HOPKINS v. HICKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

AL-QUON HOPKINS,

Case No. 24–cv–06646–ESK–SAK

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

ADM. MARCUS HICKS, et al.,

Defendants.

KIEL, U.S.D.J.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on pro se plaintiff Al-Quon

Hopkins’s civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint).

(ECF No. 1.) Because plaintiff has been granted in forma pauperis status, I

must review the Complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as

frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the following reasons, I will dismiss

the Complaint with prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement within South Woods State Prison (South Woods) in September

2021. (ECF No. 1–2 p. 1.) He states that South Woods Administrator Marcus

Hicks and Nurse Marsha ignored CDC protocols for social distancing and mask

wearing. (Id.) He claims that he became sick, beginning with chills and pain

in his head. (Id.) Eventually, breathing became difficult. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that he was denied medical care because “nobody wanted to get close to

us.” (Id.)

Plaintiff asks the court award him $75,000 and to “fix” the medical

department. (ECF No. 1 p. 6.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to sua sponte

screen a civil complaint filed by a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis for

cognizable claims and to dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from

a defendant immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

To survive a sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, a complaint

must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the plaintiff’s claims are

facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.

2009). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v.

Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

“The Court must accept all facts in the complaint as true, draw all

reasonable inferences in the prisoner’s favor, and ask only whether the

complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.” Durham v.

Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2023). Moreover, “[c]omplaints filed pro se

should be construed liberally and held to ‘less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).at 251).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has not stated an Eighth Amendment violation. The Eighth

Amendment imposes on prison officials the duty to provide humane conditions

of confinement, including provision of adequate medical care and the obligation

to take reasonable measures to protect inmate safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 832 (1994). This duty extends to protection against future harm from

unsafe conditions, including “serious contagious diseases[.]” Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34 (1993). Thus, “[a] prison official’s deliberate

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the

Eighth Amendment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828 (cleaned up).

To the extent plaintiff “makes general claims that his constitutional rights

were violated merely by having been exposed to [COVID-19], or by an increased

risk of exposure to the virus, the allegations are insufficient. Exposure alone

does not establish a constitutional violation[.]” Graham v. Aviles, No. 22–cv–

5760, 2022 WL 16949131, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2022) (citing Hope v. Warden

York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 329 (3d Cir. 2020)). Moreover, a jail is not

required to completely eliminate the risk of exposure to comply with

constitutional mandates. Hope, 972 F.3d at 329. Plaintiff alleges that he

contracted COVID-19, as opposed to only being exposed, but courts “must

acknowledge that practical considerations of detention justify limitations on

many privileges and rights,” and “ordinarily defer” to the expertise of prison

officials in responding to COVID-19 unless there is “substantial evidence in the

record that the officials have exaggerated their response” to the situation when

evaluating a detention facility’s protocols. Id. at 326; see also Jones v. Ellis,

No. 21–cv–13625, 2021 WL 5015921, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2021) (“[A] detainee

asserting deliberate indifference based on exposure to COVID-19 must still

establish that the Defendant had the requisite mental state, which is akin to

recklessness.”).

Plaintiff asserts that defendants failed to follow CDC guidance on masking

and social distancing. (ECF No. 1 p. 4). “[I]mperfections in masking, testing,

and quarantining procedures—particularly in the challenging environment of

a detention center—do not, without more, amount to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement or punishment.” Lawson v. Hudson Cnty. Bd. of

Freeholders, No. 22–cv–04340, 2023 WL 6971540, at *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2023).

Moreover, “distancing strategies ‘will need to be tailored to the individual space

in the facility and the needs of the population and staff and ... ‘[n]ot all

strategies will be feasible in all facilities.’” Hope, 972 F.3d at 330 (alteration in

original) (quoting CDC, Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus

Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities, available at

https://perma.cc/XJ98-Q54X (last visited Feb. 26, 2025). I cannot reasonably

infer that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment without more

information about what policies, if any, were in effect in September 2021.

Therefore, I will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim.

Generally, “[a] plaintiff[ ] who file[s a] complaint[ ] subject to dismissal

under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be

inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d

Cir. 2002). I conclude that it would be futile to permit plaintiff to amend the

Complaint because the Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.

“Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a court may

dismiss claims sua sponte if a time-bar is obvious from the face of the complaint

and no further development of the record is necessary.” Demby v. Cnty. of

Camden, No. 21-1433, 2021 WL 4957002, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2021) (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1163 (2022). Section 1983

complaints are governed by New Jersey’s limitations period for personal

injuries and must be brought within two years of the claim’s accrual. See

Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under

federal law, a cause of action accrues ‘when the plaintiff knew or should have

known of the injury upon which the action is based.’” Montanez v. Sec’y

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Kach v.

Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009)).

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement and became ill in September 2021. (ECF No. 1–2 p. 1.) Plaintiff

would have known about the conditions at South Woods and his illness in

September 2021, so “[h]is claims accrued as he endured the circumstances while

confined.” McCargo v. Camden Cty. Jail, 693 F. App’x 164, 166 (3d Cir. 2017)

(per curiam). Therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s conditions of

confinement and denial of medical care claims expired in September 2023.

(ECF No. 1–2 p. 1.) This Complaint was filed over a year late.

I may equitably toll the statute of limitations in certain circumstances, but

“[a] party must plausibly plead allegations to support equitable tolling and ‘a

district court may dismiss an untimely cause of action if it is plain on the face

of the complaint that the limitations period cannot be tolled.’” Margolis v.

Warner Chilcott (US) LLC, No. 17–cv–04550, 2018 WL 2455925, at *6 (D.N.J.

May 31, 2018) (quoting Menichino v. Citibank, N.A., No. 12–cv–00058, 2013 WL

3802451, at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2013)). There are no facts in the Complaint

from which I could reasonably conclude that equitable tolling would be

appropriate in this matter. Therefore, I will deny leave to amend as plaintiff

cannot remedy the expiration of the statute of limitations. Ostuni v. Wa Wa’s

Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal with prejudice

due to expiration of statute of limitations); McCargo, 693 F. App’x at 166 (“We

therefore agree with the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s assessment that amendment of the

complaint would be futile because the statute of limitations clearly had expired

when [plaintiff] filed this complaint.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I will dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Leave to amend is denied. An appropriate

Order accompanies this Opinion.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel

EDWARD S. KIEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 28, 2025