Adame v. National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, Inc.

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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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12 MYRNA ADAME, et al., Lead Case No.: 24-cv-00297-AJB-VET

Plaintiffs, Consolidated with:

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Case No. 24-cv-00306-AJB-VET

14 v. Case No. 24-cv-00346-AJB-VET

Case No. 24-cv-00350-AJB-VET

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NATIONAL STEEL AND

16 SHIPBUILDING COMPANY, INC., ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

et al., MOTION TO REMAND

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Defendants. (Doc. No. 12)

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20 Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. (Doc. No. 12.)

21 Defendants National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, General Dynamics Corporation,

22 Inc., General Dynamics NASSCO, and General Dynamics NASSCO Holding, LLC

23 (collectively, “NASSCO”) and United Support Systems (“USSI”) (collectively,

24 “Defendants”) filed an opposition (Doc. No. 15), to which Plaintiffs replied (Doc. No. 16).

25 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to remand.

26 I. BACKGROUND

27 Plaintiffs’ complaint arises from injuries caused by toxic smoke that emanated from

28 a July 2020 fire on the United States Navy’s amphibious assault ship, the USS Bonhomme

1 Richard (“BHR”). (Complaint (“Compl.”), Doc. No. 1-4, ¶¶ 1–2, 25–26.) The fire began

2 on July 12, 2020, and continued until July 16, 2020. (Id. ¶ 15.) From the cargo area where

3 the fire originated, flames spread quickly throughout the ship, raising temperatures to about

4 1,200 degrees and resulting in a series of explosions. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.) At the time of the fire,

5 the ship was undergoing maintenance pier-side adjacent to Naval Base San Diego (the

6 “Naval Base”) in San Diego, California. (Id. ¶ 15.) Both NASSCO and USSI were under

7 contract with the Navy to service BHR at the time of the fire. (Doc. No. 15 at 8.)2 NASSCO

8 provided general contractor services for the repair of BHR, while USSI was hired to

9 provide the duties of the Contract Fire Service Officer (“CFSO”). (Doc. No. 12-1 at 9.)

10 In the aftermath, the Navy investigated the fire aboard BHR and concluded that,

11 while the cause of the fire was arson, the “magnitude and severity of the fire” was caused

12 by “the handling and storage of materials coupled with the lack of coordination on the

13 weekend of the fire, combined with a lack of mitigation or consideration for risk

14 accumulation[.]” (U.S. NAVY, COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FIRE ABOARD USS

15 BONHOMME RICHARD (LHD-6) 12 JULY 2020, 5830 MEMO N00/156 (Apr. 5, 2021), Doc.

16 No. 12-5, at 11, 259.)

17 Plaintiffs, who are homeowners, renters, business owners, and other individuals in

18 the San Diego area, allege their health and property were severely harmed by the BHR fire.

19 (Compl. ¶ 2.) The San Diego County Air Pollution Control District found over a dozen

20 harmful toxic substances in the air. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs inhaled these substances over

21 several days, causing severe eye, nose, throat, and lung damage, other upper respiratory

22 conditions, and neurological symptoms, including but not limited to headaches, dizziness,

23 fatigue, anxiety, confusion, stress, nausea, and vomiting. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants’

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25 1 This case results from the consolidation of four actions filed against Defendants: (1) the instant

lead case Adame et al. v. Nat’l Steel and Shipbuilding Co. et al., 23-cv-00297-AJB-VET; (2) Garland et

26 al. v. Nat’l Steel and Shipbuilding Co. et al., 24-cv-00306-AJB-VET; (3) Adame et al. v. Nat’l Steel and

Shipbuilding Co. et al., 24-cv-00346-AJB-VET; and (4) Garland et al. v. Barrera et al., 24-cv-00350-

27 AJB-VET. All references to filings are to those in the lead case.

2 Citations to the record refer to the electronic pagination of the CM/ECF system at the top of each

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1 negligent acts and omissions caused the fire and directly contributed to its uncontrolled

2 spread across the ship. (Id. ¶ 15.)

3 Each of the consolidated actions were originally filed in state court but removed to

4 this Court. On March 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to remand. (Doc. No. 12.)

5 II. LEGAL STANDARD

6 As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts may hear only those cases for which

7 subject matter jurisdiction has been conferred either by Congress or by the Constitution.

8 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Generally, removal of

9 a civil action to federal court is proper only if the district court would have original

10 jurisdiction over the matter at the time of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts

11 must construe the removal statutes strictly against removal and resolve any uncertainty as

12 to removability in favor of remanding the case to state court. Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662,

13 663 (9th Cir. 1988). The burden is on the removing party to demonstrate federal subject

14 matter jurisdiction over the case. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195

15 (9th Cir. 1988).

16 III. DISCUSSION

17 Defendants removed the state civil action to this Court raising several bases for

18 removal: (1) federal enclave jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); (2) the Federal Officer

19 Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442; and (3) maritime jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

20 (Notice of Removal (“NOR”), Doc. No. 1, ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs challenge each of these theories

21 of removal and move to remand. (Doc. No. 12.)

22 A. Federal Enclave Jurisdiction

23 1. Parties’ Arguments

24 As an initial matter, the parties agree that Naval Base San Diego is a federal enclave.

25 (See Doc. Nos. 12-1 at 15; 15 at 10.) The Court concurs. See Carvajal v. Pride Indus., Inc.,

26 No. 10-CV-002319-GPC-MDD, 2013 WL 1728273, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) (“The

27 Naval Base San Diego, formerly known as The Destroyer Base, became a federal enclave

28 on February 23, 1922 pursuant to General Order No. 78 of the Navy Department and the

1 State of California authorized the transfer of land.”). However, at issue here is whether

2 BHR constituted a federal enclave while docked at Pier 2 of the Naval Base during the

3 events in question.

4 Plaintiffs assert federal enclave jurisdiction does not apply because their claims do

5 not “arise” within a federal enclave. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 14–17.) First, as BHR was docked

6 in navigable waters within three miles of the coast, Plaintiffs assert there is joint state and

7 federal jurisdiction, thus precluding federal enclave jurisdiction. (Id. at 15–16.) Second,

8 Plaintiffs argue their claims arise where the injury occurred—“within their San Diego

9 residential neighborhoods”—not where Defendants’ actions occurred. (Id. at 16–17.)

10 In opposition, Defendants respond that removal is proper based on federal enclave

11 jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ claims stem from conduct alleged to have taken place within

12 a federal enclave, regardless of where the alleged injury occurred. (Doc. No. 15 at 10–12,

13 15–16.) Specifically, Defendants assert that BHR was docked within the boundaries of the

14 Naval Base, thus making the ship itself a federal enclave. (Id. at 12–15.) To support this

15 contention, Defendants provide a photograph depicting BHR docked at Pier 2 of the Naval

16 Base and a map demonstrating that “326 acres of water,” including those waters

17 surrounding Pier 2, are within the boundaries of the Naval Base. (Id. at 12–13; see also

18 Exhibit A–B of this Order.)

19 2. Legal Standard

20 “Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over tort claims that arise on

21 ‘federal enclaves.’” Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir.

22 2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The federal enclave doctrine draws its authority from

23 Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution:

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Congress shall have power . . . [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases

25 whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by

Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat

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of Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all

27 Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the

Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,

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1 U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 17. “As this clause has been interpreted, when the federal

2 government purchases state land with the consent of the state legislature, any law existing

3 on that land must derive its authority and force from the United States and is for that reason

4 federal law.” Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. (“San Mateo III”), 32 F.4th 733, 749

5 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal punctuation and citation omitted); see also Willis v. Craig, 555

6 F.2d 724, 725 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647

7 (1930)) (“‘Exclusive legislation’ in clause 17 has been construed to mean exclusive

8 ‘jurisdiction’ in the sense of exclusive sovereignty.”).

9 The Ninth Circuit has noted that the doctrine of federal enclave jurisdiction is applied

10 narrowly. City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP (“Honolulu II”), 39 F.4th 1101, 1111

11 (9th Cir. 2022). “A claim must allege that an injury occurred on a federal enclave or that

12 an injury stemmed from conduct on a federal enclave.” Id. (citing San Mateo III, 32 F.4th

13 at 749–50). “And the connection between injuries and conduct must not be too attenuated

14 and remote. For example, a defendant cannot use activities on federal enclaves to create

15 instant jurisdiction for a state-law claim.” Id. (citation omitted).

16 3. Location of Injury and of Conduct from Which Injury Stemmed

17 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs argue that their injuries could not have “arisen from”

18 a federal enclave because, pursuant to California substantive law, a cause of action only

19 accrues once all the elements of the tort were complete—including the injuries which

20 occurred in the residential neighborhoods. (Doc. Nos. 12-1 at 16–17; 16 at 11–13.)

21 Plaintiffs’ initial argument on this issue is devoid of case law. (See generally Doc. No. 12-

22 1.) In their reply, Plaintiffs assert that “[c]ourts in this district and many others have held

23 that tort claims ‘arise’ within the federal enclave for jurisdictional purposes once the

24 underlying tort is complete as a matter of substantive law.” (Doc. No. 16 at 11–12.)

25 However, the cases cited by Plaintiffs are outdated, are inapposite either to the proposition

26 presented for or to the circumstances of the instant case, or are out-of-circuit.

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1 More apropos, in 2022, the Ninth Circuit issued two opinions setting forth the

2 framework for federal enclave jurisdiction. See San Mateo III, 32 F.4th at 749–50;

3 Honolulu II, 39 F.4th at 1111. In San Mateo III, after surveying the sparse case law on the

4 issue, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the plaintiffs’ “tort claims arose from actions and

5 injuries that occurred on federal enclaves and thus were governed by federal law.” 32 F.4th

6 at 749–50. In Honolulu II, the Ninth Circuit clearly set forth the rule that “[a] claim must

7 allege that an injury occurred on a federal enclave or that an injury stemmed from conduct

8 on a federal enclave.” 39 F.4th at 1111 (emphasis added).3

9 Here, the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs clearly stemmed from conduct on BHR.

10 Plaintiffs’ complaint includes myriad allegations of negligent conduct on BHR, including

11 failing to clear and properly store scaffolding, cables, equipment and debris. (See, e.g.,

12 Compl. ¶ 17 (“A reasonable person in Defendants’ position would store away such clutter

13 to prevent fire hazards, but Defendants failed to implement the most basic fire safety

14 practice.”); ¶ 18 (“Defendants had carelessly placed large and heavy electric and other

15 cables in a manner that prevented sailors from closing doors and other hatches to prevent

16 the further spread of the fire. Misplaced scaffolding, equipment, and debris also came in

17 the way of firefighters, thereby compounding the already difficult task of fighting

18 flames.”); ¶ 19 (“Considering the maintenance work that was being done, and the

19 hazardous conditions on the ship, a reasonable person would have maintained close watch

20 on the area, but Defendants failed to maintain the requisite level of competent watch crews

21 to look after the vessel.”); ¶ 22 (“Nonetheless, fire safety procedures were not followed by

22 Defendants on the USS Bonhomme Richard and their negligence caused (and helped

23 spread) the fire that burned for nearly five days and emitted toxic fumes that enveloped

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25 3 Because the Ninth Circuit has clearly defined what it means for a tort claim to “arise on” a federal

enclave, the survey of case law and conclusions of the out-of-circuit case relied on by Plaintiffs is

26 unavailing. Cf. Amtec Corp. v. U.S. Centrifuge Sys., L.L.C., No. CV-12-RRA-1874-NE, 2012 WL

12897212, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 6, 2012), report and recommendation not adopted but objections

27 overruled sub nom. Amtec Corp. v. US Centrifuge Sys. LLC, No. 5:12-CV-1874-RRA, 2013 WL 12147712

(N.D. Ala. May 29, 2013) (“Neither party cites and this court has not found a case issued by the Eleventh

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1 several San Diego residential neighborhoods and endangered the life, health, and safety of

2 innocent residents who were miles away from the ship.”) (emphasis added).) As such,

3 Plaintiffs’ complaint expressly identifies their injuries as stemming from Defendants’

4 conduct on BHR.

5 In their reply, Plaintiffs rely on cases following the proposition that federal enclave

6 jurisdiction applies to injuries that occur on a federal enclave. See, e.g., In re High-Tech

7 Employee Antitrust Litigation, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The Ninth

8 Circuit has held that in federal enclave cases, ‘the jurisdiction of the federal court depends

9 upon . . . the locus in which the claim arose.’”); Anderson v. Crown Cork & Seal, 93 F.

10 Supp. 2d 697, 700 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“First, the Court must determine whether a vessel

11 standing alone can be a federal enclave. Second, the Court must determine whether federal

12 enclave jurisdiction is established in a case where a person’s alleged injuries occur on a

13 vessel that was at some points located in a facility considered a federal enclave, and at other

14 times was not.”); Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1078 n.2, 1082 (D. Nev. 2001)

15 (noting on summary judgment in a products liability case that the plaintiff’s choice-of-law

16 argument failed because the injury did not occur under the exclusive jurisdiction of the

17 United States). Although Plaintiffs’ injuries occurred in residential neighborhoods outside

18 the Naval Base, such case law is not persuasive because Ninth Circuit law does not require

19 both the injury and the injurious conduct to occur on a federal enclave. Here, it is the status

20 of the conduct’s location, not that of the injury, the parties contest.

21 Plaintiffs also cite numerous cases where courts did not have sufficient facts to

22 determine whether the injury occurred on a federal enclave. See, e.g., Zuniga v. Chugach

23 Maint. Servs., No. CVF060048AWILJO, 2006 WL 769317, at *6–*8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24,

24 2006) (finding insufficient facts to determine the application of the federal enclave doctrine

25 where the complaint did not allege any facts as to where the incidents at issue took place);

26 Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1035 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district

27 court’s determination that the term “while working at” a military base “could serve as either

28 a ‘geographical modifier’ or a ‘durational modifier’” so removal timely occurred upon

1 discovery resolving the ambiguity). However, these are not the circumstances at issue in

2 the instant case as the parties have proffered sufficient evidence for the Court to make a

3 determination.

4 Finally, Plaintiffs reference cases where courts found that the injury was too

5 attenuated or remote from conduct on a federal enclave for jurisdiction to apply. See, e.g.,

6 Honolulu II, 39 F.4th at 1112 (“Even if much of Defendants’ oil and gas operations

7 occurred on federal enclaves, that still does not transform Plaintiffs’ claims about deceptive

8 practices into claims about the conduct itself.”); San Mateo III, 32 F.4th at 750 (“[T]he

9 Energy Companies allege only that some of the defendants engaged in some conduct on

10 federal enclaves that may have contributed to global warming, which allegedly caused the

11 rising sea levels that resulted in the injuries that are the basis for the Counties’ claims.”).

12 Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct on BHR caused the magnitude

13 and duration of the fire, the smoke from which injured Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 31

14 (“Here, Plaintiffs had to live in toxic chemical smoke for nearly a week solely due to the

15 negligent acts of Defendants.”).

16 Thus, having found that Plaintiffs’ injuries stem from conduct on BHR, if the Court

17 finds that BHR qualifies as a federal enclave, then federal enclave jurisdiction applies. See

18 infra §§ III.A.4–5. Accordingly, the Court turns to that issue next.

19 4. Status of the Waters in Which BHR Was Docked

20 The primary theory upon which Defendants’ federal enclave argument rests is that

21 the waters in which BHR was floating while docked are a federal enclave as they are within

22 the boundaries of the Naval Base. (See NOR ¶ 18; Doc. No. 15 at 12–13.)

23 Plaintiffs’ focus on labeling BHR’s pier-side mooring as in “navigable waters”

24 appears to implicitly argue that water cannot both be navigable and a federal enclave. (Doc.

25 Nos. 12-1 at 15 (“Defendants have not identified any binding or persuasive authority

26 supporting an argument that coastal land is automatically subject to the exclusive

27 jurisdiction of the federal government.”); 16 at 8 (“At the time of the fire, the ship was

28 docked in navigable waters for repairs. Thus, the ship was within three miles of the coast,

1 and therefore was not under exclusive federal jurisdiction.”), 9–10 (“Defendants’

2 Opposition now attempts to provide evidence by introducing two images to show the ship

3 was docked within the boundaries of the Naval Base. However, water is not part of a federal

4 enclave merely because it is adjacent to or near the enclave or flows into or out of it.”).) In

5 their reply, Plaintiffs even go as far as to assert that water never qualifies as a federal

6 enclave. (Doc. No. 16 at 9 (“A federal enclave is a portion of land over which the federal

7 government exercises exclusive legislative jurisdiction.”) (emphasis in original).)

8 However, Plaintiffs do not proffer, nor is the Court aware of, any binding or

9 persuasive authority supporting either assertion. Plaintiffs first rely on Childs v. San Diego

10 Family Housing LLC, a case in which the United States, a non-party, challenged the court’s

11 subject matter jurisdiction by asserting the property at issue, which was located within the

12 boundaries of Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, was not a federal enclave. 714 F. Supp.

13 3d 1262, 1268 (S.D. Cal. 2024), appeal filed No. 24-1256 (9th Cir. May 4, 2024). There,

14 the defendants argued that, “because the United States exercises jurisdiction over the

15 navigable waters of the United States” pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act, any “land

16 created by dredging and filling navigable coastal waters are automatically under the federal

17 government’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. at 1272. The court rejected the theory because the

18 Ninth Circuit “had found previously there was congressional intent for there to be ‘joint

19 federal/state regulation of ocean waters within three miles of shore.’” Id. at 1272–73

20 (quoting Beveridge, 939 F.2d at 864). However, unlike in Childs, Defendants here do not

21 rely on general theories of federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act.4 (See

22 generally Doc. No. 15 at 10–15.)

23 ///

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4 Considering Defendants do not rely on such theories, Plaintiffs’ argument that “Defendants have

27 not identified any binding or persuasive authority supporting an argument that coastal land is

automatically subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government,” (Doc. No. 12-1 at 16), is

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1 Plaintiffs’ argument in favor of remand relies heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s

2 assessment of congressional intent, which Plaintiffs and the Childs court attribute to

3 Beveridge. In Beveridge, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether federal law regulating

4 navigation, waterways, and harbors preempted a Santa Barbara city ordinance regarding

5 mooring of boats. Beveridge, 939 F.2d at 861. In conducting its preemption analysis, the

6 Ninth Circuit determined that, despite its comprehensiveness, the Ports and Waterways

7 Safety Act did not rise to the level of implicit preemption in part because there is

8 congressional intent for joint regulation within three miles of shore, such as for regulating

9 pollution. Id. at 861, 864. Federal enclave doctrine was neither addressed nor relevant to

10 the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Beveridge.

11 Distinct from Beveridge, the waters at issue here are within the bounds of a military

12 installation, as evidenced by the map proffered by Defendants. (See Doc. No. 15 at 12–15;

13 Ex. B.) The nautical boundaries of the Naval Base are physically marked in the water

14 beyond BHR. (Ex. A.) Moreover, per federal regulation, the waters within the boundary

15 line marked by the map are a restricted “security zone,” providing further evidence that the

16 waters are a part of the Naval Base and thus a federal enclave. See 33 C.F.R. §

17 165.1101(b)(1) (“In accordance with the general regulations in § 165.33 of this part, entry

18 into the area of this zone is prohibited unless authorized by the Captain of the Port San

19 Diego; Commander, Naval Base San Diego; Commander, Navy Region Southwest; or the

20 Commanding Officer, Naval Station, San Diego.”).5

21 ///

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23 ////

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5 “[T]his zone” is defined as “the water area within Naval Station, San Diego enclosed by the

26 following points: Beginning at 32°41′16.5″ N, 117°08′01″ W (Point A); thence running southwesterly to

32°40′58.3″ N, 117°08′11.0″ W (Point B); to 32°40′36.0″ N 117°07′49.1″ W (Point C); to 32°40′17.0′ N,

27 117°07′34.6″ W (Point D); to 32°39′36.4″ N, 117°07′24.8″ W (Point E); to 32°39′38.5″ N 117°07′06.5″

W, (Point F); thence running generally northwesterly along the shoreline of the Naval Station to the place

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1 Plaintiffs fail to challenge Defendants’ map or otherwise substantively address

2 Defendants’ evidence, arguing instead that “water is not part of a federal enclave merely

3 because it is adjacent to or near the enclave or flows into or out of it” (see generally Doc.

4 No. 16); however, this argument is foreclosed by the evidence.

5 Having found that Plaintiffs’ claims arise from conduct aboard BHR, see supra §

6 III.A.3, and because BHR was docked within a federal enclave at the time of the incident

7 at issue, federal enclave jurisdiction applies.

8 4. Status of BHR as Derived from Docking at Pier 2

9 Secondarily, Defendants argue that federal enclave status extends to BHR by virtue

10 of docking at the federal dockyard. (Doc. No. 15 at 14–15.) In support of this contention,

11 Defendants cite to three cases where courts have held that the federal enclave doctrine

12 applies to conduct aboard ships docked at federal dockyards. (Id. (relying on Scott v. Does

13 1 through 100, No. 12-cv-06235, 2012 WL 13013026, at *1, *9–10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15,

14 2012); Carvajal, 2013 WL 1728273, at *3, *5; and Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569,

15 571 (N.D. Cal. 1992)).)

16 The Court is not persuaded by cases where federal enclave jurisdiction was

17 presumed or otherwise not in dispute. See, e.g., Carvajal, 2013 WL 1728273, at *4–*6

18 (preliminarily noting the plaintiff “d[id] not dispute that the relevant events occurred on a

19 federal enclave” when analyzing whether state law claims were barred by the federal

20 enclave doctrine on summary judgment); Fung, 816 F. Supp. 569 at 571 (analogizing to a

21 case where the parties conceded federal enclave jurisdiction existed and finding, without

22 analysis, the same to be true).

23 Although Scott preceded the recent Ninth Circuit opinions on federal enclave

24 jurisdiction by a decade, it is informative as it thoroughly analyzes “whether federal

25 enclave jurisdiction applies . . . to naval ships that are docked in the water of a naval

26 shipyard.” Scott, 2012 WL 13013026, at *2. Both plaintiffs—Scott and Boyd—developed

27 numerous health issues after long-term exposure to products containing asbestos through

28 the course of their work. Id. at *1. Scott, who worked for Long Beach Naval Shipyard, was

1 exposed entirely while on naval vessels that were docked at the naval shipyard; Boyd was

2 a boatsman mate whose exposure occurred exclusively aboard two vessels while docked at

3 various shipyards and while at sea. Id. at *1, *5–*6. In the absence of relevant Ninth Circuit

4 authority on federal enclave jurisdiction, the court analogized to the land-sea jurisdictional

5 boundaries drawn in admiralty law and surveyed district court cases across the circuits to

6 determine that federal enclave jurisdiction applied to Scott’s claims but not to Boyd’s. Id.

7 at *3–*9.

8 Instead of countering Defendants’ reliance on Scott for the proposition that naval

9 ships docked at naval dockyards are federal enclaves, Plaintiffs assert that their experiences

10 are more akin to Boyd’s than to Scott’s as their injury occurred in the residential

11 neighborhoods. (Doc. No. 16 at 11.) However, the Court has already disposed of Plaintiffs’

12 exclusive location-of-injury argument as contrary to recent Ninth Circuit law. See supra §

13 III.A.3.

14 It is clear to the Court that federal enclave doctrine extends from federal dockyards

15 to a naval vessel attached thereto if the claims arose (1) on the vessel and (2) while the

16 vessel was docked. Because both are true in the instant action, federal enclave jurisdiction

17 is proper, regardless of the status of the waters in which BHR was docked.

18 5. Conclusion

19 Having found that the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs stem from conduct on BHR and

20 that BHR at the time of the conduct at issue was a federal enclave (1) due to its location

21 within the boundaries of the Naval Base and independently (2) due to connection to the

22 federal dockyard, federal jurisdiction is proper pursuant to the federal enclave doctrine.

23 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to remand.

24 B. Remaining Grounds for Removal

25 As the Court has determined subject matter jurisdiction exists under the federal

26 enclave doctrine, the Court declines to address the other grounds for removal that Plaintiffs

27 contest.

28 ///

1 |}IV. CONCLUSION

2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to remand

3 ||(Doc. No. 12). No later than March 14, 2025, Defendants are to file a response to the

4 || complaint.

5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 Dated: February 27, 2025 □

8 United States District Judge

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17 || U.S. Navy’s Comments and Evidentiary Submission: Tentative Cleanup and Abatement

18 ||Order No. R9-2011-0001, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. NAvy, at 14

19 (May 26, 2011), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/rwqcb9/water_issues/programs/shipyar

20 ds_sediment/docs/sediment_cleanup/adt/updates06021 1/navy.pdf

21 || [https://perma.cc/45MD-B83X].

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