The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
AUGUST SESSION, 1998 January 22, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9711-CC-00521
)
Appellee, )
) COFFEE COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON. GERALD L. EWELL, SR., JUDGE
PARKS A. BRYAN, )
)
Appe llant. ) (FIRST D EGRE E MU RDER )
FOR THE APPELLEE: FOR THE APPELLANT:
B. CAMPBELL SMOOT JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defe nder Attorney General & Reporter
RACH EL E. W ILLIS KAREN M. YACUZZO
Assistant Pu blic Defende r Assistant Attorney General
603 East Carroll Street 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Tullahoma, TN 37388 425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
C. MICHAEL LAYNE
District Attorn ey Ge neral
STEPHEN E. WEITZMAN
Assistant District Attorney General
P.O. Box 147
Manchester, TN 37355
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defe ndan t, Park s A. Br yan, ap peals as of right following his con viction in
the Coffee C ounty C ircuit Cou rt. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of
preme ditated first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole. Defendant appeals both the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission
of certain photo graph s of the victim which he argues were more prejudicial than
probative . We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the
standa rd is whe ther, after rev iewing the evidenc e in the light m ost favora ble to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reaso nable d oubt. Jack son v. V irginia, 443 U.S. 307, 31 9 (1979).
On appe al, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and
all inference s therefro m. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 197 8).
Because a verdic t of guilt removes the presumption of innocen ce and replaces it with
a presum ption of gu ilt, the ac cuse d has the bu rden in this court of illustrating why the
evidence is insufficient to support th e verdict re turned b y the trier of fac t. State v.
Tug gle, 639 S.W.2 d 913, 9 14 (Te nn. 198 2); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476
(Tenn . 1973).
Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht and va lue to
be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised b y the evidence, a re
resolved by the trier of fact, not this c ourt. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 198 7). Nor ma y this court
reweigh or reevalu ate the ev idence . Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d at 835 . A jury verdict
approved by the trial judg e accre dits the Sta te’s witnesse s and re solves all co nflicts
in favor of the State. Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.
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Rebecca Nickerson worke d with th e victim , Helen Bryan , at PC A Ap parel in
1984. She also knew the Defendant and thought the two would make a good match.
After “matchmaking,” the two began a relationship and Helen and the Defendant
event ually married . Nickerso n continu ed to socialize with them for several years and
knew th eir marria ge was unstab le.
Abbie Wa lker wa s a frien d of the victim and kn ew her m arriage to be “volatile.”
They talked almost daily, but Walker did not often see her in person. In May 1995,
she took the vic tim to Alabama to Restoration Ranch, a nondenominational Christian
rehab center. The victim went to this shelter to escape her hus band’s abuse and to
recover from her own alcoholism. The day after Walker drove the victim to the
shelter, the Defendant cam e to he r hom e requ esting the victim ’s location. Walker
recalled that sh e lied a nd told him th at she did not know. Defendant then stated that
he believed the victim was driving to California to see her sister, but that her car
would not make it and would probably break down before she reached the
Mississippi River. W hile Defe ndant b elieved the victim wou ld have to call him to
come to get her, he stated that he would go after “the car and the dog, but . . . not
. . . after her.” When Walker asked the Defendant if he would leave her on the side
of the road , Defend ant resp onded , “If I brought the bitch b ack he re, I would k ill her.”
Walker described the Defendant’s expression when he stated that he would kill the
victim as “very serious , just dead set.”
The victim c alled th e Def enda nt two (2 ) days la ter and aske d him to come and
pick her up at Restoration Ranch. Defendant brought the victim home. Following
the victim’s return home, Walker did not speak with her as frequently because she
was afraid of the victim’s husband. They spoke every few weeks. On August 17,
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1995, the victim called Walker. Walker recalled that the victim was not able to get
her breath very well and had a “shuddery” voice. Walker never spok e with th e victim
again, and lea rned that she h ad been k illed two (2) days later.
Debra Luttrell is an E MT w ith the Co ffee Cou nty Amb ulance Service. She was
called to the scene of the Defendant and the victim’s home on Roy Bryan Road on
August 18, 1995, at approximately 8:30 to 9:00 p.m. When Luttrell arrived, deputies
were already present at the scene. Defendant met Luttrell and her partner in the
doorway, then they found the victim lying on the bed on her back with no signs of life.
Luttrell recalled that the victim “looked like she had been beat from her head down
to her feet. T here w as [sic] n ew bru ises on top of o ld bruis es tha t just co vered all of
her body.” She n oted th at it was one of the worst beatings she had ever seen. The
victim’s body was cool in temperature, and she was not yet stiff, indica ting to L uttrell
that the victim had been dead over fifteen to twenty minutes. They attempted to
revive the vic tim, but the re was n o respo nse.
Various officers testified that they were present at the scene and that the
victim had bruises over the entire length of her body, suffering one of the worst
beatings they had ever seen. The Defendant advised the police that the victim had
fallen on a pro pane b ottle in the living roo m, bu t no pro pane bottles were fo und in
the house. All the officers testified as to the filth of the living conditions, with alcohol
bottles and tras h strewn about the home . Bloody to ilet paper w as foun d in the
Defendant’s yard and blood stains were on the floor near the victim’s be d. Also, a
partially empty vodka bottle was found in a brown paper bag, and scie ntific tests
confirm ed that the paper b ag had the victim’s b lood on it.
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Dr. David Florence observed the victim in the emergency room and
determined she was both medically and legally dead upon arriv al at the hosp ital.
After performing an exam ination of her bod y, Dr. Florenc e found in excess of sixty
(60) or seventy (70) bruises on the victim’s body, with some less than forty-eight (48)
hours old and some approximately seven (7) days old. She had also suffered eleven
(11) fractured ribs, causing six (6) puncture wounds in her lung, inflicted between a
few minutes to forty-eight (48) hours prior to her death. While the victim may have
been able to walk, talk, and breathe after thes e injurie s were inflicted , she w ould
have been in pain and would have had difficulty speaking. Dr. Florence testified that
the victim’s voice would have s ound ed cra ckly or lik e a wh isper. T he ba ck of h er rib
cage also had multiple fractured ribs, likely inflicted at least three (3) months prior
to her death. In addition, she had a large laceration on the back of her head which
was inflicted shortly before her death as she was still bleeding from that laceration
upon her arr ival at the hosp ital.
Dr. Charles Harlan testified regarding the results of the vic tim’s autopsy. Her
death was caused by multiple blows to the chest which produ ced “b lood a nd air in
the space around the lungs compressing the lungs and ca using he r to be un able to
breathe .” After the fractured ribs punc tured he r lungs, the victim slow ly bled to
death, struggling to breathe and having a “very tough way to die.” From the
examination it appeared that the victim had been beaten over a period of time, and
it was likely that she died “ove r many ho urs or a coup le of days.”
Depu ty Mike Jarvis was gua rding the victim’s bod y prior to her transpo rt to the
medical examiner’s office when the Defendant entered the room and asked to see
the victim. After approaching her body, the Defendant turned his back and removed
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the victim’s bloodstained shirt and then hid it unde rneath his jack et. W hen J arvis
confronted the Defe ndan t, the D efend ant rep lied tha t it was th e victim ’s favorite shirt
and he wanted to keep it in remembrance of her. Jarvis refused to allow the
Defendant to keep the shirt, and the shirt was admitted into evidence.
Investigator Alexander recorded the Defendant’s statement regarding the
victim’s death. In his statement, Defendant recalled that he had been to the grocery
store after work on August 18, 1995. When he pulled into his driveway, he blew the
horn but received no response from the victim. This angered the Defendant who
was drinking alcohol at the time. He then picked up the groceries and carried them
into the kitche n, returning to the car to drink m ore alcoh ol. In his state ment,
Defendant admits he was “furious,” and went inside, leaning over to “thu mp” his wife
with the vodka bottle on the back of the head. They had a few drinks together, but
Defendant was s till angry and told the victim to go to bed. When the victim rose, she
fell down. Having to help the victim up made him so mad that he kicked her in the
side, possibly more than once. Defendant then drug her to bed by the armpits .
When he put her in bed, Defendant noticed some blood on her pillow and he got
some toilet pape r to place o n the cut o n her he ad.
Some time after he returned to the living room to watch television, Defendant
heard the victim fall out of bed. When he went to check on her, he noticed that she
had fallen and “messed on hers elf.” Defen dant pu lled off her pink shorts and then
cleaned her off, throw ing her sh orts on the po rch. W hen D efenda nt returne d to her
room, the victim had “messed on herself again,” and this made him so mad that he
hit her with his fists. Defendant stated he was “nice enough to clean her up a gain,”
then went back to watching television. Later he got worried about his wife, so he
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went to check on her and discovered she was pale. When he checked for her pulse,
he thought he heard a small heartbeat and he shook her to wake her up. When he
again checked for a pulse and could not find one, he called 911 and started CPR.
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction
for first-degree murder. Defendant suggests that his case is similar to State v.
Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992), in which a conviction for first degree murder
was reversed and modified to a second degree murder conviction. Defendant
sugge sts that because the abuse of his wife had existed for an extended period of
time, he should not have expected the abuse occurring on Augus t 17, 18, an d 19 to
have killed the victim. Therefore, Defendant argues if he had no expectation of her
death, h e could n ot have c omm itted first degre e murd er.
In order to convict the Defendant in the case sub judice, the State was
required to prove that he committed an unlawful killing, both inten tionally and with
premeditation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 9-13-20 2(a)(1). Premeditation requires that the
act be committed after the exercis e of reflection and judg ment, b ut the pur pose to
kill is not required to have pre-existed in the mind of the defendant for any de finite
period of time. Id. at (d). Whether a defendant has acted with premeditation is a
question for the jury to determine, and it may be inferred from the manner and
circumstances of the killing. State v. Ge ntry, 881 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1993). The use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim, the declarations of a
defendant of his inte nt to kill, th e inflictio n of m ultiple wounds, the defendant’s prior
relation ship with the victim, and the fact that the killing was particularly crue l are all
factors which the jury may consider in determining whether the murder was
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premeditated. Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 541-4 2; State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660
(Tenn . 1997).
In the light most favorable to the State, there is more than sufficient evidence
that the Defend ant comm itted the first degree m urder of the victim. When
questioned regarding his actions after the victim “disappeared” from their home in
May 1995, only three (3) months prior to her death, the Defen dant state d, “[i]f I
brought the bitch back here, I w ould k ill her.” This declaration by the Defendant of
his intent to kill the victim was made when Defendant was “very serious.” In addition
to this threat to kill the victim, when he did k ill the victim multiple wound s were
inflicted upon her. In add ition to nea rly seventy (70) br uises on he r body , the victim
had numerous broken ribs and her lungs were punctured. Also, she had a large
laceration on her head as a result of a wound admittedly inflicted by the Defe ndant.
In his statement to the police, the Defendant admitted to both hitting and kicking the
victim on mu ltiple occas ions. Th e Defe ndant’s p rior relations hip with the victim was
filled with turmoil, as two witnes ses te stified to the “vo latile” na ture of th eir
relationship. Finally, the jury could have inferred from the circumstances of the
killing that the D efenda nt was p articularly cru el. Medical evidence demonstrated that
the victim’s injuries may have been inflicted up to forty-eight (48) hours prior to her
arrival to the hos pital, following which she had a painful, slow death, described by
Dr. Harlan as a “very tough way to die.” Even the Defendant’s own statement
indicates his cruelty in his actions toward his own wife, in which he describes kicking
and hitting her for having to help her walk and to clean her up although he indicated
he was “nice en ough to clean her up aga in.” The evidence demonstrated that some
of the victim ’s wounds were inflicted nearly two (2) days prior to her death, during
which the Defend ant admittedly be came a ngry with her and beat her repe atedly.
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The Defe ndan t’s actio ns ca used the victim to have difficulty s tandin g, walking,
remaining cons cious, and maintaining control of her bodily functions, yet he
continue d to abu se her.
Defe ndan t’s declarations of his inte nt to kill the victim, th e inflictio n of m ultiple
wounds, the nature of their relationship and th e partic ularly cr uel na ture of h is
conduct are all circumstances from which the jury properly inferred premeditation.
While Defendant may argue to the contrary, there is no evidence that he killed the
victim while suffe ring from a sudd en and uncon trollable rag e. Rath er, he re peate dly
beat, kicked and otherwise abused the victim until her body could no longer
withstand the lethal a buse. T his issue has no merit.
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of
photographs of the victim during her autopsy. He asserts that the photographs’
probative value wa s substa ntially outwe ighed b y the preju dice they c reated. T he trial
court ruled the photographs were admissible with the following explanation:
The issue is whether or not the probative value outweighs the
prejudicial effect that might be incurred as a result of this but
notwithstanding Dr. Harlan’s graphic verbal testimony, I think these
photographs will show to the jury more than can ever be described
verbally by testimo ny of anyo ne and are prob ative to the e xtent that,
according to the defendant over here, she fell and hit her head on a
propane tank, and for that and various reasons, to show the jury what
the injury exactly was to the head and to the rib cage.
The admissibility of photographs falls within the sound disc retion of the trial court,
whose ruling will not be overturned except upon a clear showing of an abuse of
discretion. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 262-63 (Tenn . 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1086, 1 15 S.C t. 743, 13 0 L.Ed.2 d 644 (1 995); State v. Zirkle, 910 S.W.2d 874,
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888 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). A photo must be relevant to an iss ue that the jury
must decide and the probative value of the photograph must outweigh any prejudicial
effect that it may have upon the trier of fact before a photograph may be admitte d
into evidenc e. State v. Auco in, 756 S.W.2d 705, 71 0 (Ten n. Crim. A pp. 198 8), cert.
denied, 489 U .S. 1084 (1989); State .v Braden, 867 S.W.2d 750, 758 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1993 ).
Banks v. State, 564 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn. 1978), sets forth the factors to be
taken into co nside ration in determ ining w hethe r the inh erently prejudicial character
of the photographs outweighs their probative value. These factors are as follows:
(1) their accu racy and clarity; (2) whe ther they w ere take n before the corpse was
moved, if the position and location of the body when found is material; (3) the
inadequacy of testimonial eviden ce in relating the facts to the jury; and (4) the need
for the evidence to establish a prima facie case of guilt or to reb ut the d efend ant’s
conten tions. Id. at 951.
The accuracy an d clarity of these photo s is not contested , but the photos w ere
adm ittedly made after the victim’s body had been moved. Photographs of a corpse
are admissible in murder prosecutions , if they ar e relev ant to is sues on trial,
notwithstanding their gruesome and horrifyin g chara cter. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951.
W hile photographs made during or after an autopsy are often condemned, they are
not rendered inadmissible m erely becaus e they are cumu lative to the testimony at
trial. See Collins v. S tate, 506 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 73); State v.
Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d 530, 542 (Ten n. 1994). Ob viously these pho tos are
relevant to this case due to the issue of wheth er the De fendan t intentiona lly and with
premeditation killed the victim or whether she hit her head on a propane bottle as he
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first stated to the police. The Defendant admitted to kicking the victim, possibly more
than once, and hitting the victim in the head, also perhaps more than once.
Howeve r, the photogra phs dem onstrate that the victim ’s extensive injuries could not
have been caused by only a few punches or kicks. The medical testimony
demonstrated that the force of these blo ws was sufficient to result in a compound
fracture of the victim ’s ribs, caus ing the pu ncture o f her lungs . Admitte dly, these
photos are some what graph ic and grueso me. How ever, this court has p reviously
uphe ld the trial cour t’s decision to allow the admis sion of gruesome autopsy
photographs of the victim when other State’s witnesse s had d escribed the subje cts
of the pho tograph s. State v. Terre nce D avis, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9511-CR-00343,
Shelby Coun ty (Tenn . Crim. A pp., at Jac kson, Ju ne 2, 19 97), perm. to appeal denied
(Tenn . 1998). T his issue is without m erit.
We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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