Sheets v. Prummell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ANDREW BRYANT SHEETS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:24-cv-943-SPC-NPM

SHERIFF BILL PRUMMELL and

DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER SCOTT

WILLIAMS, in their individual and

official capacities;

Defendants.

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Sheriff Bill Prummell and Deputy Christopher

Scott Williams’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) and Plaintiff Andrew Bryant

Sheets’ Response (Doc. 34). For the below reasons, the Court grants the motion

in part.

Background

Plaintiff, proceeding without a lawyer, brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (Doc. 15). In his amended complaint, he alleges as follows.1 On

October 20, 2020, he visited the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office to file an

1 The Court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[es] them in the

light most favorable to” Plaintiff. Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th

Cir. 2009).

internal affairs complaint while wearing a body camera. (Doc. 15 ¶¶ 10–12).

His complaint included allegations that Sheriff Prummell had an extra-marital

affair and that a SWAT team doctor was illegally distributing steroids. (Id. ¶

12). After requesting to speak with someone from the internal affairs

department, Plaintiff was met by Deputy Williams, who issued him a trespass

warning. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 15). Plaintiff incessantly asked Deputy Williams the

reason for the trespass warning, but Deputy Williams did not provide one. (Id.

¶¶ 15–17). Deputy Williams warned Plaintiff that failure to exit the building

would result in his arrest. (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff then exited the building. (Id.

¶ 19).

The trespass warning cites Florida Statute § 810.09 as the reason for the

issuance, includes prohibitions from visiting multiple Charlotte County

Sheriff’s Office locations for one year, and does not provide notice of the

availability of an appeals process. (Doc. 15-1). A local news station released a

statement from Sheriff Prummell saying that Plaintiff had “on a repeated basis

. . . come into the various sheriff’s office locations and berated, belittled, and

cursed at [his] staff.” (Doc. 15 ¶ 27). He stated that he sought to “protect [his]

staff from [Plaintiff’s] constant abuse.” (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges other incidents of “viewpoint discrimination,” including

a 2018 Facebook incident where the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office hid his

comments on their post. (Id. ¶ 30). Other allegations include a May 25, 2021,

incident where he was “[k]icked off the sidewalk during a 1st Amendment

protest” and a November 14, 2022, incident where he was trespassed while

directing profane and aggressive language toward a Charlotte County Sheriff’s

Office employee. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 34, 35).

Plaintiff sues Sheriff Prummell and Deputy Williams in their individual

and official capacities under various § 1983 theories. In Claim One, Plaintiff

alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated through viewpoint

discrimination. (Id. at 11). In Claim Two, he alleges that the trespass warning

issued by Deputy Williams was retaliation for exercising his First Amendment

rights. (Id. at 11–12). Claim Three is a Monell claim for failure to train. (Id.

at 12). Claim Four is a Monell claim for violation of procedural due process.

(Id. at 13). And in Claim Five, Plaintiff alleges that the trespass warning was

a prior restraint violating the First Amendment. (Id. at 14). Defendants move

to dismiss. (Doc. 22 at 2–3).

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547

(2007)). If courts can draw reasonable inferences of a defendant’s liability from

the facts pled, then the claim is “facially plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

“[L]abels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action” are simply not enough. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Analysis

The Court starts with the claims against Deputy Williams. Defendants

argue that the claims against Deputy Williams in his official capacity are

effectively claims against the governmental entity and should be dismissed

because they are duplicative of the claims against Sheriff Prummell. (Doc. 22

at 5). “[W]hen an officer is sued under Section 1983 in his or her official

capacity, the suit is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity

of which an officer is an agent.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776

(11th Cir. 1991). Also of note, “a municipality cannot be held liable under

§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory[,] rather they are only liable “when

execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury[.] Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978). Claims

One, Two, and Five against Deputy Williams in his official capacity are thus

dismissed, as the proper vehicle for those claims is a Monell claim—two of

which have already been pled.

Defendants argue the Court should dismiss the individual-capacity

claims against Deputy Williams as well. They raise the same two arguments

against both Plaintiff’s viewpoint-discrimination and retaliation claims, so the

Court addresses them together.

“A restriction on speech constitutes viewpoint discrimination ‘when the

specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the

rationale for the restriction.’” Jackson v. McCurry, 762 F. App’x 919, 930 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Vir., 515 U.S.

819, 829 (1995)). A restriction on speech in a sheriff’s office lobby “must be

viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”

Hoffman v. Delgado, No. 23-13213, 2025 WL 25856, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 3,

2025). To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, on the other hand,

Plaintiff “must establish first, that his speech or act was constitutionally

protected; second, that the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected

the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the

retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423

F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005).

Defendants argue that both the viewpoint-discrimination and retaliation

claims fail because (1) Deputy Williams issued Plaintiff the trespass warning

based on several incidents of harassment at the Sheriff’s Office, not his internal

affairs complaint; and (2) Plaintiff can still submit complaints by email, phone,

and mail. (Doc. 22 at 11–13).2

2 Defendants’ argument about past incidents of harassment goes to Williams’ rationale for

issuing the trespass warning and the causal connection between the trespass warning and

Plaintiff’s internal affairs complaint. (Doc. 22 at 11–13). Defendants’ argument about other

ways to submit complaints goes to whether the trespass warning adversely affected Plaintiff’s

speech. (Id. at 13). Defendants do not assert any arguments about whether (1) Plaintiff’s

The first argument fails. Reading the amended complaint in light most

favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must at this stage, he has plausibly alleged

that Deputy Williams issued the trespass warning because of his internal

affairs complaint, not other incidents of harassment. Plaintiff alleges that he

politely requested to speak with someone from the internal affairs department.

(Doc. 15 ¶ 26). Then Deputy Williams issued him a trespass warning because

he did not agree with his viewpoint (that is, the critical nature of the internal

affairs complaint). (Id. ¶¶ 26, 41, 42). Deputy Williams baldly cites Florida

Statute § 810.09 on the trespass warning, providing no rationale for the

warning. (Doc. 15-1). Plaintiff does not allege that any intervening events

occurred between him requesting to speak to internal affairs and Deputy

Williams issuing the trespass warning. Given the sequence of events and lack

of explanation for the trespass warning, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

allegations support a reasonable inference that Deputy Williams issued the

trespass warning because of and in retaliation against Plaintiff’s viewpoint.

internal affairs complaint was constitutionally protected speech, (2) Plaintiff has alleged a

viewpoint rather than merely the content of his speech, or (3) the trespass warning was

reasonable.

The Court finds the internal affairs complaint is protected speech. See Bailey v. Wheeler, 843

F.3d 473, 486 (11th Cir. 2016) (written complaint about inappropriate officer conduct was

protected speech). The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged a viewpoint (a viewpoint critical

to the Sheriff and SWAT team doctor). And, as alleged, the trespass warning was not

reasonable in light of the purpose served by the Sheriff’s office lobby. See Moms for Liberty -

Brevard Cnty., FL v. Brevard Pub. Sch., 118 F.4th 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2024) (“prohibited

speech must be naturally incompatible with the purposes of the forum”) (quotation omitted).

Defendants’ second argument also fails. Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s rights were not adversely affected because he can still submit

complaints by email, phone, and mail. (Doc. 22 at 11–13). But their argument

on this point is insufficient. They point to caselaw for the general proposition

that Plaintiff’s rights are adversely affected only if the defendant’s conduct

“would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First

Amendment rights.” Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1254. But they provide no authority

suggesting that the availability of other methods to submit a complaint defeats

his claims. (Doc. 22 at 13). So Defendants fail to meet their burden.

In short, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated viewpoint discrimination and

retaliation claims in Claims One and Two of his amended complaint.

Defendants also argue that Deputy Williams is entitled to qualified

immunity. (Id. at 9). “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “In order

to receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that he was

acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly

wrongful acts occurred.” Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1054 (11th Cir.

2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “When a court

concludes the defendant was engaged in a discretionary function, ‘the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified

immunity.’” Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 978 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Defendants argue Deputy Williams was acting within the scope of his

discretionary authority when he issued the trespass warning. (Doc. 22 at 9).

Plaintiff does not dispute this. (See generally Doc. 34). The Court finds that

Deputy Williams was acting in his discretionary authority. See Patrick v.

McGuire, No. 8:24-CV-999-MSS-NHA, 2024 WL 4803217, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov.

15, 2024) (officer acted within her discretionary authority when she told the

plaintiff to leave a government office because of the office’s policy against video

recording). So the burden shifts to Plaintiff.

As to Plaintiff’s viewpoint-discrimination and retaliation claims, he has

met his burden to show that Deputy Williams is not entitled to qualified

immunity, at least at this stage. Among other ways, a plaintiff may show that

a right was clearly established by pointing to a “broader, clearly established

principle that should control the novel facts of his situation.” Garcia v. Casey,

75 F.4th 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Plaintiff appears to take

this approach. (Doc. 34 at 4) (quoting Moms for Liberty, 118 F.4th at 1332).

The Court agrees that broad principles from Eleventh Circuit caselaw

clearly establish that Deputy Williams’ conduct—alleged as viewpoint

discrimination and retaliation—was unlawful. See, e.g., Jarrard v. Sheriff of

Polk Cnty., 115 F.4th 1306, 1325 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he law is clearly

established that the state cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination—that is,

the government cannot discriminate in access to the forum on the basis of the

government’s opposition to the speaker’s viewpoint.”); Bennett, 423 F.3d at

1256 (“[I]t is ‘settled law’ that the government may not retaliate against

citizens for the exercise of First Amendment rights[.]”). This Court has already

found a clearly established constitutional violation in a similar case involving

a trespass warning in retaliation to a complaint. See Harris v. Rambosk, No.

2:18-CV-17-FTM-29MRM, 2018 WL 5085721, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2018)

(citing Bailey, 843 F.3d at 485; Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1255–56). Claims One and

Two against Deputy Williams in his individual capacity survive.

Plaintiff has not met his burden with respect to Claim Five, his prior-

restraint claim against Deputy Williams. For this claim, Plaintiff also relies

on broad principles, rather than caselaw with analogous facts. (Doc. 34 at 6–

7). But he provides only two bare caselaw quotes, without explaining how

these prior-restraint cases apply. (Id.). For this reason alone, Plaintiff has

failed to meet his burden, and qualified immunity defeats this claim. See

Carruth, 942 F.3d at 1062 (affirming a dismissal on qualified immunity

grounds because the plaintiff “failed to offer any argument” on qualified

immunity and thus did not meet his burden).

The lack of argument is particularly problematic because whether the

trespass warning was an unlawful prior restraint is unclear. “Prior restraints

contrast with subsequent punishments, which regulate a given type of speech

by penalizing the speech only after it occurs.” Barrett v. Walker Cnty. Sch.

Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).

Supreme Court “decisions have steadfastly preserved the distinction between

prior restraints and subsequent punishments.” Alexander v. United States,

509 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1993). The distinction “is critical to [the Supreme

Court’s] First Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 554. As alleged, the trespass

warning issued here was a subsequent punishment for Plaintiff’s speech.

Whether it was also a prior restraint due to its prospective one-year ban is

anything but clearly established.

“[C]lassic examples” of a prior restraint include permitting and licensing

ordinances. Barrett, 872 F.3d at 1223. A court-ordered injunction forbidding

speech can also be a prior restraint. Id. The trespass warning here is none of

these things. And Courts have considered cases involving similar one-year

trespass warnings and found no prior restraint. See, e.g., Sheets v. City of

Punta Gorda, Fla., 415 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1126 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (holding that

an ordinance prohibiting recording was not a prior restraint either facially or

as applied to the plaintiff, even though enforcement of the ordinance resulted

in a one-year trespass warning).

The only Eleventh Circuit opinion suggesting that a one-year trespass

warning could be a prior restraint is Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla., 833

F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2016). But there, the court found the trespass

warning was not a prior restraint because it “allowed [the plaintiff] to continue

his expressive activities in other public areas” and “was not imposed on the

basis of an advance determination that [the plaintiff’s] expressive conduct was

prohibited[.]” Id. at 1299 n.5 (citation omitted). Critical to that case, the

trespass warning “had nothing to do with any expressive conduct at all,” as it

was issued because the plaintiff obstructed a police investigation and resisted

arrest. Id.

This case is like Wright in some respects and different in others. On one

hand, Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Williams issued the trespass warning

because of his expressive conduct, making his claim stronger than the claim in

Wright. On the other hand, like Wright, Plaintiff does not allege that Deputy

Williams issued the trespass warning based on an advance determination that

Plaintiff’s future speech at the Sheriff’s property would be prohibited. Nor can

he. Plaintiff emphasizes that the trespass warning provided no rationale at

all. The only reasonable inference supported by Plaintiff’s allegations is that

Deputy Williams issued the trespass warning because of Plaintiff’s past

speech—his attempt to submit an internal affairs complaint just moments

earlier. And the extent to which Plaintiff can continue his expressive activities

in other public areas is unclear. He was banned from several Sheriff’s

properties for a year, although Defendants assert that he may submit

complaints by other means. Given these competing considerations, how

Wright’s holding may apply here is unclear. In other words, Wright did not

clearly establish that the trespass warning issued here is a prior restraint.

In any event, Plaintiff does not cite Wright or explain how any other

prior-restraint authorities apply. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden.

Given this failure and having reviewed the caselaw, the Court cannot say that

the issuance of the trespass warning—framed as a prior restraint—violated

clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known. As a result, qualified immunity shields Deputy Williams from

that claim. The Court dismisses Claim Five.

Next, the Court addresses the claims against Sheriff Prummell. In

Claim Three, Plaintiff brings a Monell claim asserting that Sheriff Prummell

“through [his] procedure, policies, practices, and customs” has violated

Plaintiff’s rights through his “indifference and a failure to train” his employees

properly on viewpoint discrimination. (Doc. 15 ¶¶ 56, 57). “To impose Monell

liability, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated;

(2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate

indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom

caused the violation.” Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1333

(11th Cir. 2021) (internal citation omitted). “In limited circumstances, a local

government’s decision not to train certain employees to avoid violating citizens’

rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of

§ 1983.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1328 (11th

Cir. 2015) (cleaned up and internal citation omitted). “A pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to

demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Plaintiff “must present some evidence

that the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular

area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action.”

Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff’s claim falls short.

Plaintiff fails to allege that Sheriff Prummell was on notice of his

employees’ viewpoint discrimination and deliberately chose not to act. Not

only that, but Plaintiff’s allegations of a pattern of conduct are insufficient.

Plaintiff includes three instances in which he believes the Charlotte County

Sheriff’s Office discriminated against him because of his viewpoint. One

instance was on Facebook where his comments were hidden on a Charlotte

County Sheriff’s Office post. (Doc. 15 ¶ 30). Another occurred on May 25, 2021,

when Plaintiff was “[k]icked off the sidewalk during a 1st Amendment

protest[.]” (Id. ¶ 31). And the final instance was on November 14, 2022, when

Plaintiff was trespassed while directing profane and aggressive language

toward a Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office employee filing an internal affairs

complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 35). The only instance that provides enough facts for

the Court to even consider that viewpoint discrimination occurred is the

Facebook incident where Plaintiff embeds a screenshot of his comments.

(Id. ¶ 30). The others provide no context regarding Plaintiff’s speech or

viewpoint. (Id. ¶ 31–35). Even if the Facebook incident was viewpoint

discrimination, once instance alone does not create a pattern. Thus, the Court

dismisses Claim Three.

Claim Four against Sheriff Prummell is another Monell claim brought

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantees of procedural due

process.3 (Doc. 15 at 13). Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Prummell had a “policy

of allowing its employees to trespass Andrew Sheets for First [A]mendment

activities” and a policy of issuing trespass warnings that “provide[] no

procedural means” for a recipient “to challenge the warning[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 65, 67–

69).

Defendants argue the Court should dismiss this claim because a “single

trespass warning” is not enough to sustain a claim for an alleged

3 Plaintiff cannot bring this claim under the Fifth Amendment because he is not challenging

the actions of the federal government. See Buxton v. City of Plant City, Fla., 871 F.2d 1037,

1041 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution restrains the

federal government, and the fourteenth amendment, section 1, restrains the states, from

depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”).

unconstitutional policy or practice. (Doc. 22 at 19). Plaintiff responds by

pointing out that he cites two trespass warnings in his amended complaint—

the 2020 trespass warning after entering the Sheriff’s office and a similar 2022

incident. (Doc. 15 ¶ 34; Doc. 15-1). Plaintiff does not allege whether the 2022

trespass warning (or any trespass warning other than the 2020 warning)

provided the recipient with a procedural means to challenge the warning.

Plaintiff also broadly alleges that Sheriff Prummell “uses trespass warnings”

to stop his speech and has trespassed Plaintiff “multiple times.” (Doc. 15

¶¶ 62–63). But Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, coupled with only two

examples, are insufficient to establish a policy or practice. See Wakefield v.

City of Pembroke Pines, 269 F. App’x 936, 940 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Two incidents,

occurring approximately thirteen months apart, are insufficient to establish a

custom.”). Thus, the Court dismisses Claim Four.

Finally, Defendants also contend that the individual-capacity claims

against Sheriff Prummell should be dismissed because he did not have any

participation in the allegedly unlawful conduct. (Doc. 22 at 6). The only claims

brought against Sheriff Prummell in his individual capacity are Monell claims

(Claims Three and Four). Since “Monell claims do not apply to claims against

individuals[,]” Claims Three and Four are dismissed against Sheriff Prummell

in his individual capacity. Fountain v. City of Lakeland, No. 8:11-CV-52-T-

17TBM, 2011 WL 3703454, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2011); Wilcox v. Andalusia

City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 660 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1184 (M.D. Ala. 2023) (finding

that a Monell claim is not cognizable against an official in their individual

capacity).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part.

1. Claims One and Two are DISMISSED with prejudice against

Deputy Williams in his official capacity only.

2. Claims Three and Four are DISMISSED with prejudice against

Sheriff Prummell in his individual capacity only.

3. Claims Three and Four are DISMISSED without prejudice

against Sheriff Prummell in his official capacity with leave to

Amend.

4. Claim Five is DISMISSED with prejudice.

5. On or before March 19, 2025, Plaintiff may file a second-

amended complaint to address the Court’s holdings as to Claims

Three and Four against Sheriff Prummell in his official capacity.

Failure to do so will cause the Court to deem those claims

abandoned.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 5, 2025.

, Lh platralh< 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record

17