The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
LOUIS HAMLET,
Plaintiff,
v. Case 2:24-cv-02250-SHL-cg
SHELBY COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
_____________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Defendant Shelby County Sheriff’s Office’s (“Defendant” or “SCSO”)
Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Rules 4, 12(b)(4), 12(b)(6), and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) # 12). Pursuant to Administrative Order 2013-05, the
instant motion has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for Report and
Recommendation. For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. Introduction
a. Plaintiff’s Complaint
On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff Louis Hamlet filed a pro se Complaint alleging violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (D.E. #1). Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of gender/sex (male) and
that the discriminatory acts occurred on July 22, 2021. (Compl. ¶ 6 & 7). Plaintiff does not allege
retaliation in this portion of the Complaint form. (Id. ¶ 10). In Paragraph 10 of the pro se
Complaint form, Plaintiff is asked to set forth the facts of his case and notes that the plaintiff may
attach additional sheets as necessary. (Id. ¶ 10). Plaintiff wrote, “Please see document gender
discrimination, Case # 490-2021-01947.” (Id.)
Plaintiff’s first addendum is entitled “Gender Discrimination Case # 490-2021-01947
Facts.” (Id. at PageID 7-8). Plaintiff alleges that he was “subjected to unjust failed inspection for
grooming” in July of 2021 because he wore his hair in braids. (Id. at PageID 7). Plaintiff alleges
that female officers are permitted to wear their hair in braids but that male officers are not allowed
to do so. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this failed inspection made him ineligible for promotion and
prohibited him from working in specialized units. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he filed a hostile work environment complaint with SCSO Human
Resources and with the Shelby County Government’s Equal Opportunity Complaint. (Id.) He
alleges that both refused to investigate his complaints. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he then filed a
Complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and that, afterwards,
he received constant retaliatory harassment from officers and supervisors. (Id.) As one example,
Plaintiff alleges that SCSO Chief Claud Robinson told Plaintiff that he might be fired if he
“pull[ed] a stunt” like braiding his hair again. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that, on April 15, 2023, he again filed a hostile work environment claim
against Sergeant James Raddatz with SCSO’s Human Resources. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Complaint does
not detail his claims against Sergeant Raddatz. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that, following that
complaint, and with knowledge of the pending EEOC complaint, he received a write-up with a
three-day suspension without pay. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that, on that same day, Sergeant Raddatz
threatened him that he would “get days off and taken off the overtime detail permanently.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that these incidents also made him ineligible for promotion and unable to move to
another division in the department. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he filed an EEOC complaint against
the Shelby County Government, Equal Opportunity Compliance, in May of 2023 for failure to
investigate his complaint against Sergeant Raddatz. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that, in August of 2023, SCSO assigned Sergeant Raddatz the duty of
scheduling overtime. (Id. at PageID 8). Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Raddatz removed him from
the prison ward and jail transport detail that he had been working six days per week for a six-
month period. (Id.) Plaintiff estimates that he lost $70,000 in overtime pay as a result of his
removal from this detail. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that, in February of 2024, he filed an amended complaint of retaliation
against Sergeant Raddatz and SCSO. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he has been retaliated against
following this amended charge, including officers and supervisors telling him that Sergeant
Raddatz “has to watch what he says to you because you have a lawsuit against him.” (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that these comments demonstrate that the management is discussing his claims with
everyone in the department. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint then contains a number of exhibits filed as part of the same document.
(See PageID 9 – PageID 63). Certain documents purport to demonstrate that he exhausted his
administrative remedies. (See PageID 9 – PageID 15). The remaining documents are extensive
evidence Plaintiff suggests supports his Complaint, including memoranda, emails, and
photographs. (See PageID 16 (summary of evidence) & PageID 17 – PageID 63).
2. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
On May 10, 2024, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state a claim for gender/sex discrimination and retaliation and fails to state a
claim against the proper defendant such that his Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant alleges that the attachments to his
Complaint should be stricken pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
redundant and/or immaterial. Finally, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has failed to properly serve
it because, while service was effectuated, the Complaint itself (but not the attachments thereto)
was missing. Thus, Defendant argues that service was defective pursuant to Rule 4(c)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(4)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Local Rule 12.1 provides that a “party opposing a motion to dismiss must file a response
within 28 days after the motion is served.” Plaintiff failed to do so. Accordingly, the Court issued
an Order to Show Cause on July 8, 2024 directing Plaintiff to respond “as to why the Court should
not consider the Motion on the record before it and file a Report and Recommendation
recommending that the District Court enter an Order granting the Motion.” (D.E. #14).
On July 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Response to the Order to Show Cause. (D.E. #15).
Plaintiff’s Response does not substantively address the issues presented in Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a claim may be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff can support
a claim “by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). This standard requires more than bare assertions of
legal conclusions. Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001). “[A]
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Any claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . .claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Nonetheless, a complaint must contain sufficient facts “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face’” to survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A plaintiff with no
facts and “armed with nothing more than conclusions” cannot “unlock the doors of discovery.” Id.
at 678-79.
Pleadings and documents filed by pro se litigants are to be “liberally construed,” and a “pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, “the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has
limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d
108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991)). The basic pleading essentials are not abrogated in pro se cases. Wells
v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) A pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Barnett v.
Luttrell, 414 Fed. Appx. 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal
quotations and emphasis omitted). District Courts “have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). District Courts are also
not “required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him. Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 Fed.
Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).
III. Proposed Analysis and Conclusions of Law
The threshold question presented in SCSO’s Motion to Dismiss is whether Plaintiff has
named the proper defendant. SCSO argues that it is not a separate, suable entity apart from Shelby
County and that, as such, the claims against it must be dismissed.
It is well-settled that government departments are not suable entities. Rodney Dotson v.
Fayette Cty. Sheriff Dep’t., 2024 WL 493924, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2024) (citing Johnes v.
Union City, Tennessee, 296 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049
(6th Cir. 1994)). In Dotson, the plaintiff consented to as much and requested that the county
defendant be substituted in place of the sheriff’s department. However, Plaintiff here has neither
responded to SCSO’s argument or requested that Shelby County be named in place of SCSO.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted against SCSO and that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with leave to
amend.1
Signed this 7th day of February 2025.
s/ Charmiane G. Claxton
CHARMIANE G. CLAXTON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ANY OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS TO THIS REPORT MUST BE FILED WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE REPORT. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). FAILURE TO FILE SAID OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR
FORFEITURE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE OBJECTIONS, EXCEPTIONS,
AND ANY FURTHER APPEAL.
1 SCSO raises additional arguments in its Motion to Dismiss that it may contend warrants dismissal of this
case without leave to amend. Namely, SCSO argues that Plaintiff failed to set forth any factual basis for his
Complaint and that the Court should not be required to search through fifty-six pages of documents to
attempt to determine the factual basis for Plaintiff’s Complaint. (See Mot. to Dismiss at PageID 80-84).
Upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint and exhibits, when asked to state the factual basis of his claims,
Plaintiff clearly wrote the following in the space provided under Paragraph 10: “Please see document
Gender Discrimination Case # 490-2021-01947.” (Compl. ¶ 10). Plaintiff’s first exhibit is titled “Gender
Discrimination Case # 490-2021-01947 Facts,” and it contains a concise two-page summary of his factual
allegations. (See Compl. at PageID 7-8). Thus, the Court does not consider Plaintiff’s Complaint to require
a “exploratory expedition through the dozens of pages of documents . . . to piece together his cause of
action.” (See Mot. to Dismiss at PageID 80). Further, while Defendant argues that Plaintiff “makes no
allegation of lowered pay, demotion, or suspension or any other adverse action,” (Mot. to Dismiss at PageID
82), Plaintiff does make such allegations in his brief summary of the facts. Accordingly, the Court does
not find this argument to be a persuasive reason to prevent Plaintiff from having leave to amend his
Complaint to name the proper party.