Wyatt v. Hauser

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TARIQ WYATT, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-92

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

CHRISTINA HAUSER, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Tariq Wyatt, who was incarcerated at the State Correctional

Institution at Mahanoy in Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Mahanoy”) during

the times relevant to this lawsuit, filed this pro se Section 1983 action on

January 18, 2022. (Doc. 1). He asserts First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment claims against multiple prison officials, alleging that Defendants

violated his rights due to a series of events, which include a nurse handing

him medications without wearing gloves, his temporary placement in a

Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”), the issuance of misconduct reports for

his behavior and related sanctions, cold conditions in the Restricted Housing

Unit (“RHU”), and the taking of some of his property. This alleged campaign

of abuse against him was inflicted, in part, as “preemptive” retaliation for

grievances he had not yet filed about prison officials’ behavior towards him.

Presently pending before this Court is Defendants’ and Plaintiff’s motions for

summary judgment. (Docs. 76 and 80, respectively). For the following

reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

80) and GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Tariq Wyatt, is a state prisoner who was housed at the State

Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, SCI-Mahanoy. On January 18, 2022,

Wyatt filed a pro se complaint naming approximately twenty-one correctional

officials as defendants. (Doc. 1). An Amended Complaint was filed

establishing the identities of several Doe defendants. (Doc. 50). Plaintiff has

suffered from mental illness while in custody, and has alleged that he had

been subjected to unfair treatment by correctional staff due to his

impairments in the pasts. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 27-43).

On October 5, 2021, Plaintiff had a dispute with a member of the

medical staff, Defendant nurse Amy Bing, who placed Wyatt’s medication in

a cup without wearing gloves. According to Wyatt, Defendant Bing was

dispensing the medications for all other inmates in similar fashion. (Doc. 92,

Ex. B, p. 19). Wyatt, believing the medication was dispensed in an unsafe

and unsanitary fashion, requested Bing to provide him with “a different pill”

since she “ha[d] no gloves on.” (Id., p. 12). At such point, Defendant Bing

returns to her cart, where the medications are held, and retrieves, out of

Wyatt’s sight, medication in a cup and says “here.” (Id.). Wyatt believes that

Defendant Bing, with sleight of hand, pretended to replace the medication

with a different cup but instead simply brought back the same medication in

the same cup. (Id., p. 20). Consequently, Wyatt begins to yell and scream

for his medication. (Id.). Defendant Bing asserted that she had placed

another medication capsule in a different paper cup to divert negative

behavior from Wyatt and that Wyatt began screaming “Give me my fucking

pills. I want my fucking pills” while holding a threatening stance over her.

(Doc. 92, Ex. C, p. 9).

Wyatt contends that he did not curse but does admit he yelled and

screamed at Defendant Bing “want[ing] everybody to hear it, hear [him] loud

and clear” that he wanted his medication. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 22). Wyatt

received a misconduct report from this incident, which he claims was

“bait[ed]” by Defendant Bing to get her “little hit off of [him],” (Id., p. 23), and

as “preemptive retaliation” for Wyatt filing a grievance against her despite the

fact that he had not yet filed a grievance or had any interaction with

Defendant Bing previous to that incident. (Id., pp. 34-36). Wyatt ultimately

submitted a grievance regarding this matter, and among the numerous

defendants he implicates, he included Defendant Nurse Hauser for simply

having responded to his grievance in a manner he disapproved. (Id., p. 30).

Due to Wyatt’s erratic behavior, he was assigned to a Psychiatric

Observation Cell, POC, where he was seen by medical staff until his release

the next day. (Id., p. 26; see also Doc. 92, Ex. E). Wyatt named Defendant

Lieutenant Davis for placing him in the POC “as a punishment for not

cooperating,” (id., p. 26), and Defendant Dreher, the shift commander, for

not handling the misconduct in the manner Wyatt would have preferred –

which is to discount Defendant Bing’s report and find, Wyatt contends, that

“‘stand[ing] in a threatening manner’ … is not a reason to send somebody to

the RHU.”1 (Id., p. 28). Wyatt contends that he would have to threaten with

words “to them or their family or something like that” to warrant being placed

in the POC. (Id., p. 29).

Wyatt contends that, while in POC, Defendant Correctional Officer

Fritzinger denied him access to hygiene supplies at first, but Wyatt also

admits having received such supplies the next day. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, pp. 39-

40). Another named Defendant, Correctional Officer Flynn, provided Wyatt

with the supplies he requested. (Id., p. 41). Wyatt was in POC for a single

1 Though Plaintiff said RHU (Restrictive Housing Unit) during his

deposition, he was not sent to the RHU but the POC after the incident.

day. (Id.). Furthermore, Wyatt alleged that that the POC “was kind of cold”

when he first got in there, as well as the RHU and the whole facility, because

“[t]he heat went off that day, and [he] think[s] they were trying to fix it.” (Id.,

p. 39).

On October 8, 2021, Wyatt had a hearing on the misconduct reported

three days prior, where the hearing examiner, Defendant Dupont, found that

Plaintiff was guilty of using abusive language and found the testimony of

Defendant Nurse Bing to be credible. (Doc. 92, Ex. D, p. 1). Wyatt contends

that he was unfairly treated because he was denied a witness (Correctional

Officer Alexy) who would have allegedly confirmed Wyatt’s version of events;

i.e., that he didn’t curse when he was screaming at the nurse. (Doc. 92, Ex.

B, pp. 42-43). However, according to Wyatt himself, Alexy himself told Wyatt

that he was not going to serve as his witness. (Id., p. 61). Nevertheless,

Wyatt was consequently placed in RHU for his misconduct.

That same day, Wyatt covered the windows of his cell door in RHU

with toilet paper and sheets of paper – obstructing any prison officials from

seeing within – because Wyatt was frustrated that staff members “keep

telling [him] that everything [was] going to be okay” when he was not allowed

a witness for his misconduct hearing. (Id., pp. 43-44; Doc. 92, Ex. F). Wyatt

was given multiple direct orders to uncover his door but Wyatt refused to

comply and was unresponsive. (Doc. 92, Ex. F, p. 10). Consequently, prison

officials deployed OC spray to gain his compliance. (Id., pp. 5, 10). Wyatt

received another misconduct based on this behavior to which he pled guilty

to the charge presented in the report. (Doc. 92, Ex. G).

After the spraying, Wyatt was removed from the cell and triaged by a

medical staff member, Defendant Nurse Landmesser. Defendant

Landmesser began a standard medical check up of Wyatt, asking him where

he is injured, if at all, and when she was instructed to decontaminate Wyatt

from the OC spray, she did so. This chain of events took about five minutes.

(Doc. 92, Ex. H at 4:55). Wyatt contends that Defendant Landmesser was

abusively dithering instead of counteracting the painful effects of the OC

Spray. However, this contention is belied by the video evidence. Wyatt

contends that fifteen to twenty minutes passed as Defendant Landmesser

refused to assist him, but the video evidence clearly shows that she flushes

his eyes as soon as it is brought to her attention that she is to do so, which

occurs less than five minutes after her arrival. (Id.). Defendant Captain Banks

placed Wyatt on paperwork restriction for his use of such to cover up his

window. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 55). Wyatt believed that this treatment was unfair

and contends that he should have been restricted from only toilet paper for

his behavior and not paperwork, which would include legal paperwork that

he can use to file a lawsuit, and thus accuses Defendant Banks for violating

his constitutional rights. (Id., p. 55-56). The restriction was temporary.

Afterwards, when Wyatt was taken to RHU to serve the time for his

misconduct, his property was to be stored away after being inventoried. (Id.,

pp. 63-69). Defendants Rodriguez, Guzenski and Evans, among others,

were involved in the inventorying of Wyatt’s property and the handling of his

filed grievance regarding such property. (Id.). The property taken from Wyatt

included, among others, “some books and magazines,” a television, a

religious medallion and art supplies. (Id., p. 69). The only property that Wyatt

took issue with being taken was the medallion, art supplies and television.

(Id.). All the property was returned or replaced. (Id.). Defendant Dreher was

the shift commander at the time, and his involvement is limited to that role.

(Id., pp. 26-28).

Wyatt implicates numerous defendants for responding to his

grievances in a manner he disagreed. For example, Wyatt named Defendant

Mason, the Superintendent of SCI-Mahanoy, because Defendant Mason told

Wyatt to appeal his misconduct sanction but ultimately upheld the sanction.

(Id., pp. 58-59). Defendant nurse Hauser is implicated for reviewing Wyatt’s

grievance against Defendant Bing, for which Wyatt believes is improper

given both Defendants Hauser and Bing make part of the same medical staff.

(Id., pp. 30-31). Defendants White, MacKnight and Chuma make part of the

Program Review Committee and their implication in the suit is due to their

decision to affirm the judgment on Wyatt’s misconducts. (Id., pp. 56-57).

Defendants Mahally, Walter and Guzenski’s involvement is limited to

responding to Wyatt’s grievances in a manner that Wyatt disagrees. (Id., pp.

69, 71, 73). Wyatt was unsure what Defendant Sokaloski’s involvement in

the lawsuit was and believes he might have mixed him up with Defendant

Guzenski. (Id., p. 73).

The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) has established

a formal policy and a procedures manual for inmates, which must be followed

by inmates who file grievances while incarcerated at state correctional

institutions operated by the DOC. The purpose of a grievance is to allow an

inmate to bring concerns and complaints to the attention of prison officials.

The grievance procedures are set forth in the DOC’s Administrative Directive

804 (“DC-ADM 804”), titled Inmate Grievance System. (Doc. 92, Ex. J).

Pursuant to the DC-ADM 804, the DOC has a three-tiered grievance system

which serves as an inmate’s administrative remedy: (1) an initial review by a

Grievance Officer, (2) appeal to the Facility Manager or designee; and (3)

appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals for final

review. (Id.). Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, a grievance must be submitted in

writing, using the grievance form available on all housing units or blocks,

within 15 working days after the events noted in the grievance. (Id.). A

grievance must include the following: a statement of facts relevant to the

claim during the date and approximate time and location of the event(s)

giving rise to the grievance; the identity of any individuals who were directly

involved in the event(s); any claims the inmate wishes to make concerning

violations of DOC directives, regulations, court orders, or other law; and any

compensation or legal relief desired. (Id.). Upon receipt, the Facility

Grievance Coordinator assigns each grievance (even a rejected grievance)

a tracking number and enters it into the Automated Inmate Grievance

Tracking System. (Id.). If an inmate is dissatisfied with the initial response,

he or she may appeal that decision to the Facility Manager. (Id.). The Facility

Manager then provides a written response to the grievance. The Facility

Manager may uphold the response, uphold the inmate, dismiss the

grievance (either as untimely or on the merits), or uphold in part or deny in

part. The Facility Manager may also remand the Initial Review Response for

further investigation or consideration. (Id.). If an inmate is not satisfied with

the decision of the Facility Manager, he or she may submit an appeal to the

Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals. Only issues raised in

both the original grievance and the appeal to the Facility Manager may be

appealed at this level. (Id.). The Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and

Appeals reviews the original grievance, the Initial Response Review, the

appeal to the Facility Manager, the Facility Manager’s response thereto, and

the appeal to final review. (Id.). The Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances

and Appeals then may uphold the response, uphold the inmate, dismiss, or

uphold in part and deny in part. Alternatively, the Chief Grievance Officer

may remand the grievance to the facility for further investigation or

reconsideration or may refer the appeal to a different bureau. (Id.).

Among the 154 grievances Wyatt has filed while incarcerated at SCI-

Mahanoy, eight grievances were filed regarding the series of events related

to this matter; particularly, grievances numbered:

• 949383, regarding Defendant Bing not wearing gloves when

giving Plaintiff his medication;

• 950467, regarding Defendant Evans for allegedly “stealing”

Plaintiff’s television when such television was ultimately

replaced;

• 950481, regarding the taking of Plaintiff’s religious medallion

which was ultimately returned;

• 950547, regarding the incident with OC spray and the cold

conditions;

• 950549, regarding Plaintiff’s stay in POC;

• 950824, regarding a comment made by Defendant White;

• 951864, regarding responses to grievances by Defendant

Mahally;

• 952020, regarding property being taken from Plaintiff.

(Doc. 92, Ex. I). None of the grievances were appealed by Wyatt for

final review.

After the filing of the Complaint, Defendants moved for dismissal of the

action. (Doc. 17). Defendants’ motion was denied, and the parties were

permitted to proceed with discovery. (Doc. 28). Discovery closed on May 31,

2024. (Doc. 85). Defendants filed a motion for Summary Judgment on April

1, 2024. (Doc. 76). Plaintiff filed a motion for Summary Judgment on April

15, 2024. (Doc. 80). Defendants filed a statement of facts on July 31, 2024.

(Doc. 92). Plaintiff filed his statement of facts in the form of exhibits to his

brief in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 91, Ex. A) which

are selected pages of his misconduct reports that show the Plaintiff had

requested witnesses for his misconduct hearing (specifically, CO Alexy) and

that Defendant Banks approved of Plaintiff’s temporary placement in RHU

with a restriction on use of paperwork. With all briefs submitted, the motions

are ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to

isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those “that could alter the outcome”

of the litigation, and “disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a

rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden

of proof on the disputed issue is correct.” EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc.,

618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d

321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)); Matsushista Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (“[w]here the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-

moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial”).

At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence

and determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

249 (1986). The Court must view the facts and evidence presented “in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all reasonable

inferences in that party’s favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d

217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the nonmovant’s

position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d

181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252) (alteration

in original). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of

fact merely by ... denying averments ... without producing any supporting

evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 F. App’x 896, 899

(3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary

judgment is made and supported ..., an adverse party may not rest upon

mere allegations or denial.” Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v.

DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v.

Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is

insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as

to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v.

Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting

a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions,

conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d

Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)); Nat’l

Labor Rel. Bd. v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff's]

testimony ... amounts to an unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we

have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant’s burden of proof on summary

judgment.”).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Wyatt cannot meet his Rule 56 burden

because he cannot adduce any competent evidence to support his bare

allegations. The Court agrees.

Defendants have asserted that Wyatt failed to exhaust the prison

grievance process, cannot produce any admissible evidence that would

establish the elements of his First, Fifth,2 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

claims other than his own self-serving, conclusory allegations, and Wyatt has

not identified any record evidence that would rebut this assertion. The Court

agrees. Wyatt has not, for example, pointed to a declaration or affidavit other

than his own repeated bare allegations, or any other evidence that could

sustain a verdict in his favor. At summary judgment, “the non-moving party

must oppose the motion and, in doing so, may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of his pleadings but, instead, must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions,

2 Defendants contend that there does not appear to be a claim under

the Fifth Amendment relevant to this action. After review of all the filings in

this matter, the Court agrees, and this claim is dismissed.

conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.” Jutrowski v. Township

of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2018) (alteration omitted)

(quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir.

2014)). The Court will nevertheless address each of the parties’ arguments

in turn.

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies and his claims are consequently procedurally defaulted. The Court

agrees.

Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner may not

bring an action with respect to prison conditions “until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). Exhaustion

is mandatory, see Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007); see

also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that the exhaustion

requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance procedures “regardless of the

relief offered through administrative procedures”); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d

65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000) (same), and “applies to all inmate suits about prison

life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and

whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle,

534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion must also be “proper,” the prisoner

must comply with all administrative requirements so that the agency can

address the issues on the merits. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006);

Williams, 482 F.3d at 639. Claims that have not been properly exhausted are

procedurally defaulted. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004);

Couch v. Tritt, 2016 WL 278776 at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2016) (“Inmates

who fail to fully, or timely, complete the prison grievance process, or who fail

to identify the named defendants, are barred from subsequently litigating

claims in federal court.”). To determine whether a prisoner has “properly”

exhausted a claim, the court must evaluate the prisoner’s compliance with

the prison’s administrative regulations governing inmate grievances. Id. “[I]t

is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries

of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.

Here, the applicable procedural process governing inmate grievances

and appeals is the DOC Administrative Directive 804 (DC-ADM 804). The

process begins with the submission of a grievance form and a response

thereto. If an inmate is dissatisfied with the initial response to his grievance,

he may file an appeal to the facility manager in writing, within fifteen working

days from the date of the initial review/rejection. An inmate dissatisfied with

the decision of the facility manager may appeal to final review with the chief

of SOIGA within fifteen working days from the date of the facility manager’s

decision.

Wyatt was well aware of the grievance process when he used it 154

times while incarcerated at SCI-Mahanoy. (Doc. 92, Ex. I, ¶9). Among the

154 grievances Wyatt has filed, eight relate to the claims Wyatt raised in his

Complaint:

• 949383, regarding Defendant Bing not wearing gloves when

giving Plaintiff his medication;

• 950467, regarding Defendant Evans for allegedly “stealing”

Plaintiff’s television when such television was ultimately

replaced;

• 950481, regarding the taking of Plaintiff’s religious medallion

which was ultimately returned;

• 950547, regarding the incident with OC spray and the cold

conditions;

• 950549, regarding Plaintiff’s stay in POC;

• 950824, regarding a comment made by Defendant White;

• 951864, regarding responses to grievances by Defendant

Mahally;

• 952020, regarding property being taken from Plaintiff.

(Doc. 92, Ex. I). None of the grievances were appealed by Wyatt for

final review. Wyatt has not alleged any facts that demonstrate he was

somehow unable to appeal his grievances. Due to Wyatt’s failure to exhaust

his administrative remedies, his claims are procedurally defaulted and

summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Defendants on that

ground alone. However, given the fatal flaws existent in Wyatt’s claims above

the procedural defect, this Court will nevertheless continue through its

analysis demonstrating the other grounds upon which summary judgment

will be granted in favor of the Defendants.

B. Lack of Personal Involvement

Defendants submit that the record is devoid of evidence from which a

reasonable factfinder could conclude that certain defendants were

personally involved in any of the alleged constitutional violation. Specifically,

with respect to Defendants Sokaloski, Flynn, Dreher, Hauser, White,

MacKnight, Chuma, Mason, Mahally, Walter and Guzenski.

Section 1983 provides that persons acting under color of state law may

be held liable if they deprive an individual of “any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See

42 U.S.C. §1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two

essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a

person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws

of the United States. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v.

George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Individual liability can be imposed

under Section 1983 only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the

alleged misconduct, and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of

respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fishser, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)

(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). In other

words, a defendant “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs

... shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge

and acquiescence[.]” See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 270 (3d Cir.

2003) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

Allegations of personal involvement must be made with appropriate

particularity in that the complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time,

place, and personal responsibility. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845

F.2d at 1207-08. Subsequent knowledge of an incident is insufficient to

demonstrate that a state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged

misconduct. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08 (the after-the-fact submission

of a grievance is “simply insufficient” to establish a defendant's knowledge of

an underlying constitutional violation at the time it occurred); Dooley v.

Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (Grievance Coordinator and

Superintendent's involvement in review and denial of grievance insufficient

to establish personal involvement). It is the plaintiff's burden to “show that

each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his

rights.” Kirk v. Roan, No. 1:04-CV-1990, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 14, 2006) (quoting Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353). Allegations that broadly

implicate multiple defendants without delineating individual conduct are

legally insufficient. See Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 F. App'x 66, 69-70 (3d

Cir. 2015). Accordingly, against this precedential backdrop, the Court will

review whether each of the aforementioned defendants had the requisite

personal involvement to be liable under §1983.

1) Administrative Respondents

Plaintiff has alleged that the following defendants violated his rights for

either responding to grievances he filed or affirming the decision on

grievances and misconduct reports. To wit:

• Defendant Hauser is a nurse, and her involvement is only

responding to grievances. (Doc. 92, ¶18).

• Defendants White, MacKnight, and Chuma are the Program

Review Committee; their involvement is limited to upholding

Plaintiff’s misconducts. (Doc. 92, ¶19).

• Defendant Superintendent Mason supervises SCI-Mahanoy, and

in this action appears to be limited to having once told Plaintiff to

appeal a sanction that she later upheld anyway. (Doc. 92, ¶20).

• Defendants Mahally, Walter, and Guzenski’s involvement is

limited to responding to grievances. (Doc. 92, ¶21).

Thus, the allegations against these Defendants amount to their

responses to grievances and misconducts in a manner that the Plaintiff is

unhappy with. “[T]he failure of a prison official to act favorably on an inmate’s

grievance is not itself a constitutional violation.” Little v. Mottern, 2017 WL

934464, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017) (quoting Rauso v. Vaughn, 2000 WL

873285, at *16 (E.D. Pa., June 26, 2000). Such allegations are insufficient to

establish the above-named Defendants’ personal involvement in the

challenged conduct under Section 1983. See Watkins v. Horn, 1997 WL

566080 at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concurrence in an administrative appeal

process is not sufficient to establish personal involvement); Mitchell v.

Keane, 974 F.Supp. 332, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“it appears from the

submissions before the court that [Plaintiff] filed grievances, had them

referred to a prison official, and received a letter reporting that there was no

evidence to substantiate his complaints. [Plaintiff]'s dissatisfaction with this

response does not constitute a cause of action.”); Caldwell v. Beard, 2008

WL 2887810, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2008) (“Such a premise for liability

[i.e., for performing a role in the grievance process] fails as a matter of law.”),

aff’d, 2009 WL 1111545 (3d Cir. April 27, 2009); Orrs v. Comings, 1993 WL

418361, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1993) (“But an allegation that a defendant

failed to act on a grievance or complaint does not state a Section 1983

claim.”). Accordingly, the claims against such Defendants will be dismissed.

2) Defendant Dreher

Plaintiff only brought an action against Defendant Dreher for his role

as shift commander. (Doc. 92, ¶17). As explained above, a defendant must

have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be

predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). “Personal involvement

can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence; however, allegations of knowledge and

acquiescence must be made with appropriate particularity.” Id. Additionally,

a plaintiff must show that “some affirmative conduct by the supervisor played

a role in the discrimination.” Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,

1478 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976)

(supervising officials do not violate the constitutional rights of the victims

unless they have played an “affirmative part” in the misconduct). Plaintiff has

made no such showing and, accordingly, summary judgment will be granted

in favor of Defendant Dreher.

3) Defendant Sokaloski

During his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he was unsure why he

even named Defendant Sokaloski, and may have confused him with another

Defendant. (Doc. 92, ¶22). Given that Plaintiff has shown no personal

involvement of Defendant Sokaloski, summary judgment will be granted in

favor of Defendant Sokaloski.

4) Defendant Flynn

During his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that Defendant Flynn came to

him while he was at POC and provided Plaintiff with the supplies he

requested, such as hygiene products. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 41). Thus, Plaintiff

has neither established any violation of his rights nor any personal

involvement of Defendant Flynn in any constitutional violations. Accordingly,

summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant Flynn.

C. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims

1) Verbal Abuse

Plaintiff has alleged that he has been verbally harassed or referred to

as a “snitch” by certain Defendants (i.e., Defendants White (Doc. 92, Ex. B,

pp.61-62), Counselor (id., pp. 59-58), Evans (id., pp. 64-65), Fritzinger (id.,

p. 41) and Rodriguez (id., pp. 66, 68, 69)). Statements and verbal threats,

without action, cannot as a matter of law violate a prisoner’s rights.

Rodriguez v. Wetzel, 2015 WL 1033842 at *8 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (“it is well

established that the use of words, no matter how violent, vulgar or

unprofessional, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. §1983”) (citing Dunbar v.

Barone, 487 Fed. Appx. 723 (3d Cir. 2012)). Verbal harassment in the

correctional setting, while unprofessional and not condoned, simply does not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Gandy v. Reeder, 2019 WL

2537923, at *2 (3d Cir. 2019) (“…mere insults, without more, cannot

constitute as an Eighth Amendment violation.”); Aleem-X v. Westcott, 347 F.

App'x 731, 731 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Verbal abuse of a prisoner, even of the lewd

variety [ ], is not actionable under § 1983”). Accordingly, to the extent any of

Plaintiff’s claims allege constitutional violations related to verbal harassment

or verbal abuse, such claims will be dismissed.

2) The Dispensation of Medication and Resulting Misconduct

Plaintiff admits to having “yelled” and “screamed” at Defendant

Bing “want[ing] everybody to hear it, hear [him] loud and clear” that he

wanted his medication and refused to take the medication she provided him

on two separate occasions because he believed, without seeing, that she

dispensed his medication without gloves. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 22). He received

a misconduct due to his behavior. Because of these events, Plaintiff claims

that his constitutional rights have been violated. Defendants submit that to

the extent that Defendant Bing should have been wearing gloves Plaintiff

“does not seem to have the expertise necessary to offer an opinion on” the

matter and that Defendant Bing “would be shielded by qualified immunity”

regardless. (Doc. 92, p. 13). The Court agrees with Defendants.

Despite their participation in constitutionally impermissible conduct,

government officials “may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil

damages if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Hope

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity ensures that before officers are

subjected to suit, they have notice that their conduct is unlawful. Id. “Qualified

immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their

duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “If the

law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail,

since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing

his conduct.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19.

The qualified immunity analysis has two prongs. Pearson, 555 U.S. at

232. One prong of the analysis is whether the facts that the plaintiff has

alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right. Id. The other

prong of the analysis is whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

“To determine whether a right was ‘clearly established,’ we conduct a

two-part inquiry.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021).

“First, we must ‘define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of

specificity.’” Id. (quoting Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012)).

“This requires us to frame the right ‘in light of the specific context of the case,

not as a broad general proposition.’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).

“Second, we must ask whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time

of its alleged violation, i.e., whether the right was ‘sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). “This is an ‘objective (albeit

fact-specific) question,’ where ‘[an officer]'s subjective beliefs ... are

irrelevant.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).

“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently

clear foundation in then-existing precedent.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63

(2018). In other words, “[t]he rule must be ‘settled law,’ which means it is

dictated by ‘controlling authority’ or ‘a robust ‘consensus of cases of

persuasive authority.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is not enough that

the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent.” Id. Rather, “[t]he precedent

must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to

establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id.

Defendants submit that there is certainly not a robust consensus of

case law indicating that a nurse must wear gloves when dispensing pills to

prison inmates. The Court agrees. Furthermore, if the law did not put the

defendant on notice that her conduct would be clearly unlawful, qualified

immunity is appropriate. Bayer v. Monroe County Children & Youth Services,

577 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2009). “In other words, ‘existing precedent must

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Reichle

v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 741 (2011)). “This exacting standard ‘gives government officials

breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing]

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” City

& Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015) (quoting al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743). Given the exacting standard, Defendant Bing’s

conduct does not rise to the level of plain incompetence and a knowing

violation of law. Accordingly, Defendant Bing is shielded by qualified

immunity and the claim against her regarding the manner in which she

dispensed Plaintiff’s medication will be dismissed.

Turning to the misconduct against Plaintiff, Plaintiff offers a convoluted

theory of his and Defendant Bing’s motivations—namely, that Defendant

Bing goaded him into a misconduct, apparently for her own sinister

amusement to get her “little hit off of [him]” and as preemptive retaliation for

Plaintiff’s intended not yet filed (nor announced) grievance against her. (Doc.

92, Ex. B, p. 23).3 Plaintiff’s support for this claim is conclusory, stating,

“[p]eole do it all the time …” and commented on the curious way Defendant

Bing was handling the medication he was to take. (Id., pp. 22-24). Plaintiff

finally noted that “[p]eople be in a certain mood and that they want to write a

[misconduct] on somebody. That’s what it feels like.” (Id., p. 24). Regardless

of Plaintiff’s feelings on the matter, his suspicions are not evidence.

Plaintiff’s goading theory is circular, for a jury to believe that Defendant

Bing filed a false misconduct against him to preemptively head off Plaintiff

from filing a grievance against her would require such a jury to forego reason

and adopt a belief in mind reading. Ultimately, the premise to Plaintiff’s

circular conclusion is weakened by Plaintiff’s own admission that he doesn’t

3 Defendants correctly note that Plaintiff remains responsible for his

own actions, even if he was provoked (or believed to be so).

even believe anything would have happened to Defendant Bing regardless

of whether or not he filed a grievance against her. When confronted with this

inconsistency, the following exchange occurred:

Q: Why would staff bother to retaliate against you for filing

grievances if nothing ever happens with the grievances anyway?

A (Plaintiff): Well, that’s what I think, because something does

sometimes happen, but they don’t tell us, or people tell them -- I

really, really believe that this is what happens when somebody

does something that you could put a grievance in on. I believe

that people are looking at them and they’re telling them -- looking

at them like they're being weird, like, "You did that?" And I believe

that’s really their motivation for coming back and trying to

retaliate first, because they just want to get you back somehow.

Q: So they retaliate against you preemptively for filing

grievances. But you don’t know if they get in trouble for getting

grievances or not, you’re not sure?

A (Plaintiff): I feel like, sometimes, if you tell somebody in

Medical, "Oh, you're giving this guy poison. She's giving

somebody poison"; right? -- so then I believe somebody come

over to tell them, "Listen, don't do that no more. You give people

poison, what’s wrong with you? We took care of it, but --” you

know what I mean? It’s kind of hard to explain.

(Doc. 92, Ex. B, pp. 35-36). As fantastical as Plaintiff’s theory may be,

even granting him, arguendo, that Defendant Bing issued a false or

fabricated misconduct, it still does not state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

“To invoke the Due Process Clause, an inmate must first identify

a liberty interest that has been violated. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545

U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393, 162 L.Ed.2d 174, 189

(2005). It is well established that the act of filing a false

disciplinary misconduct does not itself violate a prisoner's

constitutional rights even if it may result in the deprivation of a

protected liberty interest. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949,

951 (2d Cir.1986) (A “prison inmate has no constitutionally

guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of

conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty

interest.) However, inmates do have the right not to be deprived

of a protected liberty interest without due process of law. Id. at

952. Accordingly, “so long as certain procedural requirements

are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified evidence or

misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to state a due

process claim.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d

Cir.2002) (citing Freeman, 808 F.2d at 953).

Hutchinson v. Kosakowski, 2015 WL 373765 at * 4 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 15,

2015). The Hutchinson court found the inmate plaintiff in that matter, who

also alleged that his due process rights were violated when he was issued a

false or fabricated misconduct and denied witnesses at his misconduct

hearing, was not deprived of a protected liberty interest and “fail[ed] to state

a due process, or any other, claim against [the defendant].” 2015 WL 373765

at * 5. Similarly here, even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant Bing issued

Wyatt a false or fabricated misconduct, “so long as certain procedural

requirements are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified evidence or

misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to state a due process

claim.” Id. (citing Smith, 293 F.3d at 654).

Thus, turning to the misconduct hearing itself, due process protections

attach in prison disciplinary proceedings in which the loss of good-time

credits is at stake. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974). In

Wolff, the Supreme Court held that an inmate must receive “(1) advance

written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent

with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the

factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary

action.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). Because Wyatt

does not allege that he suffered a loss of good conduct time, the Wolff

protections are inapplicable. Furthermore, the Third Circuit in Watson v.

Rozum, noted that “to determine whether prison officials’ decision to

discipline an inmate for his violations of prison policy was within the broad

discretion [ ] afford[ed] [to] them,” the court must evaluate “the quantum of

evidence” of the misconduct. 834 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2016). Here,

Defendant Dupont explicitly noted that Defendant Bing presented testimony

that was more credible than Plaintiff. Defendant Dupont relied upon that

testimony in finding Wyatt’s guilt, which is sufficient. Beyond that, Plaintiff

admits that he was “yelling” and “screaming” at Defendant Bing with all his

might. Not allowing additional witnesses would not have made a difference

since Plaintiff essentially admits to the violation for which he was convicted.

Moreover, the Due Process Clause does not provide protection against

the imposition of discipline, including disciplinary confinement and the loss

of various privileges inasmuch as these other forms of discipline do not

“impose[ ] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150-51 (3d

Cir. 2002) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). Confinement in administrative or

punitive segregation is insufficient, without more, to establish the kind of

“atypical” deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty interest.

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486; see Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-07 (3d

Cir. 1997). Here, Wyatt alleges that he was denied witness testimony of CO

Alexy. However, Wyatt does not allege that he was subjected to an atypical

and significant hardship. Moreover, placement in disciplinary confinement

(such as the RHU or POC) does not impose an atypical and significant

hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Accordingly, no aspect of this incident constitutes a constitutional violation

and summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants on all claims

relating to it.

3) POC Placement

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s brief placement in POC for less than

day is not a constitutional violation. The Court agrees.

In order to succeed on a claim as to one's conditions of confinement,

a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) he was incarcerated under conditions

imposing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the defendant-official was

deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety, and

(3) the defendant-official’s deliberate indifference caused him harm.” Bistrian

v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2015) abrogated on other grounds by

Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 96 (3d Cir. 2018). “[T]he Constitution does not

mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. Therefore,

conditions of imprisonment violate the Eighth Amendment only if they, “alone

or in combination...deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measures of life's

necessities.” See id. at 347. Such necessities include “adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994). Thus, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-

of-confinement claim.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. However, “[s]ome conditions

of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in

combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a

mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,

identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.” Mammana v.

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Wilson,

501 U.S. at 304 and Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).

Here, Plaintiff had an overnight stay in POC where he was temporarily

denied hygiene supplies but received them the day after. The conditions of

such a confinement do not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Court

has previously found that denial of showers for 15 days does not rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 Fed.

Appx. 116, 122 (3d Cir. 2010). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held

that “[i]t is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core

of prison administrators' expertise.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002).

Wyatt was briefly placed in POC for his erratic and aggressive behavior, for

which he admits to, and was then appropriately tended to by medical staff.

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant

Fritzinger relating to the Eighth Amendment claim.

4) Cold Temperature in the RHU

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim that the RHU is cold does not

state a constitutional claim. The Court agrees.

The Third Circuit has held that it “is questionable if having a cold cell”

is an atypical and significant hardship when “much more harsh conditions”

do not violate the Eighth Amendment. Burkholder v. Newton, 116 Fed. Appx.

358, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Sandlin, 515 U.S. at 484). Both the Supreme

Court and the Third Circuit have held that low cell temperatures may satisfy

the objective deprivation requirement of an Eighth Amendment claim, but

only if the low cell temperature is exacerbated by other mutually enforcing

conditions that deprive the inmate of adequate shelter. See Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991) (low cell temperature at night combined with

failure to issue blankets may establish violation); Sampson v. Berks Co.

Prison, 117 Fed. Appx. 383, 385-86 (3d Cir. 2006) (low cell temperature

combined with refusal to provide additional clothing, move to warmer cell, or

take any other measures to ameliorate the cold sufficient to survive motion

to dismiss).

Here, Plaintiff never alleged any facts that show the low cell

temperature was exacerbated by other mutually enforcing conditions that

would deprive him of adequate shelter. If anything, based on his deposition,

he stated that it “was kind of cold” when he first got in there and that “[t]he

heat went off that day, and [he] think[s] they were trying to fix it,” (Doc. 92,

Ex. B, p. 39), effectively mitigating (not exacerbating) the conditions of his

confinement. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are unsupported

by any evidence and summary judgment will be granted in favor of the

Defendants.

5) Use of OC Spray and Second Misconduct

On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff covered the windows of his cell and was

unwilling to uncover or respond when asked to by prison officials.

Accordingly, OC spray was used to gain his compliance. As a result of this

incident, Plaintiff was issued a misconduct, to which he pled guilty. In his

complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the spray was used as punishment, and the

manner in which he was later “detoxed” was violative of his constitutional

rights because Defendant Landmesser, Plaintiff alleges, cruelly dithered

instead of counteracting the painful effects of the OC spray. Plaintiff has

neither alleged sufficient facts to constitute a cognizable claim nor has any

presented any evidence to support his conclusory allegations. If anything,

the record evidence flatly contradicts Plaintiff’s allegations.

As previously explained, prison officials are entitled to qualified

immunity which extends to the use of OC spray. “Qualified immunity

balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their

duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. “Thus, so long as an official

reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified

immunity will shield that official from liability.” Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159 (3d Cir.

2012) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). Here, as part of Defendant

Gunther’s duties to gain compliance of an inmate, he may use OC spray,

and the deployment of it was reasonable given Plaintiff’s behavior of covering

the windows of his cell and purposely refusing to respond. (Doc. 92, Ex. B,

p. 43) (“I put something on the door so they couldn't see me, and they

sprayed me.”).

If Plaintiff is arguing that this was excessive force, the core inquiry of

an excessive-force claim is “‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm.’” Fennell v. Cambria County Prison, 607 F. App’x 145, 148 (3d Cir.

2015) (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam). In

conducting that inquiry, a court must examine the need for the application of

force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the

extent of injury inflicted, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and

inmates, and any efforts to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id.

(citing Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000)). As made clear, the

use of force was applied in a good faith attempt by Defendant Gunther to

restore discipline and the following efforts of the nurse, Defendant

Landmesser, in performing a standard medical checkup of Plaintiff were

meant to temper (and counter) the severity of the effects of OC spray.

Furthermore, the resulting issuance of the misconduct is clearly supported

by the quantum of evidence; a misconduct to which Plaintiff pled guilty to.

As to Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Landmesser particularly,

that she allegedly cruelly and purposefully dithered instead of counteracting

the painful effects of the OC spray, such allegations are belied by the video

evidence. (Doc. 92, Ex. H). Plaintiff contended that fifteen to twenty minutes

passed as Defendant Landmesser refused to assist him, however, the video

shows that Defendant Landmasser performs a standard medical checkup of

Plaintiff, asking him where he is injured and then flushes his eyes as soon

as it is brought to her attention that she is to do so; which is less than five

minutes after her arrival. (Id.; see also Doc. 92, ¶15). When an opposing

party’s side of the story is “blatantly contradicted” by clear video evidence on

the record, “so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007); see, e.g., Fennell,

607 F. App’x at 148 (ruling that “the District Court properly relied on the

videotape of the incident to resolve any factual disputes” between an officer

and a state prisoner in an excessive force case). Accordingly, summary

judgment will be granted in favor of the Defendants regarding any claims

related to the events of October 8, 2021.

6) Property

Plaintiff claims that he had property taken from him but only takes issue

with a medallion, a television and art supplies, all of which were either

returned or replaced. (Doc. 92, ¶16). From Plaintiff’s deposition, the following

interaction occurred:

Q: Okay. And you said what you took issue with was the TV or

religious medallion and your art supplies?

A (Plaintiff): Right.

Q: Did you ever get any of that stuff back?

A (Plaintiff): Yeah, I ended up getting my art supplies back and

my chain. And the TV, I ended up getting a different TV.

(Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 69). Not only is there no claim stated but also no

damages. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the

Defendants.

7) Retaliation

To state a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1)

constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a

person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3)

a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the

retaliatory action.” Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d

Cir. 2006); see also Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001);

Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000). To

amount to retaliation, the conduct must be “sufficient to deter a person of

ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.” McKee v.

Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Although the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim remain

constant, the underlying concepts that they signify will vary with the setting—

whether activity is ‘protected’ or an action is ‘adverse’ will depend on

context....” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999). The

fact of incarceration and the valid penological objectives of deterrence of

crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security justify limitations

on the exercise of constitutional rights by inmates. See Pell v. Procunier, 417

U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). Thus, a prison inmate “retains [only] those rights

that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate

penological objectives of the corrections system.” Id. at 822.

Plaintiff claims, to some extent, that all of the transpiring events make

part of the same overarching retaliatory conspiracy against him for filing

grievances. As severe as such allegations may sound, they are completely

conclusory and vague, and Plaintiff makes no attempt to allege any particular

facts connecting any of the alleged retaliatory acts against him to his

grievance filings. When Plaintiff was asked for supporting evidence, he

responded with the following:

“Because that's all they do in there. So it become a habit. Now,

if I tell somebody that somebody's doing something, first they try

to act like they don't believe me; then when I say I'm putting in

the paperwork, I end up in a POC. Like I said, everybody knows

-- most of the people was walking around telling me that this CO

was coming to be a witness, but I can't understand how that didn't

happen. You know what I'm saying? I couldn't understand that.

The only thing that I could believe right now is, this is all one

thing, they all working together. Because there's nothing to say

that they wasn't -- you know what I mean? It's like, why did this

happen at this point in time? It's only one reason I could see.”

(Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 50). The filing of grievances is a protected activity

under the First Amendment, Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.

2003), however, at the outset, it is also clear that Plaintiff “consistently

display[s] a preternatural, global, subjective sensitivity to alleged retaliation,

… ascribing some retaliatory motive to virtually every action that occurs at

the prison.” Smith v. Price, 2012 WL 6541008, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21,

2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 6553651 (M.D. Pa.

Dec. 14, 2012). Accordingly, with no competent evidence of retaliation

presented, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 80) and GRANT Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 76). An appropriate order will issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: March 11, 2025

22-92-01