“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)
How later courts described this case
- “dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
QUEEN CHARLOTTE FRANKLIN, Case No. 1:25-cv-59
Plaintiff, Hopkins, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.
BUTLER COUNTY COURTS, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On February 5, 2025, Plaintiff Queen Charlotte Franklin moved for leave to file the
above-captioned complaint in this Court in forma pauperis, or without payment of fees.
(Doc. 1). Plaintiff previously filed a copy of the proposed complaint. (Doc. 1).
I. General Screening Authority
By separate Order issued this date, Plaintiff has been conditionally granted leave
to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. As a result, the complaint is
now before the Court for a sua sponte review to determine whether the complaint, or any
portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31
(1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous
when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d
1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is
immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does
not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
Congress has also authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints which fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Although a plaintiff’s pro se complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” the complaint must “give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(internal citation and quotation omitted)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and
Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.
II. Analysis of Complaint
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that between Plaintiff’s first pro se
appearance in this Court on December 30, 2022 and the end of 2024, this Court
dismissed (or recommended the dismissal of) at least four complaints filed by Plaintiff as
frivolous under applicable screening standards. See e.g., Franklin v. U.C. Drake Hospital,
No. 1:24-cv-611-JPH-KLL (case dismissed, appeal pending); Franklin v. Hamilton County
Sheriffe, No. 1:24-cv-610-DRC-SKB (R&R recommending dismissal pending before
presiding district judge); Franklin v. Dieffenbach, No. 1:24-cv-524-JPH-SKB (case
dismissed by this Court, in forma pauperis denied, but ruling on in forma pauperis status
pending in Sixth Circuit); Franklin-Samuels v. Soc. Sec. Admin., et al., No. 1:22-cv-775-
MWM-KLL (case dismissed, motion to reopen denied, no appeal filed).
Recently, Plaintiff has picked of the pace of her filings. Between January 31, 2025
and February 11, 2025, Plaintiff initiated twenty new cases. In each case, she seeks to
file in forma pauperis, or without payment of fees. See, e.g., Case Nos. 1:25-cv-41-DRC-
SKB, 1:25-cv-42-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-44-MRB-SKB, 1:25-cv-48-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-49-
MRB-KLL, 1:25-cv-51-JPH-SKB, 1:25-cv-52-DRC-SKB, 1:25-cv-58-SJD-SKB, 1:25-cv-
60-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-65-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-77-MRB-SKB, 1:25-cv-78-DRC-KLL, 1:25-
cv-79-MWM-KLL, 1:25-cv-80-JPH-KLL, 1:25-cv-82-MWM-KLL, 1:25-cv-83-SJD-KLL,
1:25-cv-86-SJD-SKB, 1:25-cv-87-JPH-KLL, 1:25-cv-88-JPH-SKB. The undersigned is
working diligently to review and screen all cases that have been randomly assigned to
her. Each case is unique and must be addressed on its unique facts. But in every case
reviewed to date, the undersigned has determined that Plaintiff’s complaints either fail to
assert facts sufficient to support the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction and/or
fail to state any cognizable claim. Therefore, the number of cases filed by Plaintiff that
have been deemed to be subject to sua sponte dismissal as frivolous continues to grow.
In the above-captioned case, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
indicates that she receives $1,793 in retirement income on a monthly basis, as well as
$1,248 in earned income, yet she owes a single creditor only $300 with no other debts.
(Doc. 1, PageID 2-3). Given that report and evidence that she paid a $605 filing fee in
another case on January 31, 2025, 1 it is unclear whether Plaintiff actually qualifies to
proceed in forma pauperis. But absent further information, the undersigned has
conditionally granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed without payment of a filing fee.
Under the referenced screening standards, however, the undersigned recommends that
Plaintiff’s lawsuit be dismissed for failure to state any plausible claim.
This Court routinely warns pro se litigants who file multiple cases that are deemed
to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 screening standards that continuing the same
course of conduct may result in the imposition of pre-filing sanctions and/or a declaration
that their filings are “vexatious.” Despite the prior dismissal of multiple frivolous lawsuits
and Plaintiff’s recent initiation of twenty new lawsuits, the undersigned acknowledges that
Plaintiff was only recently warned that she could be deemed to be “vexatious.” Part of the
reason for the delay in issuing that warning is because Plaintiff’s use of different first and
1On January 31, Plaintiff paid an appellate filing fee of $605 in order to pursue her appeal of this Court’s
dismissal of Case No. 1:24-cv-611-JPH-KLL.(Id., Doc. 15).
last names made it more difficult for this Court to track her cases.2 In addition, although
Plaintiff tenders her complaints on a form that is commonly used by pro se litigants, she
routinely leaves blank a section of the form that specifically asks her to list her previous
cases, including “the case number and caption” of each lawsuit in which she previously
appeared. (See Doc. 1-1, PageID 7). The referenced query is designed to assist the Court
in more readily identifying duplicitous lawsuits and/or vexatious litigants. By leaving the
question blank, Plaintiff falsely implies that she has filed none. (See id.)
Turning to the complaint filed in this case, Plaintiff names the following Defendants
(1) Butler County Courts; (2) Dr. Wendy; (3) Probate Officer Nick S. (4) Big O Tire and (5)
Dr. Melinda Newman. She has checked every possible box on the form to assert subject
matter jurisdiction, indicating both that she is filing a civil rights lawsuit that arises under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that
she is also invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). In the
“Statement of Claim” section, Plaintiff appears to assert that she was held hostage in the
hospital against her will and that black magic caused her to fall asleep while driving. She
further asserts that she won a case in court but that Big O Tires is trying to kill her. (Doc.
1 at 3). In the “Relief” section, Plaintiff states “Give me Liberty, Justice and Freedom.” Id.
at 4.
Upon careful review, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted in this federal court. Plaintiff’s factual allegations
are generally illogical and incomprehensible. The complaint provides no factual content
2Plaintiff has filed cases under multiple first and last names. For example, she routinely uses variations of
“Charlotte” or “Queen” as a first name and either “Franklin” or “Franklin-Samuels” as a surname.
or context from which the Court may reasonably infer that the Defendants violated
Plaintiff’s rights under federal law. As such, Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed.
Given the number of lawsuits that Plaintiff has filed as to which sua sponte
dismissal has been recommended under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 screening standards, and in
light of Plaintiff’s dramatically increased litigation activity in 2025, the undersigned further
warns Plaintiff that if she persists in filing further lawsuits that are dismissed sua sponte
on initial screening, she is likely to be deemed to be a vexatious litigant subject her to pre-
filing restrictions. Every frivolous lawsuit that is filed taxes scarce judicial resources and
necessarily detracts from this Court’s administration of justice in presiding over legitimate
non-frivolous cases.
Because Plaintiff initiated twenty new cases within so short a time period, the
undersigned entered an order in No. 1:25-cv-52-DRC-SKB that prohibits the Clerk of
Court from accepting new case filings from Plaintiff for the sixty-day period beginning
February 12 and continuing through April 13, 2025. That order is intended to permit the
assigned magistrate judges adequate time to screen the twenty recently filed cases, and
for the presiding district judges to rule on those Reports and Recommendations. If, after
the expiration of the requisite time period, Plaintiff’s frivolous cases number six or more,
the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be deemed to be vexatious, and that pre-filing
restrictions be imposed.
When a litigant fails to comprehend the basis for the prior dismissals and continues
to file additional lawsuits subject to dismissal on the same grounds, a federal court may
deem that litigant to be vexatious and impose an appropriate sanction. See Tropf v.
Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 938-940 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming imposition of
monetary sanctions and injunction that prohibited plaintiffs from filing any civil lawsuit in
federal court that included similar claims without written permission); Feathers v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir.1998) (“There is nothing unusual about imposing
prefiling restrictions in matters with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation.”); Filipas
v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir.1987); Stewart v. Fleet Financial, 229 F.3d 1154, 2000
WL 1176881 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (Table) (upholding sanctions against pro se litigant
who had repeatedly attempted to collaterally attack foreclosure and eviction, and was
using the judicial system to harass and punish anyone who had anything to do with those
actions). See also, generally Matter of Chaban, Case No. 2:17-cv-11139, 2017 WL
2544346 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2017) (directing plaintiff to “show cause” under Bankruptcy
Rule 8020 why the court should not sanction him for filing a fifth frivolous appeal of a
bankruptcy court order).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons stated, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. All claims contained in the above-captioned complaint should be DISMISSED
with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B),
2. Based on the number of cases for which this Court has recommended sua
sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Plaintiff should be formally
warned that she is highly likely to be deemed to be vexatious and made subject
to prefiling limitations if she persists in filing additional cases that lack any
reasonable basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction and/or that are factually
and legally frivolous under screening standards;
3. The Court should certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing
reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation
would not be taken in good faith and therefore should deny Plaintiff leave to
appeal in forma pauperis.
s/Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
QUEEN CHARLOTTE FRANKLIN, Case No. 1:25-cv-59
Plaintiff, Hopkins, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.
BUTLER COUNTY COURTS, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of
the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of
the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of
the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).