Johnson v. Honeywell International Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

3:23-cv-00640-RJC-SCR

SYLVESTER JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

) ORDER

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, )

INC., SOFIE R. LUTFY, and )

AMANDA TONY, )

)

Defendants. )

)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Sofie R. Lutfy’s Motion to

Dismiss, (Doc. No. 16), Defendant Amanda Tony’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 18),

the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”), (Doc. No. 27),

recommending that this Court grant Defendants’ motions, Plaintiff’s Objection to

the M&R, (Doc. No. 28), Defendants’ reply (Doc. No. 29), and other documents of

record. For the reasons explained below, the Court ADOPTS the M&R and

GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Neither party has objected to the Magistrate Judge’s statement of the factual

and procedural background of this case. Therefore, the Court adopts the facts as set

forth in the M&R and discusses relevant portions herein. Plaintiff originally filed

the present action in Mecklenburg County Superior Court, and Defendants removed

it to this Court. (Doc. No. 1). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Sylvester

Johnson, a 62-year-old African American man and ordained Christian minister,

alleges various forms of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and 42 U.S.C. §

1981, as well as state public policy claims against Defendant Honeywell

International, Inc. (Doc. No. 15). Relevant to the present discussion, Plaintiff also

asserts a state law claim for tortious interference with contract against Defendants

Lutfy and Tony. (Id.).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may assign dispositive pretrial matters, including motions to

dismiss, to a magistrate judge for “proposed findings of fact and recommendations.”

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). The Federal Magistrate Act provides that a district

court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. §

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). However, “when objections to strictly legal issues

are raised and no factual issues are challenged, de novo review of the record may be

dispensed with.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982) (citation

omitted). De novo review is also not required “when a party makes general and

conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the

magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Id. (citations omitted).

Similarly, when no objection is filed, “a district court need not conduct a de novo

review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of

the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc.

Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, advisory

committee note).

III. DISCUSSION

The M&R recommends the Court grant Defendants Lutfy’s and Tony’s

motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s tortious interference with contract claim. (Doc. No. 27

at 12). Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court

judge shall make a de novo determination of any portion of an M&R to which

specific written objection has been made. Plaintiff objects to the M&R on three

grounds: (1) Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to “show that his tortious interference

claims have substantive plausibility”; (2) the M&R incorrectly “confers an absolute

privilege to employees – non-outsider – who lodge complaints of sexual harassment

even if those allegations are false”; and (3) the M&R failed to specify whether the

recommendation of dismissal is with prejudice. (Doc. No. 28 at 2–3).

1. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

Plaintiff first objects to the M&R’s conclusion that Plaintiff failed to plead

sufficient facts to support the fourth element of a tortious interference with contract

claim—that Defendants “acted without justification.” (Doc. No. 28 at 10). The M&R,

“[a]ssuming arguendo” that Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to satisfy the third

element, nevertheless concluded that he failed to plausibly allege the fourth

element. (Doc. No. 27 at 8). The M&R explained that Defendants Lutfy and Tony

are “non-outsiders”1 to Plaintiff’s employment contract with Honeywell, and as

such, they “are entitled to a qualified privilege and their actions are presumed to

have been done in the interest of the corporation and are therefore ‘justified’” absent

any evidence of “legal malice.” (Id. at 8–10 (citations omitted)). The M&R concluded

that Plaintiff’s “sparse pleading” fails to overcome this presumption of justification

because “the Amended Complaint establishes no more than Plaintiff has a

subjective belief that the complaint Defendant Lutfy made to Human Resources was

‘false’ while Plaintiff has pled little to no additional allegations in support.” (Id. at

10, 12). The M&R notes that regarding Defendant Tony, “the Amended Complaint is

even more speculative” as the only allegation against her states she communicated

with Defendant Lutfy. (Id. at 11–12).

Plaintiff, restating arguments already made, objects on grounds that his

Amended Complaint satisfies the threshold to survive a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No.

28 at 11). Plaintiff points to his pleadings that Defendants Lutfy’s harassment

complaint was neither objectively reasonable nor done in good faith, and

Defendants “were motivated to file false claims against him to promote their own

career interests and/or because his expressed Christian religious beliefs concerning

marriage did not align with their views regarding marriage and/or because of his

race.” (Id. at 11–12 (citation omitted)). Plaintiff further reiterates that his conduct

did not amount to harassment, and while he did mention his religious beliefs with

1 The M&R correctly defined a “non-outsider” as someone who “is not a party to the

terminated contract but ‘had a legitimate business interest of his own in the subject

matter.’” (Doc. No. 27 at 8 (citations omitted)).

Defendant Lutfy during a work dinner, he did not discuss any sexual, pornographic,

or otherwise inappropriate content. (Id. at 12). Plaintiff acknowledges that he

exchanged Teams messages with Defendant Lutfy asking if she had lunch plans but

reiterates that he did not make any sexual comments. (Id. at 13).

Plaintiff fails to state a specific objection directing the Court to a specific

error in the M&R or otherwise rebut its sound reasoning. Nevertheless, having

conducted a full review of the M&R and relevant documents of record, the Court

agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

against Defendants Lutfy and Tony. As the M&R correctly acknowledged, “tortious

interference claims against non-outsiders generally fail because plaintiffs cannot

satisfy the fourth element of the tort.” Benjamin v. Sparks, 173 F. Supp. 3d 272, 290

(E.D.N.C. 2016) (citing cases). A plaintiff “merely alleging an improper actual or

primary motive will not suffice. Instead, the ‘complaint must admit of no motive for

interference other than malice.’” Id. (citing cases). For the reasons stated in the

M&R, the Court agrees that Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege the fourth element of

a tortious interference with contract claim.

2. Non-Outsider Privilege

The content of Plaintiff’s second objection largely resembles his first

objection. Plaintiff objects on the ground that the M&R erred in conferring on

employees who lodge complaints of sexual harassment an absolute immunity from

tortious interference claims. (Doc. No. 28 at 18). The M&R stated that “Defendants

Lutfy and Tony have a legally protected right to come forward with complaints of

behavior they believe to be workplace harassment.” (Doc. No. 27 at 11 (citation

omitted)). The M&R emphasized that “[t]his is a bedrock principle of federal

employment law.” (Id. (citing Cupples v. AmSan, LLC d/b/a Maint. Supply Co., No.

3:04-CV-574-W, 2007 WL 1075178, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2007), aff’d sub nom.

Cupples v. AmSan, LLC, 282 F. App’x 205 (4th Cir. 2008))). The M&R quoted

Cupples:

In light of the rights and obligations imposed by Title VII, the social

interest in ensuring free and open channels of communication between

an employer and its employees for the purpose of reporting and

redressing suspected sexual harassment is so compelling that the

Court has found no reported decision failing to recognize the

availability of a privilege defense, at least in the absence of malicious

and wantonly false accusations.

(Id. (quoting Cupples, 2007 WL 1075178, at *9)).

Plaintiff urges that “[w]hile actual victims of sexually harassing behavior

have a legally protected right to lodge internal complaints about such behavior,

Cupples makes clear that right is not absolute.” (Doc. No. 28 at 18 (citing Cupples,

2007 WL 1075178, at *9)). Plaintiff repeats the well-acknowledged principle that

“the privilege can be lost if the defendant acts without justification.” (Id.). Plaintiff

further contends that while the privilege seeks to protect victims from retaliatory

employment actions taken by the employer, Title VII does not supplant state tort

laws. (Id. at 18–19 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), 2000e-7)). Plaintiff restates the

law regarding the privilege and echoes his arguments regarding the sufficiency of

his pleadings.

Plaintiff further reiterates arguments already made—that Defendant Lutfy

does not have an actionable claim for Title VII, thus establishing she acted without

justification in reporting Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues the M&R “wholly dismissed the

holding in Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breedan, 532 U.S. 268 (2001),” in which the

Supreme Court articulated the standard for actionable sexual harassment claims.

(Id. at 20). Further, Plaintiff argues the M&R unjustifiably relied on Boyer-Liberto

as the facts therein are “inapposite to this case.” (Id. at 21); see Boyer-Liberto v.

Fountainbleu Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015). Similarly, Plaintiff argues the

M&R’s reference to Wilkes “is not particularly instructive.” (Id. at 22); see Wilkes v.

Argueta, No. 1:16CV260, 2017 WL 1215749, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2017).

Plaintiff proposes that his lack of direct evidence regarding Defendants Lutfy’s and

Tony’s motives should not prevent him from proceeding into discovery because “[t]he

requirement of nonconclusory factual detail at the pleading stage is tempered by the

recognition that a plaintiff may only have so much information at his disposal at the

outset.” (Id. at 22).

To the extent that Plaintiff restates arguments already presented to the

Magistrate Judge or asserts that the M&R fails to sufficiently acknowledge those

arguments, de novo review is not required. Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47. Insofar as

Plaintiff suggests that the Magistrate Judge misapplied the relevant law, the Court

disagrees. Having conducted a full review of the M&R, Plaintiff’s objection, and

relevant documents of record, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation that Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference of contract should be

dismissed for the reasons discussed in the M&R. The M&R correctly recognized that

the privilege available to non-outside employees is a qualified privilege. (Doc. No. 27

at 10). As mentioned multiple times by the M&R and within this Order, an

employee can lose this privilege by acting without justification, i.e., acting

maliciously. Varner v. Bryan, 113 N.C. App. 697, 701–702 (citing Smith v. Ford

Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976)) (citations omitted). The law does not

require—nor does the M&R suggest—that Defendants must have a viable Title VII

claim to hold the privilege. Rather, a non-outsider, like Defendant Lutfy or Tony, has

“a qualified right to bring about the termination of another’s terminable contract of

employment when, in good faith, he believes this to be necessary to protect his own

legitimate business interest or to perform his own fiduciary duty to the employer.”

Albright v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 3:17-cv-00461-FDW-DSC, 2017

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199763, at *14 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2017) (quoting Smith v. Ford

Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 88, 221 S.E.2d 282, 292–93 (1976)) (emphasis in original)

(alteration omitted).

The North Carolina Supreme Court explains the rule:

A non-outsider’s actions, then, are presumed justified, and the

presumption can only be overcome by a showing that the non-outsider

acted with malice. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. at 87–88, 91, 221 S.E.2d

at 292, 294. Essentially, the claimant “must allege facts demonstrating

that [the] defendant’s actions were not prompted by legitimate

business purposes.” Embree, 330 N.C. at 500, 411 S.E.2d at 926

(cleaned up). “General allegations which characterize defendant’s

conduct as malicious are insufficient as a matter of pleading.” Spartan

Equip. Co. v. Air Placement Equip. Co., 263 N.C. 549, 559, 140 S.E.2d

3, 11 (1965). Further, “[i]n order to survive dismissal, a complaint

alleging tortious interference must admit of no motive for interference

other than malice.” Wells Fargo Ins. Servs. USA, Inc. v. Link, 372 N.C.

261, 285 (2019) (cleaned up).

Button v. Level Four Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc., 380 N.C. 459, 468, 869 S.E.2d

257, 265 (2022) (applying the privilege to a corporate non-outsider); see Cupples,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24496, at *30 (noting the privilege is presumed absent

“evidence supporting a conclusion that the individual defendants acted in bad faith

or otherwise lacked a reasonable belief in the truth of the accusations”). A

non-outsider lacks justification and acts with malice when “he does a wrongful act

or exceeds his legal right or authority in order to prevent the continuation of the

contract between the parties.” Bloch v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 143 N.C. App. 228,

240, 547 S.E.2d 51, 60 (2001) (citation omitted); see Cho v. Duke Univ., No.

1:18CV288, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9524, at *37 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2020) (“Bad

motive is the essence of a claim for tortious interference with contract.” (quoting

Bloch, 143 N.C. App. at 239, 547 S.E.2d at 59 (2001))).

The Court agrees with the M&R’s sound development of the law and its

emphasis on the importance of this privilege in protecting employees. (Doc. No. 27

at 7–12). The Court observes that Plaintiff’s allegations lack factual support beyond

his own perspective. Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Defendant Lutfy or Tony

had a malicious motive. Rather, Plaintiff makes insufficient conclusory

allegations—that Defendants Lutfy and Tony were motivated to complain about

Plaintiff to advance their careers and because of his race and religious views. (Doc.

No. 15 ¶¶ 82, 86). Further, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that malice was

Defendants’ sole motive. See Benjamin, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 290; (Doc. No. 27 at 10

n.1); see (Doc. No. 15 ¶¶ 20–22 (Plaintiff suggested Defendant Lutfy meet him for

dinner, which occurred outside of work hours and in Concord)).

For the reasons already discussed, and for the reasons stated in the M&R,

the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege the fourth element of a

tortious interference with contract claim, and Defendants Lutfy and Tony may enjoy

the privilege available to non-outsiders. Therefore, the Court adopts the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation to dismiss the tortious interference with contract claim

against Defendants Lutfy and Tony.

3. Dismissal With Prejudice

Regarding Plaintiff’s third objection asking for clarification on whether the

M&R recommends dismissal with prejudice, “[c]ourts have held that, unless

otherwise specified, a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is

presumed to be both a judgment on the merits and to be rendered with prejudice.”

McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other

grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 207 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2020);

Carter v. Norfolk Community Hospital Asso., 761 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1985) (“A

district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is, of course, with prejudice unless it

specifically orders dismissal without prejudice.”). Accordingly, this Court interprets

the M&R as recommending dismissal with prejudice and for that reason and those

stated herein, dismisses Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Lutfy and Tony with

prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Magistrate Judge’s M&R, (Doc. No. 27), is ADOPTED;

2. Defendant Lutfy’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 16), is GRANTED; and

3. Defendant Tony’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 18), is GRANTED.

Signed: February 26, 2025

Robert J. Conrad, Jr. hed.

United States District Judge “ae

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