The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
STEVE PASCHALL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:23-cv-02799-SHL-tmp
)
MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS AND WATER )
DIVISION a/k/a THE LIGHT, GAS AND )
WATER DIVISION OF THE CITY OF )
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, and the PENSION )
BOARD OF THE MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS )
AND WATER DIVISION RETIREMENT )
AND PENSION SYSTEM, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 21,
2024, by Defendants Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division a/k/a the Light, Gas and Water
Division of the City of Memphis, Tennessee, and the Pension Board of the Memphis Light, Gas
and Water Division Retirement and Pension System. (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiff Steve Paschall
filed his response on December 19, 2024. (ECF No. 28.) Defendants filed their reply on January
2, 2025. (ECF No. 30.)1 For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND2
This case is about the denial of benefits under a retirement plan. Paschall worked as an
engineer for Memphis Light Gas & Water (“MLGW”), from December 11, 1989, until his
1 On February 13, 2025, Defendants filed a Notice of Filing the Chancery Court’s
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in a Case Between the Same Parties. (ECF No. 33.)
2 The factual recitation included is undisputed, unless otherwise noted.
termination on July 13, 2016. (ECF No. 29 at PageID 701–02.) As part of Paschall’s
employment, he was required to participate in the MLGW Division Retirement and Pension
System (the “Pension Plan”), into which he paid approximately eight percent of every paycheck
during his employment. (ECF No. 31 at PageID 1696.) Paschall became eligible to apply for a
monthly pension benefit upon his termination. (ECF No. 29 at PageID 702.) Before he did so,
Paschall filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and a lawsuit against MLGW (“Paschall
I”), in which he sought reinstatement and backpay. (Id. at PageID 703.)3
Upon his termination, Paschall “understood that any election made for his retirement
benefits was irrevocable.” (ECF No. 31 at PageID 1698.) He did not discuss with anyone at
MLGW, including anyone with the Pension Department or the Pension Board, if he could retire
but later unretire. (ECF No. 29 at PageID 705.) He elected to not apply for his pension benefit
upon his termination, for fear of “negat[ing] the lawsuit,” and, in so doing, he relied on his
interpretation of documents governing the Pension Plan. (Id. at PageID 704, 720.)
The Pension Plan is governed by the Plan Document, as amended and restated January 1,
2015. (Id. at PageID 720.) Section 7.6 of the Plan Document provides the following:
Failure to Apply for Benefits. Each Participant and Beneficiary, or his/her
representative, shall be responsible for making application, in accordance with
uniform procedures established by the Pension Board, for any benefit due him/her
under the Plan. A Participant or Beneficiary shall have no claim against the Fund
for any retroactive payment by reason of the failure of such Participant or
Beneficiary to properly or timely apply for benefits under the Plan.
(Id. at PageID 720.) Similarly, in outlining the benefits application process, the 2016 Summary
Plan Description and the 2018 Summary Plan Description each contain the following identical
3 On January 11, 2022, the Court granted MLGW’s Motion for Summary Judgment in
Paschall I. (See Paschall v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, No. 2:17-cv-2280-MSN-tmp (ECF
No. 134).)
language: “[i]f you or your beneficiaries fail to apply timely for benefits, you will not have any
claim against the Pension Fund for any retroactive payment under the plan.” (Id. at PageID 721.)
Paschall acknowledges having had possession of, and access to, the 2016 Summary Plan. (Id. at
PageID 703.)
At the same time, the Plan Document asserts that “a Participant’s Accrued Benefit shall
become one hundred percent (100%) vested and nonforfeitable (i) upon his/her attainment of
Normal Retirement Age while still employed as an Employee of the Division, (ii) upon complete
discontinuance of Contributions as provided in §3.2(b), or (iii) the termination of the Plan as
provided in § 112.” (ECF No. 27-16 at PageID 598.) Paschall attained the Normal Retirement
Age prior to his termination. (ECF No. 31 at PageID 1696.)
On May 10, 2022, about four months after MLGW was granted summary judgment in
Paschall I, Paschall submitted his first application to MLGW for monthly pension benefits.
(ECF No. 29 at PageID 714; ECF No. 27-11.) In that application, Paschall included language
related to Title VII’s prohibition on retaliation,4 which obscured a portion of the form application
4 Paschall included the following language, in bold:
*NOTICE OF NON-RETALIATION REQUIREMENT
Title VII Section 704a of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant
for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.
On July 13, 2016, I was wrongfully terminated. I entered into a dispute with MLGW under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 seeking reinstatement to my position with the company.
Pursuant to that, even though my effective date that I could retire at that time was 7/14/2016,
Pension Policy states that my election to do so would be irrevocable. The dispute has just been
settled. Therefore I am now electing for full retirement benefits, retroactively effective to that
date, as I have per Section 7.6 of the plan, properly and timely applied for benefits.
he submitted, and he explained that, because his underlying employment dispute with MLGW
had recently been settled, he was “electing for full retirement benefits, retroactively effective” to
his July 2016 termination. (ECF No. 29 at PageID 714–15; ECF No. 27-11 at PageID 546.) On
June 28, 2022, Paschall submitted a revised application, which included the almost identical Title
VII language on a separate sheet, and the same language that he had “properly and timely
applied for benefits,” under Section 7.6 of the Plan Document. (ECF No. 27-13 at PageID 551–
52.) Defendants never disputed Paschall’s right to his benefits upon proper application. (ECF
No. 31 at PageID 1696.)
Defendants initially rejected Paschall’s May 10, 2022 application based on his inclusion
of the Title VII language, because the form was not completed, and because he sought
retroactive benefits to the time he was terminated. (Id. at PageID 1700–01.) After initially
rejecting his June 28, 2022 application, Defendants accepted the application upon appeal after
redacting Paschall’s Title VII-related attachment, and awarded Paschall benefits payments
effective as of June 28, 2022. (Id. at PageID 1701, 1702.) As of August 2024, Plaintiff was paid
his service retirement benefits back to June 28, 2022, in a lump sum. (Id. at PageID 1711.)
On November 21, 2022, Paschall filed a charge with the Tennessee Human Rights
Commission, which was later transferred to the EEOC for investigation. (ECF No. 31 at PageID
1708–09.) The EEOC issued its Determination and Notice of Rights letter on September 29,
2023. (ECF No. 1-7.)
Please be advised that also under Title VII (See Above), denial of my full benefits will be
considered retaliation and unlawful discrimination.
(ECF No. 27-11 at PageID 546.)
Paschall asserts two retaliation claims against Defendants under Title VII, which protects
individuals who make charges, testify, assist, or participate in enforcement proceedings. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).5 The first count alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for filing a
charge with the EEOC and for filing his federal lawsuit, in violation of Title VII’s participation
clause. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 221–224.) Title VII’s participation clause prohibits an employer
from discriminating against an employee “because [the employee] has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
The second count alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for opposing their
conduct against him, in violation of Title VII’s opposition clause. (Id. at PageID 224–25.) The
opposition clause makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee “because [the
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
In their summary judgment motion, Defendants assert that Paschall cannot make out a
prima facie case for retaliation. First, they assert that he cannot establish that he engaged in
protected activity when he added language to his application for pension benefits, as this did not
constitute opposition made in a reasonable manner, and, by altering the form application, he
violated their legitimate rules. (ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 452–53.) Defendants further assert that
there is no genuine issue of fact as to why it denied Paschall’s request for retroactive benefits, as
it was relying on the language of the Plan Document. (Id. at PageID 455.) They assert that,
while there was an open question at the motion to dismiss stage as to whether the Plan Document
5 On May 14, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, (ECF No. 23), dismissing Paschall’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and limiting his
potential recovery to $300,000 (see id.)
was being withheld from Paschall and whether he would have acted differently had he been
provided access to it earlier, the record now demonstrates that Paschall had access to the 2016
Summary Plan Description at the time of his termination, that he was later provided a copy of the
virtually identical 2018 Summary Plan Description upon his request, that he was informed that
the full Plan Document was available to the public by making a public records request, and that
he had access to the full Plan Document during his employment. (Id. at PageID 456.)
Ultimately, Defendants assert that Paschall has received “all of the benefits to which he is
entitled under the terms of the Plan Document,” which means “he did not suffer an adverse
employment action or otherwise sustain any damages as a result of Defendant’s actions.” (ECF
No. 30 at PageID 1689.)
ANALYSIS
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party can prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by showing a
lack of evidence to support the non-moving party’s cause. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 325 (1986). Although the court views all evidence and factual inferences in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).
The movant has the initial burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to go
beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at
324 (quotations omitted). Ultimately, in evaluating the appropriateness of summary judgment,
the court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
II. Paschall’s Claims for Retaliation
The standard for evaluating Paschall’s Title VII claims is the same under both the
participation and opposition clauses. “[U]nder Title VII, the plaintiff may prove unlawful
retaliation by presenting direct evidence of such retaliation or by establishing a prima facie case
under the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). “Direct evidence is that
evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful retaliation was a motivating
factor in the employer’s action.” Id. (citing Laderach v. U–Haul of Nw. Ohio, 207 F.3d 825, 829
(6th Cir. 2000)). Direct evidence “proves the existence of a fact without any inferences or
presumptions.” Davis v. Metro Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 854 F. App’x 707, 714 (6th Cir.
2021) (citation omitted). “Direct evidence of discrimination is rare because employers generally
do not announce that they are acting on prohibited grounds.” Erwin v. Potter, 79 F. App’x 893,
896–97 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Absent direct evidence, a party can make a case for retaliation by relying on the burden-
shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas
Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Taylor v. Donahoe, 66 F. Supp. 3d 993,
1000 (W.D. Tenn. 2014) (citations omitted). Under that familiar framework, plaintiffs have “the
initial burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.” Id. If the plaintiff satisfies this low
burden, the defendant then “has a burden of production to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason
for its action. If the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff must prove the given reason is
pretext for retaliation.” Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999 F.3d 400, 419–20 (6th Cir. 2021)
(quoting E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 767 (6th Cir. 2015)). To demonstrate the
proffered reason was mere pretext, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the reason “1) has no basis in fact; 2) did not actually motivate the adverse action;
or 3) was insufficient to motivate the adverse action.” Abbott, 348 F.3d at 542 (citing Manzer v.
Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Despite his assertions to the contrary, Paschall has offered no direct evidence of
retaliation. He argues that, when the Pension Department rejected his applications for benefits
by citing to his Title VII references in his applications for benefits, and when the Pension Board
later adopted those same positions, it sufficiently established direct evidence of retaliatory
animus. (ECF No. 28 at PageID 689.) Paschall asserts that Defendants passed a rule that applied
only to him and limited him to twenty minutes during his hearing before the Pension Board,6
which constitutes further evidence of retaliatory animus and causation. (Id. at PageID 689–90.)
None of these facts, even viewed in a light most favorable to Paschall, establish direct
evidence of retaliation. The evidence does not prove that the Pension Board’s actions were
retaliatory in nature without inferences or presumptions. “Whatever the strength of the evidence,
it is not ‘direct’ evidence if it admits more than one plausible interpretation, and requires a
6 Although Paschall asserts that the Pension Board only allowed him twenty minutes to
present his case at the hearing on the matter, Defendants assert that, not only was he able to make
his full presentation to the Pension Board during that time, but also counsel for MLGW was
allotted the same amount of time, and both parties were afforded additional time during an open
question-and-answer session with the Pension Board. (ECF No. 31 at PageID 1702–03.)
Paschall has not established a question of material fact as to whether he was improperly limited
from making his case before the Pension Board.
significant inference or presumption on the part of the trier of fact.” Kocak v. Cmty. Health
Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). To
conclude that the actions Paschall describes were retaliatory, one would have to presume that
Defendants’ rejection of Paschall’s applications and their determination that he was not entitled
to retroactive benefits was merely pretext. One would also have to presume that the Pension
Board’s twenty-minute limitation on Paschall’s hearing presentation was somehow a retaliation
against Paschall, even though the Pension Board placed the same time restraint on MLGW at the
hearing and allowed the parties additional time to interact with the Pension Board. At bottom,
Paschall’s proffered evidence is not direct evidence of retaliation because it does not compel a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the actions he describes constitute retaliation. See id.
In the absence of direct evidence, Paschall must rely on circumstantial evidence, and the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The first step in that process, establishing a
prima facie case of retaliation, requires a party to show the following: “(1) he engaged in activity
protected by Title VII; (2) his exercise of such protected activity was known by the defendant;
(3) thereafter, the defendant took an action that was ‘materially adverse’ to the plaintiff; and (4) a
causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.”
Taylor, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 (quoting Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir.
2014)). The burden of establishing a prima facie case “is minimal; all the plaintiff must do is put
forth some credible evidence that enables the court to deduce that there is a causal connection
between the retaliatory action and the protected activity.” Id. (quoting Dixon v. Gonzales, 481
F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Defendants assert that Paschall has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination,
warranting summary judgment in their favor even before the burden shifts to them to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting Paschall’s benefits applications and denying his request
for retroactive benefits. Defendants argue that Paschall has failed to demonstrate that he
engaged in protected activity, or that they took a materially adverse action against him, or that
there was a causal connection between his protected activity and the materially adverse action.
As a starting point, Defendants acknowledge that they “do[] not dispute that Plaintiff
engaged in protected activity when he filed a lawsuit against MLGW in 2017” (ECF No. 26-1 at
PageID 452.) But Defendants then cast too narrow a focus by arguing that Paschall failed to
demonstrate that he engaged in protected activity when he added Title VII-based retaliation
language to his applications for benefits. Even if Paschall’s inclusion of the Title VII-based
retaliation language did not constitute protected activity,7 the filing of Paschall I, along with the
filing of his EEOC complaints, satisfy his burden of demonstrating he engaged in protected
activity under the participation and opposition clauses.
7 A question of fact exists as to whether Paschall’s inclusion of the Title VII language in
his May 10, 2022 benefits application was protected activity, particularly under his Title VII
opposition clause claim. Defendants argue that the inclusion was an unreasonable violation of its
rules. (See ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 453.) They argue that “[t]he application was no place to
lodge such a complaint or, for that matter, a premature complaint.” (Id.)
The Court is dubious that Paschall’s inclusion of the Title VII language on his
applications violated Defendants’ rule that “[c]laims for benefits under the Plan may be filed
with, and on forms supplied by, the Pension Department,” as Defendants assert. (Id.) After all,
the applications were submitted on the Defendants’ forms, albeit with added information which,
at least in the first instance, could not be redacted from the submission, and the Plan Document
contemplated the submission of additional evidence with an application. (ECF No. 29 at PageID
721.) It is true, as Defendants point out, that “courts have generally granted less protection for
opposition than for participation in enforcement proceedings.” (ECF No. 30 at PageID 1693
(quoting Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989).)
Nevertheless, at the very least, a question of fact exists on the issue as to whether Paschall’s
submissions were a violation of Defendant’s legitimate rules. This is particularly evident
because Defendants granted Paschall’s second request for benefits, on appeal, after having
redacted the Title VII language that he included in both applications.
Paschall has also demonstrated that Defendants took an adverse action against him.
Defendants assert that they took no adverse action against Paschall because they were simply
following the dictates of the Plan Document. However, there is no dispute that, by denying
Paschall’s request that his benefits be retroactively applied to his termination date, he would
receive less retirement benefits.8 A retirement benefits decision that results in the loss of
potentially significant amounts of money qualifies as an adverse action.
Finally, Paschall has also met the low burden of demonstrating the final element of his
prima facie claim—a causal connection between his protected activity and the materially adverse
action Defendants took against him. Defendants assert that “Plaintiff has presented no evidence
to suggest the Pension Board made the decision to deny Plaintiff’s request for retroactive
benefits on anything other than the language of the Plan, particularly section 7.6 of the Plan.”
(ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 455 (citation omitted).) The Board insists that its “interpretation tracks
the plain language of the Plan Document.” (ECF No. 30 at PageID 1690.)
Paschall has offered less proof as to the causation element of his prima facie case, but,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him as the Court must do at this stage, the
Court can deduce a causal connection between Defendants’ retaliatory actions and Paschall’s
protected activity.
Defendants cling to what they deem a legitimate, longstanding interpretation of the Plan
Document to argue that their denial of retroactive benefits to him cannot be connected to the
protected activity he engaged in. However, Paschall has pointed to language from the Plan
Document that suggests that his right to benefits was 100% vested and non-forfeitable, and that
8 Paschall’s expert report suggests that the denial of his request for retroactive benefits
cost him as much as $444,214. (ECF No. 35-1 at PageID 1990.)
the Pension Board was obligated to take actions necessary to assure the timely payment of
benefits to him. (See ECF No. 28 at PageID 691, 693.) Defendants counter that Paschall’s
“benefits have not been forfeited as contemplated under the Plan,” as his “benefit was a right to
receive payments calculated in accordance with the formula set forth in the Plan and
commencing upon ‘written election’ of the Participant as provided in the Plan Document,” and
that “[n]othing in the Plan guarantees any Participant a right to receive a sum certain or a
specified aggregate of payments.” (ECF No. 31 at PageID 1697–98.)
The evidence viewed in a light most favorable to Paschall establishes questions of fact as
to whether Defendants eschewed the portions of the Pension Plan that supported his entitlement
to benefits as of the date of his termination, as well as upon his initial application for benefits in
May 2022, in favor of portions of the Plan Document that would result in him being denied
benefits, and whether that decision was made based on the protected activity he previously
engaged in.
Given the foregoing, Paschall has satisfied his low burden of establishing a prima facie
case of retaliation. The burden thus shifts to Defendants to demonstrate that there was a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their actions.
As outlined above, Defendants assert that the nondiscriminatory reasons for denying
Paschall retroactive benefits, and denying his initial application for benefits, are that they were
adhering to the terms of the Plan Document, and that Paschall’s application failed to follow the
applicable rules. Defendants’ burden “at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is not to
prove the existence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Rather, as
the Supreme Court has instructed, ‘This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it “can
involve no credibility assessment.’”” Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank, 785 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir.
2015) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)). Thus,
Defendants have satisfied this threshold.
Finally, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that Defendants’ proffered
reasons were mere pretext, which he can do by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the reasons have no basis in fact, did not actually motivate Defendants’ adverse actions, or were
insufficient to motivate the adverse actions. “[T]o survive summary judgment a plaintiff need
only produce enough evidence to support a prima facie case and to rebut, but not to disprove, the
defendant’s proffered rationale.” Carter v. Toyota Tsusho Am., Inc., 529 F. App’x 601, 609 (6th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Paschall makes the blanket assertion that he has met each of these prongs, asserting there
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the denial of his applications based on the
inclusion of the Title VII language and the denial of his retroactive benefits were based in fact,
whether they actually motivated Defendants’ actions, or whether they sufficiently motivated
those actions. (ECF No. 28 at PageID 697.)
According to Defendants, there is an absence of a question of material fact as to whether
its reasons were pretextual. They base this in part on the fact that Paschall has not shown that
any other participant in the Pension Plan ever received retroactive benefits after having
consciously decided to delay applying for years, or that a plan participant ever began receiving
monthly pension payments without having made an application or having made only an altered
or incomplete application. (ECF No. 30 at PageID 1690.)
Defendants’ argument that their “interpretation of the Plan was applied the same to
Plaintiff as it was to any other Participant” (ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 450) is, at best, incomplete,
as it never applied the Plan to anyone who engaged in the same actions as Paschall. Although
the burden is Paschall’s at this stage in the McDonnell Douglas analysis, as he points out,
Defendants identified no instances where a participant inserted language into an application for
retirement benefits or attached a document to a participant’s application for retirement benefits
or any instances where a participant sought retroactive retirement benefits. (ECF No. 31 at
PageID 1699.)
As to whether Paschall has otherwise carried his burden of demonstrating pretext,
although he cannot show that the actions taken by Defendants had no basis in fact, he has shown
that a question of fact exists as to whether Defendants’ articulated basis for denying him benefits
were the actual motivation or, even more, were sufficient to motivate the adverse actions.
To establish pretext based on a claim that a defendant’s proffered reason did not actually
motivate its conduct, “the plaintiff may attack the employer’s explanation ‘by showing
circumstances which tend to prove an illegal motivation was more likely than that offered by the
defendant.’” Cook v. McHugh, 193 F. Supp. 3d 866, 874 (M.D. Tenn. 2016) (quoting Smith v.
Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000)). Under this type of showing, a plaintiff
can “argue[] that the sheer weight of the circumstantial evidence of discrimination makes it
‘more likely than not’ that the employer’s explanation is a pretext, or coverup.” Carter, 529 F.
App’x at 610 (quoting Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084).
Here, Paschall has pointed to sufficient evidence to rebut Defendants’ arguments as to
pretext and through which a jury could reasonably reject Defendants’ explanation and infer that
they retaliated against him. See Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). Specifically, Paschall has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendants’ proffered reasons for denying him retroactive retirement benefits, and for denying
his initial application for benefits, were the actual motivation or were sufficient to motivate those
actions. This is especially so given that the Plan Document’s provisions could be read in ways
that would have allowed for Paschall to recover retroactive benefits, as well as benefits upon his
first application in May 2022. In short, Paschall has carried his burden of creating a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether an illegal motive was more likely than the reason for the
adverse actions offered by Defendants.
Given the foregoing, Paschall has carried his burden under McDonnell Douglas to
demonstrate that, based on the circumstantial evidence in the record, there are genuine issues of
material fact that preclude summary judgment as to all of his claims.9
CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED
as to Paschall’s claims under both the participation and opposition clauses of Title VII.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 27th day of February, 2025.
s/ Sheryl H. Lipman _____
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9 Defendants also argue that summary judgment is warranted as to the discrete acts that
occurred prior to the 300 days before November 21, 2022, the day Paschall filed his latest charge
of discrimination. (ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 459–60.) As the Court explained in its Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, “it is not clear what
impact, if any, eliminating any time-barred retaliatory actions would have on Paschall’s claims in
this lawsuit.” (ECF No. 23 at PageID 423.) It is clear now that, given that the retaliatory actions
Paschall complained of occurred on May 10 and June 28, 2022, which are both within the
applicable 300-day window of the filing of Paschall’s latest charge of discrimination, his claims
are timely. Defendants Motion is therefore DENIED on these grounds.