Juan Hernandez Ruiz v. B. Birkholz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES--GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10548-JLS (DTB) Date: March 3, 2025

Title: Juan Hernandez Ruiz v. B. Birkholz, Warden

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DOCKET ENTRY

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PRESENT:

HON. DAVID T. BRISTOW, MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Rachel Maurice n/a

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PETITIONER: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR RESPONDENT:

None present None present

PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED DUE TO FAILURE TO EXHAUST

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

On December 4, 2024, Petitioner Juan Hernandez Ruiz (“Petitioner”) filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 (“Petition”) without paying the appropriate filing fee or filing an application to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). (Docket No. 1). On December 6, 2024,

the Clerk issued a Notice re: Discrepancies ordering Petitioner to pay the appropriate

filing fee or file an IFP Application. (Docket No. 2). On February 14, 2025, Petitioner

paid the filing fee. (Docket No. 4).

A habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is subject to the same

screening requirements as a habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (“Habeas

Rules”), Habeas Rule 1(b)(providing that district courts may apply the Habeas Rules

to habeas petitions not brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254).

In turn, Habeas Rule 4 requires a federal judge to “promptly examine” a petition

after filing, and the judge “must dismiss” the petition if it “plainly appears from the

petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief[.]” See

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005) (citing Habeas Rule 4).

Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the Petition pursuant to Habeas Rule 4.

The Petition appears to be subject to dismissal on the grounds that Petitioner has not

exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the one claim raised therein. (See

Petition at 2-3, 6).1 The Court will not make a final determination regarding whether

the Petition should be dismissed, however, without first giving Petitioner an

opportunity to address the issue of exhaustion.

Accordingly, the Court hereby issues this Order to Show Cause as to why the

Petition should not be dismissed on the basis that the claim raised therein is

unexhausted, and specifically orders Petitioner to respond to the Order to Show Cause

in writing by no later than March 24, 2025. The Court further directs Petitioner to

review the information that follows, which provides additional explanation as to why

the Petition appears to be subject to dismissal.

The Exhaustion Requirement

“Federal prisoners are required to exhaust their federal administrative remedies

prior to bringing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.” Martinez v.

Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); see also Ward v. Chavez, 678

F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). The exhaustion requirement applicable to habeas

petitions under Section 2241 is a prudential requirement. See Singh v. Napolitano, 649

F.3d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (as amended); see also Ward, 678 F.3d at

1045 (“As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all

available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.”).

As the exhaustion requirement is judicially created, the failure to exhaust does not

deprive a federal court of jurisdiction. See Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th

Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995). Further,

the exhaustion requirement can be waived in Section 2241 cases since it is not a

“jurisdictional prerequisite.” Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045 (citation omitted). Exhaustion

may be waived “if pursuing those [administrative] remedies would be futile.” Id.

(alteration in original) (citation omitted). Courts also have discretion to waive the

exhaustion requirement where administrative remedies are inadequate or not

efficacious, irreparable injury would result, or the administrative proceedings would be

void. See Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A

“key consideration” in exercising such discretion is whether “relaxation of the

requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme.” Id.

(quoting Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1990)).

For the Petition, the Court cites to the CM/ECF pagination at the top of each page.

1

The BOP provides an administrative remedy process through which inmates may

seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of their confinement. See 28

C.F.R. § 542.10(a). Generally, in order to exhaust available administrative remedies,

an inmate must proceed through a four-step process using the appropriate form: (1)

Informal resolution (Form BP-8), (2) formal written administrative remedy request to

the Warden of the facility of incarceration (Form BP-9), (3) appeal to the Regional

Director (Form BP-10), and (4) appeal to the General Counsel (Form BP-11). See 28

C.F.R. §§ 542.13-542.15. A final decision on the merits of the claim from the General

Counsel completes the BOP administrative remedy process. See 28 C.F.R. §§

542.15(a), 542.18. Alternatively, if the Office of General Counsel does not respond to

the appeal within the time allotted by the regulations, the inmate may consider the

absence of a response to be a denial. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18.

Here, Petitioner has raised a single ground for relief in his Petition, alleging that

his rights were violated, and that the defendant’s agents abused their discretion when

Petitioner exercised his constitutional right to remain silent during an internal

investigation which resulted in a finding of guilt. (Petition at 6). The Petition reflects

that Petitioner’s single claim was not raised in the BOP administrative process or

otherwise exhausted through all four levels of review, since Petitioner does not indicate

that he administratively challenged the decision he attacks in the Petition (see Petition

at 2-3), and checked the “no” box as to the question of whether he has presented his

sole claim in all appeals available (Petition at 6).

Therefore, based on the face of the Petition, it appears the Petition is completely

unexhausted in terms of the BOP’s four-step process of administrative appeals, and

Petitioner must show cause as set forth in this Order as to why the Petition should not

be dismissed on such basis. Petitioner is warned that his failure to timely respond to

this Order may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to

comply with the Court’s Order and/or for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

41(b). See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2002).

IT IS SO ORDERED.