Edwards v. Wilson County Government

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

MARSHALL EDWARDS and )

ALICE EDWARDS, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) Case No. 3:24-cv-00831

v. ) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

)

WILSON COUNTY GOVERNMENT et )

al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

The Magistrate Judge to whom this case has been referred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) has issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc.

No. 45), recommending that the Motion for Class Certification (Doc. No. 3) and Petition for Writ

of Mandamus (Doc. No. 4) filed by plaintiffs Marshall Edwards and Alice Edwards both be denied.

Now before the court are the plaintiffs’ Objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 46.) Defendants

Wilson County Government, Wilson County [Circuit] Court,1 Wilson County Board of

Commissioners, Wilson County Judicial District, and Wilson County Human Resource

Department (collectively, the “Wilson County defendants”) have filed a Response to the plaintiffs’

Objections. (Doc. No. 47.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Objections will be overruled. The

court will accept the R&R and, consequently, will deny the plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

Certification and Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

1 Although the plaintiffs do not specify, the Wilson County defendants clarify that the

plaintiffs brought their original case in the Wilson County Circuit Court. (Doc. No. 21 at 9.)

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Dispositive Matters

Within fourteen days after being served with a report and recommendation as to a

dispositive matter, any “party may serve and file specific written objections to [a magistrate

judge’s] proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The district court

must review de novo any portion of the report and recommendation “that has been properly

objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In conducting its review, the district court “may accept,

reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to

the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.

The court is not required to review those aspects of the report and recommendation to

which no objection is made and should instead adopt the magistrate judge’s findings and rulings

to which no specific objection is filed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 151 (1985). “The filing

of vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections

and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir.

2001); see also Langley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 502 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2007) (issues raised

in a “perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived

(quoting Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))).

Likewise, “[a] general objection to the entirety” of a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation has the same effect as a complete failure to object. Howard v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Arguments made in an objection to a magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation that were not first presented to the magistrate judge for

consideration are deemed waived. Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).

B. Nondispositive Matters

A party may also seek review of an order issued by a magistrate judge concerning any

nondispositive pretrial matter. On this review, the district court can “reconsider any pretrial matter

. . . where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to

law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). That is, the standard governing this court’s

review of a nondispositive pretrial order is much more limited than the de novo standard of review

that applies to objections to a magistrate judge’s ruling on a dispositive matter. See Massey v. City

of Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 1993) (“When a magistrate judge determines a non-excepted,

pending pretrial matter, the district court has the authority to ‘reconsider’ the determination, but

under a limited standard of review.”). Review under this standard “provides considerable

deference to the determinations of magistrates.” Bonasera v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., No.

2:19-CV-3817, 2021 WL 1785618, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 2021) (quoting Langenfeld v.

Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 299 F.R.D. 547, 550 (S.D. Ohio 2014)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Marshall and Alice Edwards are residents of Atlanta, Georgia. They filed this

lawsuit pro se and in forma pauperis on July 9, 2024, naming as defendants the Wilson County

defendants identified above, along with the City of Lebanon Police Department, Wilson County

Judge Michael Collins, Brown & Brown Insurance Brokers, William Brown, and Fresh Co. Foods,

LLC (“Fresh Foods”). (Doc. No. 1.) The plaintiffs’ claims arise from an automobile accident that

occurred on August 25, 2022 in Wilson County, Tennessee, when their car was hit by a semi-truck

driven by defendant William Brown, who was employed by Fresh Foods, causing both plaintiffs

serious injuries. (Id. at 5, 13.)

The plaintiffs allege that the accident was caused by Brown’s negligence and recklessness.

(Id. at 5.) The police officer who was dispatched to the scene of the accident from the City of

Lebanon Police Department, Officer Andy Byrnes, allowed Brown to leave the scene of the

accident without issuing him a citation for outdated insurance, despite “clear evidence that Brown

lacked proper insurance coverage for the commercial vehicle.” (Id. at 6.) The plaintiffs allege that

Byrnes failed to enforce the law and demonstrated “bias” by “prioritiz[ing] the interests of the

commercial entity over the safety and legal rights of individual citizens” and that this was not an

isolated incident but “part of a broader, systemic issue within the department” of according

leniency to commercial operators at the expense of the well-being of the general public. (Id. at 7.)

The plaintiffs further allege that Brown’s employer, Fresh Foods, has a “history of safety

violations and employs drivers with inadequate training and expired credentials.” (Id. at 6.) Fresh

Foods and its insurance brokers allegedly gave the plaintiffs fraudulent and misleading insurance

certificates related to insurance coverage on the semi-truck, thus compounding the plaintiffs’

distress and the challenges they confronted in trying to seek compensation for their injuries. (Id.

at 7.) The plaintiffs allege that these actions, too, “reflect a broader pattern of unethical behavior

and gross misconduct.” (Id.)

The plaintiffs filed suit in the Wilson County Circuit Court, seeking to recover damages

for the injuries sustained in the accident, but their lawsuit was dismissed by Wilson County Circuit

Judge Michael Collins, despite “compelling evidence of negligence, fraud, and misconduct by

Defendants.” (Id. at 8.) The Complaint contains little additional information about that lawsuit and

its current status, but, from the Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed with the Complaint, it appears

that the lawsuit was dismissed after a hearing before Judge Collins on May 13, 2024. A hearing

for reconsideration of the dismissal was set for July 8, 2024. (See Doc. No. 4-1 at 9–12.) Given

the filing of this lawsuit on July 9, 2024, the court presumes that the motion for reconsideration

was denied, but the plaintiffs have not indicated whether final judgment was entered or whether

they appealed. In any event, the plaintiffs assert that Judge Collins dismissed the case “without

proper consideration,” ignoring the merits of the case and denying the plaintiffs the right to seek

justice. This decision purportedly “exemplified a broader pattern of judicial actions within the

Wilson County Court.” (Id. at 9.) The plaintiffs claim that the Wilson County Circuit Court

systematically undermines the legal rights of “vulnerable individuals, particularly elderly African

American citizens like the plaintiffs” and that the dismissal of their case was “a miscarriage of

justice fueled by racial animus and a failure to uphold the principles of due process and equal

protection under the law.” (Id.) Judge Collins also allegedly deprived them of their right to self-

representation. (Id. at 11.)

The plaintiffs, without any apparent factual support, assert that Wilson County “and its

constituent entities, including the Defendants” have a history of discriminatory employment

policies, “permitting a culture of nepotism and favoritism that disproportionately benefits White

employees and residents over non-Whites,” and that the defendants’ actions, apparently including

negligent hiring, training and supervision, “through their coordinated misconduct in response to

the accident involving Plaintiffs, deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights to due process

and equal protection.” (Id. at 12.)

Seeking various forms of relief in the instant lawsuit, the plaintiffs state:

This action seeks to remedy egregious violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional and

civil rights, as well as address systemic discrimination, elder abuse, fraud, and

negligence perpetrated by Defendants. As senior Black American citizens,

Plaintiffs have been denied due process, equal protection under the law, and their

fundamental human dignity through a coordinated series of unlawful acts by

government entities and private actors in Wilson County Tennessee.

(Id. at 2.) They assert that the court has federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as

well as supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

The Complaint, while short on facts, is long on legal claims. Based on the allegations

outlined above, the Complaint purports to state the following causes of action against the various

defendants: (1) claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants for allegedly ongoing

violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; (2) violation of the Elder Justice Act, 42 U.S.C. §

1397j et seq., against all defendants; (3) negligence and gross negligence against all defendants;

(4) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against defendants Wilson County and the City of

Lebanon; (5) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., against

defendants Wilson County Circuit Court, City of Lebanon Police Department, and the “other

government entity Defendants” (Doc. No. 1 at 21); (6) fraud and conspiracy to defraud against

defendants Fresh Foods and Brown & Brown Insurance Brokers, and “Does 1–20” (id. at 22); (7)

violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.,

against Fresh Foods and Brown & Brown Insurance Brokers, and “Does 1–20” (Doc. No. 1 at 22);

and (8) violation of the plaintiffs’ rights to due process and equal protection by the government

entity defendants.

The Complaint, although not styled as a class action, was accompanied by the pending

Motion for Class Certification as well as the Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Although it does not appear that any defendant has been formally served, the plaintiffs

apparently delivered a copy of their Complaint to at least some of the defendants. The plaintiffs’

claims against Brown & Brown Insurance Brokers have been settled and dismissed pursuant to an

Agreed Order (Doc. Nos. 33, 34), and the City of Lebanon (sued as the City of Lebanon Police

Department) and the Wilson County Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) (Doc. Nos. 13, 20.) The remaining three defendants—Judge Michael Collins, William

Brown, and Fresh Foods—have not appeared in the case.

On January 3, 2025, after the plaintiffs filed properly supported Applications to Proceed in

Forma Pauperis, the court granted them leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee,

directed the Clerk of Court to issue service packets for the remaining defendants, and referred the

matter to the Magistrate Judge. (Doc. No. 44.)

The R&R was issued shortly thereafter. The Magistrate Judge expressly recognized therein

that “not all Defendants are yet in the case” but nonetheless found it appropriate to address the

plaintiffs’ pending motions. (Doc. No. 45 at 4.)

III. THE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

The Complaint itself is not characterized as a class action complaint and does not, even

tangentially, refer to the standards pertaining to class actions. Aside from the plaintiffs’ conclusory

and unsupported assertions that the wrongs they suffered at the hands of various defendants were

not “isolated” incidents but, instead, part of a “broader pattern” or “broader scheme” of “systemic”

issues (see, e.g., Doc. No. 1 at 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) requiring “comprehensive reforms” (id. at 11), the

Complaint contains no factual allegations that would support claims on behalf of a class.

The plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification nonetheless seeks an order appointing the

plaintiffs as class representatives and certifying a class of plaintiffs consisting of:

All individuals who, within the applicable statute of limitations period, were:

a) Provided with fraudulent or misleading insurance documentation by Defendants

Brown & Brown Insurance Brokers, Fresh Co. Foods, LLC, or their agents;

b) Subjected to discriminatory practices or denial of due process by Defendants

Wilson County Court, Judge Michael Collins, City of Lebanon Police Department,

Wilson County Government, Wilson County Board of Commissioners, Wilson

County Judicial District, or Wilson County Human Resources Department; or

c) Harmed as a result of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision practices by any

of the Defendants.

(Doc. No. 3 at 2–3.)

In support of their motion, the plaintiffs identify and claim to satisfy each of the

requirements for pursuing a class action set forth in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, including numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. (Id. at

3–5.) Regarding the last requirement, and despite proceeding pro se, the plaintiffs assert that they

“have retained counsel experienced in complex civil rights litigation and class actions who are

prepared to devote the necessary resources to represent the class.” (Id. at 6.)

The plaintiffs also purport to satisfy the Rule 23(b) requirements of predominance and

superiority. (Id. at 6–7.) They then request, pursuant to Rule 23(g), that the court “appoint their

counsel as class counsel.” (Id. at 7.) They apparently copied and pasted this language from some

unidentified source, because the same paragraph also states: “[Note: As Plaintiffs are currently

proceeding pro se, they should seek qualified legal representation before pursuing class

certification.]” (Id. (brackets in original).) As part of the relief sought in this motion, they again

ask the court to “[a]ppoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as class counsel.” (Id. at 7.) Their motion does not,

however, incorporate a motion or request for the appointment of counsel.

The R&R recommends that the Motion for Class Certification be denied for the simple

reason that the plaintiffs are not represented by counsel, and it is well established in this Circuit

that a pro se party is not a proper class representative. (Doc. No. 45 at 4–5 (citations omitted).)

The plaintiffs object to this conclusion as “[m]isinterpret[ing]” their request and

“overlook[ing] established precedents allowing courts to appoint counsel in complex cases

involving significant public interest and systemic violations.” (Doc. No. 46 at 2.) They seek now

to characterize their Motion for Class Certification as also “explicitly request[ing] that the Court

appoint counsel to fairly represent the proposed class.” (Id. at 3.)

As noted, the plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification does not incorporate a motion or

request for the appointment of counsel.Thus, the Magistrate Judge did not err as a matter of law in

denying the plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification on the basis that the pro se plaintiffs are not

qualified to act as class representatives. Specifically, while an individual can represent himself

personally under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, the statute “does not permit plaintiffs to appear pro se where

interests other than their own are at stake.” Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir.

2002) (citation omitted). Consequently, as the Magistrate Judge explained, non-attorneys

proceeding pro se cannot adequately represent a class. (Doc. No 45 at 5 (citing, among other cases,

Ziegler v. Michigan, 90 F. App’x 808, 810 (6th Cir. 2004)).)

The court further finds that, even if the plaintiffs had properly requested the appointment

of counsel or were already represented, their Motion for Class Certification would still be denied

on the merits. The Supreme Court has recognized that “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading

standard.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Rather, “[b]ecause class

certification ‘magnifies the stakes of litigation’ by resolving hundreds, if not thousands, of cases

at one time,” the “named [plaintiffs] must ‘affirmatively demonstrate’ the four threshold

imperatives of certification.” In re Nissan N. Am., Inc. Litig., 122 F.4th 239, 245 (6th Cir. 2024)

(quoting In re Ford Motor Co., 86 F.4th 723, 726 (6th Cir. 2023) (per curiam), and Wal-Mart, 546

U.S. at 350). That is, plaintiffs “must actually prove—not simply plead—that their proposed class

satisfies each requirement” of Rule 23. Id. at 246 (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,

Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 275 (2014)).

Particularly at this stage of the litigation, not having conducted any discovery, the plaintiffs

have no evidence whatsoever to establish any of the Rule 23 requirements. Moreover, their

Complaint consists of conclusory legal assertions untethered to actual facts, such that, even if the

court could grant a Rule 23 motion for class certification on the basis of the pleading alone, the

pleading here does not establish that this case is suitable for class resolution or that the plaintiffs

could satisfy any of the standards.

The court further notes that six of the defendants have pending Motions to Dismiss that

may well be meritorious; one of the defendants has already been dismissed by Agreed Order; Judge

Collins is, in all likelihood, absolutely immune from suit in this court, and the other two defendants

(William Brown and Fresh Food) are not yet a part of this case. The plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

Certification, in short, is premature and without merit.

The plaintiffs’ Objections to the recommendation that their Motion for Class Certification

be denied will be overruled. The court will instead accept the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation

that the motion be denied, and the motion will be denied based on the plaintiffs’ pro se status and

on the alternative basis that the motion is utterly lacking in evidentiary support for any of the Rule

23 criteria.

IV. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Along with their Complaint and the Motion for Class Certification, the plaintiffs also filed

a Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Doc. No. 4), supported by plaintiff Marshall Edward’s

Declaration in Support of Writ of Mandate [sic] (Doc. No. 5). As an initial matter, the court notes

that the standard of review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling on this Petition is not entirely clear.

Because it is not a stand-alone petition and the denial of it does not have the effect of dismissing

this case altogether, it does not appear to be a dispositive matter. The court, in an abundance of

caution, nonetheless applies the more demanding standard of review that applies to magistrate

judges’ rulings on dispositive matters. Regardless, under any standard, the plaintiffs’ Objections

are without merit.

A. Background

The plaintiffs’ Petition is directed to the “United States District Court for the Middle

District of Tennessee, Wilson County Division,” and asks for a Writ of Mandamus “ordering the

“District Court” to vacate “its” dismissal of the plaintiffs’ case, investigate judicial and law

enforcement misconduct, “[i]mplement corrective measures to address systemic discrimination,”

and “[e]nsure proper adjudication of Petitioners’ claims of elder abuse and fraud.” (Doc. No. 4 at

5.)

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be denied as “both procedurally flawed

and substantively meritless.” (Doc. No. 45 at 6.) She points out that there is no “Wilson County

Division” within the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee; that the

attachment to the Petition appears to be a separate Petition for Writ of Mandamus directed to the

“Wilson County Court” (see Doc. No. 4-1); and that the Declaration in support of the Petition in

this court suggests that only a single Petition is at issue but also requests that the mandamus order

be directed at all “Defendants” collectively. (Doc. No.5 at 2, 5.) The R&R correctly notes that a

writ of mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy,” and the party seeking such relief must make a

clear and precise request that does not “require the Court to guess or speculate about to whom the

requested order is intended to be directed.” (Doc. No. 45 at 6.)

The Magistrate Judge also finds that the Petition is substantively meritless. Construing it

liberally under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the Magistrate Judge observes that, (1) there is no such entity as

the “United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Wilson County Division”;

(2) if the Petition is construed as directed to this court, “it is nonsensical to request that a federal

court issue a mandamus against itself”; and (3) to the extent the Petition is directed to the “Wilson

County Court,” this court “has no authority to issue a writ of mandamus to direct a state court or

its judicial officers in the performance of their duties.” (Doc. No. 45 at 7 (citations omitted).)

B. The Objections

In their Objections, the plaintiffs assert that their Petition “clearly identifies the requested

relief: accountability for systemic misconduct by the Wilson County Court, the Wilson County

Government, and associated parties.” (Doc. No. 46 at 3.) Substantively, they assert that the federal

courts have “inherent authority to issue writs in extraordinary circumstances to prevent injustice.”

(Id. at 3–4 (citing Kerr v U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976)).) They object that the Magistrate

Judge “fails to consider key aspects of Plaintiffs’ case,” including the factual allegations in their

Complaint and Petition that “merit further factual development and discovery, rather than

dismissal at this early stage.” (Id. at 4.)

C. Discussion

As the R&R recognizes, the writ of mandamus was technically abolished by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 81(b), but, under the All Writs Act, “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts

established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their

respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

The Supreme Court recognizes that the All Writs Act codifies the common law writ of mandamus.

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004).

The writ is a “drastic and extraordinary” remedy, “reserved for really extraordinary

causes.” Id. (citing Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947)). Traditionally, the writ has been

used “to confine [the court against which mandamus is sought] to a lawful exercise of its prescribed

jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)). Although

“jurisdiction” in this context has not been narrowly confined, “only exceptional circumstances

amounting to a judicial usurpation of power . . . or a clear abuse of discretion . . . will justify the

invocation of this extraordinary remedy.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Because the writ is one of “the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal,” a court may

issue a writ of mandamus only if three conditions are met:

First, the party seeking issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to

attain the relief he desires—a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be

used as a substitute for the regular appeals process. Second, the petitioner must

satisfy the burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and

indisputable. Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing

court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate

under the circumstances.

Id. at 380–81 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).

Under these standards, a writ of mandamus is clearly not appropriate in this case, for many

reasons. First, as the Magistrate Judge found, it is well settled that “federal courts have no authority

to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of

their duties.” Haggard v. Tennessee, 421 F.2d 1384, 1386 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing Clark v.

Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1966), and Campbell v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 263 F. Supp.

991 (W.D. Wash. 1967)). Thus, insofar as the plaintiffs are asking this court to issue a writ to the

Wilson County Circuit Court, it has no power to do so. Second, insofar as the plaintiffs are asking

this court to vacate Judge Collins’ dismissal of their state court lawsuit, this court has no

jurisdiction to reconsider a state court judgment, and the plaintiffs had other means to attain that

relief—by appealing the decision to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Third, to the extent the

plaintiffs contend that the other defendants are violating or have violated their rights, the plaintiffs

have other adequate means of remedying those alleged violations—and in fact are in the process

of following one such avenue by filing their lawsuit in this court and asserting claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, the plaintiffs have not shown that they have a “clear and indisputable” right

to issuance of the writ. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. Accordingly, the plaintiffs fail to show that this

14

matter involves a “really extraordinary cause” that requires the “drastic and extraordinary” remedy

of mandamus. /d. at 380.

The Objections to the recommendation that their Petition for Writ of Mandamus be denied

will be overruled.

V. CONCLUSION

As set forth herein, the court will overrule the plaintiffs’ Objections (Doc. No. 46) and

accept the R&R’s recommendations in their entirety. The plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification

(Doc. No. 3) and Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Doc. No. 4) will both be denied. An appropriate

Order is filed herewith. fe

United States District Judge