Opinion

White v. St. Tammany Sheriff's Department

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Mar 7, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.4%

“Although courts must construe evidence in light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will not adopt a plaintiff’s characterization of the facts where unaltered evidence contradicts that account.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Although courts must construe evidence in light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will not adopt a plaintiff’s characterization of the facts where unaltered evidence contradicts that account.”
  • “A government official’s acts are not objectively unreasonable unless all reasonable officials in the defendant’s circumstances would have then known that the defendant’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.”
  • “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RANDY M. WHITE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 22-3049

ST. TAMMANY SHERIFF’S SECTION: D (2)

DEPARTMENT, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Cole

Willie (“Willie”).1 Plaintiff Randy White (“White”) opposes the Motion.2 After careful

consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the

Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 16, 2022, White, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed

a Complaint in this Court, naming as Defendants the St. Tammany Sheriff’s

Department, Sheriff Randy Smith, and Deputy Cole Willie.3 In his Complaint, White

alleges that on July 25, 2022, while incarcerated as a pretrial detainee,4 he “was

involved in an altercation (fight) dep Willie used unnecessary force he ran dove a

football tackled [him] in result [his] hand was broken it happened in C-700 in the

dayroom.”5 Magistrate Judge Currault held a Spears hearing on May 23, 2023,

during which White provided additional details of the encounter.6

1 R. Doc. 63.

2 R. Doc. 79.

3 R. Doc. 1 at 2; R. Doc. 7.

Video surveillance of the incident likewise provides additional context.7 Video

footage shows a prison dayroom with approximately fifteen inmates sitting at tables,

making phone calls, and conversing.8 In the video, White can be seen pacing around

the dayroom.9 Ferguson is in the corner of the dayroom and appears to be picking up

and putting his personal items into a bag.10 White paces around the dayroom several

times, quickens into a run, and begins punching Ferguson who appears to have been

kneeling on the floor picking up laundry or pieces of clothing.11 White testified that

as he was punching Ferguson, he heard deputies yelling from the hallway for him to

stop.12 White further testified that he began to turn towards Deputy Willie, but had

not yet fully turned, when Willie tackled White.13

On June 27, 2023, following the Spears hearing, Judge Currault issued a

Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Court allow White’s claim of

excessive force by Willie to proceed but that it dismiss the remainder of White’s claims

as frivolous.14 Neither party filed an objection, and the Court approved and adopted

Judge Currault’s Report and Recommendation on July 31, 2023.15

7 R. Doc. 63-8.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 10:32-11:23.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 10:32-11:30.

12 R. Doc. 31 at 4.

13 R. Doc. 63-8 at 11:31. The Court notes that other than White’s allegation that White was not being

combative when Willie tackled him, White’s sworn testimony regarding the incident exactly mirrors

the video of the incident. To the extent White’s testimony contradicts the video of the incident, the

Court does not consider White’s testimony. See Thompson v. Mercer, 762 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2014)

(“Although courts must construe evidence in light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will not

adopt a plaintiff’s characterization of the facts where unaltered evidence contradicts that account.”).

14 R. Doc. 31 at 17-18.

15 R. Doc. 32.

On September 20, 2024, Willie filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s

Expert Testimony and Expert Reports,16 which remains pending. Thereafter, on

September 24, 2024, Willie filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, in which

he asks the Court to dismiss White’s claim against him based on qualified

immunity.17 In support of his Motion, Willie argues that White’s claim cannot

succeed because the force Willie used against White was not objectively

unreasonable.18 Willie argues that he only used as much force as was necessary to

break up the altercation started by White, he tackled White only after White ignored

repeated verbal commands to stop hitting Ferguson, and Willie reasonably perceived

the scene before him to require the force used.19

White filed a response to White’s Motion for Summary Judgment.20 In it,

White asks the Court to allow him to proceed with trial because he wishes to have an

opportunity to explain his case at trial.21 White argues that Willie’s use of force was

excessive and that “instead of allowing [White] to let [Willie] and the other officers

detain [White] without” using excessive force, Willie acted in a way that caused

serious damage to White.22 White asks that “because of . . . Willie’s judgement [sic],

please allow [White’s] case to remain open to go to trial.”23

16 R. Doc. 61.

17 R. Doc. 63.

18 R. Doc. 63-2 at 11.

19 Id. at 13-18.

20 R. Doc. 79.

21 Id. at 1.

22 Id. at 2.

23 Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”24 A dispute is “genuine” if it is

“real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.”25 Further,

a fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law.”26 When assessing whether a genuine dispute regarding any material fact

exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from

making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”27 While all reasonable

inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat

summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or “only

a scintilla of evidence.”28 Instead, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable

jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.29

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”30 The

24 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

25 Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilkinson v. Powell,

149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945)).

26 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

27 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribus. Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citations omitted).

28 Id. (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations

omitted).

29 Id. at 399 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

30 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1991).

non-moving party can then defeat summary judgment by either submitting evidence

sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact or by

“showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the

reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”31 If, however,

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,

the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in

the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim.32 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond

the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’”33 “When there is video evidence in the record, courts are

not bound to accept the nonmovant’s version of the facts if it is contradicted by the

video.”34 However, “a court should not discount the nonmoving party’s story unless

the video evidence provides so much clarity that a reasonable jury could not believe

his account.”35

“A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of

proof.”36 “Once an official pleads the defense, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff,

who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the

31 Id. at 1265.

32 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

33 Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).

34 Crane v. City of Arlington, No. 21-CV-10644, 2022 WL 4592035, at *4 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2022) (citing

Harris v. Serpas, 745 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2014)).

35 Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d

369, 374 (5th Cir. 2013)).

36 Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).

official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.”37 However,

when considering a qualified immunity defense, the court must still view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in the

nonmoving party’s favor.38

III. ANALYSIS

Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary

functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.”39 “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the

need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and

the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they

perform their duties reasonably.”40 The Supreme Court has made clear that qualified

immunity functions as an immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to

liability.41 “[T]he qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken

judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.’”42 “This means that even law enforcement officials who reasonably

but mistakenly commit a constitutional violation are entitled to immunity.”43

37 Id.

38 Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 122–23 (5th Cir. 1993).

39 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

40 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

41 Id. at 237 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

42 Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326–27 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d

226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000)).

43 Bazan, 246 F.3d at 488 (quoting Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001)) (internal

quotations omitted).

To overcome a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)

that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) that the right was

“clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.44 Put differently, a

government official’s liability “generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’

of the action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at

the time it was taken.”45 When deciding whether the right allegedly violated was

‘clearly established,’ [a] court asks whether the law so clearly and unambiguously

prohibited the conduct that every reasonable official would understand that what he

is doing violates the law.”46 In other words, precedent existing at the time of the

challenged conduct “must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.”47

The Court considers first whether Willie violated White’s constitutional rights.

Here, White argues that Willie’s force against him was excessive. Force against a

pretrial detainee is “excessive” and therefore a violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights when the force was objectively unreasonable.48 The

reasonableness of an officer’s actions “turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each

particular case.’”49 “A court must make this determination from the perspective of a

44 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citation omitted).

45 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).

46 Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 169

(5th Cir. 2015) (“A government official’s acts are not objectively unreasonable unless all reasonable

officials in the defendant’s circumstances would have then known that the defendant’s conduct

violated the plaintiff’s rights.”).

47 al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.

48 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015).

49 Id. at 397 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with

the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”50 Critically, courts “must also account for the

‘legitimate interests that stem from the government’s need to manage the facility in

which the individual is detained,’ appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices

that in the judgement’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order and

discipline and to maintain institutional security.’”51 Considerations bearing on

reasonableness or unreasonableness of force used include: (1) the extent of the injury

suffered; (2) the need for the application of force; (3) the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the

responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful

response.52

The first factor considers the extent of the injury suffered. “Although a

showing of ‘significant injury’ is not necessary,” a plaintiff must show that he

“suffered at least some form of injury that is more than de minimis.”53 The Court

notes that although White alleges injuries to his hand, White has not pointed the

Court to summary judgment evidence showing the extent of his injuries.54 Even

assuming White’s injuries are more than de minimis, and thus weighing this factor

50 Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

51 Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979)).

52 Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

53 Galada v. Payne, 421 F. App’x 460, 462 (5th Cir. 2011).

54 See Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 56 does not impose

upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s

opposition to summary judgment.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

in his favor, however, White cannot succeed on his claims, because the remaining

factors weigh against a finding of excessive force.

It is undisputed that on July 25, 2022, while in a prison dayroom, and in the

presence of approximately fifteen other inmates, White initiated an altercation with

Ferguson, a fellow inmate.55 After he circled the dayroom several times,56 White

hurriedly moved towards Ferguson, who was kneeling down at the time,57 and began

to punch him repeatedly and pull his hair.58 Video footage of the incident shows that

White did so without provocation and as Ferguson was initially on his knees and then

backed up against a wall.59 White testified that as he attacked Ferguson, Willie

repeatedly yelled at him to stop.60 Despite these repeated commands, however, White

continued hitting Ferguson. Ultimately, Willie tackled White.61

The foregoing video plainly demonstrates the need for the application of force

in this case. The force employed by Willie was an attempt to stop the altercation

started by White; notably, the tackle would not have occurred had White not struck

Ferguson. Indeed, “the use of force is . . . appropriate when necessary to control a

‘recalcitrant inmate.’”62 As White acknowledged during the Spears hearing, Willie’s

use of force came only after White repeatedly ignored orders to stop beating Ferguson.

55 R. Doc. 63-8 at 11:26-11:32.

56 Id. at 10:35-11:22.

57 Id. at 11:24.

58 Id. at 11:26-11:31.

59 Id. at 11:26.

60 Willie alleges that the video of the incident supports White’s position. The video provided to the

Court does not have audio capabilities, however.

61 R. Doc. 63-8 at 11:31.

62 Brown v. Gusman, No. 15-CV-1491, 2015 WL 6827260, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2015) (Jones v. Shields,

207 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2000)).

The Fifth Circuit “has consistently found no excessive force where prison officials

employ force against inmates refusing to comply with orders.”63 Moreover, the force

employed was limited to the amount of force necessary to stop the altercation. White

violently, and seemingly without cause, began to beat Ferguson and, by his own

admission, ignored numerous orders to stop.64 Based on the summary judgment

evidence, the second and third factors—the need for the force applied and the

relationship for that need and the amount of force employed—weigh in favor of

qualified immunity.

Furthermore, the scene in front of Willie constituted a reasonably perceived

threat. As the Court outlined above, the uncontradicted evidence shows that White,

an inmate known by Willie to be violent,65 attacked a fellow inmate without

provocation. White’s actions clearly posed a threat to the institutional security of the

prison, both for the individuals involved as well as those surrounding them.

Critically, the altercation occurred in a crowded prison dayroom, which increased the

63 Schneider v. Kaelin, No. 12-CV-233, 2013 WL 1867611, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2013) (citing

Thomas, 222 F. App’x at 441).

64 To the extent the video shows White turning towards Willie prior to Willie tackling him, this does

not change the Court’s analysis. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to White, the video

shows White begin to turn in the direction from which Willie was running a mere two seconds before

Willie tackled White. R. Doc. 63-8 at 11:31. Even if the video does show White backing off Ferguson

two seconds before Willie tackled him, the Court finds that Willie was not objectively unreasonable in

considering the risk to Ferguson and the entire facility to be ongoing or failing to register a change in

circumstances. Indeed, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that

police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.

65 Willie stated that when he was called to address the altercation between Ferguson and White, he

was already familiar with White “due to the violent nature of his past criminal charges.” R. Doc. 63-6

at ¶ 9.

threat of an institutional security threat.66 Indeed, “[d]isobeying orders poses a

threat to the order and security of an institution.”67 This factor too weighs in favor

of qualified immunity.

As to the final reasonableness factor, it is undisputed that, prior to physically

engaging White, Willie repeatedly ordered him to stop hitting Ferguson. Only after

White ignored these commands did Willie tackle him. Importantly, the video also

details the length of time from Willie’s entrance into the dayroom, the tackle of White

away from Ferguson, and the standing up of White and his removal from the day

room. The entire encounter between Willie and White lasted less than forty-five

seconds.68 Willie sought to temper the severity of his response, and the final factor

therefore weighs in favor of qualified immunity.

In sum, Willie was presented with an inmate whom he knew to be violent and

who was actively beating a fellow inmate despite orders to stop. The facts of this

case, which the Court views in the light most favorable to White, show no violation of

White’s constitutional rights. Having found no constitutional violation, the Court

66 See Wilson v. Allison, No. 22-CV-231, 2023 WL 7308106, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2023) (“When

Officer Johns first struck and subdued [Wilson] in the common room, Wilson had just initiated two

physical conflicts with other inmates in the span of five minutes. These fights occurred in the presence

of many other inmates, some of whom had approached the scuffles or were tangentially involved,

creating the possibility of an institutional security threat.”); Pierce v. Rodriguez, No. 22-CV-147, 2023

WL 4878863, at *6 (W.D. Tex. July 31, 2023) (“Here, a reasonable officer would have been justified in

believing that in each incident some use of force was objectively reasonable . . . due to Pierce’s actions

and the threat to others and institutional security posed by those actions.”); Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 399-

40 (“[A] court must take account of the legitimate interests in managing a jail, acknowledging as part

of the objective reasonableness analysis that deference to policies and practices needed to maintain

order and institutional security is appropriate.”).

67 Johnson v. Hill, 514 F.Supp.3d 958, 968 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (citing Minix v. Blevins, No. 06-CV-306,

2007 WL 1217883, at *24 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2007)).

68 R. Doc. 63-8 at 11:30-12:06.

finds it unnecessary and declines to consider the remaining qualified immunity

prong.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment® filed by

Defendant Cole Willie is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Randy White’s claims against

Defendant Cole Willie are DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude

Plaintiff's Expert Testimony and Expert Reports” filed by Defendant Cole Willie is

DENIED as moot.

New Orleans, Louisiana, March 7, 2025.

Vitter

bob

United States District Judge

68 R. Doc. 63.

7 Doe. 61.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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