MacAllister v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 25-351C

Filed: February 28, 2025

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DON MACALLISTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

ORDER

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action on February 27, 2025, and the complaint

was docketed the same day. The plaintiff contemporaneously filed a motion for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis.1

The complaint fails to identify a non-frivolous basis for Tucker Act jurisdiction over the

plaintiff’s claims and is dismissed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the

Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”).

Before considering the merits of a plaintiff’s claims, a court must first determine that it

has jurisdiction to hear the case. Jurisdiction is a threshold matter that a court must resolve

before it addresses the merits of a case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-

95 (1998). A federal court has a responsibility to ensure that it has jurisdiction over any claims

asserted. See, e.g., St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 916 F.3d 987, 992-93 (Fed. Cir.

2019). A court may dismiss a complaint on its own initiative if “the pleadings sufficiently

evince a basis” for the court to take that action. Anaheim Gardens v. United States, 444 F.3d

1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006). At this stage of the case, all the plaintiff’s nonfrivolous factual

allegations are assumed to be true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Trusted

Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

The plaintiff is proceeding pro se. As a result, his complaint is given a more liberal

construction than it would be given if prepared by a lawyer. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972). Notwithstanding this liberal construction, a pro se plaintiff must still

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Based on the information contained in the plaintiff’s motion, the plaintiff is eligible to

proceed in forma pauperis. The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is

GRANTED.

demonstrate that his complaint satisfies the jurisdictional limits on the Court of Federal Claims.

See Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

The jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is established by the Tucker Act, which

provides:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to

render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded

either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any

regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or

implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

The Tucker Act waives the sovereign immunity of the federal government to provide

jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims for a claim founded on an express or implied contract

with the United States, for a refund from a prior payment made to the United States, or a claim

based on a federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision mandating compensation by

the federal government for damages sustained, unless arising from a tort. See United States v.

Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289-90 (2009). For a claim based on an alleged violation of law,

the plaintiff must identify a money-mandating source of law in addition to asserting jurisdiction

under the Tucker Act. See Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en

banc in relevant part).

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, acting through the Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA”), has imposed an illegal condition that limits what entities can receive federal

grants through the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund that the complaint alleges was established

under the Inflation Reduction Act, Pub. L. 117-169. The complaint alleges that the EPA has

imposed a “five-year commercialization rule” on applicants for funding to establish charging

station for electric vehicles. (Compl. at 1.) The plaintiff alleges that this five-year

commercialization rule is not authorized by the Inflation Reduction Act, the law creating the

fund. The plaintiff further alleges that he has invented a charger for electric vehicles that is

much faster than those that have been commercialized for five years and is being shut out of the

funding due to the five-year commercialization requirements imposed by the EPA but not

authorized under the law.

The plaintiff seeks a declaration that the EPA’s five-year commercialization rule is

illegal, an injunction barring further disbursement of the relevant funds, and an award of

damages of $5 billion for “lost business opportunities, reputational harm, and financial damages

suffered due to the [EPA’s] deliberate exclusion” of the technology invented by the plaintiff

from qualifying for the grant program. (Compl. at 2.) The damages requested also would

compensate the plaintiff for the delay in listing his company on the NASDAQ stock exchange

caused by the EPA’s regulation.

The complaint fails to identify a source of law that can reasonably be interpreted as

requiring the defendant to pay damages for its violation. The complaint alleges that the EPA

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acted without statutory authorization in imposing the five-year commercialization rule. That

claim presents the quintessential claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); it is

not a claim cognizable under the Tucker Act because there is no underlying source of law that

mandates the payment of money to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s claim for damages is also outside the Tucker Act’s limits on the

jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. Nothing in the relevant provisions of the Inflation

Reduction Act can reasonably be read to mandate the payment of damages for a violation of the

law. The damages claim is not within this court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction. In addition, the harm

the plaintiff alleges the EPA’s regulatory action has caused him to suffer—lost business

opportunities and reputational damages—are tort claims. Gates v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 9,

12 (1995). The financial damages the plaintiff alleges arise from these tort claims and are not the

type of damages available under the Tucker Act, which expressly excludes claims arising in tort

from the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.

The plaintiff seeks to qualify to receive federal grants; he cannot do so due to a regulatory

restriction alleged to be illegal. The focus of the complaint on equitable relief (a declaratory

judgment and injunction), reflects that this case is best viewed as an APA claim that can only be

brought in a federal district court, not this court. Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over

the complaint. Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The Court of

Federal Claims lacks APA jurisdiction”).

Before dismissing a complaint for lack of jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1631 requires the

court to consider whether to transfer the case to a federal court that can exercise jurisdiction.

The Inflation Reduction Act does not appear to include any specific jurisdictional or venue

limitations in the relevant portions of the law. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s APA claims can be

brought in any district court. Typically, such a claim would likely be brought in the District of

Columbia, but it need not be. The plaintiff resides in California and might prefer to litigate his

claim there, closer to his home. Rather than select a court to which this case should be

transferred, it is in the plaintiff’s best interest to allow him to select the appropriate venue in

which to pursue his claim. Transfer initiated by this court is not appropriate.

The dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is without prejudice, meaning the plaintiff is able to

refile his complaint in a federal district court of his choosing; this dismissal does not reflect a

determination on the merits of the complaint.

The complaint fails to present a claim within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal

Claims and is, accordingly, DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) and

12(h)(3). The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. No costs are awarded.

It is so ORDERED.

s/ Richard A. Hertling

Richard A. Hertling

Judge

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