Georgewill v. CMH Homes Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

BIOBELE GEORGEWILL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:25-cv-22-TRM-MJD

)

CMH HOMES, INC., d/b/a Clayton Homes )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Biobele Georgewill (“Plaintiff”) filed this case pro se and without payment of

fees. Plaintiff has filed a complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) [Doc. 1].

This is the third of three lawsuits Plaintiff has filed in this Court in less than one month, all filed

pro se and without payment of the administrative filing fee. All three cases relate to the same

dispute over the sale and installation of a mobile home, and all three cases name the same

defendant, an entity Plaintiff identifies as CMH Homes, Inc., d/b/a Clayton Homes (“Clayton

Homes”).1

The first-filed federal case, no. 1:24-cv-400, has already been dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915. As set forth below, the Court also recommends dismissal in the instant case

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The IFP motion [Doc. 1] should be denied as moot.2

1 As explained below, this is actually Plaintiff’s fourth lawsuit against Clayton Homes related to

the same facts. The first one was filed in the McMinn County Circuit Court some time in 2024.

2 In a separate report and recommendation entered contemporaneously herewith, the Court

likewise recommends dismissal of related Case No. 1:25-cv-16. The two reports and

recommendations are identical in terms of substance; each one addresses both currently pending

cases.

Before explaining the applicable standards for IFP screening under § 1915 and addressing

Plaintiff’s claims in the instant case, the Court hereby FOREWARNS Plaintiff that if she

continues to engage in this pattern of filing repetitive lawsuits (and motions, supplements, etc.)

over a very short span of time, or if she otherwise submits vexatious, harassing, or frivolous filings,

which require the Court to dedicate its scarce resources to review and screen, she may be enjoined

and required to seek the Court’s permission before filing any future pleadings or lawsuits. See,

e.g., Smith v. Akron City Council, Nos. 98-3389, 98-3465, 1999 WL 183409, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.

16, 1999) (“A district court has the authority to issue an injunctive order to prevent prolific litigants

from filing pleadings without first obtaining court approval to do so.” (citing Feathers v. Chevron

USA, Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998))).

I. STANDARDS

A plaintiff may commence a civil action in federal court without prepaying the

administrative costs of the suit if the plaintiff demonstrates she is financially unable to do so. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, a district court is required to dismiss the civil action, or portion thereof,

if the court determines the complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or if the IFP plaintiff seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

The standard required by § 1915(e)(2) to properly state a claim for which relief can be

granted is the same standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Brand v.

Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 2008); accord Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir.

2007). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The

complaint need not state “detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007) (citations omitted). But it must contain more than mere “labels and conclusions, . . . a

formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked assertions . . . without further factual

enhancement.” Id. at 555, 557 (citations omitted). In other words, the complaint must contain

sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). Stated differently, “the court must be able to draw a ‘reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” KSR Int’l Co. v. Delphi Auto. Sys., 523 F. App’x

357, 358-59 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

A “frivolous” claim, subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), is one that is based on

“an indisputably meritless legal theory,” or on allegations of “infringement of a legal interest which

clearly does not exist.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 319. Such claims are described as “clearly baseless,”

“fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Id. at 327-28.

In applying these standards, the Court also considers that the pleadings of pro se litigants

are to be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

106 (1976)). Nevertheless, pro se plaintiffs must abide by “basic pleading standards,” and the role

of the court is not to “conjure allegations on a litigant’s behalf.” Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710,

714 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[P]ro se litigants are not

relieved of the duty to develop claims with an appropriate degree of specificity.” Kafele v.

Lerner, Sampson, Rothfuss, L.P.A, 161 F. App’x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2005).

Finally, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. When presented with a case,

federal courts “presume” they lack jurisdiction until the party asserting jurisdiction demonstrates

otherwise. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area School

Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)). Further, if at any time the Court determines it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the Court “must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

II. ANALYSIS

The background facts are described in the report and recommendation [Doc. 10] in Case

No. 1:24-cv-400. In short, the parties allegedly performed under an oral contract for several

months. At some point Clayton Homes presented a written contract for Plaintiff to sign, which

Plaintiff alleges introduced a new provision requiring the parties to first attempt mediation for any

disputes and, if unsuccessful, to submit to binding arbitration. Plaintiff signed the contract, but she

alleges Defendant did not sign the contract, at least not at that time.

The parties’ relationship eventually soured, and Plaintiff filed suit in the McMinn County

Circuit Court (the “State Court”). Clayton Homes moved to stay the case and compel arbitration

and in doing so, it produced a copy of the written agreement now signed by both parties. Plaintiff

alleged in the State Court action that the version produced by Clayton Homes was forged or

fraudulent and that the entire agreement with Clayton Homes was void. After receiving and

considering Plaintiff’s arguments regarding Defendant’s allegedly-forged signature, the State

Court nonetheless concluded the agreement was enforceable as a matter of law and granted Clayton

Homes’ motion, ordered the parties to arbitration, and stayed the case pending the results of the

arbitration [see Case No. 1:24-cv-400, Doc. 18-1]. Thus, the record before the Court clearly

reflects that the State Court has already adjudicated the enforceability of the agreement.

Plaintiff first filed suit in this Court against Clayton Homes on December 31, 2024 (Case

No. 1:24-cv-400). Citing the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, she alleged

Clayton Homes “deprived [her] of a fair hearing” by submitting the allegedly forged/fraudulent

contract to the State Court. For relief, she asked the Court to award monetary damages and to “void

the fraudulent judgment issued against [her]” in the State Court case [Case No. 1:24-cv-400, Doc.

2 at Page ID # 13]. On January 15, 2025, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice

pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine [Case No. 1:24-cv-400, Doc. 16].3 The Court held:

[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims in

this case because it is clear that the source of her alleged injuries is

the underlying state-court judgment. Indeed, Plaintiff’s complaint

requests that the Court “void the fraudulent judgment” entered

against her in state court, order a forensic examination of documents

presented to the state court, and issue an injunction to prevent

Defendant from compelling arbitration ordered by the state court.

Such requested relief demonstrates that the source of Plaintiff’s

alleged injuries is the state-court judgment, and, as a result, the

Court lacks jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s claims under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

[Id.].

Plaintiff then filed Case No. 1:25-cv-16 and the instant case (No. 1:25-cv-22) against

Clayton Homes on January 24, and January 28, 2025, respectively. As mentioned, these two

pending cases are based on the same underlying facts as the first federal case. For example, in Case

No. 1:25-cv-16, Plaintiff contends Defendant’s actions in “submitting an altered contract with the

Defendant’s signature added . . . constitute fraudulent misrepresentation,” and “may constitute

fraudulent conduct” [Case No. 1:25-cv-16, Doc. 2 at Page ID # 14]. She further contends

Defendant “committed fraud by knowingly including a fraudulent arbitration clause in the written

contract, which was never discussed or agreed to during the verbal agreement,” and “intentionally

forged documents to falsely impose the arbitration clause on the Plaintiff” [id. at Page ID # 18]. In

3 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held: “The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court cases which establish that lower federal courts lack

subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court proceedings. The Court has

summarized the doctrine as being designed to prevent a party losing in state court from seeking

what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in the lower federal courts based

on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Pieper

v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).

Case No. 1:25-cv-22, she contends the “forged addition of Defendant’s signature renders the entire

agreement, including the arbitration clause, void and unenforceable.” [Doc. 2-1 at Page ID # 45].

As the legal basis for her claims in Case No. 1:25-cv-16, Plaintiff cites Tennessee Code

Annotated § 47-50-112 (“Contracts in writing as prima facie evidence of intent of parties; written

waiver”), § 29-2-101 (“General provisions” related to Tennessee’s statute of frauds); § 39-14-112

(criminal statute for extortion, which is not recognized as a tort in Tennessee4); § 47-18-104

(Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, prohibiting certain “Unfair or deceptive acts or practices”);

and § 47-18-109(a)(3) (providing treble damages for willful or knowing violations Tennessee

Consumer Protection Act).5 Plaintiff does not directly request that the State Court’s decision

ordering the parties to arbitration be “voided” as she did in the first federal case, presumably

because—as noted in the Court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s first federal case—such relief is

clearly barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Hohenberg v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 68 F.4th 336, 339 (6th

Cir. 2023) (holding that to be applicable, Rooker-Feldman requires a state court judgment, and “an

effort to ‘review’ that judgment, namely to ‘undo’ or ‘overturn’ it” in the federal action).

But in effect, Plaintiff’s claims in Case No. 1:25-cv-16 do seek to “undo” the State Court’s

determination that the written agreement between Plaintiff and Clayton Homes (including the

arbitration provision) is enforceable.6 For example, Plaintiff alleges “the inclusion of the

4 See Montgomery v. Hall, 3:19-cv-0113, 2020 WL 4003769, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. July 15, 2020).

5 In addition, Plaintiff relies on diversity jurisdiction in Case No 1:25-cv-16, asserting Clayton

Homes is “a corporation located in Ringgold, Georgia” [Case No. 1:25-cv-16, Doc. 2 at Page ID

# 15]. Plaintiff does not allege Clayton Homes’ state of incorporation or principal place of

business, which is required for relying on diversity jurisdiction.

6 It appears there were actually two written agreements: a Sales Agreement and a “Binding Dispute

Resolution Agreement.” [See Case No. 1:25-cv-16, Doc. 3-1 at Page ID # 50-58]. For simplicity’s

sake, the Court uses the singular “agreement” herein.

arbitration clause was fraudulent because it was inserted into the contract after the work had

already begun and after the full payment was made.” [Doc. 2 at Page ID # 16]. In her motion for

sanctions in Case No. 1:25-cv-16, Plaintiff alleges “Defendant has engaged in fraudulent conduct

by submitting documents to the Court in an attempt to compel arbitration[.]” [Case No. 1:25-cv-

16, Doc. 3]. These allegations/claims would appear to directly contradict the State Court’s

determination that “there was mutual assert to the terms” of the written agreement, including the

arbitration clause [Case No. 1:24-cv-400, Doc. 18-1 at Page ID # 129-30]. See RLR Invs., LLC v.

City of Pigeon Forge, 4 F.4th 380, 388 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that Rooker-Feldman barred

federal court case because the federal plaintiff “would only prevail” on its federal court claims “if

the state court were wrong,” which meant that the state court’s order was the source of the

plaintiff’s injury); Brown v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, No. CV 08-00779 MMM (shx), 2008

WL 2128057, at *5 n.37 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2008) (“the Browns de facto seek relief from an

adverse state court ruling” by challenging aspects of the state court’s order compelling arbitration

in federal court); Mailly v. Wachovia Corp., No. 1:03CV309, 2004 WL 601654, at *3 (M.D.N.C.

Mar. 9, 2004) (“As reflected by its order compelling arbitration, the state court already found a

valid arbitration clause governing the disputes regarding Ms. Mailly’s account. Therefore, Ms.

Mailly is, in essence, seeking review of the state court’s order to compel arbitration, and the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies[.]”). Cf. Talbot v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 19-10214, 2019

WL 4166921, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2019) (citing cases and noting the “Sixth Circuit

repeatedly has held that a suit premised on independently fraudulent conduct by a defendant, not

comprising a direct attack on [the state court judgment], is not barred by Rooker-Feldman.”

(emphasis added)).

Indeed, the State Court specifically rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the arbitration

provision was unenforceable due to Defendant’s alleged fraud:

The Plaintiff has taken the position that because she never

actually saw Ms. Robinson execute the aforesaid Agreements on

behalf of the Defendant after the Plaintiff executed the Agreements,

the Agreements are “fraudulent” and/or the result of a “forgery”

and/or “alteration.” As such, the Plaintiff alleges in her Motion to

Strike Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration filed on

September 9, 2024 that the “entire contract” or Agreements are

“void” and that there is no “binding Agreement.”

. . . .

. . . . However, and significantly, even if the Defendant never

executed the Agreements, this Court finds that pursuant to . . .

Tennessee law . . . , there was mutual assent to the terms of the

Agreements, and the Defendant sufficiently manifested its assent to

be bound by the Agreements. Again, it is undisputed that the

Plaintiff signed the Agreements at issue. It is also undisputed that

the Plaintiff offered approximately $160,000.00 to purchase a

mobile home from the Defendant. It is further undisputed that the

Defendant accepted the Plaintiff’s offer and sold the Plaintiff a

mobile home. It is likewise undisputed that the Defendant delivered

the mobile home to Plaintiff’s property. It is also undisputed that the

parties have attended mediation, which is the prerequisite to

arbitration, and is consistent with the terms of the Binding Dispute

Resolution Agreement. Moreover, and once again, the Plaintiff in

her original Complaint alleged that she “completed the purchase of

a home from Clayton Homes.”

[Doc. 18-1 at Page ID # 130]. In other words, the judgment of the State Court was to uphold the

agreement and order the parties to arbitration. Plaintiff cannot prevail on her fraud (and related)

claims in this case without “undoing” that judgment.

In the instant case (No. 1:25-cv-22), Plaintiff’s third federal case, Plaintiff explicitly asks

the Court to: “Declare the arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable;” “Declare that

Defendant’s signature on the agreement was improperly added and constitutes a forgery, rendering

the entire agreement void;” and to “Order that Defendant be precluded from compelling arbitration

under the invalid agreement” [Case No. 1:25-cv-22, Doc. 2-1]. As explained in Case No. 1:24-cv-

400, such relief is clearly barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Pieper, 336 F.3d at 464 (“If Pieper were

permitted to circumvent the state court’s order staying litigation and compelling arbitration, so

could any party who is forced by a state court to arbitrate its disputes. Any party dissatisfied with

a state court’s order compelling arbitration and staying litigation could simply file a federal

lawsuit, claiming that the state court’s order . . . violated his . . . rights.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds Rooker-Feldman prevents this Court from asserting

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims asserted in either of the two currently-pending related federal

cases. Furthermore, given the nature of her claim and the relief she seeks, this Court finds it would

be futile and a waste of the Court’s resources to grant Plaintiff leave to amend either of her

complaints to attempt to state a claim over which this Court has jurisdiction. See Aumueller v.

Ottawa Cnty. 58th Dist. Court, No. 1:07-CV-1171, 2008 WL 52479, at *1-2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 2,

2008) (dismissing case without leave to amend based on application of Rooker-Feldman).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court RECOMMENDS7 this case be DISMISSED

and closed, and Plaintiff’s IFP motion [Doc. 1] and motion for sanctions [Doc. 3] be DENIED AS

MOOT, with no filing fee assessed against Plaintiff.

ENTER:

7 Any objections to this report and recommendation must be served and filed within 14 days after

service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party. Such objections must

conform to the requirements of Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to file

objections within the time specified waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 n.7 (1985). The district court need not provide de novo review where

objections to this report and recommendation are frivolous, conclusive, and general. Mira v.

Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). Only specific objections are reserved for appellate

review. Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).

MTX

/s/ ZT

MIKE DUMITRU

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10