The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JESSE HELMS,
Case No. 24–cv–07857–ESK–MJS
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
ANTHONY DEGNER, et. al,
Defendants.
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on pro se plaintiff Jesse Helms’s
civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint). (ECF
No. 1.) Because plaintiff has been granted in forma pauperis status, I must
review the Complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous
or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the following reasons, I will dismiss the Complaint
without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, a convicted and sentenced state prisoner, was confined in South
Woods State Prison (South Woods) when he filed the Complaint. (ECF No. 1
p. 4; ECF No. 8.) He seeks relief from New Jersey Department of Corrections
Commissioner Victoria Kuhn for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. (Id. p. 2.)1 According to plaintiff, there was no privacy when
1 Plaintiff stated he wanted to dismiss the claims against South Woods
Administrator Anthony Degner in a letter to the Court dated February 25, 2025. (ECF
No. 8.) Therefore, I will only review plaintiff’s allegations against Kuhn.
prisoners used the cell toilets in South Woods. (Id. p. 5.) He further alleges
that the lights were kept on all day. (Id.) He asks for punitive damages and
injunctive relief requiring South Woods to turn off the lights and provide a
privacy barrier in cells. (Id.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to sua sponte
screen a civil complaint filed by a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis for
cognizable claims and to dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
To survive a sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, a complaint
must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the plaintiff’s claims are
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v.
Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
“The Court must accept all facts in the complaint as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in the prisoner’s favor, and ask only whether the
complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.” Durham v.
Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2023). Moreover, “[c]omplaints filed pro se
should be construed liberally and held to ‘less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam))).
III. DISCUSSION
Supervisory officers like Kuhns “may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “Individual defendants
who are policymakers may be liable under § 1983 if it is shown that such
defendants, ‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the]
constitutional harm.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr.,
372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist.,
882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)) (alteration in original).
Plaintiff alleges that Kuhn’s custom of having no privacy barriers in the
cells and continuous lighting violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (ECF No.
1 p. 5.) “The Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ but neither
does it permit inhumane ones and it is now settled that ‘the treatment a
prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981);
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). “The Eighth Amendment
imposes duties on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement’
and ‘ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care.’” Barndt v. Wenerowicz, 698 F. App’x 673, 676–77 (3d Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). To allege an Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim, plaintiff must provide facts showing “that (1)
the deprivation alleged was objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’ such that the
prison officials’ acts or omissions resulted in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities’; and (2) that the prison officials exhibited a
‘deliberate indifference’ to his health and safely.” Id. at 677 (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834).
Here, the alleged deprivations fail to state a claim of constitutional
magnitude. “Plaintiff’s inability to maintain the highest manners possible (or
his embarrassment ensuing from having another person in the cell while
[p]laintiff uses the toilet) cannot qualify as a violation of [p]laintiff’s
constitutional rights.” Junne v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., No. 07–cv–05262, 2008 WL
343557, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2008). “The need to have a toilet in the cell
appears to be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective (i.e.,
having detainees able to use the toilet at any time the detainees might wish to
do so, without the need for constant escort to public bathrooms).” Id.
Requiring prisons to install privacy barriers may also negatively impact
security measures by limiting guards’ ability to see the entirety of the cell. In
the absence of facts suggesting the lack of a private toilet caused anything other
than embarrassment, plaintiff has not alleged that he was deprived of the
minimal of life’s necessities. Therefore, I will dismiss this claim without
prejudice.
Plaintiff also has not pled facts that would allow me to reasonably infer
that the custom of having continuous lighting violated his Eighth Amendment
rights. Plaintiff alleges he was unable to sleep and developed headaches from
the lighting, but there are no facts that plausibly suggest Kuhn was deliberately
indifferent to the effects of the lighting. “Deliberate indifference requires
significantly more than negligence.” Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972
F.3d 310, 329 (3d Cir. 2020). “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under
the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
[s]he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994). There are no facts in the Complaint that plausibly suggest Kuhn knew
of the risk posed by the lights and disregarded that risk. Therefore, I will
dismiss this claim without prejudice.
Finally, plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are moot because he has
been released from South Woods. (ECF No. 8.) “[A] prisoner lacks standing
to seek injunctive relief if he is no longer subject to the alleged conditions he
attempts to challenge.” Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981). I
will dismiss the injunctive relief requests with prejudice.
Generally, “[a] plaintiff[ ] who file[s a] complaint[ ] subject to dismissal
under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d
Cir. 2002). It is possible that plaintiff may be able to state a claim by providing
more information about the conditions of his confinement, so I will grant
plaintiff 45 days to submit a proposed amended complaint. The proposed
amended complaint will be subject to my § 1915 review prior to service.
Failure to submit a proposed amended complaint within 45 days of the
accompanying order will convert the order into a dismissal of all claims with
prejudice without further action by the Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I will dismiss the Complaint without
prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The injunctive relief requests are
dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff may submit a proposed amended
complaint within 45 days. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 6, 2025