The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION
LUCKY B. KELLER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-05042
)
WESTLAKE FINANICAL SERVICES, LLC, )
And PAUL KERWIN, CFO OF WESTLAKE )
FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, )
and DANIEL S. PEROTTI, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Paul Kerwin’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)
(Doc. 19). Defendant Kerwin has filed his suggestions in support (Doc. 20) and Plaintiff has filed
his suggestions in opposition. (Doc. 24). Defendant Kerwin has replied (Doc. 31) and thus the
motion is ripe for adjudication. For reasons herein, Defendant Kerwin’s Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a financing contract Plaintiff entered into with Defendants for the
purchase of a Roper Kia. Plaintiff is a resident of Neosho, Missouri. Defendant Westlake Financial
Services, LLC, is a finance company conducting business in Missouri. Defendant Paul Kerwin is
alleged to be the CFO of Westlake Financial Services, LLC.
On or around February 18, 2022 Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a valid financing
contract with Defendants to purchase a vehicle. Plaintiff alleges he made consistent payments on
the vehicle loan until financial hardship temporarily impacted his payment abilities. Subsequently
on or around April 26, 2024 Plaintiff alleges he attempted to tender payment via negotiable
instrument for $11,405.00 to settle the outstanding balance which Defendants refused to accept. It
is alleged on August 19, 20204 Defendants repossessed the vehicle from Plaintiff’s residence.
Plaintiff brings this action alleging breach of contract, violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA), and violations of the Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 9 against
Defendants. Defendant Kerwin seeks to be dismissed from the current action arguing that this
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Personal jurisdiction over a defendant represents the power of a court to enter “a valid
judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff.” Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-
Papst St. Georgen Gmbh & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kulko v. Superior
Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978)). Personal jurisdiction can
be specific or general. “‘Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of action arising
from or related to a defendant’s actions within the forum state,’ while ‘[g]eneral jurisdiction …
refers to the power of a state to adjudicate any cause of action involving a particular defendant,
regardless of where the cause of action arose.’” Id. (quoting Miller v. Nippon Carbon Co., 528 F.2d
1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 2008). The party asserting jurisdiction must make only a prima facie showing
of jurisdiction and the court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to that party.
Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2011).
“The party seeking to establish the court’s in personam jurisdiction carries the burden of proof,
and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.” Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs.
Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
Defendant Kerwin argues that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not include sufficient
allegations to show personal jurisdiction over him, where he resides, or where he is domiciled.
Defendant Kerwin points out that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains no allegations as to the
domicile of any Defendant and that he was served in Los Angeles, California. Defendant thus states
that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. Plaintiff asserts venue is proper within the
Western District of Missouri but makes no arguments to rebut the personal jurisdiction claims
concerning Defendant Kerwin.
I. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific personal jurisdiction can be exercised by a federal court in a diversity suit only if
authorized by the forum state’s long-arm statue and permitted by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d
589, 593 (8th Cir. 2011). In Missouri, specific personal jurisdiction is authorized by its long arm
statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 506.500. It states:
Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, or any
corporation, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in
this section, thereby submits such person, firm, or corporation, and if an individual,
his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of such actions:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) the making of any contract within this state;
(3) the commission of a tortious act within this state;
(4) the ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this state;
(5) the contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at
the time of contracting[.]
Id.
These individual categories are construed broadly, such that if a defendant commits one of
the acts specified in the long-arm statute, the statute will be interpreted “to provide for jurisdiction,
within the specific categories enumerated in the statute [], to the full extent permitted by the [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause.” Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589,
593 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting State ex rel. Metal Serv. Ctr. Of Ga., Inc. v. Gaertner, 677 S.W.2d
325, 327 (Mo. banc 1984). The touchstone of the due-process analysis remains whether the
defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310-, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). The fundamental inquiry is whether the
defendant has “purposefully availed” itself of the “benefits and protections” of the forum state to
such a degree that “it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980).
Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden that this Court may assert specific personal
jurisdiction over Defendant Kerwin. Plaintiff has made no allegation that Missouri’s long arm
statute pertains to Defendant Kerwin. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint simply states:
Defendant, **Paul Kerwin, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Westlake Financial
Services, LLC**, is responsible for overseeing financial operations, including
policy-setting and actions involving debt collection and repossession, which
directly impacted Plaintiff. As CFO, Defendant Kerwin played a pivotal role in
supervising and approving practices that led to the claims stated herein, and he is
therefore named in his official capacity.
(Amended Complaint pages 1-2). Plaintiff only makes conclusory allegations about Defendant
Kerwin’s role and has failed to show that Defendant Kerwin has purposefully availed himself of
the benefits and protections of Missouri that he should reasonable anticipate being haled into court
here. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff has failed to show Defendant Kerwin is subject to specific
personal jurisdiction.
II. General Jurisdiction
If a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant, it can “adjudicate any cause of action
involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the cause of action arose.” Viasystems, Inc.
v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 595 (8th Cir. 2011). General
jurisdiction can only be asserted insofar as it is authorized by state law and permitted by the Due
Process Clause. Sondergrad v. Miles, Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir. 1993). The Missouri
Supreme Court has held that general jurisdiction is properly asserted over an out-of-state
corporation when that corporation is “present and conducting substantial business in Missouri.”
State ex Rel. K-Mart Corp. v. Holliger, 986 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Mo. banc 1999); see also Wineteer
v. Viet. Helicopter Pilots Ass’n, 121 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Mo.Ct.App.2003). “For an individual, the
paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”
Goodyear Dunlap Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. ----,----, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851, 180
L.Ed.2d 796, 803 (2011).
Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden that this Court may assert general personal
jurisdiction over Defendant Kerwin. Plaintiff fails to plead facts that show Defendant Kerwin is
subject general jurisdiction. Defendant Kerwin does not live in, nor is a resident of Missouri. There
are no facts that would suggest that Defendant Kerwin would be subject to the general jurisdiction
of this Court. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Kerwin is subject
to general personal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to show that this Court has either specific personal jurisdiction or
general personal jurisdiction over Defendant Kerwin. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant
Kerwin’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2) is GRANTED. The Court hereby dismisses Defendant Kerwin from the case
with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 4, 2025
/s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE