The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CASSIDY GREEN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 20-cv-1078- RJD
)
CHAD WALL, BRETT DAMRON, JAMES )
GROVES, and BRADLEY KIRKMAN )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants. Docs. 109 and 110. Plaintiff filed Responses. Docs. 124 and 125. As explained
further, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, formerly incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed this
lawsuit pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. He alleged that on or around October 6, 2019, he
was incarcerated in “house 5 of wing C” at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. Doc. 51, p. 20.
Other inmates in house 5 of wing C started a fire, and ten minutes later Defendant Wall took notice.
Id. Approximately 10-20 minutes passed before correctional officers, including Defendant Wall,
extinguished the fire. Id., p. 22. Plaintiff yelled to Defendant Wall that he could not breathe and
needed medical attention. Id., p. 23. Plaintiff was left in his cell, coughing and experiencing
nausea, dizziness, light-headedness, and headache from the smoke and the chemical agent used to
extinguish the flames. Id. Following the Court’s threshold review conducted pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. §1915(A), identification of John Doe Defendants, and resolution of the affirmative defense
of administrative remedy exhaustion, Plaintiff proceeded on one Eighth Amendment claim of
deliberate indifference against Chad Wall, Brett Damron, James Groves, and Bradley Kirkman (all
current or former correctional officers).1 Docs. 21, 61, and 103.
Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on May 30, 2024. Docs. 109-111.
Nearly three months later, the Court ruled on several pending motions filed by Plaintiff prior to
the filing of Defendants’ summary judgment motion, including a “Motion for the Court’s
Acknowledgment” in which Plaintiff informed the Court that Defendants had failed to respond to
pleadings and asked the Court “to move [the] proceeding forward.” Doc. 113. The Court denied
Plaintiff’s “Motion for the Court’s Acknowledgment”, noting that Defendants had filed their
Motion for Summary Judgment to which Plaintiff had not responded. Doc. 113. Five days later,
Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Recruitment of Counsel” in which he informed the Court that he
“endured significant injury” on June 29, 2024 (the date his response to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment was due) that left him hospitalized and requiring treatment at a skilled nursing
facility. Doc. 114. Over the next two months, the Court entered multiple orders, extending the
time for Plaintiff to respond to the summary judgment motion and directing the Clerk of Court to
provide Plaintiff with a copy of the Motion and all corresponding exhibits; the Court also ordered
Defendants to send copies of their written discovery and produced documents to Plaintiff. Doc.
115, 119, 123. The Court extended Plaintiff’s response deadline to December 6, 2024. Doc.
123.
Plaintiff filed Responses to the Motion for Summary Judgment on November 8, 2024.
1 The Clerk of Court is directed to update the docket to reflect that the full and correct names of Defendant Damron,
Groves, and Kirkman are Brett Damron, James Groves, and Bradley Kirkman.
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Docs. 124 and 125. He stated in one of the Responses that he did not have adequate time to
prepare the responses. Doc. 125, p.8. The Court entered another Order on November 12, 2024,
reminding Plaintiff that his deadline to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment was
December 6, 2024 and if there were additional arguments Plaintiff would like the Court to
consider, he could file a supplemental response on or before the December 6, 2024 deadline. Doc.
126. Plaintiff did not file any additional documents.
Plaintiff’s Deposition Testimony
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center from 2019 to 2021. Doc.
110-1, p. 7. Plaintiff was asleep in his cell “around lunchtime” on October 6, 2019. Id., pp. 8,
10, 11. He became very warm and developed a throbbing headache; he woke up to smoke in his
cell and he was having trouble breathing. Id. In another cell, two inmates had started a fire. Id.,
pp. 18, 19. The ventilation was poor and it took officers approximately ten minutes to respond to
the fire. Id., p. 9. Plaintiff was “yelling out to [Defendant] Wall specifically” to take him out of
his cell so he could get medical treatment. Id., p. 10. Plaintiff was telling Defendant Wall “hey
I can’t breathe. I want medical.” Id., p. 23. Defendant Wall never responded to Plaintiff. Id.,
p. 24. Plaintiff testified that Defendant Wall heard him yelling or talking. Id., p. 25. When
asked multiple times how he knew that Defendant Wall heard him, Plaintiff objected, stating
“that’s a question for the jury.” Id., p. 25-27.
Approximately five minute later, some nurses walked by and said “oh do you guys need
help” but did not actually stop to help or treat anyone. Id., p. 21. Plaintiff was never evacuated
from his cell. Id., p. 21.
Plaintiff further testified that Defendant Damron “heard” Plaintiff “yell[ing] out to
[Defendant] Wall. Id., p. 29. However, Plaintiff objected when asked how he knew that
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Defendant Damron heard him, again stating “that’s more of a question for the jury.” Id. Prior to
Defendants’ counsel finishing her questions to Plaintiff, he became disconnected from the
videoconference and did not return. Id., pp. 30, 31.
Affidavits by Defendants
Defendant Wall stated that the records of the October 6, 2019 fire indicate that it occurred
in cell 77 of the R5 Housing Unit, C-Wing and records also reflect that Plaintiff was housed in
Cell 57 of the R5 Housing Unit, C-Wing. Doc. 117, ¶¶5, 6. Cell 57 and Cell 77 are
approximately 30-40 feet apart. Id., ¶7. Defendant Wall responded to the fire. Id., ¶1.
Because the smoke from the fire was “relatively minor”, Defendant Wall did not need to wear a
self-contained breathing apparatus. Id.
Defendants Damron, Groves, and Kirkman also responded to the fire. Docs. 110-5 at ¶1,
110-6 at ¶1, and 110-8 at ¶1. All Defendants state in their affidavits that medical staff also
responded to “assess and do a wellness check on staff and offenders.” Docs. 110-5 at ¶3, 110-6
at ¶3, and 110-8 at ¶3, and 117 at ¶3. None of the Defendants heard Plaintiff request medical
treatment. Id. If they had heard him, they would have requested that medical staff perform a
wellness check and assess his need for medical treatment. Docs. 110-5 at ¶4, 110-6 at ¶4, 110-8
at ¶4, and 117 at ¶4.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-
Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material
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fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is
made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248). In considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light
most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex
Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Discussion
The Eighth Amendment “‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ but neither does it
permit inhumane ones.” Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F. 4th 545, 559-60 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal
citations omitted). To succeed on his deliberate indifference claims, Plaintiff must “provide
evidence, either direct or circumstantial” that shows (1) “he had an objectively serious medical
need” (2) “which [the defendant] “[knew] of and disregard[ded] a substantial risk of harm.” Id.
at 550. Negligence or even recklessness does not constitute deliberate indifference; the defendant
must have shown “something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face
of serious risks.” Id.
Here, there is no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. While the jury could
infer that Defendants were aware that Plaintiff and other inmates had been exposed to smoke, the
undisputed statements in Defendants’ affidavits reflect that medical staff was present for any
inmate who needed medical treatment or evaluation. While Plaintiff’s testimony indicates that
the nurses were not helpful to him (or even perhaps ignored him), no evidence indicates that
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Defendants were aware the medical staff was refusing, declining, or forgetting to treat any inmates
(including Plaintiff).
Moreover, while Plaintiff was specifically calling to Defendant Wall for help, there is no
evidence to suggest that Defendant Wall (or any other Defendant) was aware that Plaintiff was
calling for medical help. Defendants specifically state in their affidavits that they did not hear
him. Plaintiff presents no evidence from which the jury could infer otherwise. At most, the jury
could infer that Defendants were negligent for failing to notice or hear that Plaintiff was calling
for help. An isolated instance of neglect is not deliberate indifference. Hayes v. Snyder, 546
F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008).
Consequently, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendants
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 11, 2025
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge
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