The opinion
[Cite as Dennewitz v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 2025-Ohio-782.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
EARL DENNEWITZ, et al., :
Plaintiffs-Appellants, : Case
No. 24CA13
v. :
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
ENTRY
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
:
Defendants-Appellees.
:
________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Mark D. Tolles, II, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellants.
Todd M. Zimmerman, Westerville, Ohio, for appellees.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:3-3-25
ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Common Pleas
Court summary judgment entered in favor of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, defendant below and appellee
herein. Mona Lisa Roberts, plaintiff below and appellant
herein, assigns the following error for review:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
MONA LISA ROBERTS DOES NOT QUALIFY UNDER
STATE FARM’S UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE (UM/UIM) POLICY AS AN INSURED AND
FURTHER ERRED IN GRANTING STATE FARM’S
ROSS, 24CA13
2
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS
MARCH 1, 2024 ORDER.”
{¶2} On April 11, 2021, appellant sustained significant
injuries in a motor vehicle accident when Leland Brown’s vehicle
crashed into the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger.
Appellant’s injuries resulted in $238,387.93 in medical bills.
{¶3} At the time of the accident, Brown, the tortfeasor,
carried a motor vehicle insurance policy that provided liability
coverage in the amount of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per
accident. Additionally, appellant had an insurance policy with
Western Reserve Mutual Casualty Company that provided uninsured/
underinsured motor vehicle (UM) coverage in the amount of
$50,000 per person. Appellant subsequently received $25,000
from the tortfeasor’s insurer and $25,000 from her insurer.
{¶4} Appellant also sought coverage under appellee’s
policy. Appellee insured the owner of the vehicle in which
appellant had been injured, Clayton Dennewitz (appellant’s
nephew). Appellee’s policy provided UM coverage to an insured
in the amount of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident.
ROSS, 24CA13
3
{¶5} After appellee denied appellant’s request to pay any
amount for her injuries, appellant filed a complaint against
appellee for breach of contract.1
{¶6} Appellee subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment and argued that the insurance policy’s definition of
“insured” established that appellant is not entitled to UM
coverage. The policy’s “Insuring Agreement” stated that
appellee
will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury an
insured is legally entitled to recover from an
uninsured motorist. The bodily injury must be:
a. sustained by an insured; and
b. caused by an accident arising out of the
operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle
by an uninsured motorist.2
1
Appellant also named her own insurance company as a
defendant in the complaint, but later dismissed her claim
against her insurance company. Additionally, the other persons
injured in the accident filed a breach of contract claim against
appellee. They later dismissed their claims.
2
In the “Definitions” section of the policy, the policy
indicates that appellee defines “certain words and phrases below
for use throughout the policy” and further states that
“[d]efined words and phrases are printed in boldface italics.”
ROSS, 24CA13
4
{¶7} The policy defined an “insured” for purposes of
“Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage” as follows:
1. you;
2. resident relatives;
3. any other person who is not insured for uninsured
motor vehicle coverage under another vehicle policy
while occupying;
a. your car . . .
{¶8} Appellee argued that appellant did not satisfy the
definition of an “insured” because she (1) is not the named
insured (i.e., “you”), (2) is not a resident relative (i.e., a
relative who resided with the named insured), and (3) is insured
for UM coverage under another policy while occupying the named
insured’s car.
{¶9} In response, appellant argued that she qualifies as an
insured under appellee’s policy because the UM benefits that she
received from the tortfeasor’s policy and her own policy are not
sufficient to cover the amount of her damages. Appellant argued
that appellee’s policy provides “that someone like [her] is
considered an insured under the policy when the policy limits of
her personal [UM] coverage . . . are less than the policy
ROSS, 24CA13
5
limits” of appellee’s policy. She contends that, because her
damages (more than $200,000) exceeded the amount of her UM
coverage ($50,000), she is entitled to collect $50,000 under
appellee’s policy. Appellant asserted that because her
insurance did not cover the damages that exceeded the policy
limit of $50,000, she is therefore “not insured for uninsured
motor vehicle coverage under another vehicle policy.”
{¶10} Appellant contended that her reading of appellee’s
policy is consistent with the policy’s definition of “uninsured
motorist.” The policy defines an “uninsured motorist” to mean
the owner or operator of:
1. a motor vehicle, whose ownership, operation,
maintenance, and use of that motor vehicle is:
a. not insured or bonded for bodily injury
liability at the time of the accident; or
b. insured or bonded for bodily injury liability
at the time of the accident; but
(1) the limits of liability are less than
required by the financial responsibility act
of the state where your car is mainly garaged;
(2) the limits of liability;
(a) are less than the limits you carry
for Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
under this policy; or
(b) have been reduced by payments to
persons other than an insured to an
ROSS, 24CA13
6
amount less than the limits you carry for
Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage under
this policy;
(3) the insuring company denies coverage or is
or becomes insolvent;
(4) the owner or operator has diplomatic
immunity . . .
{¶11} Appellant further argued that the “Other Uninsured
Motor Vehicle Coverage” section indicated that she is entitled
to coverage. Appellant claimed that this section meant “that
someone may be an insured under [appellee]’s policy even if that
person has coverage under another [UM] coverage policy.” She
asserted that if a person with other UM coverage “was
automatically removed from the third definition of an
‘insured,’” then the policy would not need “to address
situations where ‘other uninsured motor vehicle coverage
applies.”
{¶12} The section of appellee’s policy titled, “If Other
Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Applies,” first specifies that
“[a]ny and all stacking of uninsured motor vehicle coverage is
precluded.” The remaining relevant provisions read as follows:
2. If other Policies Issued By Us To You or Any Resident
ROSS, 24CA13
7
Relative Apply
If two or more motor vehicle liability policies issued
by us to you or any resident relative providing Uninsured
Motor Vehicle Coverage apply to the same accident, then
the maximum amount that may be paid from all such
policies combined is the single highest applicable limit
provided by any one of the policies. . .
3. If Any Other Policies Apply
a. If the Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
provided by this policy and the uninsured motor
vehicle coverage provided by any other policy apply
to the same bodily injury, then this coverage is
excess to such other uninsured motor vehicle
coverage, but only in the amount by which it exceeds
such other coverage.
b. If coverage under more than one policy applies
as excess, then:
(1) the maximum amount payable may not exceed
the difference between the uninsured motor
vehicle coverage limit of the policy that
applies as primary and the highest applicable
uninsured motor vehicle coverage limit of any
one of the uninsured motor vehicle coverages
that applies as excess; and
(2) we are liable only for our share. . .
{¶13} Appellee replied that appellant’s arguments are
meritless and that numerous courts have rejected these same
arguments.
{¶14} On March 1, 2024, the trial court granted appellee
summary judgment regarding appellant’s claim for UM coverage
ROSS, 24CA13
8
under appellee’s policy. This appeal followed.
{¶15} In her sole assignment of error, appellant asserts
that the trial court incorrectly entered summary judgment in
appellee’s favor. She contends that appellee’s policy allows
her to recover excess UM coverage and that she meets the
definition of an “insured” for purposes of UM coverage.
{¶16} Appellee asserts that its policy clearly and
unambiguously shows that appellant is not entitled to UM/UIM
coverage under its policy. Appellee points out that the
policy’s UM coverage does not extend to insureds, like
appellant, who are not resident relatives and who carry their
own automobile liability policy that includes UM coverage.
Appellee observes that other courts have considered the policy’s
definition of “insured” and concluded that the definition
clearly and unambiguously excludes nonresident relatives who
carry their own automobile liability policy that includes UM
coverage.
{¶17} Appellee further disputes appellant’s assertion that
the “other insurance” provision means that she qualifies as an
ROSS, 24CA13
9
insured and is entitled to UM coverage under its policy.
Appellee states that the “other insurance” provision still
requires a person to be an “insured,” as defined in the policy’s
UM coverage provisions.
{¶18} In response, appellant reiterates her argument that
the “other insurance” provision shows that she is entitled to
UM/UIM coverage under appellee’s policy. She states that “any
other conclusion would improperly render Paragraph No. 3a
meaningless, superfluous, and unnecessary.”
A
{¶19} Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of trial
court summary judgment decisions. E.g., Tera, L.L.C. v. Rice
Drilling D, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-1945, ¶ 10, citing Grafton v. Ohio
Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Accordingly, an
appellate court need not defer to a trial court’s decision, but
instead must independently review the record to determine if
summary judgment is appropriate. Grafton, 77 Ohio St.3d at 105.
Civ.R. 56(C) provides in relevant part:
ROSS, 24CA13
10
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence,
and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed
in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or
stipulation may be considered except as stated in this
rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless
it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only
from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the
evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the
party’s favor.
{¶20} Therefore, pursuant to Civ.R. 56 a trial court may not
award summary judgment unless the evidence demonstrates that (1)
no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be
litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, and (3) after viewing the evidence most strongly
in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to
but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the
nonmoving party. E.g., State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lucas Cty.
Prosecutor’s Office, 2021-Ohio-1241, ¶ 8; Temple v. Wean United,
Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977).
ROSS, 24CA13
11
{¶21} In the case at bar, as we explain below, we believe
that the trial court correctly granted appellee summary
judgment.
B
{¶22} In the case sub judice, the parties dispute the
interpretation of appellee’s insurance policy, and more
specifically, whether appellant falls within the definition of
“insured” under the policy’s UM provisions.
{¶23} “Insurances policies are contracts,” Acuity, A Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-3780, ¶
11, and the interpretation of a contract is a question of law
that appellate courts independently review, see Sharonville v.
Am. Emp. Ins. Co., 2006-Ohio-2180, ¶ 6. “In all cases involving
contract interpretation, we start with the primary interpretive
rule that courts should give effect to the intentions of the
parties as expressed in the language of their written
agreement.” Sutton Bank v. Progressive Polymers, L.L.C., 2020-
Ohio-5101, ¶ 15, citing Sunoco, Inc. (R & M) v. Toledo Edison
Co., 2011-Ohio-2720, ¶ 37; see Laboy v. Grange Indemn. Ins. Co.,
ROSS, 24CA13
12
2015-Ohio-3308, ¶ 8 (“The fundamental goal when interpreting [a
written agreement] is to ascertain the intent of the parties
from a reading of the [agreement] in its entirety.”). Courts
presume that the language used in the contract reflects the
parties’ intent. Smith v. Erie Ins. Co., 2016-Ohio-7742, ¶ 18;
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶ 11.
{¶24} Thus, courts first must review the plain and ordinary
meaning of the language used in a contract “unless manifest
absurdity results, or unless some other meaning is clearly
evidenced from the face or overall contents of the instrument.”
Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 (1978),
paragraph two of the syllabus; accord Acuity, 2023-Ohio-3780, at
¶ 11; Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, at ¶ 11. If the language is
clear and unambiguous, “a court may look no further than the
writing itself to find the intent of the parties.” Galatis at ¶
11. “[A] contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite
legal meaning.” Id.
{¶25} Generally, a contract is ambiguous if it is
“susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Tera,
ROSS, 24CA13
13
L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-1945, ¶ 12. To
determine whether a contract is ambiguous, courts must consider
the contract “‘as a whole,’” and not simply “‘detached or
isolated parts thereof.’” Sauer v. Crews, 2014-Ohio-3655, ¶ 13,
quoting Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166,
172 (1982). “Only when a definitive meaning proves elusive
should rules for construing ambiguous language be employed.”
State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, ¶ 11, citing Galatis at ¶
11.
{¶26} “[T]he initial determination of whether an ambiguity
exists presents an abstract legal question, which [appellate
courts] review on a de novo basis.” Pierron v. Pierron, 2008-
Ohio-1286, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.), citing Stewart v. Stewart, 1992 WL
388546, *2 (4th Dist. Dec. 22, 1992). If ambiguity exists,
“then the determination of what the actual terms were becomes a
question of fact.” Lake Erie Towing v. Troike, 2006-Ohio-5115,
¶13 (6th Dist.); accord Tera, 2024-Ohio-1945, at ¶ 12 (“whether
a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but the resolution
of an ambiguous term in a contract is a question of fact”);
ROSS, 24CA13
14
Inland Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Industries of
Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 322 (1984) (“if a term cannot be
determined from the four corners of a contract, factual
determination of intent or reasonableness may be necessary to
supply the missing term”).
{¶27} In the case sub judice, we agree with the trial
court’s conclusion that the relevant provisions of appellee’s
insurance policy are clear and unambiguous. The “Uninsured
Motor Vehicle Coverage” section defines an “insured” as follows:
1. you;
2. resident relatives;
3. any other person who is not insured for uninsured
motor vehicle coverage under another vehicle policy
while occupying:
a. your car . . .
Appellant does not dispute that she does not satisfy the first
or second definitions, but instead contends that she is “any
other person who is not insured for uninsured motor vehicle
coverage under another vehicle policy.” Appellant recognizes
that she has her own UM policy, but nevertheless contends that
she “is not insured for uninsured motor vehicle coverage under
ROSS, 24CA13
15
another vehicle policy” because her UM policy limit was less
than the amount of her damages.
{¶28} The Ohio Supreme Court considered and rejected a
similar argument in Wohl v. Swinney, 2008-Ohio-2334. In that
case, the tortfeasor crashed into a vehicle containing a driver
and a passenger. All three parties carried insurance, and both
the passenger’s and the driver’s policies included UM coverage.
The tortfeasor’s liability insurer paid its policy limit of
$500,000 for the driver’s and passenger’s injuries. The driver
and passenger then allocated the funds so that the passenger,
who also was the owner of the vehicle, received $499,999, and
the driver received $1.
{¶29} The driver’s policy had UM limits in the amount of
$12,500 per person and $25,000 per accident. The passenger’s
policy had UM limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per
accident. The driver thus sought UM coverage under the
passenger’s policy. The passenger’s insurer denied the driver’s
claim based upon its determination that the driver was not an
“insured” under its policy.
ROSS, 24CA13
16
{¶30} The insurance policy defined an “insured” for UM
coverage to mean:
1. You or any family member.
2. Any other person occupying your covered auto who is
not a named insured or an insured family member for
uninsured motorists coverage under another policy.
Id. at ¶ 7-9
{¶31} Litigation ensued, and the parties filed competing
summary judgment motions. The trial court found that R.C.
3937.18, as amended by 2001 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97 effective October
31, 2001, required the passenger’s insurer to provide the driver
with UM coverage.
{¶32} The insurer appealed and argued that the trial court
erred by requiring it to provide the driver with UM coverage
when the driver did not satisfy the definition of an “insured”
under the UM policy provisions. The Twelfth District Court of
Appeals did not agree. See Wohl v. Swinney, 2007–Ohio–592 (12th
Dist.). The court instead determined that the definition of an
“insured” was ambiguous and strictly construed the provision
against the insurer.
ROSS, 24CA13
17
{¶33} The Twelfth District subsequently granted the
insurer’s motion to certify a conflict with Safeco Ins. Co. of
Illinois v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 2006-Ohio-2063, (8th
Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court recognized the conflict and
framed the certified question as “[w]hether the definition of
‘insured’ as ‘any other person occupying your covered auto who
is not a named insured or insured family member for uninsured
motorist’s coverage under another policy’ is ambiguous and
should be construed against the insurer to provide coverage for
a permissive operator of a covered vehicle who is not a named
insured or insured family member.”
{¶34} The Supreme court concluded that the policy’s
definition of an “insured” was unambiguous and that the
definition did not support the driver’s UM claim. The court
stated that the driver was “someone else who was occupying the
covered auto but who was a named insured for uninsured motorist
coverage under another policy (his own).” Id. at ¶ 24. The
court thus determined that under the plain language of the
policy, the driver was not an insured for UM coverage under the
ROSS, 24CA13
18
passenger’s policy. Id.
{¶35} Likewise, in the case at bar, the definition of
“insured” contained in appellee’s UM policy provision is plain
and not open to appellant’s interpretation. The UM policy
provision defines an insured to include “any other person who is
not insured for uninsured motor vehicle coverage under another
vehicle policy while occupying” the named insured’s car. In the
case sub judice, appellant is “any other person.” She is not,
however, “not insured” for UM coverage under another vehicle
policy, i.e., her own. Instead, her policy included UM coverage
and paid her $25,000. Consequently, appellant is insured for UM
coverage under another vehicle policy. Thus, the plain and
unambiguous definition of “insured” in appellee’s policy does
not include appellant. Because appellant is not an “insured,”
appellee has no obligation to provide her with UM coverage.
{¶36} Moreover, adopting appellant’s interpretation of
“insured” would require this Court to read terms into the
contract and change the definition an “insured” to include any
other person who is insured for UM coverage under another
ROSS, 24CA13
19
vehicle policy but whose limits are less than the amount of the
person’s damages. The rules of contract interpretation do not
permit us to change or add language when the contract language
is plain and unambiguous, as it is in the case sub judice. See
Ramsey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2016-Ohio-5871 (2d
Dist.) (construing identical policy definition of “insured” to
exclude a person who had UM coverage under another policy);
Johns v. Hopkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99218, 2013-Ohio-2099,
¶ 21 (refusing to read “insured” “to include an individual who
is unable to recover from the UM/UIM portion of his or her own
insurance policy,” when the policy defined “insured,” in
relevant part, as “any other person who is not insured for
uninsured motor vehicle coverage under another vehicle policy
while occupying your car”); see also West Am. Ins. Co. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2010–Ohio–6311 (1st Dist.); Watkins v.
Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 2007–Ohio–4366 (3d Dist.); Ashcraft v.
Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 2008–Ohio–1519 (10th Dist.); see generally
Keffer v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 2007-Ohio-3984 (4th Dist.)
(recognizing validity of UM provisions that limit the definition
ROSS, 24CA13
20
of an “insured”).
{¶37} We also believe that appellant’s alternate argument
regarding other UM insurance is without merit. The “other
insurance” provisions do not mean that appellant is an insured
and is entitled to recover excess UM insurance under appellee’s
policy. Instead, the “other insurance” provisions would allow a
person who satisfies the definition of “insured” to recover
excess UM insurance; it does not create a separate category of
insureds.
{¶38} The relevant provisions read as follows:
2. If Other Policies Issued By Us To You or Any Resident
Relative Apply
If two or more motor vehicle liability policies issued
by us to you or any resident relative providing Uninsured
Motor Vehicle Coverage apply to the same accident, then
the maximum amount that may be paid from all such
policies combined is the single highest applicable limit
provided by any one of the policies. . .
3. If Any Other Policies Apply
a. If the Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
provided by this policy and the uninsured motor
vehicle coverage provided by any other policy apply
to the same bodily injury, then this coverage is
excess to such other uninsured motor vehicle
ROSS, 24CA13
21
coverage, but only in the amount by which it exceeds
such other coverage.
b. If coverage under more than one policy applies
as excess, then:
(1) the maximum amount payable may not exceed
the difference between the uninsured motor
vehicle coverage limit of the policy that
applies as primary and the highest applicable
uninsured motor vehicle coverage limit of any
one of the uninsured motor vehicle coverages
that applies as excess; and
(2) we are liable only for our share. . .
Nothing in the foregoing provisions defines who qualifies as an
“insured” for purposes of UM coverage. See Engler v. Stafford,
2007-Ohio-2256, ¶ 59 (6th Dist.) (“other insurance” clause
“applies only to those who are insured” under the policy).
{¶39} Moreover, we do not agree with appellant that failing
to read the excess clause as she proposes would render excess UM
coverage “illusory . . . and a sham.” Appellant asserts that
because Clayton bargained for excess UM insurance, she is
entitled to it. Even if appellant is correct that appellee’s
policy allows excess coverage, the provisions do not change the
meaning of an “insured” for purposes of UM/UIM coverage.
{¶40} Contrary to appellant’s argument, nothing in paragraph
ROSS, 24CA13
22
3.a. indicates that it does not apply to the named insured or
resident relatives. She apparently reaches that conclusion by
noting that paragraph 2 applies to the named insured or resident
relatives. Paragraph 2 further states, however, that it
applies if appellee had issued other policies to the named
insured or resident relatives. Paragraph 2 thus would apply if
appellee had issued multiple policies with UM coverage to
Clayton or a resident relative. If appellee had not issued
other policies to the named insured or resident relatives, then
paragraph 2 would not apply; instead, paragraph 3.a. may apply.
{¶41} Paragraph 3.a. governs if any other UM coverage
applies, and that paragraph presumes that UM coverage under the
policy exists (i.e., “[i]f the Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
provided by this policy . . . appl[ies] . . .”). Nothing in
this paragraph suggests that it does not apply to the named
insured or resident relatives. Furthermore, nothing in the
“other insurance” provisions changes the definition of an
“insured” for purposes of UM coverage or conflicts in any manner
with the definition of an “insured.”
ROSS, 24CA13
23
{¶42} Appellant additionally asserts that R.C. 3937.18(C)
establishes that she is an “insured” under appellee’s policy.
R.C. 3937.18(C) reads as follows:
If underinsured motorist coverage is included in a
policy of insurance, the underinsured motorist coverage
shall provide protection for insureds thereunder for
bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death,
suffered by any insured under the policy, where the
limits of coverage available for payment to the insured
under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance
policies covering persons liable to the insured are less
than the limits for the underinsured motorist coverage.
Underinsured motorist coverage in this state is not and
shall not be excess coverage to other applicable
liability coverages, and shall only provide the insured
an amount of protection not greater than that which would
be available under the insured’s uninsured motorist
coverage if the person or persons liable to the insured
were uninsured at the time of the accident. The policy
limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be
reduced by those amounts available for payment under all
applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance
policies covering persons liable to the insured.
For purposes of underinsured motorist coverage, an
“underinsured motorist” does not include the owner or
operator of a motor vehicle that has applicable
liability coverage in the policy under which the
underinsured motorist coverage is provided.
{¶43} Contrary to appellant’s argument, nothing in this
provision defines whether a person is an “insured” under a UM
policy. Furthermore, we agree with the court’s analysis of this
ROSS, 24CA13
24
same issue in Johns v. Hopkins, 2013-Ohio-2099, at ¶ 34 (8th
Dist.):
In Holliman[ v. Allstate Ins. Co.], 86 Ohio St.3d
414, 416–417, 1999–Ohio–116, 715 N.E.2d 532, the Ohio
Supreme Court noted that “[n]othing in R.C. 3937.18 . .
. prohibits the parties to an insurance contract from
defining who is an insured under the policy.” In fact,
R.C. 3937.18(C) does not expand, or even touch upon,
whether an individual person qualifies as “an insured”
under an insurance policy. R.C. 3937.18(C) is solely
directed to the issue of the limits of coverage available
under the UM/UIM provisions in a policy.
{¶44} Consequently, we do not agree with appellant that the
trial court erred by entering summary judgment in appellee’s
favor.
{¶45} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s sole assignment of error and affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
ROSS, 24CA13
25
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that
appellees recover of appellants the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
ROSS, 24CA13
26
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.