The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
SEPTEMBER SESSION, 1998
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) No. 03C01-9708-CR-00358
vs.
Appellee )
)
)
FILED
ROANE and MORGAN COUNTIES
) Hon. E. Eugene Eblen, Judge
October 13, 1998
MARK GRIFFIS, )
) (Community Corrections Revocation)
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellant ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Joe Walker John Knox Walkup
Walter B. Johnson, II Attorney General and Reporter
P. O. Box 334
Harriman, TN 37748 Todd R. Kelley
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Charles E. Hawk
District Attorney General
Dennis Humphrey
Asst. District Attorney General
P. O. Box 703
Kingston, TN 37763
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Mark Griffis, appeals the judgments of the Criminal Courts of
Roane and Morgan Counties revoking his placement in the local Community
Corrections program. Prior to his revocation, the appellant was serving an eight
year Community Corrections sentence from Roane County and a three year
Community Corrections sentence from Morgan County. The appellant argues, on
appeal, that the conditions, which he does not deny violating, were merely technical
in nature, thus, the trial court’s revocation of his Community Corrections sentences
constituted an abuse of discretion.
After review, we affirm.
Analysis
In April 1995, the appellant pled guilty in Roane County to the class B felony
sale of cocaine and received an eight year Community Corrections sentence. In
November 1995, he was convicted of aggravated burglary and theft of property in
Morgan County and received a concurrent three year Community Corrections
sentence.
In April 1997, a warrant issued charging the appellant with violation of Rules
6, 10, 16, and 21 of his behavioral contract, i.e., the appellant (6) failed to make
scheduled payments on fines, (10) failed to report to his Community Corrections
officer, (16) failed to report changes in his residence, and (21) failed to report an
arrest for aggravated burglary and theft over one thousand dollars to his Community
Corrections officer. Finding the alleged violations supported by the proof, the trial
2
court revoked the appellant’s Community Corrections sentences and ordered that
the balance of his sentences be served in the Department of Correction.1
The law concerning revocation of a Community Corrections sentence is clear.
The trial court has the discretion to revoke a community corrections sentence upon
a finding that the defendant has violated the conditions of his behavioral contract.
State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). However, before a defendant
may be revoked, the record must contain sufficient evidence to permit the trial court
to make an intelligent and conscientious decision. Id. On appeal, the trial court’s
decision will not be disturbed absent a finding that the trial court abused its
discretion. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d at 82. To find an abuse of discretion, the reviewing
court must conclude that the record contains no substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trial court that the defendant violated the terms of the community
corrections program. Id.
At the revocation hearing, the State presented the testimony of Frank Tucker,
the appellant’s Community Corrections officer, who related the circumstances
surrounding the alleged violations. The appellant offered the testimony of his
fiancee, Deanie Brown, not to refute the occurrence of the violations, but to offer
reasonable explanations for them. Accordingly, the record provides ample proof to
support the trial court’s finding that the violations occurred.
Moreover, the appellant’s argument that revocation is not proper because the
violations were only technical in nature is clearly without merit. The behavioral
contract setting forth the conditions of his Community Corrections sentences makes
1
We note that the trial court’s “Order of Revocation . . .” in Roane County case #10712
reflects that the appellant was resentenced to the Community Corrections program. Obviously, as
evidenced by the transcript of the revocation hearing and the fact that neither party disputes the
appellant’s sentence to the Department of Correction, this is merely a clerical mistake. Such
clerical errors may be remedied by motion in the trial court pursuant to Rule 36 of the Tennessee
Rules o f Crim inal Proce dure. See State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W .2d 834, 8 37 (Te nn.199 6).
3
no distinction between what the appellant refers to as a “technical” violation versus a
“non-technical” violation. The contract does provide that “Mark Griffis further
understands that failure to comply with any portion of this contract may result in a
warrant being filed for immediate arrest. . . .” (Emphasis added). In plain language,
a violation irrespective of its nature remains a violation.
Upon review of the record before us, we conclude that the record contains
more than sufficient proof to enable the trial court to make an intelligent and
conscientious decision. As we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
4