The opinion
USCA11 Case: 23-14218 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 03/04/2025 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-14218
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
GLENN HOWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VICTOR HILL,
Clayton County Sheriff; in his official
and individual capacities,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
USCA11 Case: 23-14218 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 03/04/2025 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 23-14218
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-02662-WMR
____________________
Before LUCK, ANDERSON, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Glenn Howell, who was a pretrial detainee at the Clayton
County Jail in 2020, asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the
former sheriff of Clayton County, Victor Hill, in his individual ca-
pacity, based on his alleged use of excessive force in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Howell contends that the sheriff left him
handcuffed in a restraint chair for more than four hours solely for
the purpose of punishment and even though Howell was compli-
ant and nonresistant. Hill filed a motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity, which the district court denied. This
is Hill’s interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity.
Hill is not entitled to qualified immunity if he violated How-
ell’s constitutional rights and if those rights were clearly estab-
lished. See Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2024).
While Hill’s appeal in this case was pending, this Court issued a
decision in a different appeal that affirmed Hill’s criminal convic-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 242. See United States v. Hill, 99 F.4th 1289
(11th Cir. 2024); see also 18 U.S.C. § 242 (imposing criminal liability
when a person acts under color of law to willfully deprive another
person of their constitutional rights). Hill’s conviction arose from
his punishment of Howell and five other compliant, nonresistant
detainees by leaving them in a restraint chair for hours at a time.
USCA11 Case: 23-14218 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 03/04/2025 Page: 3 of 4
23-14218 Opinion of the Court 3
See Hill, 99 F.4th at 1292. In that case we held it was clearly estab-
lished that Hill’s use of force against Howell and the other detain-
ees was constitutionally excessive. See id. at 1300.
We explained that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 re-
quires that binding precedent give “the defendant ‘fair warning’
that his actions violated constitutional rights.” Id. at 1300. And we
recognized the Supreme Court’s directive that, “‘[t]he standard for
determining the adequacy of that warning [is] the same as the
standard for determining whether a constitutional right was
‘clearly established’ in civil litigation under § 1983.’” Id. (quoting
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)).
We concluded that Hill had “‘fair warning’ that the use of
restraint chairs on compliant, nonresistant detainees inflicted ex-
cessive and thus unconstitutional force.” Id. One of those detainees
was Howell. Id. at 1296–97. This Court has now held that clearly
established law put Hill on notice that the use of a restraint chair
under the specific circumstances of this case was an unconstitu-
tional use of force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Hill, 99 F.4th at 1301.
The Hill decision was published, and we are bound by its
holdings. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1292
(11th Cir. 2005) (“Under the well-established prior panel precedent
rule of this Circuit, the holding of the first panel to address an issue
is the law of this Circuit, thereby binding all subsequent panels un-
less and until the first panel’s holding is overruled by the Court
USCA11 Case: 23-14218 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 03/04/2025 Page: 4 of 4
4 Opinion of the Court 23-14218
sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.”). The district court’s
judgment denying qualified immunity to Hill is AFFIRMED.