N.E.3d 1124, 1127 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Paul H. Robinson, The Unknowingly

Justified Actor—Knowledge, Purpose, and Motive in Justifications, 2 Crim. L.

Def. § 122(f), at 28 (1984) (citing statutes with and without “belief”

language and urging legislatures to clearly distinguish between the

“excuse of an actor who is mistakenly unjustified and the justification of

an actor who is unknowingly justified”).

Finally, as noted above, this Court has held that a defendant who acted

out of no apparent necessity to preserve life or limb may not “interpose

the defense of self-defense” simply because it “subsequently appears that

there was actual danger, of which he was at the time ignorant.” Trogdon,

32 N.E. at 727. The legislature, of course, may enact statutes that modify or

abrogate the common law. State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Ind.

1992). But we presume the contrary “unless a statute declares otherwise in

either express terms or by unmistakable implication.” WEOC, Inc. v.

Niebauer, 226 N.E.3d 771, 777 (Ind. 2024) (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted). And, as I see it, nothing in the Clause meets this standard.

Simply because the sole reference to reasonableness attaches to the

“means” used by the defendant, it does not necessarily follow that the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 3 of 12

justification for use of force depends only on “the accuracy of the

defendant’s belief” in hindsight. See ante, at 14.

The Court insists that its decision here aligns with Trogdon because

there, like here, the Court concluded that a defendant cannot point to

actual danger to justify his actions in hindsight when he “deliberately and

maliciously kill[s] another.” Id. at 15. But the holding in Trogdon wasn’t so

limited, as multiple commentators have observed. See Charles A.

Thompson, Commentary to Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2, at 173–74 (West

1978) (citing Trogdon for the general proposition that, absent a “reasonable

belief to justify an assault in self-defense at its inception such assault may

not be subsequently justified by a finding of actual danger which was

unknown to the defendant at the time of the initial assault”); Note,

Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 566, 591

& n.106 (1961) (citing Trogdon for the basic proposition that “the courts

will not justify the use of force, even when necessary for the protection of

the actor, if he was not aware of that necessity”); Robinson, supra, § 122(e),

at 21, 22 n.18 (noting that Trogdon “is one of the few cases that can be cited

to support [the] view” that a person may successfully raise a self-defense

claim “only if they act with a justificatory intent” or with “knowledge of

the justifying circumstances”) (internal quotation marks omitted). And as

the Trogdon Court itself made clear, the “law allows one who is himself

without fault, and is in a place where he has the right to be, to protect

himself from threatened danger,” whether “actual or only apparent,” and

“to use for that purpose such force as may at the time reasonably seem

necessary, and no more.” 32 N.E. at 727 (emphasis added).

B. The Court’s novel interpretation of the Clause creates

uncertainty in the law and may lead to potentially

harmful consequences.

The Court insists that its decision here is “not a revision or expansion of

Indiana’s self-defense law.” Ante, at 19. But, as I see it, that’s precisely

what the Court’s decision accomplishes. The Court itself acknowledges

that, before today, “no court has interpreted” the Legal Jeopardy Clause

“in a reported decision.” Id. at 13. And were it not for its novel reading of

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 4 of 12

this Clause, the Court “would have to affirm” the trial court’s decision

under our deferential standard of review. Id. at 12. In other words, the

Court’s interpretation of otherwise dormant language under our self-

defense statute creates a novel approach to analyzing self-defense claims

that may lead to a different outcome (like here) depending on the fact

pattern of a case.

To be sure, we’re often called upon to interpret or reinterpret our

statutes in novel ways, ultimately building upon our jurisprudence in a

given area of the law. See, e.g., Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1139 (Ind.

2022) (interpreting our burglary statute to conclude, as a matter of first

impression, that the offense is an “ongoing” one “that encompasses a

defendant’s conduct so long as he remains in the premises”); Ladra v. State,

177 N.E.3d 412, 418 (Ind. 2021) (reinterpreting a provision of the Indiana

Tort Claims Act to avoid granting “blanket immunity to the state in every

circumstance involving inclement weather”). But neither Turner nor the

State advocated for a reading of the self-defense statute the Court now

espouses. And we should be reluctant to adopt a theory without the

exchange and vigorous testing of arguments by the parties in interest.

Absent such analytical safeguards, today’s decision threatens to open a

Pandora’s Box of unintended—and potentially harmful—consequences.

Still, the Court assures us otherwise, downplaying any concern that its

interpretation of the statute “will encourage a new Wild West.” Ante, at

19. I remain skeptical.

Take, for example, a defendant who, while idling at a stop light,

encounters his rival in an adjacent vehicle—a rival known to frequently

carry a gun. If the rival lowers his window to lob threats of violence but

fails to reveal a weapon, what’s to stop our hypothetical defendant from

responding by firing his own gun into the rival’s car? The Court submits

that a self-defense justification cannot rest on a “mere verbal threat

because ‘oftentimes combatants make threats of violence which are never

carried out.’” Id. at 21 (quoting Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind.

2003)). But with today’s decision, the defendant need neither observe an

imminent threat of harm nor reasonably believe in the presence of such

threat. Even if the rival never intended to carry out his verbal threats, the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-147 | March 12, 2025 Page 5 of 12

shooting may still be justified if a gun were later discovered in the rival’s

car (at least one within the rival’s reach). See State v. Hendrix, 244 S.E.2d

503, 508 (S.C. 1978) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing Trogdon for the

proposition that the belief requirement “prevents a defendant from

deliberately and maliciously killing his fellow man and then interposing

the defense of self-defense because it subsequently appears there was

actual danger”). Such an approach runs contrary to a “basic proposition”

of our criminal law—that “control over criminal behavior can best be

achieved by reference to the state of mind of the actor rather than the

consequences of his act.” Note, supra, at 591.

The Court points to other “important limits on the self-defense

justification” in its effort to quell fears over its reading of the Clause. Ante,

at 20. I’m still left unpersuaded. For example, the Court insists that the

“right to self-defense is extinguished” when a person uses “more force

than necessary to repel an attack.” Id. at 21 (quoting Weedman v. State, 21

N.E.3d 873, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). But if the necessity of the

defendant’s conduct “wasn’t fully apparent in the moment,” see id. at 3,

how does he—or a court for that matter—determine whether the force

used is in fact proportional to the threat?

Another limitation, the Court stresses, arises when a “defendant arms

himself or herself with a weapon before an imminent threat exists in a

premeditated strategy to retaliate for past violence (rather than to protect

against the imminent use of unlawful force).” Id. at 21 (quoting Henson,

786 N.E.2d at 278). But if the “core self-defense” justification embodied in

the Clause depends on “the accuracy of the defendant’s belief, not its

reasonableness,” see id. at 14, then arguably “no subjective mental elements

should play a part in the formulation of justification defenses,” see

Robinson, supra, § 122(f), at 27. If the result is justified (protection from an

imminent threat of serious bodily harm), then why make any distinction

between the unknowingly justified actor and the improperly motivated

one? See id. (suggesting that “an objectively justified actor should have a

justification defense no matter what knowledge, purpose, disregard, or

ignorance he may have”).

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The Court’s decision fails to address these issues, creating uncertainty

in the law and leading to potentially harmful consequences for Hoosiers.

To avoid such an outcome, I would adhere to the principle set forth in

Trogdon—a principle endorsed by modern scholars of the criminal law.

See, e.g., Thompson, supra, at 174 (stressing that the “privilege of self-

defense does not accrue until there is the appearance of danger, either real

or imaginary”); Wayne R. LaFave, Reasonable Belief in Necessity for Force, 2

Substantive Crim. L. § 10.4(c), at 203–04 (3d ed. 2018) (insisting that a

“defendant must actually believe in the necessity for force,” adding that he

“has no defense when he intentionally kills his enemy in complete

ignorance of the fact that his enemy, when killed, was about to launch a

deadly attack upon him”).

C. Even if the Court’s interpretation were agreeable, its

holding rests on a flawed premise.

Even if I were to agree that the Legal Jeopardy Clause justifies the

actions of an unknowingly justified defendant, the Court’s holding rests

on a flawed premise—namely, that “Turner avoided being shot by Briscoe

only by shooting Briscoe first.” See ante, at 8. According to the Court,

“Turner’s use of force was justified not because his belief that he was

about to be shot was reasonable but because that belief was correct, and

force really was necessary to protect himself.” Id. at 17. The Court reaches

this conclusion based on the trial judge’s purported determination that

“Briscoe was lying when he testified, and he had drawn his gun to shoot

Turner just before Turner shot him first.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court

echoes this point throughout its opinion, claiming that “Briscoe was aiming

a handgun to shoot Turner just before Turner began firing.” Id. at 2

(emphasis added); see also id. at 5 (insisting that Briscoe was “aiming to

shoot Turner”); id. at 12 (suggesting that Briscoe had “been preparing to

shoot” Turner).

The problem is the record doesn’t support this conclusion. The only

determination the trial court reached was that, given the fact that his gun

was found unholstered in the passenger seat, Briscoe “likely dr[e]w his

gun inside of that car and probably had bad intent.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 126. But

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unholstering a gun with “bad intent” is not the same as “aiming a handgun

to shoot” someone. And the trial court drew no inference to the contrary.

For all we know, and for all the trial judge knew, Briscoe could have

drawn his gun from the holster not with the goal of pulling the trigger but,

rather, with the purpose of brandishing it to scare Turner into fleeing.

Still, the Court insists that “even the State agreed” the trial court

“concluded Turner confronted a ‘shoot or be shot’ predicament.” Ante, at

18 (citing Pet. to Trans. at 4, 11). But the State clarified its position at oral

argument, expressly “disagree[ing]” with the proposition that the “judge

found that Briscoe was pointing the gun at Turner.” Though

acknowledging the trial court had found that Briscoe “had drawn his

gun,” the State characterized as “pure speculation” the judge’s “comment

that he believed that [Briscoe] was pointing the gun.” Oral Argument at

19:47–20:22.

Simply put, there is no basis in the record or reasonable inference from

the evidence to support the Court’s conclusion that “Turner avoided being

shot by Briscoe only by shooting Briscoe first.” See ante, at 8.

II. Under the “reasonable belief” standard, the

circumstances here justified Turner’s actions.

Finally, the Court’s novel interpretation of the statute, in my view, is

entirely unnecessary to give Turner relief.

In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-

defense, the standard of review is the same for any sufficiency-of-the-

evidence claim: an appellate court neither reweighs the evidence nor

judges the credibility of witnesses, leaving the verdict undisturbed if

sufficient evidence of probative value supports the factfinder’s conclusion.

Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). If the defendant stands

convicted of the charged offense despite a claim of self-defense, reversal is

warranted only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was

negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 800–01.

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Here, Turner isn’t asking this Court to reweigh the evidence or assess

the credibility of witnesses. Appellant’s Br. at 12. He argues instead that

the trial court, while making the proper findings of fact, misinterpreted

and misapplied Indiana’s self-defense statute. Id. The law, he contends,

requires “only reasonable knowledge and belief that the use of self-

defense is justified,” not “perfect knowledge and belief.” Pet. to Trans. at

4. And his fear of death or bodily harm was reasonable, he insists, given

the “direct evidence of serious threats by Briscoe against Turner paired

with strong circumstantial evidence that the erratically driven car was

being driven by Briscoe to carry out his declared threats.” Reply in

Support of Trans. at 4.

I agree.

Indiana’s self-defense statute establishes “both an objective and

subjective standard” to evaluate the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief

that force was necessary to protect against the imminent use of unlawful

force. Littler v. State, 871 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 2007) (internal citation

omitted). Under the subjective standard, the defendant must have

“actually believed” force was necessary. Id. And under the objective

standard, the defendant’s belief must be one that a “reasonable person”

would form given the circumstances. Id.

Applying these standards, the circumstances here, in my view, clearly

justify Turner’s actions: he knew that Briscoe owned a gun; he overheard

Briscoe make angry, profanity-laced remarks to Nyah (his study partner)

over the phone; Briscoe threatened to “pull up on” Turner, which Turner

understood to mean that he’d be “coming to harm” him; and, not long

after that tense exchange, a vehicle sped up to Turner—its engine revving

and tires squealing—just as Turner had walked away from his own car

parked in the cul-de-sac of a suburban, residential neighborhood. Tr. Vol.

2, pp. 89–90.

Though Turner couldn’t definitively say whether it was Briscoe in the

car or whether Briscoe was pointing a gun at him, as the trial court

stressed, the law didn’t require him to. The touchstone of self-defense is

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reasonable belief, not absolute certainty.1 See Brand v. State, 766 N.E.2d 772,

781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted) (noting that a defendant’s belief

of “apparent danger” does not require that the danger be actual—only

that the belief be in good faith). And Turner testified that, given the

circumstances, he believed it “had to be” Briscoe “pulling up,” that there

was “[no] way it wasn’t.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 91, 103 (emphases added). In short,

Turner wasn’t acting based on “threats alone,” as the trial court found,

but, rather, on the circumstances before him at the time, which he

reasonably believed placed him in grave danger. See Brown v. State, 265

N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ind. 1971) (reasonableness of a defendant’s actions must

be analyzed based on what he knew “at the time”).

To be sure, Turner stood in the driveway while Briscoe’s car stopped on

the street at the edge of the driveway. But that didn’t necessarily remove

Turner from imminent danger. To the contrary, the distance between them

was relatively short, and the car could have easily accelerated and struck

Turner or run him over. Indeed, Turner testified at trial that, just as he

stepped onto the driveway, the car was “right on [his] heels,” leading him

to “believe” that if he “were to stop,” the car “would keep going and hit

[him].” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 91. What’s more, given his knowledge that Briscoe

owned a gun, and given his conviction that Briscoe occupied the car,

Turner—in his mind—was faced with either acting to protect himself or

waiting until Briscoe ran him over or drew his weapon to fire. With “no

cover” and “nowhere to hide” from these perceived threats, id. at 92

(emphases added), Turner’s fear of death or bodily harm at the time was

reasonable, thus justifying his actions.2 Cf. Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367,

1As the Court points out, “a person is justified in using force to defend against someone

pointing an unloaded gun if the person in fear reasonably believes the gun is loaded.” Ante, at

11. Under the standard applied by the trial court, by contrast, no person could successfully

claim self-defense if they couldn’t definitively say whether the assailant’s pointed gun was

loaded. Cf. Hall v. State, 166 N.E.3d 406, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (rejecting a self-defense claim

where the victim possessed a gun but made no “threatening gestures toward anyone” and

had earlier “proclaimed more than once that she did not have any bullets”).

2The attached exhibit, an overhead picture of the cul-de-sac layout in which the events

unfolded, illustrates Turner’s predicament.

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377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that self-defense claim failed where the

evidence “clear[ly]” showed that the defendant “was able to leave” her

aggressors and “was no longer under physical threat when she retrieved

her gun” before returning to shoot).

In short, given his repeated—and unwavering—testimony that he “just

knew” it was Briscoe in the car, that he “believe[ed]” he was in harm’s

way, and that he “knew” he had to act to prevent that harm, Turner

clearly met the subjective standard of our self-defense statute. Tr. Vol. 2, p.

91. And with the trial judge’s admission that he may “have done the same

thing” under the circumstances, id. at 127, Turner likewise met the

statute’s objective standard. Though there may be evidence to support the

trial court’s findings that Turner “couldn’t see inside of this car” and

“couldn’t see a gun,” id. at 126, the standard imposed by the court—one

akin to requiring an irrebuttable knowledge of imminent harm—simply

asks too much of a defendant to justify his actions.

Conclusion

For the reasons above, I concur only in the Court’s judgment.

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