Powell v. Jefferson County Department of Job & Family Services

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID POWELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:24-cv-1405

JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

JEFFERSON COUNTY Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

DEPARTMENT OF JOB &

FAMILY SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on several pro se motions filed by Plaintiff David Powell

(ECF Nos. 9, 10, 12), and motions to dismiss filed by Defendants (ECF Nos. 23, 44, 46, 49, 52).

The Court rules on the motions below.

I. Background

Mr. Powell filed this lawsuit on March 27, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) He has since amended his

Complaint three times and named fifteen Defendants in total. (See ECF Nos. 3, 8, 14.) The

allegations in Mr. Powell’s various Complaints are difficult to discern but seem to relate to his role

as the guardian on behalf of Linda Courcier. Defendants also describe discrepancies between the

various Complaints filed on the Court’s docket and the Complaints served on Defendants. The

Complaints served on Defendants vary based on the Defendant being served.

Generally, the Complaints filed with the Court and served on Defendants allege that Mr.

Powell was improperly removed as Ms. Courcier’s guardian. Mr. Powell does not state his

relationship to Ms. Courcier. When Ms. Courcier was visiting Ohio, she had a medical emergency,

which he alleged led to a conspiracy initiated by the Jefferson County Probate Court to improperly

remove him as her guardian and to prevent him from visiting her. The scope of the alleged

conspiracy is broad, and includes various media organizations, sovereign state, prominent athletes,

and political figures, and members of crime families all worked together to kidnap Ms. Courcier,

hold her hostage, and fraudulently represent that she passed away in December 2023. (See e.g.,

ECF Nos. 23-1, 23-2, 23-3.)

He seeks the release of Mr. Courcier from a facility in Ohio, the Sunnyslope Center, to his

custody so that they can return to Florida. He asks to be named as Ms. Courcier’s Social Security

payee, and for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $400,00, and $10 trillion in unspecified

damages (See ECF Nos. 3, 8, 14.) He asks the Court to issue an arrest warrant of various state and

local entities, politicians, corporations, and athletes. (Id.)

Mr. Powell also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 9), a Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10), and a Motion titled “2nd Request Motion to Add Plaintiff’s

New Names & et al to all Caption Pleadings of Plaintiff’s et al & Defendant’s et al Docket’s Case

No. Clerical Misprision or Clerical Mistake by Officers of the Court” (ECF No. 12).

Several Defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Powell’s claims for failure to state a claim for

relief or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Below is a list of the motions to dismiss before the

Court:

• State of Ohio, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Ohio Medicaid, Ohio

Department of Job and Family Services Bureau of State Hearings, Ohio Ombudsman

Long-Term Care, (collectively, the “State of Ohio Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for

Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 23.)

• State of Ohio Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 44)

• Defendant Jefferson County Department of Job and Family Services’ Motion to Dismiss

for Failure to State a Claim and for Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 46)

• Defendant Coleman Health Service’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and

for Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 49)

• Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s Motion to Dismiss Case as Frivolous, for

Failure to State a Claim, and for Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 52)

Several other Defendants did not appear after Mr. Powell’s deficient attempts to effect

service of process. When Mr. Powell failed to effect service of process after almost a year, the

Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss without prejudice Mr. Powell’s claims

against the non-moving Defendants under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for

failure to timely effect service of process. (R&R, ECF No. 53.) Mr. Powell filed a Motion broadly

objecting to the Report and Recommendation and opposing the various motions to dismiss filed

by Defendants. (ECF No. 54.) The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed

the claims against the non-moving Defendants without prejudice. (See O&O, ECF No. 55.) The

Court now addresses the remaining pending motions before the Court.

II. Mr. Powell’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the

movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet

v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). The purpose of a

preliminary injunction is “to preserve the parties’ relative positions in order to prevent irreparable

injury prior to trial.” Montgomery v. Carr, 848 F. Supp. 770, 779 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (Weber, J.).

To decide whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court examines four factors: (1)

whether the movant has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant

will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction

would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by

issuing the injunction. Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 573 (explain the four factors should be balanced

against each other).

Mr. Powell’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction states, in its entirety:

Pursuant to Civil rule 8(a), 9(g), 54, 55, 58, 64, 65, 65.1, 69 Plaintiff(s) et al hereby

moves the Court to enter as prayed FORTHWITH Injunction Relief Blanket

Protective, Restraining, & SEIZURE OF PERSON MS. COURCIER BACK

TO GUARDIAN MR. POWELL ORDER JUDGMENT in favor of prevailing

Appellant(s) et al and against Defendant’s et al 18, 19, 19.1, 20 necessary

implication. On the grounds Estoppel by Acquiescence, nil-dicit default,

Judgment. The Court after reviewing the motion and relevant laws, finds that the

motion for Blanket Protective, Restraining, & seizure of person order Habeas

Corpus, Mandamus relief is well taken and is GRANTED.

(ECF No. 9, PageID 168.)

Mr. Powell has not alleged facts sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction. His single-

paragraph motion has not shown that he has any likelihood of success on the merits, let alone a

strong likelihood of success. As grounds for relief, he cites estoppel by acquiescence. But “estoppel

by acquiescence is generally considered an affirmative defense, not an independent cause of action,

whereby a plaintiff will be held to have lost his rights against a defendant, if the plaintiff has

committed some act which ‘amount[s] to an assurance to the defendant, express or implied, that

plaintiff would not assert his . . . rights against the defendant[].’” Bey v. Brown, No. 4:16CV0267,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47833, *9 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2017) (citing Nat’l Football League v

Rondor, Inc., 840 F. Supp.1160, 1167 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Zwerin v. 533 Short N. LLC, No. 2:10-

cv-488, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157745, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2012)).

Mr. Powell does not argue that he will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued.

There is no discussion of harm to others or the public interest in his Motion. Accordingly, Mr.

Powell is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction and his Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 9) is DENIED.

III. Motions to Dismiss

All Defendants argue that Mr. Powell has failed to effect service and thus his claims should

be dismissed under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even if he had effectuated

service on the Defendants, Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction for several reasons.

Alternatively, Defendants move to dismiss contending that Mr. Powell has failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. The Court addresses each of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

in turn.

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of actions that fail to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. While Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order “[t]o survive

a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 57 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (clarifying plausibility standard from

Twombly). Further, “[a]lthough for purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all of the

factual allegations in the complaint as true, [it is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (quotations omitted).

Since Mr. Powell brings this action without the assistance of counsel, he is entitled to a

liberal construction of the Complaint. Pro se complaints are construed liberally and held to “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972). But this more lenient standard has limits. Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975,

976–77 (6th Cir. 2012). Courts “should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Id.

(citing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

B. State of Ohio Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

The State of Ohio Defendants filed two Motions to Dismiss arguing that the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over the action (ECF No. 23) and that Mr. Powell has failed to state a

claim for relief (ECF No. 44).1 Mr. Powell responded to both Motions (ECF Nos. 27, 48), and the

State of Ohio Defendants replied (ECF Nos. 29, 50).

The State of Ohio Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the case because

(1) Ms. Courcier passed away rendering Mr. Powell’s claims as moot; (2) Mr. Powell failed to

allege the proper basis for the Court’s jurisdiction; (3) federal courts lack jurisdiction to reverse

decisions by probate courts; and (4) the Eleventh Amendment bars all prospective claims and

claims for damages against the State of Ohio Defendants. (See ECF Nos. 23, 29.)

To the extent that Mr. Powell seeks monetary damages from the State of Ohio Defendants,

his claims are dismissed under sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh

Amendment states:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit

in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign state.

U.S. Const. Am. XI. The Amendment bars claims for monetary damages against State agencies

and State officers in their official capacities. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).

Mr. Powell sues the State of Ohio itself, along with several other state agencies or state

officials named in their official capacities (Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Ohio

Medicaid, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services Bureau of State Hearings, Ohio

Ombudsman Long-Term Care), so the State of Ohio is effectively the real party in interest.

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) (citation omitted). He seeks

monetary damages of $10 trillion and $400,000 in attorneys’ fees. Therefore, his claims for

monetary, non-prospective relief, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

1 The State of Ohio Defendants also argue that they were not properly served with summons and

a copy of the complaint. (ECF No. 23, PageID 457–58.) Because Mr. Powell is pro se and the

State of Ohio Defendants have appeared, the Court will treat the State of Ohio Defendants as if

service were proper for the motion to dismiss.

The State of Ohio Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Powell’s

claims for prospective relief under the probate exception. (ECF No. 23, PageID 466.) Mr. Powell

did not address the argument that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over guardianship

matters in his response to the Motion. (See ECF No. 27.)

Under Ohio law, the probate court may appoint a guardian over a person. See Ohio Rev.

Code § 2111.02(A). Federal courts are prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over certain

conflicts involving property subject to a state court probate proceeding.” Osborn v. Griffin, 865

F.3d 417, 434 (6th Cir. 2017) (describing the “probate exception” to federal jurisdiction). Although

the “full scope of the so-called probate exception remains open to debate, [] matters involving a

Guardian, Conservator[,] or other fiduciary appointed and supervised by the Probate Court fall

comfortably within its scope.” Gilroy v. Gilroy, No. 1:21-CV-261, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232092,

at *5 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2021); see also Struck v. Cook County Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858,

859–60 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying the probate exception to claim challenging revocation

of guardianship).

Mr. Powell’s Complaint primarily asks this Court to reverse the decision of the Jefferson

County Probate Court appointing a guardian for Ms. Courcier, and to instead award him

guardianship. (See ECF Nos. 23-1 (Complaint served on State of Ohio); 23-2 (Complaint served

on Medical Board); 23-3 (Complaint served on Ohio Department of Medicaid).) Matters involving

guardianship are excluded from this Court’s jurisdiction under the probate exception. Even if the

probate doctrine did not apply, the Court notes that to the extent that Mr. Powell is attempting to

overturn orders entered by an Ohio probate court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine limits this Court’s

ability to adjudicate such claims. Heimlich v. United States, No. 2:23-cv-1879, 2023 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 112100, at *9 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2023) (Vascura, M.J.) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

476 (1983)).

Even construing Mr. Powell’s Complaint liberally and assuming he adequately pled the

jurisdictional requirements, the Court nonetheless finds that Mr. Powell has failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. First, Ms. Courcier’s death likely renders moot Mr. Powell’s

claim. Second, Mr. Powell does not make clear what cause of action he brings against the State of

Ohio Defendants. Even under the liberal pleading standards afforded to pro se litigants, the Court

“should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler, 482 F. App’x at 976–77.

The State of Ohio Defendants construe his allegations as bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim

because he argues Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate his civil rights by kidnapping

Ms. Courcier and falsely claiming that she passed away. (ECF No. 23, PageID 469.) Although it

is hard to discern the relief requested, Mr. Powell appears to request the return of guardianship of

Ms. Courcier to him, the immediate discharge of her to his custody, and to name him as her Social

Security payee.

The State of Ohio Defendants correctly note that Mr. Powell fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. For one, Ms. Courcier passed away on December 3, 2023. (ECF No.

23, PageID 464–65; see also ECF No. 23-4, Certificate of Death.) Her death at minimum makes it

impossible for the Court or any of the Defendants to return guardianship to Mr. Powell, or to

release her into his custody. Further, none of the State of Ohio Defendants are able to award

guardianship or responsible for naming the Social Security payees. (ECF No. 23, PageID 468–69.)

Accordingly, because he fails to state a claim for relief even under the less stringent standards

imposed on pro se litigants, Mr. Powell’s claims against the State of Ohio Defendants are

DISMISSED.

C. Defendant Jefferson County Department of Job & Family Services’

Motion to Dismiss

Jefferson County Department of Job and Family Services (“Jefferson County JFS”) also

moved to dismiss Mr. Powell’s Complaint. (ECF No. 46.) Mr. Powell opposed that Motion. (ECF

No. 48.) As with the other Defendants, the Complaint served on Jefferson County JFS is not one

of the four Complaints on the Court’s docket. (Compare ECF No. 46-1 (Complaint served on

Jefferson County JFS) with ECF Nos. 1, 3, 8, 14 (Complaints filed on docket).) Thus, Jefferson

County JFS argues that it has not been properly served under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Like the State of Ohio Defendants, Jefferson County JFS also argues that Mr.

Powell has failed to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6).

Mr. Powell makes the allegations below against Jefferson County JFS:

• “CRIME FRAUD EXCEPTION W/ DISCRIMINATION JEFFERSON

COUNTY DJFS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE COMPOUNDING THE

CRIMES SPREE(S).” (ECF No. 46-1, ¶ 2.) “COMPOUNDING THE CRIME

CAUSE OF ACTION STIFLINF OVERT PROSECUTION CAUSATION EXIST

IN A SUBORN SECRET UNDERHANDED MATTER (CHANGE OF

GUARDIANSHIP) SUBMISSION TO A FINDINGS LINK TO HOSTAGE

KIDNAP BY JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPT. JFS/APS ET AL & THIRD

PARTY.” (Id.)

• “NECESSARY IMPLICATION FOR OVERT TERRORISM ACTS W/

JCDJFS.” (Id. ¶ 3.)

• “BASED ON PLAINTIFF(S) ET AL REBUTTAL LEGAL GROUNDS

OBJECTION AN JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPT. JFS/APS UNREASONABLE

DECISION.” (Id. ¶ 6.) “APPOINTED IMPOSTER GUARDIAN RYAN

HEDDLESTON ON 5-26-23 FALSIFYING A RECORD DECEPTION

CONSPIRACY FALSE DOCUMENTS BY JEFFERSON COUNTY DJFS IN

PROBATE COURT JUDGE LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

12/15/22 DEFENDANT’S ET AL.” (Id.)

• “PLAINTIFF(S) ASSERT TO ESTOP BAR OR PREVENT BY ESTOPPEL

ESTOPPAGE JEFFERSON CDJFS ET AL & JUDGE DECISION 11-16-23, 12-

18-23, & 2-26-24 IN PROBATE NON JURISDICTION CONTEMPORANEOUS

OBJECTION.” (Id. ¶ 9.)

• “R. 15(c) RELATES BACK TO ORIGINAL PLEADING DATE IN COUNTY

PROBATE COURT EMERGENCY HEARING DESIGNATED AGENCY

OF JEFFERSON COUNTY DJFS/APS & TRINITY HEALTH SYSTEM

11/17, 18/22.” (Id. ¶ 11.)

• “DEPRIVED OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF

STATE LAWS 42 UDCA SS. 1983 AND 42 USC SS. 1985(1-3) SEDITIOUS

CHAIN CONSPIRACY W/ JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPT. JOB & FAMILY

SERVICES/APS.” (Id. ¶ 20.)

• “WIRE AND MAIL FRAUD TO GAIN AN ECONOMICAL ADVANTAGE

JDJFS ET AL RECIPIENTS RECEIVING FEDERAL AND STATE

DOLLARS WHILE LINK TO EXTORTION, RANSOM, HUMAN

TRAFFICKING KIDNAP DOMESTIC STATE TERRORISM OF

PLAINTIFF’S ET AL.” (Id. ¶ 21.)

The Complaint served on Jefferson County JFS has not been filed with the Court. Rule 4(c)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a summons be served with a copy of the

complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). Since Mr. Powell failed to have summons and a copy of the

Complaint filed on the Court’s docket served on Jefferson County JFS in the time allotted under

Rule 4(m), Jefferson County JFS is entitled to dismissal on these grounds. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(5) (providing for dismissal for insufficient service of process).

But even if the Complaint were properly served on Jefferson County JFS, Mr. Powell does

not provide factual allegations with the detail necessary to give Jefferson County JFS notice of a

viable cause of action against it under any of the legal theories referenced by Mr. Powell. See

Milam v. Brown, No. 21-6035, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 14892, at *4 (6th Cir. May 31, 2022)

(collecting cases affirming the dismissal of rambling complaints that fail to give the defendants

fair notice). Mr. Powell’s allegations are difficult to decipher and leave Jefferson County JFS

guessing as to what causes of action he asserts. Even under the more lenient construction afforded

to pro se litigants, Mr. Powell fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly,

Jefferson County JFS’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46) is GRANTED and Mr. Powell’s claims

against it are DISMISSED.

D. Defendant Coleman Health Service’s Motion to Dismiss

Defendant Coleman Health Service also moves to dismiss Mr. Powell’s Complaint against

it. (ECF No. 49.) Mr. Powell did not respond to Coleman Health’s Motion. Mr. Powell’s

allegations against Coleman Health include:

• “Criminal negligence criminal intent of perpetrator(s) Political Offenses overt acts

introduced fabricated evidence by . . . Coleman Professional Service and Parent company

Coleman Health Service CEO Hattie Tracey.” (ECF No. 46-1, ¶ 3.)

• “TO INCLUDE Pinkerton Rule and other Simul Cum(s) Terrorism Right in Rem (Jefferson

County) and other Community at large citizens Political Offenses accomplice liability,

joint trespass (RICO ACT) subversive overt acts criminal crime spree activities. Retaliation

criminal coercion threats against sponsor David Powell being arrested and jailed if he

removed Linda Courcier as her Guardian home. By Coleman Professional Service and

Probate Court Judge no contact unreasonable decision.” (Id. ¶ 4.)

• “The Terrorist Terrorism perpetrator(s) conspirators coconspirator(s) covin overt acts

conspiracy malice False Statements 18 USCA ss. 1001 and falsifying a record in Probate

Court 11-16, 18-22 & 12-8, 15-22. Under false pretext, pretenses, and false oral testimony

ORC 2921.11(A-C) and repeated again at State Bureau hearing on 2-13-23 . . . complicity

w/ Coleman Professional Services[.]” (Id. ¶ 7.)

• “Deceit overt acts malice by both case workers and Coleman Professional Services to

blackmail trick coercion both victims in a badger game extort money scheme.” (Id. ¶ 8.)

• “Pervasive malice U.S. Joint enterprises malicious purposes overt acts exploitation and

deception to evade and or overthrow its own government and its law. Along w/ link

together facilitator Coleman Professional Service & Jefferson County Government Entities

(Probate Court) compounding the crimes.” (Id. ¶ 17.)

• “Civil servants criminal coercion crimes allowing criminal intent by Crime Families and

Coleman Professional Services (Exhibit).” (Id. ¶ 27.)

• “By Repeated blind eye willful blindness ties to the complicit aid and abetting facilitation

of . . . Coleman Professional Service[.]” (Id. ¶ 36.)

• “Aiding in abetting terrorism intimidation facilitation w/ Probate Court/Coleman

Professional Service Terrorism nondisclosure active concealment malicious purpose

unlawful force of kidnapping isolation of Ms. Courcier and Discrediting Mr. Powell.” (Id.

¶ 37.)

The Complaint served on Coleman Health does not match any of the Complaints on the

Court’s docket. (Compare ECF No. 49-1, with ECF Nos. 1, 3, 8, 14.) Accordingly, Coleman Health

moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5). When a plaintiff fails to serve a defendant a summons with

a copy of the complaint in the time allowed under Rule 4(m), a defendant may move for dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. Tepe v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 22-5826,

2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 13818, at *3 (6th Cir. June 2, 2023) (explaining that the plaintiff bears the

burden of proving that proper service was made). Ordinarily, courts cannot exercise power over a

defendant without service of process on that defendant. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe

Stringing, 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). Since initiating this lawsuit almost a year ago, Mr. Powell

has not shown that proper service was made on Coleman Health. Thus, dismissal is proper under

Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process.

But even if Coleman Health were properly served, it argues that dismissal is appropriate

under Rule 12(b)(1) because Mr. Powell has failed to establish that the Court has subject matter

jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) because he has failed to state a claim for relief. (ECF No. 46, PageID

815–17.) As with his claims against Jefferson County JFS, Mr. Powell’s claims against Coleman

Health are difficult to discern. Although he alleges some wrongdoing on Coleman Health’s part,

the Court cannot determine from the pleadings what role Coleman Health played in the alleged

deprivation of Mr. Powell’s rights. His factual allegations do not state in sufficient detail

allegations necessary to give notice of the causes of action against Coleman Health. Mr. Powell

therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Coleman Health’s Motion to

Dismiss (ECF No. 49) is GRANTED and Mr. Powell’s claims against it are DISMISSED.

E. Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s Motion to Dismiss

The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration moves to dismiss Mr. Powell’s

case as frivolous, for failing to state a claim for relief, and for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 52.)

Mr. Powell did not file a memorandum in opposition to the Commissioner’s Motion but broadly

objected to the Motions to Dismiss in his Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation. (See ECF No. 54.)

Mr. Powell names the Social Security Administration in this lawsuit because a new

representative was appointed to manage Ms. Courcier’s Social Security benefits. Mr. Powell

alleges that the Social Security Administration participated in a conspiracy to appoint a new

guardian of Ms. Courcier and fraudulently declare her death. (See ECF No. 52, PageID 934.)

The Commissioner argues that Mr. Powell lacks standing to litigate on Ms. Courcier’s

behalf as her guardian because the state probate court appointed Ms. Courcier a different guardian.

(Id. PageID 939–41.) Even if he were her guardian, Ohio law does not allow a guardian to sue on

behalf of a deceased ward. (Id. (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2111.17).) The Commissioner reiterates

that even if Mr. Powell had standing, the Court has no jurisdiction under the probate exception and

should abstain pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Id. PageID 940.)

The Commissioner also reasons that “[t]o the extent that [Mr. Powell] is asserting a right

to be Ms. Courcier’s representative payee, he identifies no legal authority supporting the existence

of such a right nor any legal authority supporting the proposition that he has a right to judicial

review of the Commissioner’s decision to appoint Ms. Courcier’s legal guardian as payee instead

of him.” (Id. PageID 942.) The selection of a representative payee is properly appealed through

the administrative appeals process. (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.903(c), 404.902(q)).) At

minimum, Mr. Powell’s Complaint is too incomprehensible to establish federal court jurisdiction

over his claims, and at best, the Complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim

for relief on its face. (Id. PageID 945–46.)

The Court agrees that the deficiency of Mr. Powell’s allegations against the Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration deprive the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. If the Court

had jurisdiction, the proper avenue to adjudicate his claim would be by exhausting the

administrative review process. Even then, the Court’s ability to review the state court judgment is

limited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415–16; Feldman, 460 U.S. at

476. Allegations before the Court are too attenuated to put the Social Security Administration on

notice of the claims brought against it. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 52) and dismisses the claims against the Social Security

Administration.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Mr. Powell’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED

(ECF No. 9). The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 23, 44, 46, 49, 52)

and DISMISSES with prejudice Mr. Powell’s claims against all Defendants. Having dismissed

the claims against all Defendants, Mr. Powell’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10), and

Motion titled “2nd Request Motion to Add Plaintiff’s New Names & et al to all Caption Pleadings

of Plaintiff’s et al & Defendant’s et al Docket’s Case No. Clerical Misprision or Clerical Mistake

by Officers of the Court” (ECF No. 12), are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3/10/2025 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE