The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
MARCH SESSION , 1999 May 14, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk
C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9704-CC-00160
)
Appellee, )
)
) FRANKLIN COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. J. CURTIS SMITH,
JAMES A. WOODS, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (DORL & Failure to Obey a
) Police Officer)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JAMES A. WOODS JOHN KNOX WALKUP
6090 Rock Creek Road Attorney General and Reporter
Tullahoma, TN 37388
ELIZABETH B. MARNEY
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
J. MICHAEL TAYLOR
District Attorney General
BILL COPELAND
Assistant District Attorney General
324 Dinah Shore Bo ulevard
Win cheste r, TN 37 398
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defendant, James A. Wo ods, was fou nd guilty by a Franklin C ounty
jury of the misdemeanor offenses of driving on a revoked license1 and failure to
obey a police officer. 2 In this appeal, he argues that his convictions violate h is
constitutional and legal rights in several regards. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The record on appeal does not contain a transcript or other substantia lly
verba tim record ing of th e evide nce o r proce eding s in the trial court. Because the
parties were unable to agree to a statement of the evidence, the trial court was
required to resolve the differences between the parties concerning the evidence.
The trial judge subsequently filed a statement of the evidence with this Court.
See Tenn. R . App. P. 24(c), (e).
The statement of evidence certified by the trial judge reflects that Officer
Troy Brow n of the Estell S prings Police Depa rtmen t obse rved a n auto mob ile
travel over the c enter line a nd onto the shou lder of the road on more than one
occasion early on the m orning of July 1 7, 199 6 on E ast Bro ok Ro ad in E stell
Springs, Franklin County, Tennessee. Officer Brown followed the vehicle for
appro ximate ly a mile and then activated his blue lights. After traveling
appro ximate ly one a ddition al mile , the veh icle pulled over. Officer Brown
recognized the Defendant and requested his driver’s license, but the Defendant
1
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504.
2
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-104.
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refused to produce a driver’s license, advising the officer that a search warrant
was neede d. Officer Brow n dete rmine d by rad io that th e Def enda nt’s drive r’s
license was in a revoke d status. Officer Brown then placed the Defendant under
arrest.
The only other witness who testified for the State was Captain Wade
Williams, the official custodian of records for the Tennessee Department of
Safety. Captain Williams testified that the Defendant had not applied for a
renewal of his driver’s license since 1980. He further testified that the
Defe ndan t’s driver’s license expired in 198 4. He te stified th at the D efend ant’s
driver’s license had been suspended in 1994 because of a conviction of driving
without a license. A certified copy of the Defendant’s driving record was
introduce d as an exhibit.
The Defendant testified that he had not possessed a driver’s license since
1984. He said that his wallet with his driver’s license was stolen or lost at about
that time. He fur ther tes tified ge nerally that req uiring h im to h ave a d river’s
license violated his right to mobility and his right of free passage upon the
comm on high ways of th e state.
At the conclusion of the proof, the jury found the Defendant guilty of driving
on a revoked license and assessed a fine of $250. The jury also found the
Defendant guilty of failure to obey a police officer and assessed a fine of $25.
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The jury found the Defendant not guilty of the offense of driving on the left side
of a roadwa y.3
Although the Defendant does not specifically challenge the sufficiency of
the convicting evidenc e, he doe s take issu e with s ome of Offic er Bro wn’s
testimony relating to the charge of failing to co mply with the lawful o rder of a
police officer. Bas ed on th e statem ent of evidence certified by the trial judge,
however, we do n ot hesitate in conclu ding that th e evidenc e pres ented is
sufficient to support the findings of guilt by the jury bey ond a reaso nable doubt.
See Tenn. R . App. P. 13(e).
The Defe ndan t asse rts num erous reaso ns wh y his convictions should not
be allowed to stand. We attempt to summarize his arguments as follows: (1) that
citizens of Tennessee have a constitutional right to mobility and free passage
upon the com mon h ighways as an es sential pa rt of liberty which is secured at
law; (2) that the right to mobility and free passage may not be declared a privilege
by the legislature and thus be subject to taxation by licensure; (3) that the
convicting court was without jurisdiction in this case because the indictment
referred to provisions of the Tennessee Code Annotated rather than referring to
the actua l laws a s pas sed b y the leg islature and therefo re failed to ade quate ly
inform him of the laws which he was alleged to have violated; (4) that his arrest
was illegal and in violation of his due process rights because the arrest was
effectuated without a warrant; (5) that he was wrongfully denied a continuance
3
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-115.
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of his trial d ue to his illness; and (6) that the trial judge failed to fully and
adequately charge the jury with all applicable laws.
W e agree w ith the De fendan t’s conten tion that he enjoys a fundamental
right to freedom of travel, as recognized by the Unite d States Supre me C ourt.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S . 618 (19 69), overruled in part on other
grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S . 651, 652 (1974); Dunn v. Blums tein,
405 U.S. 33 0, 338 (1 972); Knowlton v. Board of Law Examiners, 513 S.W.2d
788, 791 (T enn. 1974 ).
W e also note that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
the rights of individ uals m ust be ba lanced against th e need s of gove rnmen t to
regulate conduct in order to protect the health, welfare, and safety of all citizens.
The balancing of these interests has been expressed as follows:
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained
abuses. The au thority of a m unicipality to impose regu lations in
order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use
of public highways has never been regarded as in consiste nt with
civil liberties but ra ther as o ne of the m eans o f safeguarding the
good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel
on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustra tion of th is
recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of
highways in that relation is desig ned to prom ote the public
convenience in the in terest o f all, it cannot be disregarded by the
attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances
would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in
ignoring the fam iliar red tra ffic light b ecau se he thoug ht it his
religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that
means to direct pu blic attention to an announcement of his opinions.
Cox v. New Hamp shire, 312 U.S. 56 9, 574 (1941 ).
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In this case, the Defendant argues that the State of Tennessee has illegally
infringed upon his right of mobility by requiring him to have a driver’s license
before he ca n lega lly opera te a m otor ve hicle o n the h ighwa ys of this state. W e
adopt with approval the reasoning and analysis of Judge David G. Hayes writing
for this Court in State v. Booher, 978 S.W.2d 953 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), as
follows:
In the present case, the appellant asserts that the State of
Tennessee has unduly infringed upon his “right to travel” by
requir ing licensing a nd registra tion of his m otor vehic les prior to
operation on the pu blic roadw ays of this s tate. How ever, con trary
to his assertions, at no tim e did the State of Tennessee place
constra ints upon the appellant’s exercise of this right. His righ t to
travel within this state or to points beyond its boundaries remains
unimpeded. Thus, not only has the appellant’s right to freedom of
travel not been infringed, but also, we cannot conclude that this right
is even implicated in this case. Rather, based upon the context of
his argument, the appellant asserts an infringement upon his right
to opera te a m otor ve hicle on the public highw ays of th is state . This
notion is who lly sepa rate fro m the right to tra vel.
The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway is not
a fundame ntal “right.” Instead , it is a revo cable “privileg e” that is
granted upon compliance with statutory licensing procedures.
State and local governments possess an inherent power, i.e.
police power, to enact reasonable legislation for the health, safety,
welfare, morals, or convenience of the public. Thus, our legislature,
through its police power, may prescribe conditions under which the
“privilege” of operating automobiles on public highways may be
exercised. None theless, such regulations may not be un-
reasonable, may not violate fe deral o r state c onstitu tional provisions,
as by discriminating between vehicles or owners of the same class;
and, in the case of ordinances, may not conflict with state statutes.
The test to determine the validity of statutes enacted through
the state’s police pow er is wheth er or not the ends sought to be
attained are approp riate and the regu lations prescribed are
reasonable. The test of reasonableness requires a balancing effort
on private intere sts and the public good to be a chieve d. If the p ublic
benefits outwe igh the interferenc e with private rights,
reasonableness is indicated, but if the private injury outweighs the
public advantage the mea sure is unrea sona ble. In a pplying this
test, it must be remembered that the presumption is in favor of the
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reasonableness and validity of the law, so that the person
challenging the valid ity of the r egula tion has th e burd en of c learly
showin g where in it violates the constitution .
The appellant challenges various provisions of the Tennessee
Motor Vehicle T itle and R egistration Law. R equiring p ersons to
obtain a driver’s license and to register their automobiles with the
State provides a means of identifying the owner of the autom obile
if negligently operated to the dama ge of other pe rsons. Moreo ver,
because it is a mea ns of guaran teein g a minimal level of driver
competence, licensing improves safety on our highways and, thus,
protects and enhances the well being of the residents and visitors
of our state. Thus, our state legislature may properly within the
scope of its po lice power enact reasonable regulations requiring
licensing and registration of motor vehicles as it furthers the
interests of public safety and welfare.
W ithin his cons titutional cha llenge, the appellan t presen ts
additional argum ents re lating to wheth er his a utom obile is a “motor
vehicle” contemplated by the licensing and registration regulations;
whether he is exem pted fro m su ch reg ulation s bec ause of his “use”
of his automobile; and whether he is required to obtain a Tennessee
driver’s license , as he is only a common law resident of Tennessee
with a valid Indiana driver’s license. The appellant’s 1985 Dodge
Daytona is a mo tor veh icle con temp lated b y the re gulatio ns, sa id
vehicle is driven upon the public roads of this state, and, for
purposes of the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Title and Registration
Law, the appellant is a resident of Tennes see. Thes e issues are
without m erit.
Booher, 978 S.W .2d at 955-57 (footnote om itted) (citations omitted).
W e conc lude th at the s tate leg islature acted within its cons titutional
authority by enacting law s requiring a citizen of o ur state to have a driver’s
license in order to legally drive an automobile or other motor vehicle upon the
public hig hways o f our state. T his issue has no merit.
W e further conclude that it was entirely appropriate and proper for the
indictme nts to refer to our la ws in the manner that the laws are codified in the
Tennessee Code Anno tated, w hich is th e officia l compilation of the statutes,
codes, and se ssion law s of our state, as auth orized by the legislatu re. W e
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likewise find no error b y the trial cou rt in its charge to the jury concerning these
laws. Based on the facts contained in the statement of the evidence, we
conclude that the police officer effectuated a lawful warrantless arrest of the
Defen dant, and we find no violation of the D efenda nt’s due p rocess rights
concerning the arrest. We find no error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge
in denyin g the Defend ant’s re ques t for a co ntinua nce a nd als o con clude that if
the trial judg e did abus e his discretion by denying a continuance, the Defendant
has failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of not being granted a
continuance.
Based on our reading of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the
applicab le law, we a ffirm the jud gmen t of the trial cou rt.
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
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