Franklin v. McDonald's

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

QUEEN CHARLOTTE FRANKLIN, Case No. 1:25-cv-51

Plaintiff, Hopkins, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

MCDONALD’S et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On February 3, 2025, Plaintiff Queen Charlotte Franklin moved for leave to file the

above-captioned complaint in this Court in forma pauperis, or without payment of fees.

(Doc. 3). Plaintiff previously filed a copy of the proposed complaint. (Doc. 1).

I. General Screening Authority

By separate Order issued this date, Plaintiff has been conditionally granted leave

to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. As a result, the complaint is

now before the Court for a sua sponte review to determine whether the complaint, or any

portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31

(1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous

when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d

1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is

immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does

not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

Congress has also authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints which fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Although a plaintiff’s pro se complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” the complaint must “give

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(internal citation and quotation omitted)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and

Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A(b)(1)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept

all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual

allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading

that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.

II. Analysis of Complaint

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that between Plaintiff’s first pro se

appearance in this Court on December 30, 2022 and the end of 2024, this Court

dismissed (or recommended the dismissal of) at least four complaints filed by Plaintiff as

frivolous under applicable screening standards. See e.g., Franklin v. U.C. Drake Hospital,

No. 1:24-cv-611-JPH-KLL (case dismissed, appeal pending); Franklin v. Hamilton County

Sheriffe, No. 1:24-cv-610-DRC-SKB (R&R recommending dismissal pending before

presiding district judge); Franklin v. Dieffenbach, No. 1:24-cv-524-JPH-SKB (case

dismissed by this Court, in forma pauperis denied, but ruling on in forma pauperis status

pending in Sixth Circuit); Franklin-Samuels v. Soc. Sec. Admin., et al., No. 1:22-cv-775-

MWM-KLL (case dismissed, motion to reopen denied, no appeal filed).

Recently, Plaintiff has picked of the pace of her filings. Between January 31, 2025

and February 11, 2025, Plaintiff initiated twenty new cases. In each case, she seeks to

file in forma pauperis, or without payment of fees. See, e.g., Case Nos. 1:25-cv-41-DRC-

SKB, 1:25-cv-42-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-44-MRB-SKB, 1:25-cv-48-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-49-

MRB-KLL, 1:25-cv-52-DRC-SKB, 1:25-cv-58-SJD-SKB, 1:25-cv-59-JPH-SKB, 1:25-cv-

60-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-65-DRC-KLL, 1:25-cv-77-MRB-SKB, 1:25-cv-78-DRC-KLL, 1:25-

cv-79-MWM-KLL, 1:25-cv-80-JPH-KLL, 1:25-cv-82-MWM-KLL, 1:25-cv-83-SJD-KLL,

1:25-cv-86-SJD-SKB, 1:25-cv-87-JPH-KLL, 1:25-cv-88-JPH-SKB. The undersigned is

working diligently to review and screen all cases that have been randomly assigned to

her. Each case is unique and must be addressed on its unique facts. But in every case

reviewed to date, the undersigned has determined that Plaintiff’s complaints either fail to

assert facts sufficient to support the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction and/or

fail to state any cognizable claim. Therefore, the number of cases filed by Plaintiff that

have been deemed to be subject to sua sponte dismissal as frivolous continues to grow.

In the above-captioned case, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis

indicates that she receives $1,793 in retirement income on a monthly basis, and $1,048

in earned income but yet owes a single creditor only $300 with no other debts. (Doc. 1,

PageID 2-3). Given that report and evidence that she paid a $605 filing fee in another

case on January 31, 2025, 1 it is unclear whether Plaintiff actually qualifies to proceed in

forma pauperis. But absent further information, the undersigned has conditionally granted

Plaintiff’s application to proceed without payment of a filing fee. Under the referenced

screening standards, however, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s lawsuit be

dismissed for failure to state any plausible claim.

This Court routinely warns pro se litigants who file multiple cases that are deemed

to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 screening standards that continuing the same

course of conduct may result in the imposition of pre-filing sanctions and/or a declaration

that their filings are “vexatious.” Despite the prior dismissal of multiple frivolous lawsuits

and Plaintiff’s recent initiation of twenty new lawsuits, the undersigned acknowledges that

Plaintiff was only recently warned that she could be deemed to be “vexatious.” Part of the

reason for the delay in issuing that warning is because Plaintiff’s use of different first and

1On January 31, Plaintiff paid an appellate filing fee of $605 in order to pursue her appeal of this Court’s

dismissal of Case No. 1:24-cv-611-JPH-KLL.(Id., Doc. 15).

last names made it more difficult for this Court to track her cases.2 In addition, although

Plaintiff tenders her complaints on a form that is commonly used by pro se litigants, she

routinely leaves blank a section of the form that specifically asks her to list her previous

cases, including “the case number and caption” of each lawsuit in which she previously

appeared. (See Doc. 1-1, PageID 7). The referenced query is designed to assist the Court

in more readily identifying duplicitous lawsuits and/or vexatious litigants. By leaving the

question blank, Plaintiff falsely implies that she has filed none. (See id.)

Turning to the complaint filed in this case, Plaintiff names the following Defendants

(1) McDonald’s; (2) Arby’s; (3) Culvers; and (4) T.h.C; (5) K.F.C and (6) White Castle.

She has checked several boxes on the form to assert subject matter jurisdiction indicating

both that she is filing a civil rights lawsuit that arises under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Doc. 1 at 2). In the “Statement of

Claim” section, Plaintiff appears to assert that she injured her shoulder and a manager

fired her for doing black magic and spraying the customers with Holy water. (Doc. 1 at 3).

In the “Relief” section, Plaintiff states, inter alia, that she is still having shoulder problems

and is out millions of dollars and not able to work. Id.

Upon careful review, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted in this federal court. Namely, “[t]o state a viable

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff ‘must allege that she was deprived of a right

secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under

color of state law.’” Smith v. Detroit Entertainment L.L.C., 338 F.Supp.2d 775, 778 (E.D.

Mich. 2004) (quoting Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiff’s

2Plaintiff has filed cases under multiple first and last names. For example, she routinely uses variations of

“Charlotte” or “Queen” as a first name and either “Franklin” or “Franklin-Samuels” as a surname.

complaint does not include sufficient facts to state any plausible federal or constitutional

claim against any Defendant, nor that any of the named Defendants were state actors.

Plaintiff’s factual allegations are generally illogical and incomprehensible. The complaint

provides no factual content or context from which the Court may reasonably infer that the

Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under federal law. As such, Plaintiff’s complaint

should be dismissed.

Given the number of lawsuits that Plaintiff has filed as to which sua sponte

dismissal has been recommended under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 screening standards, and in

light of Plaintiff’s dramatically increased litigation activity in 2025, the undersigned further

warns Plaintiff that if she persists in filing further lawsuits that are dismissed sua sponte

on initial screening, she is likely to be deemed to be a vexatious litigant subject her to pre-

filing restrictions. Every frivolous lawsuit that is filed taxes scarce judicial resources and

necessarily detracts from this Court’s administration of justice in presiding over legitimate

non-frivolous cases.

Because Plaintiff initiated twenty new cases within so short a time period, the

undersigned entered an order in No. 1:25-cv-52-DRC-SKB that prohibits the Clerk of

Court from accepting new case filings from Plaintiff for the sixty-day period beginning

February 12 and continuing through April 13, 2025. That order is intended to permit the

assigned magistrate judges adequate time to screen the twenty recently filed cases, and

for the presiding district judges to rule on those Reports and Recommendations. If, after

the expiration of the requisite time period, Plaintiff’s frivolous cases number six or more,

the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be deemed to be vexatious, and that pre-filing

restrictions be imposed.

When a litigant fails to comprehend the basis for the prior dismissals and continues

to file additional lawsuits subject to dismissal on the same grounds, a federal court may

deem that litigant to be vexatious and impose an appropriate sanction. See Tropf v.

Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 938-940 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming imposition of

monetary sanctions and injunction that prohibited plaintiffs from filing any civil lawsuit in

federal court that included similar claims without written permission); Feathers v. Chevron

U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir.1998) (“There is nothing unusual about imposing

prefiling restrictions in matters with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation.”); Filipas

v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir.1987); Stewart v. Fleet Financial, 229 F.3d 1154, 2000

WL 1176881 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (Table) (upholding sanctions against pro se litigant

who had repeatedly attempted to collaterally attack foreclosure and eviction, and was

using the judicial system to harass and punish anyone who had anything to do with those

actions). See also, generally Matter of Chaban, Case No. 2:17-cv-11139, 2017 WL

2544346 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2017) (directing plaintiff to “show cause” under Bankruptcy

Rule 8020 why the court should not sanction him for filing a fifth frivolous appeal of a

bankruptcy court order).

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons stated, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. All claims contained in the above-captioned complaint should be DISMISSED

with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B),

2. Based on the number of cases for which this Court has recommended sua

sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Plaintiff should be formally

warned that she is highly likely to be deemed to be vexatious and made subject

to prefiling limitations if she persists in filing additional cases that lack any

reasonable basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction and/or that are factually

and legally frivolous under screening standards;

3. The Court should certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing

reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation

would not be taken in good faith and therefore should deny Plaintiff leave to

appeal in forma pauperis.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

QUEEN CHARLOTTE FRANKLIN, Case No. 1:25-cv-51

Plaintiff, Hopkins, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

MCDONALD’S et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of

the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of

the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of

the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14)

DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.

140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).