Reaux v. Laporte

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

STEVEN REAUX CASE NO. 6:25-CV-00084 SEC P

VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS

SAMMY LAPORTE, ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE AYO

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by

Plaintiff Steven Reaux, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this matter. Reaux

is currently in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections and is incarcerated at

the Vermilion Parish Jail. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review,

report, and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of

this court.

I. BACKGROUND

Reaux complains of the conditions of his confinement at the Vermilion Parish Jail.

Specifically, he contends that there are no adequate inspections of the cleaning processes at

the jail. Rec. Doc. 1, p.3. He alleges that there is mold despite the cleaning efforts of inmates,

that inmates are given cleaning chemicals without proper materials such as scrubbing pads

or towels, and that maintenance fails to properly clean the vents or sinks. Id. He also

contends that the administration continues to be indifferent to his “norm of philosophical

needs” by only allowing him to eat and drink out of an 8-ounce disposable cup. Id. Finally,

he complains that he is housed with individuals “of a different class that suffers [sic] with

mental disorders.” Id. at p. 4.

He asks for “adequate cleaning in the jail,” and $20,000.00 for pain and suffering. Id.

at p. 5.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Frivolity Review

Reaux has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter.

Accordingly, his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which

provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint or any portion thereof if the court

determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Gonzalez v. Wyatt,

157 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1998). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted if it is clear the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that

would entitle him to relief. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998).

When determining whether a complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true. Horton v. Cockrell,

70 F.3d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 1995) (frivolity); Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d at 1025 (failure to

state a claim).

B. Section 1983

Federal law provides a cause of action against any person who, under the color of law,

acts to deprive another person of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, in order to hold the

defendants liable, a plaintiff must allege facts to show (1) that a constitutional right has been

violated and (2) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color

of state law; that is, that the defendant was a state actor. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988).

C. Conditions of Confinement

Regardless of whether Reaux is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner, the

standard of liability is the same for episodic acts or omissions of jail officials of the type

alleged in this case. McCarty v. Zapata County, 243 F. App’x 792, (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Gibbs

v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 547 (5th Cir.2001); Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 636 (5th

Cir.1996)); Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir.1999). In Hare, the

Fifth Circuit held

(1) that the State owes the same duty under the Due Process Clause and the

Eighth Amendment to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates

with basic human needs, including medical care and protection from harm,

during their confinement; and (2) that a state jail official’s liability for episodic

acts or omissions cannot attach unless the official had subjective knowledge of

a substantial risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with

deliberate indifference to that risk.

74 F.3d at 650.

Nothing in the complaint before this Court leads to an inference that the conditions

Reaux describes are the result of a prison official’s act either “implement[ing] a rule or

restriction or otherwise demonstrat[ing] the existence of an identifiable intended condition

or practice” or that the “official’s acts or omissions were sufficiently extended or pervasive, or

otherwise typical of extended or pervasive misconduct by other officials, to prove an intended

condition or practice.” Id. at 645. Thus, the complained-of harm is a particular act or omission

of one or more officials, and the deliberate indifference standard enunciated in Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), applies. Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d at 526; Tamez v.

Manthey, 2009 WL 4324808, at *4 (5th Cir. 2009).

Applying this standard, Reaux’s allegations do not rise to the level of constitutional

violations. Two requirements must be met before Section 1983 liability will arise for

constitutional violations relating to conditions of confinement of the type Reaux described.

First, the alleged deprivation must objectively be “sufficiently serious,” which means

that “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial

risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). To rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, the conditions must be “‘so serious as to deprive [plaintiff] of the

minimal measure of life's necessities,’ in this case the basic human need for sanitary

conditions.” Alexander v. Tippah County, 351 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Woods v.

Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir.1995)).

Second, the inmate must show that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to

inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. A prison official cannot be held liable

“unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837

(emphasis added). The Supreme Court has held that “‘deliberate indifference’ is a stringent

standard of fault, requiring proof at a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious

consequence of his action.” Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th

Cir.1997) (quoting Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410

(1997). The “deliberate indifference” standard permits courts to separate omissions that

“amount to an intentional choice” from those that are merely “unintentionally negligent

oversight[s].” Id. (citing Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 756 (5th Cir. 1993)

“‘Subjective recklessness,’ as used in the criminal law, is the appropriate test for deliberate

indifference.” Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 838–40).

Reaux’s allegations meet neither of these two requirements. The conditions he

describes, while not comfortable or pleasant, do not rise to a level of seriousness constituting

a constitutional violation. Reaux does not allege that he has suffered a serious physical injury

or illness as a result of the allegedly unsanitary conditions. Thus, he alleges no serious harm

or risk of serious harm in the constitutional sense, and the court can perceive none under the

circumstances described in the complaint.

Short-term sanitation problems, although admittedly unpleasant, do not amount to

constitutional violations. Whitnack v. Douglas Cty., 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994); Knop v.

Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1013 (6th Cir. 1992); Robinson v. Illinois State Corr. Ctr., 890 F. Supp.

715, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1995). “[J]ails must provide only reasonably adequate hygiene and

sanitation conditions.” Burton v. Cameron County, 884 F. Supp. 234, 241 (S.D. Tex. 1995)

(citing Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 1986)); accord Benshoof v. Layton, 2009

WL 3438004, at *4 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009); Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 342 (5th Cir. 2004).

Serving time in prison “is not a guarantee that one will be safe from life’s occasional

inconveniences.” Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1982). Courts have

repeatedly held “that the Constitution does not mandate prisons with comfortable

surroundings or commodious conditions.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F .3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998)

(citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)); accord Hernandez v. Velasquez. 522

F.3d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 2008).

Reaux’s allegations about mold, dirty conditions and disposable dishes fail to establish

constitutional violations. See Davis, 157 F.3d at 1006 (no constitutional injury when plaintiff

was confined in “filthy” cell) (citing Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1996) (no

constitutional violation when prisoner was exposed for four days to raw sewage from

overflowed toilet in his cell)); Davis v. St. Charles Parish Corr. Ctr., 2010 WL 890980, at *9

(E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2010) (citing Talib, 138 F.3d at 215); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849

n.5 (5th Cir. 1989)) (holding that inmate who complained of “unsanitary practice[s],”

including inadequate ventilation, unsanitary water fountains, 52 inmates using one ice

cooler, restroom four feet from the dining area, toilets leaking water and unsanitized living

quarters, failed to state a claim and noting, “Simply because [plaintiff's] dorm is less sanitary

than he would like does not render the conditions unconstitutional.”).

D. Classification of Prisoners

Reaux also complains that the defendants have violated his constitutional rights by

housing him with prisoners who suffer from mental illness. He alleges that this housing

situation has caused him “trauma and sleep deprivation.” Rec. Doc. 1, p. 4. As discussed

above, the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons and “to the extent that such

conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders

pay for their offenses against society.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Although Reaux references

emotional and mental distress because of his housing assignment, there is no constitutional

right to a stress-free environment while incarcerated. See Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 84 (5th

Cir. 1987). Reaux’s claim that his housing classification is unconstitutional is frivolous.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Steven Reaux’s civil rights complaint be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) business days from service of this

report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A

party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served

with a copy of any objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed

legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within ten (10) days following

the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar

an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions

accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 5th day of February, 2025.

United States Magistrate Judge