Farris v. Brown(MAG+)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LAKESHA ANNETTE FARRIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:24-cv-641-MHT-CWB

)

DR. MELVIN BROWN, in his official )

capacity as Superintendent of Education )

for Montgomery Public Schools, )

)

Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Lakesha Farris, who is proceeding pro se, filed this action on October 10, 2024

(see Doc. 1) and simultaneously sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (see Doc. 2). By Order

entered October 17, 2024 (see Doc. 6), in forma pauperis status was granted and service of process

was deferred pending threshold review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). After conducting such

review and concluding that the Complaint was insufficiently pleaded, the undersigned entered an

Order on November 18, 2024 (see Doc. 7) directing Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint and

setting out what information should be included to remedy the initial pleading deficiencies (id. at

pp. 4-5). Although Plaintiff in turn filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 8) by the imposed deadline,

the allegations remain insufficient to survive § 1915(e) review.1

1 Section 1915(e) provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines

that ... the action or appeal– (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

II. Pleading Requirements

Review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) begins with an analysis of whether a complaint complies

with the pleading standards applicable to all civil actions filed in federal court. See Thompson v.

Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is

governed by the same standard as dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when the facts as pleaded do not state a claim

for relief that is ‘plausible on its face.’”) (citations omitted). To state a claim for relief that is

plausible, a plaintiff must plead factual content that “allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). A complaint thus should contain a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to

‘show that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557

(2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Moreover, “conclusory

allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not

prevent dismissal.” Davila v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003); see also

Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that courts do

not consider “any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions”).

Pro se pleadings “are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys”

and are to be liberally construed. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).

Nonetheless, a pro se complaint still “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And it has been made clear that a court does not have “license

... to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action.”

GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on

other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). It further is recognized that a pro se litigant “is

subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). Therefore, a pro se litigant must comply

with the Rule 8 requirement to file a “short and plain statement” showing an entitlement to relief.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: … (2) a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief … .”).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff at all relevant times has been employed as a guidance counselor with the

Montgomery County Board of Education. (Doc. 8 at p. 2, ¶ 4; see also Doc. 1 at p. 1). According

to Plaintiff, she was required to perform the duties of three positions but was denied additional

compensation that other similarly situated employees received. (See id.). And Plaintiff alleges

that she suffered harassment/retaliation after filing a grievance against Principal Keisha Howard.

(Doc. 8 at 2, ¶ 5; see also Doc. 1 at p. 1). Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint,

however, details how or when Howard engaged in such conduct. Nor does the Compliant or the

Amended Complaint state that any similarly situated employees outside Plaintiff’s protected class

received the additional compensation at issue.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “short and plain statement” must show that

Plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Plaintiff generally points to

Title VII as the legal basis for her claims, she fails to set out a sufficient factual basis to support

any such claim. See Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)

(“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating ‘against

any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff

must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an

adverse employment action; (3) the employer treated similarly situated employees outside her

protected class more favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job. See Holifield v. Reno,

115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802-04 (1973)), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d

1213, 1226 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). A plaintiff alternatively may rely upon a “convincing

mosaic” of circumstantial evidence, including (1) “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, or

other information from which discriminatory intent may be inferred, (2) ‘systematically better

treatment of similarly situated employees,’ and (3) pretext.” Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243,

1250 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted); see also Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Cos., 93 F.4th 1181, 1197-98

(11th Cir. 2024). “A plaintiff wishing to establish a hostile work environment claim [must] show:

(1) that [s]he belongs to a protected group; (2) that [s]he has been subject to unwelcome

harassment; (3) that the harassment must have been based on a protected characteristic of the

employee … ; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and

conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that

the employer is responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or of

direct liability.” Miller, 277 F.3d at 1275.

“To establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII …, a plaintiff must prove that [s]he

engaged in statutorily protected activity, [s]he suffered a materially adverse action, and there was

some causal relation between the two events.” Butler v. Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209,

1212-13 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009).

“An employee engages in protected activity if [s]he opposes an employment practice based on a

good faith, reasonable belief that the practice violates Title VII … . The opposition must be made

know[n] to the employer in the form of a complaint or some overt rejection of what the employee

believes to be an illegally discriminatory practice or decision.” Locascio v. BBDO Atlanta, Inc.,

56 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);

Compare Reynolds v. Golden Corral Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1253-54 (M.D. Ala. 1999)

(finding that complaint was not adequate to put employer on notice of alleged harassment and thus

did not constitute protected activity).

The allegations in the Complaint and the Amended Complaint are vague and conclusory

as to all potential Title VII claims and are lacking in necessary factual content. Nowhere does

Plaintiff allege that her employer treated similarly situated employees outside her protected class

more favorably; nowhere does Plaintiff set out a convincing mosaic of discrimination; and

nowhere does Plaintiff provide a description of the harassment or retaliation she endured.

The Complaint and the Amended Complaint instead contain the type of “unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” and “naked assertion[s] devoid of further

factual enhancement” that consistently have been deemed insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57). Even construing Plaintiff’s filings most liberally, the court

simply is unable to discern a plausible claim for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that the purpose of the federal pleading requirement is to

“give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

IV. Conclusion

For all of these reasons, the Magistrate Judge hereby RECOMMENDS that this action

be dismissed without prejudice.

It is ORDERED that all objections to this Recommendation must be filed no later than

February 18, 2025. An objecting party must identify the specific portion(s) of factual findings/

legal conclusions to which objection is made and must describe in detail the basis for each

objection. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered.

After receiving objections, the District Judge will conduct a de novo review of the

challenged findings and recommendations. The District Judge may accept, reject, or modify

the Recommendation or may refer the matter back to the Magistrate Judge with instructions for

further proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party shall be deemed to have waived the

right to challenge on appeal a District Judge’s order to the extent it is based upon unobjected-to

findings or recommendations. The court on appeal may review unobjected-to factual and legal

conclusions only for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

No party may appeal this Recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit. An appeal may be taken only from an appealable decision entered by

the District Judge.

DONE this the 3rd day of February 2025.

LA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE