Sowell v. Richardson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT February 28, 2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

KENNETH SOWELL, §

TDCJ #01322390, §

§

Plaintiff, §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-4411

§

JEFFERY RICHARDSON, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kenneth Sowell, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–

Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ), proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this

civil rights action. Sowell brings claims related to his medical care and disability.

Defendants Michelle Northcutt, R.N., and TDCJ have filed a motion for summary

judgment (Dkt. 119), and Sowell has responded (Dkt. 133; Dkt. 134).1 The motion is ripe

for decision. Having reviewed the pleadings, the motions and briefing, the applicable

authorities, and all matters of record, summary judgment will be granted for Northcutt and

TDCJ. Sowell’s claims against Captain Paul Hill will be dismissed without prejudice.

The Court’s reasons are explained below.

1 Sowell’s motion to oppose summary judgment (Dkt. 134), which the Court construes as a

motion for leave to file an additional response, will be granted, and Sowell’s arguments in the

motion will be considered.

I. BACKGROUND

Sowell originally sued seven defendants and complained of events from September

through November 2020. See Dkt. 26 (amended complaint); Dkt. 50 (more definite

statement). The Court granted Sowell leave to file a second supplemental complaint (Dkt.

51) bringing claims about events from August through October 2022. See Dkt. 53. After

screening his claims, the Court dismissed three defendants and ordered four defendants to

answer: Warden Jeffery Richardson; Captain Paul Hill; Michelle Northcutt, RN; and TDCJ

(Dkt. 58). The Court later dismissed all claims against Warden Richardson (Dkt. 97).

Northcutt and TDCJ then answered (Dkt. 98) and now move for summary judgment on all

claims (Dkt. 119). The remaining defendant, Captain Hill, separated from employment

with TDCJ on September 30, 2023 (Dkt. 73) and has not been served with process.2

Sowell has a high-grade tear of the anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) in his left knee,

diagnosed in 2019, and states that the tear causes him excruciating pain when walking, as

well as swelling, emotional distress, and mental anguish (Dkt. 50, at 1-2; see Dkt. 1-1 & 1-

2 (medical records)). He claims that on September 15, 2020, because of his torn ACL, a

medical doctor placed a restriction in his record stating that he could not walk over 25 yards

(Dkt. 26, at 12). He further claims that, in spite of the restriction, TDCJ officials forced

him to walk “exceedingly” in excess of the 25-yard limit, which caused unnecessary pain

2 In February 2024, the United States Marshal Service attempted service at Hill’s last-known

address, as supplied to the Court by the Office of the Attorney General (Dkt. 73). Service was

returned unexecuted with a notation that Hill left the residence in November 2023 (Dkt. 91).

Sowell requested that the Marshal Service attempt service again (Dkt. 103; Dkt. 106), but the Court

is unaware of any additional addresses for Hill.

and vulnerability to falls (id. at 9; Dkt. 50, at 1-2). In support of his claims, he submits

numerous sick-call requests (Dkt. 26; Dkt. 29) and grievance records from late 2020 (Dkt.

1-1, at 1-4 (Grievance 2021007195)). The grievance records reflect that, in response to his

complaint that officials were not honoring his walking restriction, the warden stated that

his restriction applied to his work assignment rather than his housing assignment. Sowell

disagrees with the warden’s characterization of the restriction, stating that the restriction

was “not a work restriction but a medical order” that TDCJ officials failed to honor (Dkt.

50, at 11). The relevant events occurred at the Estelle Unit.

Sowell alleges that Northcutt, a registered nurse, violated his Eighth Amendment

rights because she was deliberately indifferent to his severe knee pain. In particular, he

claims that Northcutt failed to have him moved or issue a wheelchair. He alleges that her

refusal to accommodate the restriction against walking more than 25 yards caused him

pain, suffering, distress, and missed activities (Dkt. 50, at 8-9) (discussing events of Sept.

21, 2020; Sept. 27, 2020; Nov. 4, 2020; and Nov. 5, 2020). His supplemental complaint

alleges that Northcutt is liable because, although he submitted sick-call requests to the

Estelle Unit’s medical department in August and September of 2022 complaining of neck

and back pain, he did not see a medical doctor or receive pain medication until September

30, 2022 (Dkt. 51, at 2) (discussing sick-call requests submitted on Aug. 25, 2022; Aug.

26, 2020; Sept. 1, 2022; Sept. 20, 2022; and Sept. 27, 2022)).

Sowell alleges that Captain Hill violated his Eighth Amendment rights because,

after Sowell showed him his 25-yard walking restriction on September 16, 2020, Hill

disregarded the restriction (Dkt. 26, at 12). He claims that Hill failed to have him moved

to a suitable facility to accommodate the restriction and failed to notify other personnel

about the restriction, causing him pain, suffering, and missed activities (Dkt. 50, at 6-7).

Sowell alleges that TDCJ violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA), because officials knew about, but failed to

accommodate, his ACL tear and his 25-yard walking restriction. He also claims that the

lack of accommodation denied him access to services and programs including the library,

the day room, and church services, and that officials’ actions were discriminatory (id. at 4;

Dkt. 51, at 3). He seeks only monetary damages for his ADA claim (Dkt. 26, at 18; Dkt.

50, at 12).

The defendants’ motion provides background information regarding medical

restrictions for TDCJ inmates which, as provided by Policy A-08.4, are assigned when an

inmate arrives at TDCJ and later updated by medical providers as needed (Dkt. 119-3

(Policy A-08.4), at 4-5). An attachment to Policy A-08.4 discusses the restrictions that

medical personnel may place on an inmate’s facility assignment, housing assignment, or

work assignment (id. at 6-10 (Attachment A)). Facility restrictions include assignments to

single-level facilities or those offering extended medical services (id. at 6 (Section I)).

Housing restrictions include “basic housing” restrictions such as single-cell or special

housing assignments, as well as bunk assignments, row assignments, and wheelchair use

(id. at 6-7 (Section II)). Work restrictions include more than 20 different restrictions,

including restrictions to sedentary work, limitations on the number of hours worked, and

limitations or climbing or reaching (id. at 7-9 (Section III)). As relevant to Sowell’s case,

these work restrictions include medical “unassignment” for inmates who should be given

no work assignment (id. at 8 (Section III(B)(1)) and walking restrictions for inmates who

should not exceed a certain number of yards on the job (id. (Section III(B)(8)). The policy

requires that these restrictions, after being determined by medical personnel, be indicated

on a Health Summary for Classification (HSM-18) form for each inmate (id. at 3). The

HSM-18 form then is used by TDCJ’s classification officials to make appropriate facility,

housing, and work assignments for the inmate (id. at 6).

Policy A-08.4 provides that restrictions for facility, housing, and work “must be

based upon orders by a physician, midlevel provider, dentist, or qualified mental health

professional” (id.).3 See Dkt. 119-4, at 5 (TDCJ Administrative Directive 4.17 states that

updates to an inmate’s HSM-18 forms are updated, based on an inmate’s health status, by

“[h]ealth care staff, such as a physician, mid-level practitioner, dentist, or psychologist”).

The defendants submit the affidavit of Bobby Vincent, M.D., Regional Medical

Director for UTMB CMC Correctional Managed Care (UTMB/CMC) (Dkt. 121-2). Dr.

Vincent provides a comprehensive review of Sowell’s medical treatment during the

relevant period, as well as pertinent medical records. His affidavit states that he reviewed

Sowell’s medical records from his incarceration in 2005 through August 20, 2024, as well

as Sowell’s complaint, amended complaint, more definite statement, and supplemental

complaint (id. at 2). The defendants also submit Sowell’s HSM-18 forms reflecting his

facility, housing, and work restrictions from 2020 through 2024 (Dkt. 119-5).

3 By contrast, disciplinary or treatment-plan restrictions may be based on recommendations

of additional providers, including nurses (id.).

Dr. Vincent states that, in the fall of 2020, Sowell received medical treatment from

Northcutt and others regarding his knee pain and his request for renewed or increased

medical restrictions (Dkt. 121-2, at 6-8). Clinic records from September 2020 reflect

objective findings that Sowell was ambulatory with a cane, had a brace on his left knee,

and had no swelling (id. at 6; see id. at 219-222 (Exhibit X)). On September 15, 2020, a

medical doctor adjusted Sowell’s restriction for work assignments, lowering the maximum

walking distance to 25 yards for one year (id. at 6, 12; see id. at 219-222 (Exhibit X)).4

Sowell’s HSM-18 forms for the period from September 15, 2020, through September 15,

2021, reflect no unit restrictions; housing restrictions to lower bunk and ground floor; no

wheelchair restrictions; and work restrictions including a 25-yard walking restriction (Dkt.

119-5, at 5-8).5

On September 27, 2020, Northcutt examined Sowell in response to an additional

sick-call request and noted a full range of motion, normal gait and posture, and that Sowell

ambulated without problems (Dkt. 121-2, at 6-7; id. at 18-26 (Exhibit AA)). Sowell

complained that his current housing assignment was more than 25 yards from the chow

hall. The records reflect that, after Northcutt informed him of other housing options

4 In the records from September 15, 2020, the provider checked boxes for “cuff pass,”

“bottom bunk/row,” “medically unassigned,” and “front cell/no walking greater than 25 yards”

(id. at 221). The records further state, “ADD Section III-8. No Walking > - Yards: 25 # of Days:

365” (id.). This notation appears to correspond to Policy A-08.4, Attachment A, Section III(B)(8),

which covers restrictions for walking over a certain number of yards on the job (see Dkt. 119-3, at

8), and to order a 25-yard walking restriction for 365 days. Dr. Vincent states that that the 25-yard

walking restriction was for work only and expired on Sept. 16, 2021 (Dkt. 121-2, at 9, 12).

5 The HSM-18 forms reflect work restrictions during the period including “W01” and

“W08,” which appear to correspond to medical unassignment and walking restrictions under

Policy A-08.4, Attachment A, Section III(B)(1) & (8). See Dkt. 119-3, at 8.

including inpatient or geriatric housing, Sowell retracted his request for different housing

(id. at 7; id. at 24). Sowell states that these records are inaccurate, that Northcutt did not

inform him of those options, and that he did not retract his request (Dkt. 134, at 6).

On October 15, 2020, an x-ray showed no acute fracture or dislocation but a

probable ligament rupture (Dkt. 121-2, at 7; id. at 27-39 (Exhibit A-B); id. at 40-42 (Exhibit

A-C)). On October 21, 2020, Sowell submitted a new sick-call request complaining of

pain and requesting medication. Northcutt responded the next day, providing him with

copies of his passes and restrictions, telling him that ibuprofen was available from the pill

window, and advising him of a follow-up appointment at Hospital Galveston two weeks

later (id. at 7; id. at 57-58 (Exhibit A-F)).

On November 4, 2020, Sowell submitted another sick-call request in which he

complained of extreme pain caused by walking from his cell to the chow hall, inquired

about the 25-yard walking restriction, and asked about his upcoming appointment (id. at 7;

id. at 59-61 (Exhibit A-G)). Northcutt called Sowell to the clinic on November 5, 2020,

reiterated that his work restriction was in place, reviewed his current orders, and provided

information about his upcoming appointment (id. at 7; id. at 62-63 (Exhibit A-H)).

On November 23, 2020, Sowell saw a specialist at Hospital Galveston and agreed

to undergo reconstructive surgery of his left knee (id. at 7; id. at 43-52 (Exhibit A-D)). His

surgery was scheduled for December 18, 2020, but Sowell did not attend the appointment

because of a dispute over his personal hygiene materials (id. at 9; id. at 66-67 (Exhibit A-

J)). Surgery was rescheduled for January 22, 2021, but Sowell again refused the procedure

(id. at 8; id. at 73-76 (Exhibits A-M & A-N)).

Sowell’s supplemental complaint alleges that Northcutt again violated his rights in

August and September 2022, after he submitted additional sick-call requests for knee pain

(Dkt. 51, at 2-3). TDCJ’s records reflect that Sowell did not attend scheduled appointments

due to unit lockdown or other issues (Dkt. 121-2, at 10; id. at 115-117 (Exhibit B-A); id.

at 118-19 (Exhibit B-B); id. at 120-21 (Exhibit B-C)). On September 23, 2022, in response

to a renewed sick-call request, Northcutt noted that Sowell had missed several

appointments but again rescheduled him (id. at 10; id. at 122-23 (Exhibit B-D)). On

September 30, 2022, a medical provider saw Sowell in the clinic for pain and provided

medications and a referral. The records reflect that, when the provider discussed Sowell’s

failure to attend past therapy appointments, Sowell stated that he had not been informed of

the appointments and that he would amend his federal lawsuit (id. at 10; id. at 124-27

(Exhibit B-E). On October 28, 2022, Sowell again was treated in the clinic for knee pain

and was provided with an expedited referral to a specialist, as well as renewed work

restrictions (id. at 10; id. at 128-30 (Exhibit B-F)).

Dr. Vincent states that Sowell’s records do not reflect that he ever had knee surgery

or any other invasive procedure to correct the ACL tear in his left knee. He avers that

specialists at Hospital Galveston had determined on February 28, 2022, that surgery was

not the best option for Sowell, but rather that he needed rehabilitation services (id. at 10-

11). Based on his exhaustive review of the medical records, Dr. Vincent concludes that

medical personnel provided Sowell a variety of treatments and therapies for his left knee

but that Sowell had refused some treatments, including surgeries, and failed to show for

multiple appointments. Regarding Sowell’s medical restrictions, Dr. Vincent states that

Sowell’s 25-yard walking restriction was a work restriction that did not control his housing

assignment and that Sowell’s condition did not require a wheelchair at any time (id. at 11-

12).

Regarding Northcutt, Dr. Vincent explains that, pursuant to Policy A-08.4,

Attachment A, a nurse such as Northcutt cannot place a restriction on a patient (id. at 11).

He opines that Northcutt rendered appropriate care in September and November 2020 when

she reviewed his history, assessed his condition, documented his complaints and requests,

and issued crutches and a pass. He also states that in August and September 2022, contrary

to Sowell’s allegation that Northcutt ignored his complaints, she or other providers

responded to all of his sick-call requests (id. at 13-14). He concludes that Northcutt

rendered timely and appropriate care:

Based upon my education, training and experience as a physician in both the

community and correctional settings, I believe that the medical care provided

to Mr. Sowell—including all of the care provided by Nurse Northcutt—was

appropriate, timely and performed within the standard of care.

(id. at 14).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary

judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 594 (5th

Cir. 2013). Once the movant presents a properly supported motion for summary judgment,

the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show with significant probative evidence the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d

473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might

affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” Id. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the

evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Id. The nonmoving party must present specific facts which show “the existence of a

genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.” Firman v. Life Ins. Co.

of N. Am., 684 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the reviewing court must “construe all

facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Dillon v. Rogers,

596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). A plaintiff’s statements may be sufficient

to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. See Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 492-

93 (5th Cir. 2019). However, the non-movant cannot avoid summary judgment simply by

presenting “conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences,

unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation.” Jones v. Lowndes Cnty., 678

F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,

1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Rather, “[s]elf-serving affidavits and declarations, like all

summary judgment evidence, must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that

would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to

testify on the matters stated.” Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 161 (5th

Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4)).

Finally, Rule 56 does not impose upon a court a duty to sift through the record in

search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment. Evidence not

referred to in the response to the motion for summary judgment is not properly before the

court, even if it exists in the summary judgment record. Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d

393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003).

B. Pro Se Filings

In reviewing the pleadings, the court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff

proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction

and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up).

Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff must allege more than “‘labels and

conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Regardless of how well-pleaded the factual

allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid

legal theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Geiger v. Jowers, 404

F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

Although the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, “the notice afforded by the Rules of

Civil Procedure and the local rules” is considered “sufficient” to advise a pro se party of

his burden in opposing a summary judgment motion. Martin v. Harrison County Jail, 975

F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992). Even a pro se plaintiff must specifically refer to evidence

in the summary judgment record in order to place that evidence properly before the court.

Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 217 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2016); see E.E.O.C. v.

Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Despite our general willingness to

construe pro se filings liberally, we still require pro se parties to fundamentally abide by

the rules that govern the federal courts. Pro se litigants must properly . . . present summary

judgment evidence”) (cleaned up).

III. DISCUSSION

Sowell brings claims against Northcutt and Hill under the Eighth Amendment. His

constitutional claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a vehicle for a

claim against a person “acting under color of state law,” such as a prison official, for a

constitutional violation. See Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016).

He brings claims against TDCJ under the ADA.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As a preliminary matter, the defendants argue that Sowell did not exhaust his

administrative remedies for some of his claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake,

136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d

503, 515 (5th Cir. 2004). Sowell argues strenuously that he fully exhausted all claims and

that some records presented by the defendants are inaccurate (Dkt. 132; Dkt. 134; see Dkt.

90; Dkt. 107). The Court does not rely on exhaustion because, for the reasons stated below,

Sowell’s claims must be dismissed on other grounds. See Nottingham v. Richardson, 499

F. App’x 368, 374 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Dillon, 596 F.3d at 271).

B. Eighth Amendment Claims

Sowell alleges that Northcutt violated his rights in 2020 and 2022 in connection

with his medical care. Because the plaintiff was, at all relevant times, a convicted felon in

state prison, his claims regarding denial of adequate medical care are governed by the

Eighth Amendment prohibition against “cruel and unusual” conditions of confinement.

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33

(1993) (the Eighth Amendment “requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human

needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety’”).

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that the

defendant exhibited “deliberate indifference” to his serious medical needs. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019);

Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2006). An inmate can demonstrate a

constitutional violation “by showing that a prison official refused to treat him, ignored his

complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that

would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Thompson v. Tex.

Dep’t of Crim. Just., 67 F.4th 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). A plaintiff must show

that the defendant was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn of a

substantial risk of serious harm; that the defendant subjectively drew the inference that the

risk existed; and that the defendant disregarded the risk. Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 676.

Deliberate indifference is an “extremely high standard.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of

Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). It requires “more than an allegation of

mere negligence, but less than an allegation of purpose or knowledge.” Hinojosa v.

Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 2015). A significant risk that the official “should

have perceived but did not” is insufficient for a constitutional violation. Cleveland, 938

F.3d at 676. Deliberate indifference is not shown when “medical records indicate that the

plaintiff was afforded extensive medical care by prison officials,” even when the plaintiff

alleges that doctors “refus[ed] to accommodate his requests in the manner he desired.”

Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “Medical records of

sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an inmate’s allegations of

deliberate indifference.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346 n. 24 (cleaned up). Moreover, a delay

in medical care can constitute a constitutional violation only if there has been deliberate

indifference that results in substantial harm. Delaughter v. Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 136 (5th

Cir. 2018).

In this case, Sowell alleges that Northcutt acted with deliberate indifference in the

fall of 2020 when she disregarded his 25-yard walking restriction and his request for a

wheelchair or a different housing assignment, despite her knowledge of his extreme pain

and his inability to put pressure on his knee (Dkt. 50, at 8-9; Dkt. 134, at 3-6). He also

alleges that she was deliberately indifferent in 2022 because he submitted five sick-call

requests to the Estelle medical clinic between August 25 and September 27, 2022,

requesting treatment for pain, but was not seen until September 30, 2022 (Dkt. 51, at 2-3).

The medical records, including those submitted by Sowell, demonstrate that Sowell

received frequent medical care in September-November 2020 and August-October 2022,

including regular care for his left knee. Some of this treatment was rendered by Northcutt,

who examined him, assessed his condition, issued crutches, confirmed his medical

restrictions, assisted with medication, and rescheduled and reminded him of his

appointments. To the extent Sowell disagrees with the treatment Northcutt provided, or

her responses to his sick-call requests, his disagreement is inadequate to demonstrate

deliberate indifference where, as here, the records show that he was afforded extensive

medical care. See Brauner, 793 F.3d at 500; Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346 n. 24. Moreover, to

the extent Sowell bases his claim on an alleged delay in care, his sick-call requests directed

to the Estelle medical department are insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact

regarding Northcutt’s deliberate indifference. See Delaughter, 909 F.3d at 136. To the

contrary, Northcutt and other providers responded to all of Sowell’s requests within days

(Dkt. 121-2, at 115-23).

Additionally, TDCJ’s records show that Sowell had no facility or housing restriction

during the relevant period, other than lower bunk and ground floor restrictions, but had a

one-year work restriction against walking over 25 yards (Dkt. 121-2, at 6, 12; id. at 219-

22; Dkt. 119-5, at 5-8). Sowell’s bare assertion that the 25-yard restriction was “a medical

order” (Dkt. 50, at 11), and thus that Northcutt or others should have applied the restriction

to his housing assignment, is conclusory and insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of

fact given the uncontroverted evidence that the restriction applied to work assignments

only. See Jones, 678 F.3d at 348. Additionally, to the extent Sowell argues that Northcutt

should have ordered a new housing restriction, the summary-judgment reflects that, as a

registered nurse, she was not authorized to fulfill such a request. See Dkt. 121-2, at 11

(restrictions can be assigned only by a physician or a mid-level provider; nursing staff

“cannot place a restriction on a patient”).

Summary judgment will be granted for Northcutt.

C. ADA Claims

Sowell sues TDCJ for failure to accommodate his disability under the ADA. He

seeks compensatory damages and has clarified that he does not seek injunctive relief (Dkt.

50, at 12). TDCJ concedes that Sowell’s ACL tear is a “qualifying disability” under the

statute (Dkt. 119, at 25).

To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) he is a

qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential limitations

were known by the covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to make reasonable

accommodations.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015). To recover

compensatory damages, he must show “intentional discrimination,” which requires more

than deliberate indifference. Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 723-24 (5th Cir.

2020); Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 574 (5th Cir.

2018).

Sowell alleges that TDCJ failed to accommodate his 25-yard walking restriction

when officials did not provide him with a wheelchair or a housing assignment that was

within 25 yards of the chow hall and other unit locations (Dkt. 133, at 2; Dkt. 134, at 7-9).

He claims that the lack of accommodation caused him excruciating pain when walking to

receive TDCJ’s programs and services, or caused him not to receive the programs and

services (Dkt. 133, at 2). He argues that TDCJ was aware of his complaints because of his

multiple grievances (Dkt. 134, at 8). However, Sowell’s records reflect that his 25-yard

walking restriction was for work, not housing, and Sowell does not demonstrate a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether TDCJ officials failed to accommodate any medical

restrictions reflected on his HSM-18 forms. To the extent Sowell argues that medical

personnel should have authorized additional restrictions for his housing assignments, this

argument cannot suffice to show ADA violations by TDCJ.6 Sowell does not demonstrate

a genuine issue of fact as to whether TDCJ failed to make reasonable accommodations for

his disability whether intentionally discriminated against him. Summary judgment

therefore will be granted for TDCJ and Sowell’s claim for compensatory damages will be

dismissed.

D. Captain Hill

Captain Hill, who has separated from TDCJ, has not been served with process. The

United States Marshal Service’s attempt to serve Hill at his last-known address was

unsuccessful, and the unexecuted return of service states that Hill left the residence in

November 2023 (Dkt. 91). The Court has no additional information about Hill’s location.

Sowell’s claims against Captain Hill are similar to his claims against Northcutt and

TDCJ. He claims that, after he spoke to Hill regarding his 25-yard walking restriction, Hill

did not arrange for Sowell’s reassignment to another facility. In other words, his claim

6 As stated above, medical restrictions are ordered by medical personnel, who complete the

classification (HSM-18) forms, and are not ordered by TDCJ officials. See Dkt. 119-3 (Policy A-

08.4); Dkt. 121-2, at 11-12. TDCJ follows and complies with the restrictions listed on an HSM-

18 form, but does not authorize medical restrictions. See Vasquez v. Kwarteng, No. 2:20-CV-

00098, 2022 WL 20209909, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2022) (“while TDCJ is responsible for

housing inmates in accordance with any medical restriction, TDCJ is not responsible for

authorizing the health-related [restriction] in the first place”); Buchanan v. Harris, No. CV H-19-

4571, 2023 WL 2504764, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-20128, 2024 WL

1927651 (5th Cir. May 2, 2024) (correctional personnel are entitled to rely on medical providers).

against Captain Hill is based on his allegation that his 25-yard walking restriction should

have been applied to his housing or facility assignments, in addition to his work

assignment. See Dkt. 26, at 12-13; Dkt. 50, at 6-7. As explained above, the uncontradicted

summary-judgment evidence shows that Sowell’s 25-yard walking restriction did not apply

to his facility or housing assignments, and Dr. Vincent avers that no such restriction was

medically necessary. Therefore, his claim against Captain Hill would lack merit. See

Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001) (when a defending party establishes that

a plaintiff has no cause of action, the defense generally inures also to the benefit of a

similarly situated defendant).

Because Hill has not been served with process, Sowell’s claims against him will be

dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Gonzales v. Reilley, 2023

WL 7443213, *4 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2023) (citing Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir.

2022)). Sowell’s motion for service on Hill (Dkt. 103) will be denied as moot. His motion

for entry of default against Hill (Dkt. 116) will be denied. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55; Lewis,

236 F.3d at 767.

E. Other pending motions

Sowell’s motion for production of documents includes requests for medical records,

TDCJ policies relevant to his claims, and grievances (Dkt. 99). Many of these documents

subsequently were produced in the summary-judgment briefing, as detailed above. To the

extent not produced, Sowell’s motion does not demonstrate that the requested documents

would be relevant to the dispositive issues in this case. Therefore, his motion will be

denied as moot.

Sowell’s motion to enter land (Dkt. 101), which requests leave to measure and

photograph distances between various locations on the Estelle Unit, will be denied as

moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above the Court now ORDERS as follows:

1. Sowell’s motion to oppose summary judgment (Dkt. 134), which the Court

construes as a motion for leave to file an additional response, is GRANTED.

2. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 119) is GRANTED.

All of Sowell’s claims against Northcutt and TDCJ are DISMISSED with

prejudice.

3. Sowell’s claims against Hill are DISMISSED without prejudice. His

motions for service on Hill (Dkt. 103) and for entry of default (Dkt. 116) are

DENIED as moot.

4. Sowell’s motion for production of documents (Dkt. 99) and motion to enter

land (Dkt. 101) are DENIED as moot.

5. All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on February 28 , 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19/19