Rashie v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TAQUAN RASHIE GULLET-EL,

Pro Se

Plaintiff,

Civ. Action No. 24-00521

v. (EGS)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Taquan Rashie, also known as Taquan Rashie

Gullet-el and gullet-el:taquan-rashe (“Mr. Rashie”) initiated

this action, pro se, on February 12, 2024. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No.

1.1 Since then, he has flooded this Court’s docket with thousands

of pages of briefs and motions based on theories that courts

have resoundingly rejected. See Dkt. in Civil No. 24-00521

(D.D.C.). This includes Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint, see Am.

Compl., ECF No. 30, which Defendants (the “government”) now seek

to dismiss, see Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38. Mr. Rashie opposes

the Motion to Dismiss. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 43.

Upon consideration of the motion, the response thereto, the

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the

Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page

number of the filed document. Citations reference docket entries

in this case, 24-cv-00521, unless otherwise specified.

1

applicable law, and the entire record, the government’s Motion

to Dismiss is GRANTED.

I. Background

The Court recently described the background of this case

when it denied Mr. Rashie’s Motion for Recusal. See Mem. Op.,

ECF No. 29. It will briefly summarize the key facts again here.

A. Moorish Sovereign Citizens

Mr. Rashie claims that he is a

Moorish American National[] under the consular

jurisdiction of the Moorish Science Temple of

America Consular Court (a Theocratic state)

for the protection and enforcement of our and

our people’s treaty birthrights secured under

the Treaty of Peace with Morocco of 1787/1836

(signed at Meccanez; copy at Tangiers) between

the United States of North America and

Moroccan Empire, which is in full force and

effect under Article 25 of the Treaty of Peace

and Friendship of 1836, and the Constitution

for the United States of North America.

Am. Compl., ECF No. 30 at 5; see also id. at 9 (“General

Executor has declared and continues to declare that he is a

Moorish American National . . . .”). His proclaimed status as a

“Moorish American National,” who appears to align himself with

sovereign citizen beliefs, is the basis of his claims in this

Court, and those that have previously led to criminal and civil

actions against him.

Other courts have described the general beliefs of Moorish

Sovereign Citizens when considering cases based on similar legal

2

theories to Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint. See, e.g., Bey v.

Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (D.N.J. 2011). For example, the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

described the foundations of Moorish Sovereign Citizenship and

related ideologies:

Two concepts, which may or may not operate as

interrelated . . . [o]ne of these concepts

underlies ethnic/religious identification

movement of certain groups of individuals who

refer to themselves as “Moors,” while the

other concept provides the basis for another

movement of certain groups of individuals

which frequently produces these individuals’

denouncement of United States citizenship,

self-declaration of other, imaginary

“citizenship” and accompanying self-

declaration of equally imaginary “diplomatic

immunity.”

Id. at 539. Although Moorish ethnic or religious convictions do

not necessarily come with adherence to the sovereign citizenship

movement,

certain groups of individuals began merging

these concepts by building on their alleged

ancestry in ancient Moors . . . for the

purposes of committing criminal offenses

and/or initiating frivolous legal actions on

the grounds of their self-granted ‘diplomatic

immunity,’ which these individuals deduced

either from their self-granted ‘Moorish

citizenship’ and from their correspondingly-

produced homemade ‘Moorish’ documents . . . or

from a multitude of other, equally non-

cognizable under the law, bases, which these

individuals keep creating in order to support

their allegations of ‘diplomatic immunity.’

Id. at 542.

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Additionally, the government cites to information from the

Southern Poverty Law Center that classifies Moorish Sovereign

Citizens to be an “extremist group” that “espouse an anti-

government doctrine” and use “their status as members of a

sovereign nation” to “justify refusing to pay taxes, buy auto

insurance, register their vehicles and to defraud banks and

other lending institutions.” Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38 at 3

(quoting Southern Poverty Law Center, Moorish Sovereign

Citizens, available at https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-

hate/extremist-files/group/moorish-sovereign-citizens (May 20,

2024)).

Some of the actions that Sovereign Citizens, including

Moorish Sovereign Citizens, have taken are based on the

‘Redemptionist’ theory, which propounds that

a person has a split personality: a real

person and a fictional person called the

‘strawman.’ . . . Redemptionists claim that

the government has power only over the

strawman and not over the live person, who

remains free [and, thus,] individuals can free

themselves by filing UCC financing statements,

thereby acquiring an interest in their

strawman. Thereafter, [pursuant to this

‘theory,’] the real person can demand that

government officials pay enormous sums of

money to use the strawman’s name or, in the

case of prisoners, keep him in custody.

Bey, 825 F. Supp. at 541 (quoting Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198,

203 & nn. 3 & 4 (3d Cir. 2008)) (alterations in original). Mr.

Rashie’s claims in this case are based on his perceived status

4

as a Moorish American National, or Moorish Sovereign Citizen,

and the Redemptionist theory.

B. Mr. Rashie’s Claims

As this Court previously explained, Mr. Rashie filed a

series of false liens against government officials that led to

both his criminal prosecution and a civil action to nullify

those false liens and enjoin him from filing more false

documents. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 29. Mr. Rashie’s criminal

conviction was affirmed on appeal and the court granted summary

judgment against him in the civil case, a decision which is

pending on appeal. See Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 30 in 15-cv-

00652 (D.D.C.) at 2–3;2 J. & Sentencing, ECF No. 187 in 2:14-cr-

00725 (C.D. Cal.);3 Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38 at 4. Mr. Rashie

2 On April 2, 2024, Mr. Rashie filed both a Motion for Relief

from Judgment in 15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.) and a Notice of Appeal to

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”). Mot. for Relief from J., ECF No. 33 in

15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.); Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 34 in 15-cv-

00652 (D.D.C.). The D.C. Circuit held the appeal in abeyance

pending resolution of the Motion for Relief from Judgment and

directed the parties to file motions to govern future

proceedings within 30 days of the district court’s resolution of

the Motion for Relief from Judgment. D.C. Cir. Order, ECF No. 36

in 15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.). On August 6, 2024, the Court denied Mr.

Rashie’s Motion for Relief from Judgment. Mem. Op., ECF No. 40

in 15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.). The D.C. Circuit denied some of Mr.

Rashie’s pending motions in his appeal but has not yet fully

resolved it. See Order, ECF No. 2098959 in Case #24-5080 (D.C.

Cir.); see generally 24-5080 (D.C. Cir.).

3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has

affirmed Mr. Rashie’s conviction and sentence. Mem. & Order, ECF

No. 241 in 2:14-cr-00725 (C.D. Cal.). Mr. Rashie has filed

numerous other motions in this criminal case, including a

5

ostensibly brought this case as a “compulsory counterclaim” to

the civil action brought against him in this Court. See Am.

Compl., ECF No. 30 at 1 (styling his Amended Complaint as a

“Compulsory Counterclaim for Constructive Trust, Equitable

Accounting, Tracing, Disgorgement of Unjust Gains, Criminal

Contempt by Military Commission, and for Damages Against Public

Official Bond (in Defendants’/Respondents’ Individual

Capacity(ies)) and for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief

(in Defendants’/Respondents’ Official Capacity(ies)),” which he

also claims to be an “Intervention Application Under Article 52

Geneva (IV) Convention of 1949 Under the Trading With The Enemy

Act (TWEA) (50 U.S.C. §§ 4301 to 4341).”). Mr. Rashie’s Amended

Complaint is more than 500 pages, alleges 30 counts, and

includes 19 exhibits. See id. All of his claims allege

violations of the Trading With the Enemy Act (“TWEA”), 50 U.S.C.

§ 4301, and depend on his apparent Moorish Sovereign Citizenship

and Redemptionist beliefs. See id. at 11.

Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss on May 30,

2024. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 20. In response, Mr. Rashie

opposed the motion and sought to amend his Complaint. See Resp.

to Mot. to Dismiss & Notice & Mot. to Amend Compl., ECF No. 22.

purported “Judicial Notice of Joinder to D.D.C. # 1:24-cv-00521-

EGS for Criminal Contempt Proceedings for Abuse of Process and

Violation of Discharge Injunction” on March 22, 2024. Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 332 in 2:14-cr-00725 (C.D. Cal.).

6

On November 13, 2024, the Court granted Mr. Rashie’s Motion to

Amend and denied Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss without

prejudice. See Minute Order (Nov. 13, 2024). In its Order, the

Court deemed the Amended Complaint to be filed as of November

13, 2024. See id.4 But despite this order, Mr. Rashie proceeded

to file what he refers to as his Amended Complaint on December

12, 2024. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30.

The government did not file a renewed motion to dismiss or

answer the Amended Complaint within the time permitted under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. On January 7, 2025, however,

the government filed a Motion to Extend Time to File Answer or

Otherwise Respond to the Amended Complaint. See Mot. to Extend

Time to File Answer or Otherwise Respond to Am. Compl., ECF No.

37. Within that motion, the government requested an extension of

time, up to and including January 9, 2025, to respond to Mr.

Rashie’s Amended Complaint. See id. It argued that the

“enlargement the United States seeks here can be granted under

the excusable neglect standard.” See id. at 2. The government

also pointed out that a challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction,

which is one of the grounds for its Motion to Dismiss, cannot be

4 Local Civil Rule 7(i) provides: “A motion for leave to file an

amended pleading shall be accompanied by an original of the

proposed pleading as amended. The amended pleading shall be

deemed to have been filed and served by mail on the date on

which the order granting the motion is entered.” LCvR 7(i).

7

waived and can be made at any time. See id. at 1-2. The

government filed its Motion to Dismiss on the same day. See Mot.

to Dismiss, ECF No. 38. Mr. Rashie filed an opposition on

February 5, 2025. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 43.5

II. Standards of Review

A. Excusable Neglect

“When an act may or must be done within a specified time,

the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion

made after the time has expired if the party failed to act

because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).

“Excusable neglect is an equitable concept that considers ‘all

relevant circumstances’ surrounding the failure to act.” Cohen

v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 819

F.3d 476, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co.

v. Brunswick Assoc., Ltd. P’ship (“Pioneer”), 507 U.S. 380, 395

(1993)). Under this analysis, counsel need not be faultless, but

there generally must be “some reasonable basis” for the delay.

See id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has articulated

four factors relevant to this analysis: “(1) the risk of

prejudice to the other side; (2) the length of the delay and the

potential for impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for

the delay and whether it was within counsel’s reasonable

5 The government has not filed a Reply.

8

control; and (4) whether counsel acted in good faith.” Id.

(citing Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395) (add’l citations omitted).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .

[and it] is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this

limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Akinseye v. District of Columbia,

339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The plaintiff has the burden

to demonstrate that a court has subject matter jurisdiction. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Am. Farm Bureau v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,

121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000) (plaintiff bears the burden

of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence); see also Phoenix Herpetological Soc’y, Inc. v. United

States Fish & Wildlife Servs., Civ. No. 20-01459, 2021 WL

620193, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2021). ‘“It is axiomatic that

subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and that courts

may raise the issue sua sponte.” NetworkIP, LLC v. Fed.

Commc’n’s Comm’n, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting

Athens Cmty. Hosp. Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C.

Cir. 1982))); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines

at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.”).

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Courts may dismiss a complaint “on jurisdictional grounds

when ‘it is ‘patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal

question suitable for decision.’” Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d

1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328,

330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see also Williams v. Davis, Civ. No. 22-

02178, 2022 WL 3585650, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2022) (quoting

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974)) (alteration in

original) (“It is well-settled that ‘federal courts are without

power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if

they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid

of merit, wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous.’”).

“Claims are patently insubstantial if they are ‘essentially

fictitious,’ for example, advancing ‘bizarre conspiracy theories,’

‘fantastic government manipulations of [one's] will or mind,’ or

some type of ‘supernatural intervention.”’ Williams, 2022 WL

3585650, at *1 (quoting Best, 39 F.3d at 330) (alteration in

original).

C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning

v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To survive a

12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (“Iqbal”), 556 U.S.

10

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”),

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not amount to a

“probability requirement,” but it does require more than a

“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may consider

only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either

attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of

which [courts] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Furthermore, the court “must accept as true all of the factual

allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v. D.C. Off.

of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal

quotations omitted). The court must also give the plaintiff the

“benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts

alleged.” Id. at 677 (internal quotations omitted). However, the

court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986). And “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not

11

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678.

D. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . .

. a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “Enforcing these rules is largely a matter for

the trial court’s discretion . . . Rule 41(b) authorizes the

court to dismiss either a claim or an action because of the

plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Federal Rules ‘or any

order of the court,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).” Ciralsky v. Central

Intel. Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 5

WRIGHT & MILLER § 1217, at 175 & n.8 (2d ed. 1990)).

III. Analysis

There are numerous reasons why Mr. Rashie’s Amended

Complaint must be dismissed. As explained below, excusable

neglect exists for the government’s delay in filing its renewed

Motion to Dismiss, and the government’s grounds for dismissal

therein are meritorious. Even if there were no excusable neglect

for the untimely Motion to Dismiss, the Court would still

dismiss Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction,

a determination it could make sua sponte. The reasons why the

Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Rashie’s claims overlap

12

with the other grounds for dismissal. Therefore, after

explaining why it finds that the government has shown excusable

neglect, the Court will address both the jurisdictional and

other reasons why it will dismiss this case.

A. Excusable Neglect for Delay

The government’s delay in filing its second Motion to

Dismiss, which is now before the Court, was due to excusable

neglect. Because Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint was deemed filed

on November 13, 2024, the government’s response was due on

November 27, 2024. As noted, the government did not file its

current Motion to Dismiss until January 7, 2025, which is

approximately 41 days late. During that delay, however, Mr.

Rashie filed an Amended Complaint on December 12, 2024, despite

the Court’s November 13, 2024 Minute Order. See Am. Compl., ECF

No. 30. Mr. Rashie also filed a Motion for Entry of Default on

December 27, 2024, see Mot. for Entry of Default, ECF No. 33, to

which the government filed an opposition on December 31, 2024,

see Resp. to Mot. for Entry of Default, ECF No. 34. Mr. Rashie

continued to file Motions to Take Judicial Notice during this

time. See Mot. to Take Judicial Notice, ECF No. 31; Mot. to Take

Judicial Notice, ECF No. 32.

In support of its excusable neglect argument, the

government contends that the risk of prejudice from the

extension to Mr. Rashie is low; the length of delay is slight;

13

the delay was reasonable under the circumstances; and counsel

did not act in bad faith. See Mot. for Extension, ECF No. 37 at

2-3. Even though Mr. Rashie submitted a supposedly combined

response to the government’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for

Extension, it is difficult to decipher what if any parts of his

response address whether there was excusable neglect for the

government’s delay. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 43.

Regardless of Mr. Rashie’s apparent failure to dispute the

government’s argument, the Court agrees that the government has

shown excusable neglect. The length of time for the government’s

delay, less than six weeks, was minimal and did not stop Mr.

Rashie from continuing to vigorously litigate his case,

something he has continued to do even after the government filed

its Motion to Dismiss. See, Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 39; Mot. to

Strike, ECF No. 41; Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 42; Mot. to Strike,

ECF No. 45; Mot. for Sanctions, ECF No. 46; Mot. to Strike, ECF

No. 48; Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 50; Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 52.

Nor did the delay inflict prejudice on Mr. Rashie. One of

the reasons the government cites for its delay is that Mr.

Rashie’s “pleadings and motions are highly confusing, which led

to the undersigned counsel’s failure to realize if or when a

responsive motion was due.” Mot. for Extension, ECF No. 37. Even

though this does not address the government’s failure to comply

with this Court’s Minute Order, the Court finds compelling the

14

argument that the number, contents, and frequency of Mr.

Rashie’s briefs and motions make it difficult to decipher and

address all his filings in a timely and thorough matter. The

Court also agrees that nothing in this record indicates that the

government has acted in bad faith in this case. Therefore, the

government’s Motion for Extension is GRANTED nunc pro tunc and

the Motion to Dismiss is deemed timely filed.

B. Failure to Allege Jurisdiction

Mr. Rashie has failed to plausibly allege that this Court

has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims.

First, Mr. Rashie’s assertion of diversity jurisdiction is

unsupported. Mr. Rashie invokes the ‘“Diversity of

Nationality/Citizenship’ under Article III Section 2,” but his

only basis for diversity of jurisdiction appears to be his

assertion of Moorish Sovereign Citizenship. See Am. Compl., ECF

No. 30 at 11. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) allows federal courts to

exercise jurisdiction over cases in which the parties’

citizenship is diverse and the matter in controversy exceeds

$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). As the government points out,

courts have repeatedly rejected Moorish Sovereign Citizen claims

as “frivolous” and therefore this theory is no basis for

diversity of citizenship. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38 at 7

(citing, e.g., Bey v. Mun. Court, Nos. 11-7343, 11-4351, 2012 WL

714575 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2012); Bey v. White, No. 17-cv-76, 2017

15

WL 934728, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2017)). Mr. Rashie cites no

cases in which courts have recognized this a basis for

diversity. His diversity jurisdiction argument fails.

Second, Mr. Rashie has not sufficiently pleaded federal

question jurisdiction. The only conceivable basis for federal

question jurisdiction is violations of the TWEA.6 Congress passed

the TWEA to permit allied individuals and non-enemies to recover

property vested within the United States during World War I and

World War II. See Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 671-74

(1960); Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494, 500 (“The

United States had expressly consented in Section 9(a) of the

Trading with the Enemy Act that suits might be brought by a non-

enemy claimant to have his claim against an enemy debtor

satisfied out of the latter's property held by the Alien

Property Custodian.”). The only support for TWEA violations in

Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint are his own far-fetched

assertions. See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 30.

Although difficult to decipher and conclusory, Mr. Rashie

appears to claim that the government violated the TWEA by

holding him accountable in criminal and civil proceedings for

6 Mr. Rashie also invokes international agreements including the

Geneva Convention, but these do not appear to be the basis for

the claims in his Amended Complaint, nor does he provide any

comprehensible allegations for violations of these agreements.

See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30.

16

filing false liens against government officials and enjoining

him from committing similar actions. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30

at 13. For example, Mr. Rashie asserts:

General Executor’s[,] and General Executor’s

associates’ constitutionally protected Treaty

Birthright secured copyright/trademark/

tradename/sign (signal) have been used

continuously by General Executor and General

Executor’s associates and General Executor’s

ancestors since time immemorial, in

intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.

Id.; see also Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 43 at 12

(claiming that Mr. Rashie “did aver and does aver that

Defendants’ / Respondents’ willful, wrongful, and wanton cause

of injury to General Executor by Unlawful 14th Amendment Forced

Conscription Fraud, Unlawful Annexation, Unlawful Taxation, and

Unlawful Monetization in violation of the Law of War UCMJ

Article 18 (18 U.S.C. § 2441)”). These assertions are based on

Moorish Sovereign Citizen and Redemptionist theories that courts

have repeatedly rejected in general, see, e.g., Bey, 825 F.

Supp. 2d at 545-56; and specifically as relates to Mr. Rashie,

see, e.g., Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 30 in 15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.);

J. & Sentencing, ECF No. 187 in 2:14-cr-00725 (C.D. Cal.); Mot.

to Dismiss, ECF No. 38 at 2 (discussing the federal court

jurisdictions in which Mr. Rashie has been enjoined from

bringing suits without obtaining prior approval from the court).

And Mr. Rashie points to no cases in which any court has held

17

that these arguments were meritorious. See Opp’n to Mot. to

Dismiss, ECF No. 43. Even taking the facts and inferences in the

light most favorable to Mr. Rashie, his claims are “patently

insubstantial” and present “no federal question suitable for

decision.” See Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1009. Mr. Rashie has not

plausibly alleged federal question jurisdiction for his claims.

Because Mr. Rashie failed to plausibly allege any basis for

subject matter jurisdiction, his Amended Complaint is dismissed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

C. Failure to State a Claim

Even if Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint presented any basis

for jurisdiction, which it does not, he fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint is riddled with nonsensical

recitals and devoid of any specific facts to support his claims.

See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30. Indeed, there are hardly any ‘facts’

to construe in the light most favorable to him, even considering

the less stringent standard to which he is held as a pro se

plaintiff. See id. The few ‘facts’ that Mr. Rashie alleges to

support his claims under the TWEA depend entirely on his Moorish

Sovereign Citizen and Redemptionist assertions, which, as

discussed above, see infra Part III.B; are meritless.7 Moreover,

7 To be clear, the Court does not fault Mr. Rashie for holding

whatever beliefs he has. The issue here is that Mr. Rashie

18

Mr. Rashie does not even provide the elements for a TWEA

violation, let alone explain why he meets them, and relies only

on his self-proclaimed bases for egregious unlawful conduct.

Contra Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Mr. Rashie’s Amended

Complaint only consists of conclusory, implausible, and widely

rejected allegations, he fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted and his Amended Complaint is also

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

D. Failure to Plead a Short and Plain Statement

Finally, Mr. Rashie fails to plead a short and plain

statement of his entitlement to relief. As noted, Mr. Rashie’s

Amended Complaint is neither short nor plain at over 500 pages

in total, including a nearly 100-page single-spaced Amended

Complaint with over 400 pages of exhibits. See Am. Compl., ECF

No. 30. In addition to the length, Mr. Rashie’s Amended

Complaint repeats the same confusingly worded assertions

throughout that are conclusory and based on nothing more than

his debunked theories. See id. Mr. Rashie fails to effectively

provide notice of his claims. See id. Therefore, dismissal is

also warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for

previously and in this current action has asserted these beliefs

in an attempt to gain vast amounts of money from the government

that he was not owed and seek relief under an alternative and

fantastical system of law that does not exist.

19

failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See

Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 669; Spence v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

109 F.4th 531, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (holding that “[t]he

district court did not abuse its discretion” in dismissing a

count of a complaint that was “neither short nor plain”).

IV. Other Motions

Mr. Rashie has filed dozens of other motions, totaling

thousands of pages, which are largely based on the same

unfounded Moorish Sovereign Citizenship and Redemptionist

theories that comprise his Amended Complaint. These include

mostly motions to take judicial notice, to strike documents that

the government has filed, for default, sanctions, and discovery.

See e.g., Dkt. in Case 24-cv-521. Because the Court dismisses

Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint, these pending motions are denied

as moot. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S.

381, 385-86 (2018) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.

85, 81 (2013) (“A case that becomes moot at any point during the

proceedings is ‘no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes

of Article III,’ and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal

courts.”).

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V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the government’s Motion for

Extension, ECF No. 37, is GRANTED; its Motion to Dismiss, ECF

No. 38, is GRANTED; and all other pending motions filed by Mr.

Rashie are DENIED AS MOOT. An Order accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

March 10, 2025

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