The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
BRANDEN HOLLAND,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 2:23-cv-399-JES-NPM
JOSEPH MUNDELLA,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Joseph
Mundella’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #69). Plaintiff Branden
Holland filed a paper titled “Default Judgment” (Doc. #70), which
appears to be a response to Mundella’s Motion.
I. Background
Holland is a former prisoner of the Florida Department of
Corrections (“FDOC”). Holland alleges that on April 8 or 9, 2020,
officers found a piece of scrap metal in his cell and reported it
to Mundella, the dormitory sergeant. Mundella ordered Holland
and his cellmate confined in two separate showers. Mundella
approached Holland and asked, “Are you going to confess to the
metal we found in your cell?” (Doc. #28 at 3). Holland refused
to answer. Mundella called Holland “a piece of trash,” aimed a
chemical bottle containing bleach at Holland’s face, and sprayed
multiple bursts into Holland’s eyes. (Id.).
Holland sues Mundella in his individual and official
capacities for subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Holland seeks $500,000 in
compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. Mundella
seeks dismissal.
II. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The preferential
standard of review, however, does not let all pleadings adorned
with facts survive to the next stage of litigation. The Supreme
Court has been clear on this point—a district court should dismiss
a claim when a party does not plead facts that make the claim
facially plausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a court can draw
a reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing
party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. This plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted)). And
a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions amounting
to a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Holland files his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state
a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant
deprived him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal
law, and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law.
Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In
addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative
causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d
1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. Analysis
Mundella argues Holland fails to state a plausible claim
and raises Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. He
also contends that punitive damages are barred.
A. Pleading Sufficiency
The core judicial inquiry in an excessive-force claim is
“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.” Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)). A prisoner
asserting an excessive-force claim must establish two elements:
“the official must have both ‘acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind’ (the subjective element), and the conduct must have
been ‘objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional
violation.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8
(1992)). A claim satisfies the subjective element if the force
was “sadistically and maliciously applied for the very purpose of
causing harm.” Id. The objective component “focuses on whether
the official’s actions were harmful enough or sufficiently serious
to violate the constitution.” Id. (cleaned up).
Holland alleges Mundella sprayed him in the face with bleach
after Holland refused to take responsibility for a piece of scrap
metal found in Holland’s cell. Holland was restrained in a shower
at the time and was not a security threat. These allegations
allow an inference that Mundella sprayed him with chemicals merely
to cause harm. Holland has sufficiently pled the subjective
element.
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “where chemical
agents are used unnecessarily, without penological justification,
or for the very purpose of punishment or harm, that use satisfies
the Eighth Amendment’s objective harm requirement.” Thomas v.
Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, the
allegations that satisfy the subjective component of excessive
force also satisfy the objective component. Holland plausibly
pleads he was sprayed with bleach as a punishment and not for any
penological reason. Holland’s excessive-force claim survives
12(b)(6) review.
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Holland sues Mundella in his individual and official
capacities. The Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Absent an abrogation
of immunity by Congress or a waiver of immunity by the state being
sued, the Eleventh Amendment is an absolute bar to suit by an
individual against a state or its agencies in federal court.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974).
“When the action is in essence one for the recovery of money
from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in
interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from
suit even though individuals are nominal defendants.” Id. at 663.
“Thus, the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking
to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the
state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. In
other words, the bar protects state officials sued in their
official capacities but not in their individual capacities.
Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2016).
Congress has not abrogated Florida’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity, nor has Florida waived it. Thus, Holland cannot sue
Mundella in his official capacity.
C. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity protects government officials from
individual liability unless they violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Snorton v. Owens, 808 F. App’x 814, 820 (11th
Cir. 2020). An official invoking qualified immunity must first
show he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.
The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show: (1) the official
violated a federal statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the
unlawfulness of the official’s conduct was clearly established at
the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 820-21.
There is no doubt Mundella was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when Holland’s claim arose. Mundella
argues he is entitled to qualified immunity because Holland fails
to state a plausible claim that Mundella violated a constitutional
right. But as the Court explains above, Holland has stated an
excessive-force claim under the Eighth Amendment. And controlling
precedent clearly establishes the illegality of Mundella’s alleged
conduct. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the use of
chemical agents on inmates can violate the Eighth Amendment when
the inmate is not presenting a threat of immediate harm to himself
or others. Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1306-07. Based on the allegations
in Holland’s Second Amended Complaint, Mundella is not entitled to
qualified immunity.
D. Punitive Damages
Mundella argues the Prison Litigation Reform Act—specifically
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A)—bars punitive damages. But the Eleventh
Circuit has consistently held that the PLRA allows for punitive
damages to punish defendants for willful or malicious conduct.
See Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021). The Court
will not dismiss Holland’s request for punitive damages.
E. Holland’s Construed Response
Finally, the document Holland filed in response to Mundella’s
Motion to Dismiss is titled, “Default Judgment.” (Doc. #70). In
it, Holland does not make a case for default judgment. Rather,
he addresses Mundella’s arguments. But to the extent Holland’s
filing could be construed as a motion for default judgment, it is
denied because Mundell is not in default. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
(1) Defendant Joseph Mundella’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #69)
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Holland’s
official capacity claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
Mundella must file an answer in his individual capacity
within 14 days of this Opinion and Order.
(2) Plaintiff Branden Holland’s “Default Judgment” (Doc.
#70) is DENIED to the extent it seeks affirmative relief.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 26th day
of February 2025.
VAY ee DH
JGHH E. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Counsel of Record