COUNTS v. STATE OF MAINE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

JOSEPH PAUL COUNTS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:24-cv-00361-JAW

)

STATE OF MAINE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER AFFIRMING RECOMMENDED DECISION OVER OBJECTION

A federal magistrate judge recommends the dismissal of a complaint brought

by an incarcerated individual against the state of Maine, the state attorney general,

and a district attorney, challenging a state court conviction. Having performed a de

novo review, the federal district court affirms the magistrate judge’s recommended

decision over the plaintiff’s objection.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 28, 2024, Joseph Paul Counts, who is currently incarcerated in Mt.

Vernon, Illinois, brought a complaint against the state of Maine, Maine Attorney

General Aaron M. Frey, and Washington County District Attorney Robert Granger,

challenging a state court conviction. Compl. at 2-3 (ECF No. 1). Mr. Counts moved

to proceed in forma pauperis on October 28, 2024, Mot. to Proceed Without

Prepayment of Fees and Costs (ECF No. 2), and the next day the United States

Magistrate Judge granted his motion and ordered Mr. Counts to notify the Court no

later than November 19, 2024 whether he intended to incur the cost of the filing fee

and proceed with this action, or whether he intended to forego litigation at this time.

Order at 2 (ECF No. 3) (Nov. 19, 2024 Order).

Subsequently, on November 18, 2024, Mr. Counts filed a motion to alter or

amend judgment or relief from order, asking the Court to relieve him of the obligation

to pay the filing fee. Pl. Joseph Paul Counts’ Mot. to Alter or Amend Judgment Rule

59(e) or Relief from Order Under Rule 60(b)(1) (ECF No. 4). The Magistrate Judge

denied Mr. Counts’s motion to amend or for relief from order on November 21, 2024.

Order (ECF No. 5).

On December 3, 2024, after the November 19, 2024 deadline had passed

without an update from Mr. Counts, the Magistrate Judge ordered the Plaintiff to

show cause in writing by or before December 17, 2024 as to why he had failed to

comply with the Magistrate Judge’s October 29, 2024 order. Order to Show Cause

(ECF No. 6). Mr. Counts responded in compliance on December 23, 2024, and moved

to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs on the same day. Def. Joseph Counts’

Mot. to Show Cause and Reconsider with Updated Status (ECF No. 9); Application to

Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Aff. (ECF No. 10). The Magistrate Judge

granted Mr. Counts’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on January 10, 2025.

Order (ECF No. 14).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the statute that governs matters filed

without the prepayment of fees, courts are authorized to conduct a preliminary review

of a complaint when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

On January 10, 2025, after performing such a preliminary review, the Magistrate

Judge recommended the Court dismiss the complaint. Recommended Decision After

Rev. of Pl.’s Compl. (ECF No. 13) (Recommended Decision). Because a Magistrate

Judge reviewed Mr. Counts’s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Mr. Counts had

a right to de novo review by the district judge upon filing an objection within fourteen

days of being served. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). On January 20, 2025, the Court

granted Mr. Counts an extension until February 28, 2025 to file any objection to the

Recommended Decision. Order (ECF No. 16). Mr. Counts filed an untimely objection

on March 6, 2025, without requesting or being granted a further extension. Pl.

Joseph Counts’ Objs. to Mag. J.’s Recommended Decision (ECF No. 17).

Nevertheless, in line with the First Circuit’s instruction to district courts

reviewing pro se pleadings to construe these submissions liberally, see Sanchez v.

Brown Univ., No. 23-1983, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 15530, at *1 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and the First Circuit’s inclination to

“dispos[e] of claims on the merits rather than on the basis of technicalities,” Kuehl v.

FDIC, 8 F.3d 905, 908 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Our federal rules promote the disposition of

claims on the merits rather than on the basis of technicalities, and courts should be

reluctant to impose a dismissal with prejudice for a rules violation that is neither

persistent nor vexatious, particularly without some review of the merits”) (citing

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962)), the Court in its discretion declines to

reject Mr. Counts’s objection based on its untimeliness and instead reviews its

contents for their merits.

II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

A. The Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision

The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court dismiss Mr. Counts’s complaint

alleging he was convicted of a crime in state court, has “tried to remedy it several

times to no avail,” was subsequently wrongfully charged with a crime based on the

prior wrongful conviction, and while the wrongful conviction has ben corrected, he

continues to experience consequences from the conviction, which he is attempting to

address through a state court post-conviction relief proceeding. Recommended

Decision at 2 (quoting and then citing Compl. at 3).

The Magistrate Judge characterizes Mr. Counts’s claims as “follow[ing] and

appear[ing] to challenge in some way a state court conviction,” and thus determines

that dismissal is warranted pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which

“divest[s] lower federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases brought by state-court

losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments that were rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and invite district court review and

rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 3 (quoting Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr.

Co., 907 F.3d 61, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted by

Magistrate Judge)); citing Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). The Magistrate Judge concludes that

“[t]he proper avenues for attacking a [state-court] criminal judgment are a direct

appeal or . . . a habeas corpus petition.” Id. (citing Olson v. United States, Civ. Action

No. 06-0565 (JR), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84650, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2006) (citation

amended); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). The Magistrate Judge adds that

Mr. Counts has himself commenced a post-conviction review proceeding in state

court. Id. at 4.

Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge recommends the Court dismiss the

Plaintiff’s complaint because his state court proceeding “is evidently ongoing as he

has initiated a post-conviction review proceeding,” and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37 (1971) generally requires abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction when a

plaintiff seeks relief in federal court from a pending state criminal prosecution or

analogous enforcement proceeding.” Id. Under the Younger doctrine, the Magistrate

Judge states that abstention is mandatory absent “extraordinary circumstances,”

none of which Mr. Counts alleges is present here and “[a]bstention, therefore, is

required.” Id. at 4-5 (citing Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 192, 197

(1st Cir. 2015); Munir v. R.I. Super. Ct., C.A. No. 22-57WES, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

39380, at *4 (D.R.I. Mar. 7, 2022) (citation amended)).

Insofar as Mr. Counts’s complaint could be construed as raising a claim for

damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Magistrate Judge determines this

warrants dismissal based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994), “because an award of damages on such a claim would implicitly

invalidate the conviction.” Id. at 4. The Magistrate Judge explained that “the

Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff [challenging his state-court conviction]

must first obtain relief from the conviction through state or federal habeas

proceedings . . .before seeking a remedy under § 1983.” Id. (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at

487). Thus, in this case, “to the extent Plaintiff’s claims attack the validity and

consequences of a state court criminal judgment, the Court is without jurisdiction to

consider Plaintiff’s claims.” Id.

Observing that the Plaintiff joined the state of Maine as a Defendant, the

Magistrate Judge additionally determines that the state of Maine is immune from

this suit under the Eleventh Amendment’s doctrine of sovereign immunity, which the

State has not waived here. Id. at 5 & n.2 (citing, e.g., Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr.,

558 F.3d 92, 97 n.6 (1st Cir. 2009)). Similarly, to the extent Mr. Counts seeks

monetary compensation from a district attorney and the state attorney general, each

of whom Mr. Counts names as Defendants in this suit, both are entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity regarding charging decisions or other similar roles in the

state proceedings against the Plaintiff “because the alleged facts do not support a

plausible inference of conduct exceeding traditional prosecutorial duties.” Id. at 6

(citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)). Further, to the extent Mr.

Counts seeks monetary relief from these individuals in their official capacities, the

Magistrate Judge concludes the claim would in essence be a claim against the State

which is barred by sovereign immunity. Id. (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).

For all these reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends the Court dismiss Mr.

Counts’s complaint in its entirety. Id.

B. Joseph Paul Counts’s Objection

Mr. Counts provides seven grounds for his objection to the Recommended

Decision, one of which is a blanket objection to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation that his complaint be dismissed. Pl.’s Obj. ¶¶ 1-7.

First, the Plaintiff objects to the recommendation of dismissal based on “factual

omissions,” id. ¶ 1 (capitalization altered), alleging the Magistrate Judge “completely

omits all the facts that give this court jurisdiction [and that] precedent has already

permitted.” Id. (citing Recommended Decision at 2). Mr. Counts rejects the

Magistrate Judge’s application of Rooker-Feldman, claiming the Court maintains

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id.

Second, Mr. Counts objects on the grounds of “improper court procedure,”

claiming “[g]iven the amount of fact[s] [he] provide[d] in his initial filing, the

defendants should be left to file a motion under Me[.] Rule Civ. P. 12 for a more

definitive statement versus the magistrate acting as ward over the state and county

in the instant action.” Id. ¶ 2 (capitalization altered).

Third, Mr. Counts objects to the form he used to file his complaint, saying the

Court provided him this form and it indicates a claimant should not “give any legal

arguments or cite any cases or statutes” and should state the facts “as briefly as

possible.” Id. ¶ 3. He claims that following these instructions caused him to omit

particular facts which may have resulted in a more favorable decision from the

Magistrate Judge, citing a Seventh Circuit decision which Mr. Counts claims “plac[e]s

the magistrate in the wrong hemisphere with his recommended decision.” Id. (citing

Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation amended)).

Fourth, the Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s application of the

Younger doctrine on the grounds that the three recognized exceptions to Younger

require legal citations, which the complaint form he used instructed claimants not to

use. Id. ¶ 4. “[I]f courts generally find the pen mightier than the sword, then myself

and the rest of the American people are going to have a serious problem

understanding how the courts don’t see where and when a defendant is being pencil

whipped in state court proceedings,” Mr. Counts says. Id.

Fifth, Mr. Counts objects to recommendation that the Court dismiss the state

of Maine as a defendant pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment’s grant of sovereign

immunity. Id. ¶ 5. Referencing the first ten amendments to the United States

Constitution, as well as the Supreme Court’s recent overturning of the doctrine of

Chevron1 deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024),

Mr. Counts suggests that the Magistrate Judge only came to his recommendation of

dismissal by overlooking the substantive rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights and

by overstepping the new balance of separation of powers as outlined by the Supreme

Court in Loper Bright. Id.

Mr. Counts objects on the sixth ground that the Magistrate Judge

misunderstood who the Plaintiff intended to name as Defendants to his suit. Id. ¶ 6.

As to the Magistrate Judge’s statement that a state attorney general and a county

district attorney are protected by prosecutorial immunity, Mr. Counts says “it was

claimant’s intention merely to name them as responding parties as they are not listed

1 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

on the cover of the complaint as defendants” and the Magistrate Judge should have

given him the opportunity to amend his complaint “specifically to address the

personal and/or subject matter jurisdiction this court has over the State and County”

pursuant to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Tate, 809 F.3d at 346. Id.

Finally, at bottom, Mr. Count objects to the Recommended Decision in its

entirety and “demands it be disregarded[] while jurisdiction under 28 [U.S.C.] [§]

1331 be applied.” Id. ¶ 7.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Mr. Counts objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision, which

the Court in its discretion construes as timely filed, and the Court thus “shall make

a de novo determination of those portions of the . . . recommendations to which

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). At the

same time, the Court is “only obliged to perform de novo review of disputed portions

of the report and recommendation.” United States v. J.C.D., 861 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.

2017). Under this standard, the Court reviews factual findings for clear error,

Phinney v. Wentworth Douglas Hosp., 199 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999), and gives plenary

review to pure questions of law. PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 15 (1st

Cir. 2010).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court reviewed and considered the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended

Decision, together with the entire record. Having made a de novo determination of

“disputed portions of the report and recommendation,” the Court affirms the

Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge over the Plaintiff’s objection and

determines that no further proceedings are necessary. See J.C.D., 861 F.3d at 6.

Mr. Counts’s first objection to the Recommended Decision appears to be that

the Magistrate Judge erred in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because this

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1331

provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

1331. While Mr. Counts is correct that federal question jurisdiction can provide a

federal court with subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute, he misunderstands that

this jurisdiction is not limitless, and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is one such

limit. See Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 984 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2020) (“‘Federal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.’ Thus, jurisdictional boundaries must be

scrupulously observed”) (quoting Rhode Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.

2004)). As the Magistrate Judge discusses, Rooker-Feldman “is confined to cases of

the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court

losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection

of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

283 (2005) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 39

(1st Cir. 1999) (holding that Rooker-Feldman “forecloses district court jurisdiction of

claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the claims adjudicated in a state

court”) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16); Mills v. Harmon Law Offices, P.C.,

344 F.3d 42, 44 n.1 (1st Cir. 2003) (reiterating that Rooker-Feldman “implicates the

court’s subject matter jurisdiction”). For the reasons explained in depth by the

Magistrate Judge in his well-reasoned Recommended Decision, Rooker-Feldman

clearly applies to the present action, where Mr. Counts appears to attack a state-

court judgment.

Mr. Counts’s second objection appears to be that the Magistrate Judge should

have sua sponte directed the Defendants to file a motion for a more definite statement

under Rule 12, rather than issuing his Recommended Decision after a preliminary

review. Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 2. However, as the Magistrate Judge explained to Mr. Counts

more than once, by electing to bring his case without the prepayment of fees, an initial

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) was the proper next step. Nov. 19, 2024 Order;

Order to Show Cause. That is what happened here.

Mr. Counts’s third objection is an objection to the form he used to submit his

complaint; it is not an objection to the Recommended Complaint. Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 3. The

Plaintiff complains that the form he used instructed him to not provide legal

argument or cite cases or statutes, and argues that, but-for this form’s instructions,

he may have provided additional facts which could have resulted in a more favorable

ruling. In support, he directs the Court to a Seventh Circuit decision, Tate v. SCR

Medical Transportation, 809 F.3d 343 (7th Cir. 2015). Mr. Counts’s objection to the

form he used—namely, that the form instructs a claimant to omit mention of legal

authority—does not align with his claim that, absent this instruction, he may have

included more facts. The form specifically instructs a petitioner to “[s]tate here as

briefly as possible the facts of your case,” Compl. at 3 (emphasis in original), and thus

the Court does not see how remedying the proffered issue with the form’s language

would have led to a different result. Insofar as Mr. Counts means to object to the

form on the ground that, rather than instructing the omission of legal authority, it

instructs claimants to state their factual allegations “briefly,” it is, in every case, the

responsibility of the plaintiff to identify the facts they need to share to support their

case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (a complaint must contain, at minimum, “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Further,

the Court notes that the prompt Mr. Counts identifies proceeds to say “[u]se as much

space as you need [and] attach extra sheet if necessary.” Compl. at 3.

Mr. Counts’s citation to a Seventh Circuit decision does not convince the Court

otherwise. Indeed, in Tate, 809 F.3d 343, Judge Posner remanded a district judge’s

dismissal of a complaint after preliminary review, determining the district court’s

determination that the plaintiff, who relied on a form complaint supplied by the court,

had pleaded insufficient factual matter. Id. 344-46. Emphasizing the “undemanding

standard” of a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) review, Judge Posner noted that the “complaint

form supplied to [the plaintiff] by the district court . . .. does not require, or indeed

permit, extensive factual detail, for it provides only six lines for listing ‘the facts

supporting the plaintiff’s claim. . ..” Id. at 345-46. As noted above, the form complaint

Mr. Counts used in fact encourages the claimant to “[u]se as much space as you need

[and] attach extra sheet if necessary.” Compl. at 3. Setting aside the issue that this

Court does not sit within the Seventh Circuit, Tate involved analysis of a different

form complaint than the one Mr. Counts takes issue with here, and is thus

distinguishable on this important point.

Mr. Counts’s fourth objection to the Recommended Decision concerns the

Magistrate Judge’s application of the Younger doctrine, seemingly on the ground that

the form the Plaintiff filled out instructed the omission of legal authority, but the

recognized exceptions for Younger require citations to legal authority. Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 4.

The Court does not credit this objection. The Magistrate Judge says “[a]bstention is

mandatory absent ‘extraordinary circumstances’ such as: (1) an action ‘brought in bad

faith . . . for the purpose of harassment,’ (2) ‘the state forum provides inadequate

protection of federal rights,’ or (3) the challenged ‘state statute is flagrantly and

patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions’ or there is ‘a facially

conclusive claim of [federal] preemption.’” Recommended Decision at 4-5 (quoting

Sirva Relocation, 794 F.3d at 192, 197). By the Court’s reckoning, the first two

“extraordinary circumstances” clearly rely on factual, not legal, allegations, and the

third has no relevance to the present case. Younger is clearly applicable to this case,

for the reasons explained by the Magistrate Judge.

Mr. Counts’s fifth objection complains that the Magistrate Judge’s focus on

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is misplaced because it overlooks the Bill

of Rights and the Supreme Court’s recent overturn of the Chevron deference doctrine.

Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 5. This objection is similarly unavailing. For the reasons explained by

the Magistrate Judge, in some detail, the state of Maine has sovereign immunity from

this suit.

Mr. Counts’s sixth objection is that the Magistrate Judge misunderstood the

identities of the Defendants in this suit, and, further, that the Plaintiff should have

been given an opportunity to amend his complaint to address any defects with

jurisdiction pursuant to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Tate, 809 F.3d at 346. Pl.’s

Obj. ¶ 6. As explained above, the Magistrate Judge followed proper procedure in

conducting a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) review and he had no obligation to invite the Plaintiff

to amend his complaint. The Seventh Circuit’s decision otherwise, on facts different

from those of this case, do not convince the Court to the contrary.

Mr. Counts’s seventh objection is a blanket rejection of the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation of dismissal on the ground that “jurisdiction under 28 [U.S.C.] [§]

1331 be applied.” Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 7. The Court discussed the limits of federal-question

jurisdiction above in regards to Rooker-Feldman and does not repeat the same

analysis here.

After reviewing Mr. Counts’s pleaded pathways to relief and the relevant legal

authority de novo, the Court now affirms the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended

Decision for the reasons stated within the same and addressed in this order. Mr.

Counts’s objections have not convinced the Court that the Recommended Decision

errs in any way, and the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge, for the numerous

reasons explained in detail in his Recommended Decision, that Mr. Counts’s

complaint warrants dismissal.

V. CONCLUSION

Having performed a de novo review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B), the

Court AFFIRMS the Recommended Decision After Review of Plaintiff’s Complaint

(ECF No. 13), OVERRULES Plaintiff Joseph Paul Counts’ Objection to Magistrate

Judge’s Recommended Decision (ECF No. 17), and accordingly DISMISSES without

prejudice the Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1). No Certificate of Appealability

should issue because there is no substantial issue that could be presented on appeal.

See FED. R. APP. P. 22 and Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Proceedings Under 28

U.S.C. Section 2254 or Section 2255.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 11th day of March, 2025