Torres v. Paredes

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 EUCEBIO TORRES, Case No.: 3:22-cv-0448-JES-DTF

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

14 OFFICER G. PAREDES et al.,

JUDGEMENT

15 Defendants.

[ECF No. 55]

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18 Plaintiff Eucebio Torres (“Plaintiff”), a former inmate previously housed at

19 Centinela State Prison (“CDCR-CEN”), filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

20 § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated the Eight Amendment, as well as California Civil

21 Code § 52.1 (“Bane Act”), when they were deliberately indifferent to violence in the Non-

22 Designated Minimum Support Facility (“MSF” or “Facility E”) Torres was transferred to,

23 resulting in significant physical harm to Torres. See generally ECF No. 1.

24 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). See

25 ECF No. 55. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion, (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 62),

26 and Defendants filed a Reply, (“Reply,” ECF No. 64). The Court held oral arguments on

27 August 21, 2024.

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1 Having reviewed the Parties’ submissions and the applicable law, the Court

2 GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion.

3 I. BACKGROUND

4 A. Procedural Background

5 On April 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

6 Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by ignoring violence throughout the

7 MSF, deliberately placing him in a dangerous situation, and failing to prevent harm,

8 causing Plaintiff physical and emotional injury. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 51-57. On June 28, 2022,

9 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), and Defendants filed a motion to

10 dismiss the FAC (ECF No. 17). On March 20, 2023, the case was transferred to this Court.

11 ECF No. 22. On June 6, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’

12 motion to dismiss the FAC. ECF No. 24. On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second

13 Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging causes of action against Defendants G. Paredes

14 (“Paredes”), M. Marrs (“Marrs”), A. Acevedo (“Acevedo”), C. Valencia (“Valencia”), Y.

15 Castillo (“Castillo”), T. Carranza (“Carranza”) (collectively “Defendants”). ECF No. 40.

16 On June 24, 2024, Defendants moved for summary judgment. On August 21, 2024, the

17 Court heard oral arguments.

18 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

19 On October 29, 2020, Plaintiff and two other CDCR-CEN inmates were transferred

20 from the general population program (“Facility A”) to Facility E. SAC ¶ 24. During their

21 transfer, the three men were informed of program expectations and one of the transporting

22 officers allegedly asked, “are you guys going to win the fight?” Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. Further,

23 the officers allegedly told them they needed to “make the general population look good,”

24 and if the men won their fights, “general population will be down by one fight.” Id. at ¶ 29.

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1 After processing, Plaintiff and the other two inmates were individually escorted to a

2 Facility E dorm. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. Plaintiff alleges that Marrs1 escorted him to Facility E and

3 told him that “he had to come through with a win.” Id. at ¶ 32. Plaintiff alleges Paredes

4 was present when he entered the Facility E dorm and spoke with Marrs before the

5 altercation began. Id. at ¶ 34.

6 Upon entering the dorm, Plaintiff saw a group of four male inmates in a circle,

7 shirtless and wearing hand wraps. Id. at ¶ 35. One inmate, Ballez, yelled at Plaintiff and

8 punched him in the head. Id. at ¶ 36. A second inmate also hit him. Id. Plaintiff then fell to

9 the floor and tried to protect himself. Id. Paredes and Marrs watched the incident but did

10 not attempt to intervene. Id. at ¶ 37. Plaintiff was examined at the prison medical facility,

11 then taken to the CDCR-CEN clinic, and was ultimately transferred to the University of

12 California San Diego hospital. Id. at ¶ 38. Plaintiff was hospitalized for two days and

13 suffered several injuries that required medical procedures. Id. at ¶ 39. Upon release from

14 the hospital, Plaintiff was returned to CDCR-CEN. Id.

15 Plaintiff alleges Paredes and Marrs submitted fabricated rule violation reports

16 accusing him of battery against inmate Ballez. Id. at ¶ 40. Plaintiff alleges Acevedo also

17 submitted a shift report falsely accusing Plaintiff of battery against inmate Ballez. Id.

18 Valencia approved Paredes’s report, and Carranza classified it. Id. at ¶¶ 41-42. Plaintiff

19 further alleges Carranza and Castillo “failed to conduct an unbiased investigation,” and

20 “simply signed off on the [reports] that were presented to them.” Id. at ¶ 42. As a result of

21 the reports, Plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement and lost 90 days of good time

22 credit. Id. at ¶ 43. Plaintiff’s incarceration was extended from September 2021 to December

23 2021, when he was released. Id.

24 In his first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Acevedo, Marrs, Paredes, and Doe 3

25 through Doe 10 acted jointly to deprive him of his Eighth Amendment rights by placing

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1 Plaintiff offers inconsistent accounts of which officer escorted him to Facility E. In the SAC, Plaintiff

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1 him in harm’s way, facilitating the attacks on him, failing to intervene, and being

2 deliberately indifferent to violence in Facility E. Id. at ¶¶ 62-65. In his second cause of

3 action, Plaintiff alleges Acevedo, Carranza, Castillo, Valencia, and Doe 3 through Doe 10

4 deprived him of his Eighth Amendment rights under supervisor liability by condoning

5 excessive force, improperly training officers, and inadequately enforcing CDCR

6 regulations. Id. at ¶¶ 71-72. Plaintiff’s third cause of action was jointly dismissed. ECF No.

7 54. In his fourth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Acevedo, Marrs, Paredes, and Doe 3

8 through Doe 10 violated the Bane Act. SAC at ¶¶ 90-94.

9 II. LEGAL STANDARD

10 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

11 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit.”

13 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

14 The initial burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact

15 falls on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant

16 can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential

17 element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party

18 failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on

19 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322–23. In such cases, “there

20 can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof

21 concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

22 facts immaterial.” Id.

23 Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot

24 rest on the mere allegations or denials of its pleading. Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party

25 must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers

26 to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

27 genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The nonmoving party may meet this requirement by

28 presenting evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in its favor, viewing the record

1 as a whole, in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. See Triton Energy

2 Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1995). In determining whether

3 there are any genuine issues of material fact, the court must “view[] the evidence in the

4 light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th

5 Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

6 III. DISCUSSION

7 In their Motion, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because

8 (1) the evidence does not establish that Acevedo, Marrs, and Paredes were deliberately

9 indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) there is no

10 evidence to support Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment supervisor liability claim against

11 Acevedo, Carranza, Castillo, and Valencia; (3) Acevedo, Marrs, and Paredes did not violate

12 the Bane Act; and (4) even if there are triable issues regarding Plaintiff’s Eighth

13 Amendment claims, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court addresses

14 these arguments in turn.

15 A. Deliberate Indifference

16 The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to protect inmates from violence

17 caused by other prisoners. Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing

18 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). A prison official violates this duty when

19 (1) objectively, their act or omission creates a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) the

20 official is deliberately indifferent to that risk. Id. The test for deliberate indifference under

21 the Eighth Amendment mirrors subjective recklessness as used in criminal law. Farmer,

22 511 U.S. at 839-40. Deliberate indifference occurs when “the official is subjectively aware

23 of a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate and disregards that risk by failing to

24 respond reasonably.” Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations

25 omitted). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can

26 be satisfied by something less than purposeful harm or knowledge that harm will result.

27 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Stated differently, deliberate indifference does not require a

28 prison official to “believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack another,”

1 but, “[the official] must have more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.” Berg

2 v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and citations

3 omitted).

4 Determining if a prison official was subjectively aware of the substantial risk is a

5 question of fact to be proven “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial

6 evidence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. If the substantial risk was obvious, or if the official

7 was exposed to evidence that the substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding or

8 well-documented, then a factfinder could sufficiently determine that the official was

9 subjectively aware. Id. at 842-43. However, even if the official should have been aware of

10 the risk but was not, there is no Eighth Amendment violation, no matter how severe the

11 risk. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Further,

12 prison officials who act or respond reasonably are not liable under the Eighth Amendment,

13 even if they knew of the substantial risk, and even if harm ultimately occurred. Farmer,

14 511 U.S. at 844-45.

15 Plaintiff alleges “Defendants [Acevedo, Marrs, and Paredes] were deliberately

16 indifferent to the violence in the MSF and failed to prevent harm to Plaintiff.” SAC ¶ 65.

17 Further, Plaintiff alleges Defendants “were subjectively aware of the risk of violence

18 during the transfer of inmates from Facility [A] to Facility E,” and this risk was “common

19 knowledge in the E Yard.” Opp’n at 9. Defendants dispute these allegations in their motion.

20 Mot. at 17-20.

21 Defendants argue Plaintiff did not have safety concerns when entering Facility E, a

22 factor that cuts against deliberate indifference. Mot. at 16. Plaintiff disputes this, alleging

23 he had “significant safety concerns about the proposed transfer,” which he shared with

24 Classification Committee counselors prior to his transfer to Facility E. Opp’n at 11. The

25 parties do not dispute that “[o]n the day of the incident, Plaintiff did not tell the correctional

26 officers in Facility E that he had safety concerns.” Id. Plaintiff also admitted in his

27 deposition, “I didn’t have no safety concerns.” Torres Depo. at 93:24-25, ECF No. 62-11,

28 Ex. 9. Even if the Court assumes he shared safety concerns with counselors prior to his

1 transfer, Plaintiff offers no evidence that Acevedo, Marrs, and Paredes were made aware

2 of those concerns.

3 Acevedo was the acting sergeant in Facility E during the shift Plaintiff’s altercation

4 occurred. ECF No. 62-3, Ex. 1. Plaintiff alleges “Acevedo was observed by inmates in

5 Facility E during inmate fights,” thus disproving Acevedo’s claim that he was unaware of

6 inmate violence during transfers from Facility A to Facility E. Opp’n at 12-13. As evidence,

7 Plaintiff proffers the testimony of Andre Wallace, a former CDCR-CEN inmate familiar

8 with Acevedo. Wallace Depo. at 68:7-15, ECF No. 62-9, Ex. 7. However, when asked how

9 many fights he saw Acevedo present for, Wallace answered, “for sure one.” Id. at 69:1-3.

10 Plaintiff also attempts to use Acevedo’s testimony for the proposition that there were

11 estimated to be around fifteen fights in the six months prior to October 29, 2020. Opp’n at

12 13. However, Acevedo clarified that his estimations were of incidents, not necessarily

13 fights. Acevedo Depo. at 142:6-19, ECF No. 64-4, Ex. G. When asked about those

14 incidents, he stated, “I wouldn’t know,” and “I wasn’t there.” Id. Lastly, Plaintiff speculates

15 Acevedo “should have taken additional measures to ensure Plaintiff’s safety,” based on

16 Acevedo’s knowledge of a fight that occurred with inmate Charles Neal, one of the two

17 other men transferred at the same time as Plaintiff. Opp’n at 13. However, Acevedo

18 testified that while he knew of the Neal fight, the other inmate transferred at the same time

19 as Plaintiff was not involved in an altercation during the transfer process. Acevedo Depo.

20 at 73:14-19, ECF No. 55-7, Ex. B. Plaintiff offers no additional evidence regarding

21 Acevedo’s knowledge of inmate violence during transfers from Facility A to Facility E.

22 Marrs was a security patrol officer during the shift Plaintiff’s altercation occurred.

23 Opp’n at 14. Plaintiff alleges when he arrived to Facility E, an officer gave a speech about

24 program expectations and referenced a “welcoming committee.” Id. Plaintiff alleges the

25 officer who gave the speech was an “older white man,” and based on this description,

26 conclusively states “the officer in question was Matthew Marrs.” However, Plaintiff’s

27 testimony was speculative, as he could not state the name of the officer nor the officer’s

28 approximate age. Torres Depo. at 91:5-7; 92:9-24, ECF No. 62-11, Ex. 9. Plaintiff stated,

1 “I’m thinking he’s white, but then again,” and “[h]e might have been an older, white man.”

2 Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants “knew about and ratified . . . the formation of

3 welcoming committees, . . . which essentially served as a roving gang that . . . instigated

4 fights.” Opp’n at 16. However, Plaintiff offers no evidence to substantiate these

5 conclusions. It should also be noted that although Plaintiff asserts “the officers did nothing”

6 when a fight broke out, Plaintiff immediately contradicts this assertion by admitting the

7 officers “issued verbal commands to stop.” Id.

8 Paredes was a CDCR-CEN correctional officer during the shift Plaintiff’s altercation

9 occurred. SAC ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges Paredes “witnessed an estimated four fights” between

10 inmates from Facility E and inmates transferring from Facility A, and “knew that there was

11 a fair chance of [sic] fight taking place.” Opp’n at 17. Plaintiff further alleges officers

12 created a communication system with Facility E inmates. Id. at 17-18. If a transferring

13 inmate was escorted by an officer, it was a signal to fight, but if the inmate was not escorted,

14 it was a signal to stand down. Id. at 18. However, the testimony of inmate Cody Law

15 directly contradicts how this alleged signaling system works. Law testified that although

16 he was not escorted to Facility E by officers, he nonetheless was intercepted by a group of

17 inmates who wanted to see if he was going to fight. Law Depo. at 29:10-16; 29:25-30:23,

18 ECF No. 62-14, Ex. 12.

19 In sum, Plaintiff does not provide evidence that (1) Defendants were made aware of

20 Plaintiff’s safety concerns regarding the transfer, (2) the substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff

21 was obvious, nor that (3) Defendants were exposed to evidence that the substantial risk of

22 inmate attacks was longstanding or well-documented. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43. Rather,

23 Plaintiff’s evidence is speculative, inconsistent, and inconclusive. Although the evidence

24 may establish Defendants suspected Plaintiff would be attacked, “mere suspicion” is

25 insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Berg, 794 F.2d at 459. The evidence does

26 not establish Defendants were “subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm” to

27 Plaintiff, nor “disregard[ed] that risk by failing to respond reasonably.” Wilk, 956 F.3d at

28 1147. Deliberate indifference is necessary to prove Plaintiff’s § 1983 Eighth Amendment

1 claim, Cortez, 776 F.3d at 1050, and Plaintiff fails to establish this essential element.

2 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

3 deliberate indifference.

4 Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants Acevedo, Marrs,

5 and Paredes as related to Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference.

6 B. Supervisor Liability

7 Although generally, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a

8 supervisor is liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor

9 participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the subordinates’ violations and did

10 not try to prevent them. Vazquez v. County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020).

11 There must be “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct

12 and the constitutional violation.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013)

13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Causal connection may be established

14 when a supervisor initiates, or knowingly refuses to terminate, a series of acts by others

15 which the supervisor knows, or reasonably should know, would cause others to inflict

16 constitutional harm. Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir.

17 2018); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011). A supervisor may be liable

18 in an individual capacity for (1) their own culpable action or inaction in the training,

19 supervision, or control of subordinates; (2) for acquiescence in the constitutional violation;

20 or (3) for conduct showing a “reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id.

21 Inadequate training may serve as the basis for a § 1983 claim only when the failure

22 to train amounts to deliberate indifference, meaning a conscious or deliberate choice on the

23 part of a municipality. Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.

24 2014). The same standard applies to supervisory officials sued in their individual capacity.

25 Id. at 1158-59. The supervisor must have been “deliberately indifferent to the need to train

26 subordinates, and the lack of training actually caused the constitutional harm or deprivation

27 of rights.” Id. at 1159. A plaintiff must allege facts showing that a deficient training

28 program would cause subordinates to violate constitutional rights, and the supervisor

1 disregarded this known or obvious consequence. Id. “Similarly, a failure to supervise that

2 is sufficiently inadequate may amount to deliberate indifference.” Dougherty v. City of

3 Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

4 However, alleging mere negligence in training or supervision is insufficient. Id.

5 Acquiescence may include when a supervisor implements a deficient policy that is

6 the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208. A plaintiff

7 who alleges supervisor liability based on policy implementation must name a specific

8 policy, custom, or event that led to the constitutional violation. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d

9 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012). General allegations without specificity are insufficient. Id.

10 Plaintiff alleges that, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Defendants Acevedo,

11 Carranza, Castillo, and Valencia (1) engaged in, condoned, ratified, and failed to properly

12 investigate or discipline CDCR employees for incidents of excessive, unreasonable, and

13 unjustified force; (2) improperly and inadequately trained and supervised officers and

14 failed to adopt or enforce policies and procedures for the proper training and supervision

15 of officers; (3) inadequately investigated and failed to adopt or enforce rules, regulations,

16 policies, and procedures for the proper investigation of a response to inmate complaints

17 about officer misconduct; and (4) were deliberately indifferent to the violence within the

18 MSF. SAC ¶¶ 71-72. Plaintiff alleges these actions caused him physical and economic

19 harm. Id. at ¶ 77. Defendants dispute these allegations in their motion. Mot. at 20-24.

20 1. Defendant Acevedo

21 Acevedo argues there is no evidence he was responsible for training Paredes and

22 Marrs. Mot. at 24. Plaintiff does not address Defendant’s argument. See Opp’n at 19-24.

23 Thus, Plaintiff has abandoned this claim as related to Acevedo. Jenkins v. County of

24 Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[Plaintiff] abandoned her other two

25 claims by not raising them in opposition to [Defendant’s] motion for summary judgment”).

26 Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendant Acevedo as

27 related to supervisor liability.

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1 2. Defendant Castillo

2 Castillo was the Associate Warden over CDCR-CEN Complex I from August 2020

3 to approximately April 2022. Decl. Castillo, ECF No. 55-3 at ¶ 2. Plaintiff alleges Castillo

4 was responsible for inmate safety and was “deliberately indifferent to the ongoing incidents

5 of violence in the MSF and failed to prevent harm to Plaintiff.” SAC ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges

6 Castillo was “aware of violence occurring in Facility E,” “aware of the fights taking place

7 during the aforementioned transfer process,” “took no action to ensure the safety of the

8 inmates,” and “made no recommendations about preventing the fights.” Opp’n at 20-21.

9 Castillo oversaw the planning, organization, operations, and activities of Facilities

10 A and B. Decl. Castillo, ECF No. 55-3. at ¶ 4. Castillo declared that while she would

11 “occasionally review disciplinary reports generated on Facility E,” she did not supervise

12 Facility E, was not responsible for training Facility E staff, and did not investigate alleged

13 misconduct of Facility E employees. Id. at ¶ 4. She also declared she had no authority to

14 rescind the transfer program, nor the ability to implement rules to override facility program

15 requirements. Id. at ¶ 5. Castillo argues there is no evidence she was responsible for training

16 Acevedo, Paredes and Marrs. Mot. at 23. Castillo further argues there is no evidence she

17 acquiesced in Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional deprivations, nor evidence her conduct

18 showed reckless or callous indifference. Id. at 24.

19 Plaintiff does not offer any evidence Castillo supervised Acevedo, Paredes, and

20 Marrs. See Opp’n at 20-21. Plaintiff also concedes “[Castillo] did not oversee Facility E.”

21 Id. at 21. Plaintiff does not provide evidence Castillo initiated a series of acts she

22 reasonably should have known would cause infliction of constitutional harm. Rodriguez,

23 891 F.3d at 798; Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08. Nor does Plaintiff provide evidence Castillo

24 was culpable for deficient training, acquiesced in a constitutional violation, or displayed

25 “reckless or callous indifference.” Id. At best, Plaintiff alleges Castillo was negligent in

26 carrying out her duties, which does not show “a sufficient causal connection between the

27 supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977.

28 Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation.

1 Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendant Castillo as related

2 to supervisor liability.

3 3. Defendant Valencia

4 Valencia is a CDCR-CEN Correctional Sergeant who supervised Facility E during

5 October 2020. Valencia Depo. at 10:2-3, ECF No. 62-12, Ex. 10. He supervised inmates

6 and informed new arrivals about program expectations. Id. at 21:7-9; 105:3-13. Valencia

7 also supervised and trained other correctional officers. Id. at 21:7-9; 21:25-22:4. Officer

8 training included expectations for new MSF arrivals, report writing, use of force, and

9 officer responsibilities. Id. at 22:5-17.

10 Plaintiff alleges Valencia was aware of inmate violence in Facility E and “failed to

11 adequately train correctional officers . . . .” SAC ¶ 48. Plaintiff further alleges Valencia

12 “failed to take affirmative actions to prevent or quell the violence in Facility E,” such as

13 discussing with supervisors about instituting additional security measures, providing

14 officers personal alarms, or installing video cameras. Opp’n at 23. Plaintiff asserts

15 “Valencia’s indifference and failure to discharge her [sic] duty to protect inmates from

16 harm ultimately resulted in Mr. Torres sustaining serious bodily injuries.” Id. at 24.

17 Valencia argues there is no evidence he “had the authority to make such

18 recommendations, or that his failure to do so amounted to deliberate indifference.” Reply

19 at 9. Plaintiff does not offer evidence showing the Defendants’ training program was

20 deficient, nor evidence a lack of training would cause subordinates to violate inmates’

21 constitutional rights, nor evidence Valencia disregarded such an obvious consequence.

22 Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159. Plaintiff does not provide evidence Valencia acquiesced in a

23 constitutional violation, nor “reckless or callous indifference.” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 798;

24 Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08. Further, Plaintiff does not allege Valencia implemented a

25 deficient policy that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.

26 Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208.

27 //

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1 As with Castillo, Plaintiff at best alleges Valencia was negligent in carrying out his

2 duties, which is insufficient. Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977. Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine

3 issue of material fact as to causation.

4 Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendant Valencia as

5 related to supervisor liability.

6 4. Defendant Carranza

7 Carranza was the Correctional Captain over Facilities C, D, and E in 2020. Decl.

8 Carranza, ECF No. 55-2 at ¶ 3. Plaintiff alleges Carranza was responsible for inmate safety,

9 the training and supervision of correctional officers, and was “deliberately indifferent to

10 the ongoing incidents of violence in the MSF and failed to prevent harm to Plaintiff.” SAC

11 ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges Carranza was aware of the fights involving transferring inmates, took

12 no meaningful action to prevent them, and never attempted to decrease the risk of inmate

13 violence, ultimately resulting in Plaintiff’s harm. Opp’n at 22.

14 Carranza argues Plaintiff must establish she was responsible for training, knew her

15 inactions could cause Plaintiff harm, and that her inactions did cause Plaintiff harm. Mot.

16 at 22; Reply at 8 (citing Edgerly v. City & County Of S.F., 599 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2010)).

17 In Edgerly, the court affirmed dismissal of supervisor liability claims for lack of causation.

18 Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 961-62 (“[n]or could a reasonable trier of fact find that a sufficient

19 causal connection existed;” “[Defendant] was not responsible for station policy;” “[n]or do

20 the facts suggest that [defendant] provided any training . . . or was responsible for providing

21 formal training to any officers.”) Carranza argues “Plaintiff has at best established

22 negligence.” Reply at 8. However, applying the Edgerly court’s reasoning to this case leads

23 to a different result.

24 Carranza declared she was responsible for “ensur[ing] that everything in that facility

25 is run based on what we have in place of policies or procedures or programs.” Carranza

26 Depo. at 44:2-11, ECF No. 62-13, Ex. 11. “If changes need[ed] to be made,” she was part

27 of the decision-making and implementation process. Id. at 44:11-16. Carranza would also

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1 frequently tour the facilities, “making sure that everything is running appropriate, safely,

2 no security issues, living conditions are sanitary.” Id. at 44:18-45:9.

3 Carranza admitted to being informed by facility supervisors of fights occurring in

4 Facility E. Carranza Depo. at 47:15-22, ECF No. 62-13, Ex. 11. She also admitted to being

5 aware of fights between inmates being transferred from Facility A to Facility E. Id. at 48:2-

6 4. Carranza described the number of fights between transferring inmates as “common” and

7 “more than few.” Id. at 49:8-14. When asked if she would advise her lieutenant to provide

8 staff training because of a particular problem, she stated yes. Id. at 64:2-14. An example of

9 such a problem was unsecured housekeeping items. Id. at 64:20-24. When asked if she

10 directed her lieutenant to train staff on “any aspects of inmate safety,” Carranza stated, “not

11 to my recollection.” Id. at 64:25-65:2. When asked if, after learning about the fights

12 involving inmate transfers, she directed her lieutenant “through any kind of training,”

13 Carranza stated no. Id. at 65:3-65:7. When asked if she initiated “any trainings to fix any

14 potential problems involving inmate violence” as related to inmates transferring from

15 Facility A to Facility E, Carranza stated no, “I don’t remember any training that I would

16 have provided.” Id. at 65:14-20.

17 Carranza managed Facility E and was responsible for various supervisory duties,

18 including decision-making, facility observation, and the training and supervision of

19 subordinate staff. She was aware of commonly occurring violence between transferring

20 inmates, but failed to train staff or suggest policies to prevent that violence, despite having

21 the authority to do so. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

22 nonmoving party, Fontana, 262 F.3d at 876, a reasonable jury could find Carranza was

23 “deliberately indifferent to the need to train subordinates, and the lack of training actually

24 caused the constitutional harm or deprivation” of Plaintiff’s rights. Flores, 758 F.3d at

25 1159. Thus, Carranza could be found liable as a supervisor for “inaction in the training,

26 supervision, or control of subordinates.” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 798; Starr, 652 F.3d at

27 1207-08.

28 //

1 Therefore, the Court DENIES summary judgment for Defendant Carranza as related

2 to supervisor liability.

3 C. Bane Act

4 The Bane Act, California Civil Code §52.1, “provides a cause of action for violations

5 of a plaintiff’s state or federal civil rights committed by threats, intimidation, or coercion.”

6 Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

7 marks and citations omitted). The Bane Act does not require “the threat, intimidation or

8 coercion element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional

9 violation alleged,” but there must be “a showing of the defendant’s specific intent to violate

10 the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 802 (citing Reese, 888 F.3d at

11 1042-43) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specific intent is a two-part inquiry

12 determining whether: (1) the constitutional right is “clearly delineated and plainly

13 applicable under the circumstances of the case;” and (2) the defendant committed the

14 alleged violation “with the particular purpose of depriving” the plaintiff of the

15 constitutional right. Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 520 (9th Cir. 2018). So

16 long as both elements are met, reckless disregard of the constitutional right can be sufficient

17 to establish specific intent. Id.

18 Acevedo, Marrs, and Paredes argue they are entitled to summary judgment for the

19 same reasons stated for Plaintiff’s first cause of action. Mot. at 31. Defendants further argue

20 there is no evidence of the specific intent element required by the Bane Act. Id. For reasons

21 provided earlier, supra § III-A, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact

22 regarding his Eighth Amendment claim. Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish the constitutional

23 right is “clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of the case.”

24 Sandoval, 912 F.3d at 520.

25 Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants Acevedo, Marrs,

26 and Paredes as related to the Bane Act.

27 //

28 //

1 D. Qualified Immunity

2 Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability when the

3 official’s conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

4 which a reasonable person would have known.” Longoria v. Pinal County, 873 F.3d 699,

5 704 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241 (2009)). The doctrine

6 exists to balance the need to hold officials accountable while shielding them from mistakes

7 in judgment, whether of law or fact, when they perform their duties reasonably. Id. (internal

8 quotations and citations omitted). Courts use a two-part test determining whether (1) there

9 was a violation of a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time

10 of the violation. Id. The first prong is a fact-based inquiry taken in the light “most favorable

11 to the party asserting the injury.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The second

12 prong is a “question of law that only a judge can decide.” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 795

13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts have discretion to decide, based on

14 the circumstances of the case, which of the two prongs to analyze first. Pearson, U.S. 555

15 at 236.

16 All Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Mot. at 32. Because

17 the Court finds Acevedo, Castillo, Marrs, Paredes, and Valencia entitled to judgement as a

18 matter of law on the merits of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, the Court also finds

19 the facts alleged do not show these Defendants committed a constitutional violation.

20 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Thus, Defendants Acevedo, Castillo, Marrs, Paredes, and

21 Valencia are entitled to qualified immunity. Longoria, 873 F.3d at 704.

22 Regarding Carranza, the law is clearly established, supra § III-B, that an official is

23 liable for inaction in the training, supervision, or control of subordinates, when such

24 inaction causes constitutional harm. Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159; Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 798;

25 Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, supra

26 § III-B-4, a jury could find Carranza violated clearly established constitutional rights of

27 which a reasonable official in her position would have known. Longoria, 873 F.3d at 704.

28 Thus, Defendant Carranza is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

1 IV. CONCLUSION

2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for

3 ||Defendants Acevedo, Castillo, Marrs, Paredes, and Valencia. For the reasons discussed

4 ||above, the Court DENIES summary judgment for Defendant Carranza and finds that she

5 not entitled to qualified immunity.

6

7 IT IS SO ORDERED.

8

Dated: March 11, 2025 J ,

9 Ja Sn 4,

11 Unites States District Judge

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