Opinion

McVay v. Trey

Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed
Feb 7, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

RICHARD THOMAS McVAY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:24-CV-04080-SOH-BAB

OFFICER TREY BAKER, NCDC, in his individual capacity;

OFFICER WILLIAM STRICKLAND, NCDC, in his individual capacity;

LIEUTENANT KAREN GHORMLEY, NCDC, in her individual capacity;

CAPTAIN STEVE OTTWELL, NCDC, in his individual capacity; and

OFFICER PAULA, NCDC, in her individual capacity;

DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF A MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Richard Thomas McVay initiated the above-captioned pro se civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when he was incarcerated in the Nevada County Detention Center

(“NCDC”). See (ECF No. 1). He proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (ECF No. 3).

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), Chief United States District Judge

Susan O. Hickey, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and

Recommendation. This matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this

case and failure to comply with court orders.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action on July 30, 2024. (ECF No. 1). He did not pay filing fee.

Instead, he requested to proceed IFP. (ECF No. 2). Upon initial review of Plaintiff’s IFP

application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP

and ordered him to submit an amended complaint by August 20, 2024. (ECF No. 3). That order

also cautioned Plaintiff that this matter would be subject to dismissal if he failed to update the

court with his change of address within thirty days of any such change. Id.

On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff submitted an Amened Complaint. (ECF No. 6). Upon

preservice review of the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court

recommended that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendants Baker, Ghormley, Ottwell,

Strickland, and Paula in their individual capacities proceed (claim one) and that all other claims

be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (ECF

No. 8). This Court subsequently ordered service of the Amended Complaint on Defendants Baker,

Ghormley, Ottwell, Paula, and Strickland (hereinafter “Defendants”). (ECF No. 9). Chief District

Court Judge Susan O. Hickey later adopted those recommendations without objection. (ECF No.

15).

On October 18, 2024, the Defendants filed their Answer. (ECF No. 13). This Court then

ordered the Defendants to either file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the

Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

by December 23, 2024, or promptly file a notice with the Court advising that they did not intend

to pursue that affirmative defense at trial. (ECF No. 14). The Court stayed discovery pending

resolution of the exhaustion issue. Id.

On December 17, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to

Exhaust Administrative Remedies along with a memorandum and statement of facts, including

four exhibits, in support. (ECF Nos. 16-18). The next day, this Court ordered Plaintiff to respond

to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment by January 8, 2025, failing which this matter would

be subject to dismissal. (ECF No. 19). That Order also included instructions on how to properly

respond to a motion for summary judgment. Id. This Order was not returned as undeliverable.

When that deadline passed without Plaintiff filing a response to the Motion for Summary

Judgment or communicating with the Court in any way, this Court entered an order to show cause

why this matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (ECF No. 20). The show cause

response deadline was January 31, 2025. Id. This Order was also not returned as undeliverable.

The deadline to respond to the Court’s show cause order has now also passed, and Plaintiff has

failed to respond or communicate with the court in any way. Indeed, Plaintiff has not

communicated with the Court since he provided a notice of change of address, over four months

ago.

LEGAL STANDARD

Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a pro se litigant is not excused

from complying with substantive and procedural law. Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir.

1984). The Local Rules state in pertinent part:

It is the duty of any party not represented by counsel to promptly notify the Clerk

and the other parties to the proceedings of any change in his or her address, to

monitor the progress of the case, and to prosecute or defend the action

diligently. . . . If any communication from the Court to a pro se plaintiff is not

responded to within thirty (30) days, the case may be dismissed without prejudice.

Any party proceeding pro se shall be expected to be familiar with and follow the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Local Rule 5.5(c)(2).

Further, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the district court has discretion

to dismiss an action for “failure to prosecute, or to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure or any court order.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Henderson v. Renaissance Grand Hotel,

267 F. App’x 496, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Additionally, a dismissal pursuant to Rule

41(b) operates as an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise specified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b);

Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1986).

In considering a Rule 41(b) dismissal, the Court must balance: (1) “the degree of

[Plaintiff’s] egregious conduct;” (2) the adverse impact of the conduct on the Defendants; and (3)

the Court’s ability to administer justice. Rodgers v. Curators of University of Missouri, 135 F.3d

1216, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). In Rodgers, the Eighth Circuit set forth

the standard the Court must consider before dismissing with prejudice for failure to prosecute:

Dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction and should be used only in cases

of willful disobedience of a court order or . . . persistent failure to prosecute a

complaint. [The Court must consider] . . . whether in the particular circumstances

of the case, the needs of the court in advancing a crowded docket and preserving

respect for the integrity of its internal procedures are sufficient to justify the harsh

consequences of forever denying a litigant of his day in court. However, the

[Court] need not [find] that appellant acted in bad faith, only that he acted

intentionally as opposed to accidentally or involuntarily.

Id.

ANALYSIS

Here, this Court directed Plaintiff to respond to two court orders—the order directing him

to respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 19), and this Court’s Order

to Show Cause, (ECF No. 20)—but Plaintiff has failed to comply. Further, Plaintiff’s mail has not

been returned as undeliverable. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to comply with court orders and has

failed to prosecute this action.

While Defendants certainly expended resources in this litigation, the Court finds that this

matter is still in its early stages. Indeed, this Court issued an order staying in discovery pending

the outcome the exhaustion issue. See (ECF No. 14). Accordingly, this Court recommends that

this matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(b) and Local Rule 5.5(c)(2) for failure to comply with the Court’s Local Rules and Orders and

failure to prosecute this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

(ECF No. 6) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute and failure to

comply with court orders.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

STATUS OF REFERRAL: NO LONGER REFERRED

DATED this 7th day of February 2025.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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