McBroom v. Boyd

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

SAHELIAN DEONDRAE McBROOM PLAINTIFF

ADC #650775

v. No: 3:22-cv-00318-PSH

MARTY BOYD, et al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Sahelian Deondrae McBroom, an Arkansas Division of Correction

inmate, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 15, 2022,

asserting claims against defendants Sheriff Marty Boyd, Sergeant Stanfield,

Corporal Norwood, Corporal Calderone, and Sergeant Jerry Foster (Doc. No. 1-1).

He alleged that he had been kept in an unclean cell covered in fecal matter for several

days at the Craighead County Detention Center. Id. at 7-8. The Court subsequently

granted McBroom’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and directed him to

file an amended complaint clarify his claims (Doc. No. 6). In that order, the Court

warned McBroom that an amended complaint would render his original complaint

without legal effect and that only claims properly set out in his amended complaint

would be allowed to proceed. Id.

McBroom subsequently filed an amended complaint naming Boyd and Foster

as the only defendants (Doc. No. 7). The Court directed service on the defendants

named in both complaints, and all defendants answered. See Doc. Nos. 8-9.

McBroom’s claims against Stanfield, Norwood, and Calderone’s were subsequently

dismissed without prejudice because they were not named in McBroom’s amended

complaint. See Doc. No. 38.

Boyd and Foster (the “Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

on the merits of McBroom’s claims, together with a Brief in Support and Statement

of Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. Nos. 42-45). McBroom was notified of his

opportunity to file a response and a separate statement of disputed facts (Doc. No.

45). He filed a response and some exhibits (Doc. Nos. 47-48), but did not file a

statement setting forth disputed facts he believes must be decided at trial as required

by Local Rule 56.1. Because McBroom failed to controvert the facts set forth in the

Defendants’ statement of facts, Doc. No. 44, those facts are deemed admitted. See

Local Rule 56.1(c). However, the Court has considered the documents provided by

McBroom in determining whether any material factual issues exist. The Court has

also considered McBroom’s motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 46) requesting

assistance obtaining witness statements. Having reviewed the summary judgment

pleadings, the Court finds that the witness statements sought by McBroom will not

assist the Court in ruling on the pending motion. Defendants do not dispute

McBroom’s allegations regarding the condition of his jail cell, but move for

summary judgment on other grounds. The Court therefore DENIES McBroom’s

motion for counsel.1

The Defendants’ statement of facts, and the other pleadings and exhibits in

the record, establish that the material facts are not in dispute, and the Defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as further explained below.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir.

2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, and must instead

demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann

v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations

1 A civil litigant does not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed

counsel in a civil action, but the Court may appoint counsel at its discretion. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(1). The Court has considered McBroom’s need for an attorney, the likelihood

that McBroom will benefit from assistance of counsel, the factual complexity of the case,

the McBroom’s ability to investigate and present his case, and the complexity of the legal

issues.

must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in

his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations

omitted).

An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must be

supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents, electronically

stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials

. . .”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact is disputed or

undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible

evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is genuine if

the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either

party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Othman v.

City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes that are not

genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude summary

judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2010).

In Reed v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2009), the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the requirement that facts be viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party when considering a motion for summary

judgment. The Court stated, “[i]f ‘opposing parties tell two different stories,’ the

court must review the record, determine which facts are material and genuinely

disputed, and then view those facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving

party—as long as those facts are not so ‘blatantly contradicted by the record . . . that

no reasonable jury could believe’ them.” Id. at 790 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).

III. Facts2

McBroom’s statement of claim in his amended complaint states, in its

entirety:

My complaints of said violations were reported directly to Sgt. Foster,

officer in charge, pertaining to my housing cell G-4 was contaminated

in human fecal matter.3 He stated he was not the officer responsible for

placing plaintiff in cell G-4, therefore he was not going to move him.

According to jail chain of command, Sheriff Boyd, was also notified of

these violations and complaints, and he took no actions to correct the

wrongdoings of stated defendants in plaintiff’s original complaint. In

Sheriff Boyd’s official capacity he neglected the protocols of safe and

humane treatment of confined persons, and did nothing that with his

official capacity could correct plaintiff’s mistreatment.

Doc. No. 7 at 4. McBroom sued Defendants in both their individual and official

capacities. Id. at 2.

2 These facts are taken from the Defendants’ statement of undisputed material

facts (Doc. No. 44), McBroom’s deposition testimony (Doc. No. 42-1), and the exhibits

filed by McBroom (Doc. No. 47). Documents are transcribed verbatim without any

corrections for misspellings or mistakes.

3 In his deposition testimony, McBroom clarified that he was moved to cell G-4

after he verbally complained about urine in another cell. Id. at 16:17-25 – 17:1-12.

On August 17, 2022, McBroom complained about alleged feces on the wall

of his cell. Doc. No. 42-1, Deposition of Sahelian Deondrae McBroom (“McBroom

Deposition”), at 15:20-22; Doc. No. 47 at 9 (copy of grievance filed by McBroom

submitted on August 17, 2022, complaining of “poo” all over cell 4). McBroom was

transferred to the Arkansas Division of Corrections (ADC) around August 22, 2022.

McBroom Deposition at 15:20-22.

McBroom submitted another grievance concerning cell 4 on August 17, 2022,

but it is not marked received until September 9, 2022. Doc. No. 47 at 11. McBroom

stated

Im in gh cell4 and it is covered with poo and this is inhuman and not

right I should not be punished like this. I only crossed the line reading

the rules and telling the officer that he was wrong to be put in this cell

is like this also breaks the jail rules

Foster responded on September 9, 2022, stating “gone.” Id. McBroom testified that

Foster was referring to him having already been moved to the ADC by then.

McBroom Deposition at 15:3-12.

McBroom submitted yet another grievance on August 17, 2022, regarding the

conditions in his cell, stating:

I’M IN CELL 4 IN GH AND THERE IS POO ALL OVER THE

WALLS AND THE WINDOW AND THE FLAP THAT MY FOOD

COME IN OFFICERS TOLD FOSTER ABOUT THE SITUATION

AND HE WILL NOT MOVE ME TO MALE POD OR HAVE

SOMEONE TO COME CLEAN IT UP THIS IS NOT RIGHT OR

FAIR TO TELL THE TRUTH IT IS UNHUMAN FOR ME TO HAVE

TO LIVE IN A POO SPREADED ROOM AND THE O.I.C KNW

ABOUT THIS IS THERE ANY WAY I CAN SPEAK TO THE LT.

SINCE THE OIC IS NOT SMART ENOUGH TO MAKE THE

WRONG RIGHT. I ONLY CROSSED THE YELLOW LINE TO

READ THE RULES.

Doc. No. 47 at 13. His grievance was answered by Corporal K. White the next day,

and McBroom appealed. Id. His appeal was also answered by White, noting that

McBroom had been released.

McBroom grieved about the conditions in his cell again on August 24, 2022.

Doc. No. 47 at 15. Foster replied on September 9, 2022, noting that McBroom was

no longer there. Id.

In his deposition, McBroom testified that he no interactions with Boyd

concerning the conditions in his cell but sued Boyd solely because he had general

responsibility for the jail as sheriff. McBroom Deposition at 7:12-20, 11:10-20.

McBroom also acknowledged that he never spoke to Foster about the conditions in

cell, but maintained that he believed other officers reported the conditions to Foster.

Id. at 10:20-25 – 11:1-8. Specifically, McBroom testified:

Q: What did Foster do wrong?

A: When it was brought to his attention that I was in that cell

covered in human feces, he did nothing.

Q: Who brought it to his attention?

A: Carter. Ofc. Carter.

Q: Were you there for that conversation?

A: Was I there for the conversation?

Q: Were you there -- did you witness the conversation between Ofc.

Carter and Sgt. Foster?

A: No. No, I -- no, I didn’t.

Q: So you were not privy to that conversation?

A: No, sir.

Q: Okay. So are you assuming that conversation happened?

A: Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I am.

Id. See also id. at 21:3-10 (acknowledging he never spoke directly to Foster but

spoke with the officers that worked under him); id. at 11:21-25 – 12: 1-2 (stating

that he submitted a grievance about feces in his jail). McBroom testified that he told

officers Stanfield, Calderone, and Norwood about the feces in his cell. Id. at 14:5-

17.

McBroom also acknowledged in his response to the Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment that he never spoke with either Defendant “face-to-face” about

the conditions in his cell. Doc. No. 48 at 2. He further alleged that the Defendants

failed to enforce jail policy and procedures. Id.

IV. Analysis

A. Individual Capacity Claims

The Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect

to McBroom’s individual capacity claims because he cannot prove they violated his

constitutional rights.4 The Court agrees for the reasons described below.

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a

prisoner must show (1) the alleged deprivation was, “objectively, sufficiently

serious,” and resulted “in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities,” and (2) prison officials were deliberately indifferent to “an excessive

risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970). A

defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 unless he was personally involved in

or had direct responsibility for the constitutional violation. See Mayorga v.

Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Liability under section 1983

requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”)

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

In Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020), the United States Supreme Court

agreed that holding a prisoner in a cell “teeming with human waste” for six days

violated the Eighth Amendment, and that any reasonable officer should have realized

4 Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for damages

“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person [in their positions] would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To determine whether a defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity, the Court must consider two questions: (1) do the facts alleged by

plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) if so, was that

right clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Wright v.

United States, 813 F.3d 689, 695 (8th Cir. 2015). Courts may exercise “their sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should

be addressed first in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

that, precluding their defense of qualified immunity. The Supreme Court further

noted that the district court would have to conduct an officer-by-officer analysis on

remand to determine which officers were aware of, but deliberately indifferent to,

those conditions. Id. at 9 (“[A]lthough an officer-by-officer analysis will be

necessary on remand, the record suggests that at least some officers involved in [the

plaintiff-prisoner’s] ordeal were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of his

cells.”).

In this case, Defendants do not present any evidence to dispute McBroom’s

alleged cell conditions. Rather, they argue they were not sufficiently involved in the

violations alleged by McBroom and that McBroom suffered no physical injuries.

Doc. No. 43 at 5-7. The Court need not reach Defendants’ arguments regarding

physical injury because McBroom has acknowledged the Defendants were not

directly involved or necessarily made aware of the conditions in his cell.

Specifically, McBroom testified that he never spoke directly to Boyd or Foster about

the conditions in cell, but believed they became aware of those conditions through

other officers or the grievances he filed. McBroom Deposition at 10:17-25 – 12:1-

2. He also clarified that it was officers Stanfield, Calderone, and Norwood that he

told about the feces in his cell. Id. at 14:5-17. McBroom also did not claim that he

told either Boyd or Foster about the conditions in his cell in the grievances he

submitted; he never mentioned Boyd by name or title, and in one grievance, he

merely claimed that officers had made Foster aware of the conditions. See Doc. No.

47 at 9-15. The grievance responses indicate that Foster eventually reviewed two of

these grievances, but only after McBroom had been moved to the ADC. Id. at 15.

Because McBroom admits neither Boyd nor Foster were directly informed of

the unclean conditions in his cell, and there is no proof they were aware of them but

deliberately indifferent to such conditions, they cannot be held liable for those

violations. Additionally, to the extent McBroom seeks to hold Boyd and Foster

accountable due to their supervisory positions as sheriff and officer in charge of a

shift, his claims fail as a matter of law because respondeat superior is not a

recognized basis for § 1983 liability. See Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309 (8th Cir.

1997).

B. Official Capacity Claims

McBroom also sues the Defendants in their official capacities. Official

capacity claims are “functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing

governmental entity.” Veach v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th

Cir. 2010). Thus, a suit against a defendant in his official capacity is in essence a

suit against the County or city itself. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868 (8th Cir.

2010); Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998). A municipality cannot be held

liable on the basis of respondeat superior, or simply by virtue of being the employer

of a tortfeasor. Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir.

2013). Accordingly, the Defendants, as county employees, can only be held liable

in their official capacities in this case if McBroom can establish that a constitutional

violation was committed pursuant to “an official custom, policy, or practice of the

governmental entity.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009). To

establish municipal liability through an unofficial custom, a plaintiff must

demonstrate

(1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of

unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees;

(2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by

the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the

officials of that misconduct; and (3) that plaintiff was injured by acts

pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was

a moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1160 (8th Cir. 2014).

McBroom has not alleged that the conditions he described were caused by an

unconstitutional policy or custom of Craighead County. In fact, he alleges the

Defendants acted in violation of county policies mandating humane and hygienic

conditions. See Doc. No. 47 at 16-29. The Defendants are therefore entitled to

judgment as a matter of law in their official capacities.

V. Conclusion

The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 42) is granted.

Judgment is awarded in favor of Defendants, and McBroom’s claims are dismissed

with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 3"¢ day of March, 2025.

UNITED STATES Lt RATE JUDGE